US Online Counterterrorism Strategy

Last week on October 4th the Trump administration released the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The White House strategy rightly prioritizes strong partnerships with allies and is refreshingly devoid of the president’s more controversial ideas. However, it curiously lacks any plan to combat the most serious evolution in terrorist threat since the last strategy was released in 2011. That is the towering success of social media as a tool for terrorists to radicalize, recruit and organize followers the world over.

ISIS’ cunning use of social media radicalized people the world over.

The US government must not only acknowledge this as the major threat that it is but develop new legislation that permits it to combat terrorist activity online. The internet continues to provide free space for terrorists to advance their causes and incite violence, all under the protection of the US constitution’s 1st Amendment. Our government must acknowledge this threat and develop a strategy to stop the dissemination of dangerous domestic terrorist propaganda on the internet. Importantly, it must do so without encroaching on US citizens’ rights to free speech.

Terrorism relies on publicity. ISIS’ capability to radicalize people the world over through its cunning use of social media was widely credited as one of the main reasons for its rapid growth, as well as its ability to create a global brand. Domestic terrorists have used the internet to accomplish the same thing. A 2016 study revealed that American white nationalist movement’s Twitter followers increased by 600% since 2012, surpassing ISIS in follower counts and tweets per day. Online forums and social media accounts provide safe spaces for violent rhetoric that extremists don’t feel comfortable using in public. For both radical Islamists and white supremacists, the internet has provided an effective means to broadcast their malicious,  hateful messages to the world.

Tech companies are not up to the threat; they are businesses with the prime motivator of profit generation, not national security.

The risks of terrorists exploiting the internet are uncontested. However, a broad interpretation of the 1st Amendment has wrapped the US government’s knuckles. Restraints on the government’s ability to censor content have left major national security decisions up to private companies, who lack the expertise to assess a threat to national security and public safety. And while tech giants like Facebook have recently stepped up their efforts to censor and report terror content, private companies should not own that burden alone.  

Tech companies have proven themselves to be inadequate to face this threat. They are businesses with the prime motivator of profit generation, not national security. In addition, they typically hold strict Libertarian views of the internet. Such companies see the internet as a common space for the free sharing of ideas. They tend to be extremely resistant to censorship of any kind. Too much government cooperation could sway public perception to their being in bed with Big Brother.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has clearly stated the significance of US leadership in passing new legislation: “It would be extremely helpful to other countries if the United States could find a solution to its limited ability to furnish judicial cooperation concerning foreign incitement offenses resulting from its jurisprudence concerning freedom of speech and expression.” 

The US cannot afford to continue without a strategy to combat digital terrorism. We must open the issue to new scrutiny. Such scrutiny starts with developing a clear and specific definition of what kinds of content can be censored. Laws that allow censorship already exist, such as the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) and recent Congressional prohibitions on sex traffickers. Why not censor content shown to be a precursor to terrorist attacks? Only content deemed to cause “imminent lawless action” would pass constitutional muster for restriction. What the US needs is a new federal bureau with combined expertise in national security, law, and technology.

In the event congressional action fails, what is a good interim solution?

With new legislation in place, tech companies will no longer decide what constitutes a threat to national security. They will also avoid the perception of denying free speech since they will simply be complying with the law. Some have suggested that a “Code of Ethics” be developed for social media companies which would create a more uniform approach to combatting terrorism. In the event congressional action fails to materialize this would be a good interim solution. If we can effectively fight terrorism in the virtual space, we can prevent the loss of lives in the real world.

Lone Wolf Bio-Terror: Are We Prepared?

It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening. However, it’s not just an increasing number of lone wolves, but the variety of tactics they’ll employ in terror’s service that makes prevention a challenge. 

[pullquote]It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening.[/pullquote]

According to Britain’s Security Minister and top counter-terrorism officer, Ben Wallace, it is likely that a biological or chemical terror attack is on the horizon. At a security conference in London, last Tuesday Wallace warned, “The only limit to the ambition of our adversaries is their imagination.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer. They have developed and worked on a better arsenal. We have to be prepared for the day when that comes to our streets.” Implicit in his remarks was the notion that counter-terror specialists, as well as governments, must be equally imaginative in their pro-activity.

