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 by Sonia Lay

Psyops: A New Frontier in Counterterror?

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An American soldier spreads free newspapers to the people of Baghdad as part of a mission in psychological operations. Image credit: Department of Defense.

“Capture their minds, and their hearts and souls will follow”.

This slogan, popular among psyops experts, clearly exemplifies the main implications and targets of psychological operations in war.

The term “psyops” refers to strategic operations aiming to evoke emotional reactions in other people. Daniel Lerner, Social Scientist and Military Intelligence Officer in World War II, identified three levels of psychological operations:

  • White Propaganda: characterized by gentle methods of persuasion. The information given is truthful and not strongly biased. Sources are cited. At this level, the most powerful techniques are narratives, framing, omissions and emphasis.
  • Grey Propaganda: the source of information is ambiguous or non-disclosed, but the messages cannot be proven false. Information shows a clear bias, and a combination of omissions and selective emphasis is used.
  • Black Propaganda: achieves its objectives by means of falsifications. Its purpose is to create confusion and deceive its audience about the origins of information. This strategy has proven to be the least effective and durable in the long term.

Today, psychological operations play a key role in counterterrorism programs. If properly used, strategic communication can help induce a shift in human behaviors and attitudes- potentially making psyops a kep weapon in the fight against terrorism.

According to current approaches and approved studies, in the war against terrorism psychological planned activities are expected to act on at least four areas, with the purpose of:

  • inhibiting people from joining terrorist groups;
  • producing dissent within groups;
  • facilitating exit from groups;
  • reducing support for groups and their leaders.

Before being able to change human emotions, every counterterrorism strategy must first understand what causes them. For this reason, it is of primary importance to investigate the variables that motivate people to join extremist groups before we can engage in successful psyops.

Messages spread by jihadist extremists clearly label their enemies as disbelievers and invaders. These strong and dangerous beliefs are a powerful means of promoting extremist ideology, and must be countered with our own narratives. In order to be effective, these counter-narratives should be able to reverse the effects of jihadi propaganda by promoting a positive image of democratic societies and values. Psyops can be used to introduce potential radicals to more positive images of secular society.

Peace-building is an extremely complex and delicate task, one which requires the intervention of several forces and involves a wide range of actors coming from different cultural backgrounds. Even so, we must not give up hope. The stakes are high: if we are successful, the reward will be more freedom, respect and peace for all of global society.

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 by Caleb Septoff

When Will the Bloodshed in Syria End?

Late last year, most of the world let out a sigh of relief as it began to appear as though the almost decade-long, brutal Syrian civil war had ended. Bashar al-Assad’s men erected their flag in the town of Daraa. Although more violence did ensue, it was obvious what the flag represented. Daraa was the town where the uprising on March 6, 2011, first began. The flag was a statement.

Syria had essentially won the war after receiving considerable support from Russia. The rebels and their allies had lost. The United States had prioritized the fight against the Islamic State and did not pay too much heed, except for words of consolation and a small amount of funding for refugees and the retraining of “well-vetted” rebels. As they entered the fray in the summer of 2017, the war was winding down and the Islamic State’s “caliphate” was hanging loosely by a thread.

After reports of chemical warfare, the U.S., along with other western nations, executed airstrikes targeting facilities in which chemical weaponry was thought to be manufactured. As the months dragged on, the Syrian government and its forces captured more and more of the last few areas held by rebels.

Finally, on October 15, 2018, Turkey, advocating on behalf of the rebels, and Russia, advocating on behalf of Assad’s regime, reached a ceasefire agreement in the Idlib region of Syria. This agreement was fabricated to establish Idlib as a buffer zone and essentially de-escalate any further perceived violence by the Syrian forces, focusing on the last of the remaining rebel forces.

As of November 26, 2018, this agreement is now being threatened given that Russia has accused the rebels of launching chemical attacks on the city of Aleppo, injuring at least 100 people. Although the rebels refused to take responsibility for the attack, the accusations were nevertheless met with immediate airstrikes by Russian forces.

The ceasefire that had managed to stand for a few months is now in danger of collapse. The chemicals in question have not yet officially been verified, although the Syrian government has claimed they are chlorine-based gas attacks. However, this has not yet been confirmed and could just as well have been a less harmful gas such as tear gas. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, a third-party watchdog, is set to investigate further to find out what exactly was used.

Opposition forces, including the rebel forces, claim that Assad’s regime is simply fabricating the accusations to give them an excuse to wipe out the last remaining rebels once and for all. Both sides have reason to avoid conflict. All parties should be routing for a peaceful conclusion in which the dispute can be solved, otherwise innocent blood will inevitably be spilled again. As in most conflicts, it is the people of the country who have suffered the most, and they will again pay the price if this cannot be solved non-violently.

If violence cannot be avoided, a new surge of refugees will flow from the violence, most likely to Turkey. This is one of Turkey’s key reasons for desiring to keep the buffer zone intact. Wars often produce fragile states, which in turn often provide hotbeds for extremism to operate, as we saw with the Islamic State not long ago.

The United States has yet to issue a statement on the incident but seeing as thwarting international terrorism is one of their chief goals in the Middle East, they should exert their influence to help mediate the conflict between Turkey and Russia. Finally, Russia wishes to show the international community that conflict in Syria has died down and that countries should look to aid in stabilizing the country once again by paying for reconstruction projects.

This will never happen if war breaks out again and more lives are lost. The rebels numbers are low, there is no hope of beating Russia and Assad’s forces if peace is not reached the country of Syria will continue to bleed.

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 by Kyle Chapman

ISIS: From Unified Caliphate to Decentralized Lone Wolves

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Members of a US-led coalition prepare to fight ISIS and retake Hajin. Credit to Sgt. Timothy Koster.

This September, the Syrian Democratic Forces began the final push to retake the last vestige of territory held by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS. After previous territorial concessions, the Islamic State has reorganized and consolidated their forces for a final stand in Hajin, a sliver of Syrian territory bordering the Euphrates River.

This final battle is a critical moment. Much like a wounded animal backed into a corner, it is expected that the remaining ISIS fighters, who are likely some of the most fanatical, will fight to the death without any intention to surrender. Regardless of how difficult