One major challenge governments face in trying to thwart chemical and biological attacks is the scale. If one person releases tiny amounts of a chemical agent like Anthrax, it could have implications for hundreds, or, millions of people. Traffic flow disruptions, water supply tainting, exposure areas untouchable, these are just some of the possibilities. 

Governments and private contractors have little experience with bio-terrorism. If terrorists were to release biotoxins in civilian areas, the damage could be enormous.

A terrorist need only infect one person, who could then infect her (sic) social circles. Epidemic exposure rates could be a reality faster than you can say Cipro, bringing repercussions on a global scale. The terrorists would need to do very little. The disease would naturally spread at a velocity that grows exponentially.

The probability of these attacks is increasing, and it’s time that governments took note. Currently, there is no international system in place specifically to combat chemical and bio-terror.

If a terrorist infected someone with a biological agent in New York, and then that person flew to Germany infecting people in Berlin, German and American authorities would have no pre-existing framework within which they could cooperate, info-share about how to stop the disease’s transmission, and help those infected. 

[pullquote]The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.[/pullquote]

It is critical that such a framework is in place before the scenario unfolds. In the event of a biological or chemical terror attack, time will be of the essence. The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.

Governments use major resources to plan for shooters, suicide bombers, and other common acts of terror. Diversifying those resources and intensifying the focus on biological and chemical terrorism could, in the future, save countless lives.

Nuclear Terrorism: Threat Profile and Potential Impact

The typical profile of a terrorist attack may include gunmen storming a government building or a suicide bomber detonating his explosive vest in a crowd of festival attendees. However, arms wonks, policy makers, and scientists have long been attuned to a more sinister threat: a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb. A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive outfitted with a radiological contaminant such as strontium or cesium, which kills not only through explosive force but radioactive contamination as well.

Terrorist groups can create dirty bombs without much scientific expertise–the difficulty is not in designing the weapon but acquiring the radioactive material. However, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, radiological sources are common in commercial or medical devices and are often poorly secured and vulnerable to theft. In fact, as early as 1998, nineteen tubes of radioactive cesium were stolen from a hospital in North Carolina and were never recovered. Poorly secured nuclear facilities in Russia and former Soviet states are also at threat for theft of nuclear materials, with facilities in a number of Russian provinces and Georgia reporting theft.

A Center for Nonproliferation Studies outlined four possible threats of nuclear terrorism. These include the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon, the theft or purchase of radioactive material and subsequent construction of an improvised nuclear device, attack against nuclear power plants, and the construction and detonation of a dirty bomb. Some sources have stated that nuclear terrorism may already be a reality: documents found in Herat, Afghanistan have indicated Al-Qaeda has been in possession of a dirty bomb since 2003, and radioactive contaminants before then.

In 2017, Indonesian militants acquired low-grade radioactive Thorium-232, which they hoped to transform into more potent Uranium-233. This uranium would then be combined with a homemade explosive to produce a dirty bomb. When ISIS conquered Mosul in 2014, radioactive Cobalt-60 was housed on a university campus in the city, ripe for the taking.

While the terrorist group proclaimed they had seized radioactive material and took over laboratories at the same university, Iraqi government officials later discovered they had not touched the Cobalt-60. Terrorist groups have long been aware of the deadly capabilities of a nuclear attack and have sought to plunder, purchase, or create dirty bombs with which to carry out nuclear attacks. At the same time, governments and nuclear scientists are aware of the threat posed by terrorists to nuclear facilities and actively work to upgrade security systems to combat it.

Despite efforts by a number of terrorist groups to obtain radioactive material and build a nuclear bomb, some experts believe the threat of nuclear terrorism is overblown. A number of explanations for terrorist nuclear abstinence have been proposed. These include the difficulty of carrying out such an attack, the disruptive impact of counter-terrorism efforts, and the potential for a nuclear attack to undermine the terrorist cause rather than advance it. Since the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks to date have been simplistic strikes such as those utilizing knives, conventional explosives, or vehicles, a RAND Corporation analysis concluded, “Governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combating the spread and use of conventional weapons,” as opposed to countering nuclear terrorism.

Even assuming a terrorist group was able to carry out a dirty bomb attack, its impact may be limited. While the public may imagine dirty bombs as capable of killing hundreds or thousands of people, the death toll would more likely be limited to fewer than 100 people. If impacted civilians leave the area quickly, remove contaminated clothing, and shower to wash off radioactive debris, a dirty bomb does not pose much of a threat. However, the economic, psychological, and social costs of a dirty bomb would be much larger. As such, governments must be prepared for the long-term impact of a nuclear terrorist threat more than an initial attack. Costly, long-lasting decontamination efforts may be necessary depending on the level of radioactive contamination, and the public may be afraid of returning to the attack location, causing economic and social disruption.

Nuclear terrorism is a threat that has been underappreciated by the general public, but it has been recognized by counter-terrorism experts, governments, and scientists for some time. While the likelihood of a nuclear terror attack may be slim and the initial deadly effects small, the long-term threat of a dirty bomb attack means governments must upgrade nuclear security efforts at hospitals, power plants, and other facilities containing nuclear materials. Although prior thefts of radioactive material have not yet resulted in nuclear terrorism, it is only a matter of time before a dirty bomb or other nuclear threat becomes a reality.

An Invisible Problem in Plain Sight

Riot police patrol Zhanaozen in December.

Within the realm of counter-terror, governments focus on preventing attacks at the source as well as at the target. Often, western governments define the target as their own backyard.

Likewise, they define the source as some far-off region at war. That point of view is not illegitimate. However, experts recognize extremist ideology is on the march across north and west Africa, southeast Asia, and Eurasia. And attacks tend to be on government or religious targets within the attacker’s own region.

Before an ISIS-linked cell in Tajikistan killed four cyclists from Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States there was scant information about the rise of extremism there.

Are we noticing? Well, western media has vested interests in Nigeria and Mali thanks to French and British influence. Similarly, western media have vested interests in the Philippines thanks to former US dependency. But what about Eurasia? Despite emerging from under the Soviet shroud it remains poorly understood. Before an ISIS-linked cell in Tajikistan killed four cyclists from Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States there was scant information about the rise of extremism there. And yet, when it comes to extremism, Central Asia is now firmly caught between Europe and Asia.

States like Kazakhstan, for example, are experiencing a problem. But not one not for which they can scapegoat immigrants — one from their own backyard. Autocratic Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has kept his state isolated from everything except foreign investment in technology and oil. He has turned Kazakhstan into a regional powerhouse, one in which other Central Asian countries see hope. But Kazakhstan may be on the verge of self-implosion given the rise in extremist ideology and a lackluster response to it. Recent attacks on national guard bases, police stations, and public transportation in oil-rich cities such as Aktobe in the northwest or the cosmopolitan Almaty have revealed socioeconomic and religious fissures that should have been addressed years ago.

We are where we are because the government turned its back on Kazakhstan’s youth.

Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, is in the midst of a religious revival. After years of Soviet suppression, 70% of Kazakhs identify as Muslim now and there has been a steep rise in ultra-conservative extremist ideology coming from Syria and Iraq. Central Asians feature prominently in infamous attacks in Stockholm, Saint Petersburg, Istanbul, and Boston. They target public events and public transport with methods akin to Al-Qaeda and ISIS. It would be disastrous if small cells like the former connect online with large groups like the latter.

Extremists have hit Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbor Uzbekistan the hardest. But Uzbekistan’s security services have been able to repel them outward to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kazakhstan has proven itself capable of no such strategy.

We are where we are, however, because the government turned its back on Kazakhstan’s youth. Watching their leaders inveigle foreign investment has left young Kazakhs feeling disaffected. Extremism always brings government corruption and poverty and Kazakhstan is no exception.

Extremists have hit Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbor Uzbekistan the hardest. But Uzbekistan’s security services have been able to repel them outward to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kazakhstan has proven itself capable of no such strategy. Experts are questioning its counterterror preparedness and methods. The government’s mission to engage the religious community with proper Islamic literacy may help. But President Nazarbayev’s vast surveillance and his calls to ban the wearing of all black will likely be seen for what they are. They are an encroachment on religion and it could alienate more of the populace. Kazakhstan’s comparably superior quality of life and moderate lifestyle have not immunized it against terror attacks. It is the reaction of its own disaffected people, not someone from a far-off, war-torn land, that reverberates ominously now.

Lone Wolf Terror

Europe, the US, and the Middle East exist in a moment of unprecedented global tension. In the face of collapsing, budding, and rapidly changing alliances, they share one common enemy: lone-wolf terrorists.

Lone-wolf terrorists are those who operate on their own, without the constraints imposed by an organisation with a structured hierarchy and chain of command. They are “self-radicalized individuals who commit violent acts to promote a cause or support a belief system… they appear to be isolated and avoid many of the traditional organizational characteristics used to identify and track traditional terrorist groups”. They pose an increasing threat to the United States and much of Europe, where most terrorist groups lack a structured presence but still possess the ability to radicalise individual members of society through media and the Internet. Though they may not be “official” members of any terrorist organisations, they often draw their inspiration from such groups, mimicking their tactics and claiming them as inspiration for the attacks.

Because they are isolated individuals, lone-wolf terrorists often lack access to the weapons, funding, and infrastructure possessed by larger terrorist groups. Instead, they use whatever they can find- knives, guns, homemade bombs- to orchestrate small-scale attacks which incite large-scale panic. As explained by Rodger Bates of Clayton State University, “the power of the lone wolf terrorist is not necessarily the actual level of harm potentially experienced, but the level of intimidation that the threat of such random acts of violence can exert on a community”- and that’s exactly what their intention is. Lone-wolf tactics are so effective that ISIS and others have directly encouraged followers worldwide to “pick up a knife, gun or any weapon and become personal warriors for the cause,” shrouding potential victims worldwide in a blanket of constant worry.

A critical factor in creating the large-scale panic these terrorists desire is the media. By focusing in extreme detail on attacks which only affect a small number of people, reporters unwittingly magnify the threat and introduce widespread panic into the public psyche. Knowing that civilians in the Western world are living in constant, subconscious worry of an attack is exactly what radical groups desire, and thus intense media coverage plays right into their hands.

Perhaps even more dangerously, extensive coverage of lone-wolf attacks may encourage more individuals to propagate attacks in the future. Individuals disenfranchised from society, particularly isolated young men, witness how much fame and notoriety lone-wolf attackers receive in the wake of the attack. This encourages them to follow the lead of those who have gone before them, creating a knock-on effect which exponentially increases the threat of terrorism in the long run.

In their quest to prevent these attacks from happening, the challenge to law enforcement lies in their apparent randomness. Because lone-wolf terrorists have few concrete ties to extremist organisations, it is very difficult to preemptively track them down and predict when the attacks will occur. Instead of placing their main focus on individuals who may be radicalised, it may therefore be more productive for law enforcement to target the factor which is most rapidly radicalising them: the media.

In this case, “the media” encompasses a variety of sources. It is important to note that, because lone wolves have little direct access to members of terrorist organisations, most of their radicalisation occurs digitally. This happens through message boards, radicalising videos, and even traditional forms of social media such as Twitter. Policing these more heavily will efficiently cut off a major terrorist recruitment tool, decreasing their reach, exposure, and membership in the long run. Most private social media companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, have stringent rules of use which ban any content encouraging terrorism or violence, but they rely upon a relatively small team of moderators to enforce this, who mainly respond to reports they receive from members and rely upon self-policing among the social media community. Perhaps establishing federal legislation requiring that each social media outlet establishes a team of moderators proportionate to the size of their user body would solve some of this problem, and ensure that posts by radicalising users are more quickly taken down.

But social media is not the only issue, and traditional media exposure is a huge issue as well. As I outlined earlier, extensive media coverage and the 24-hour news cycle can embolden those who view it to join the terrorist organisations being reported on, so networks would be wise to reduce the extensive profiles they often do of lone-wolf terrorists and perhaps even avoid mentioning them by name. As individuals, we can refrain from sharing or clicking on articles about such people, reducing their reach and the chances that their actions could inspire other disillusioned individuals to radicalise in the future.

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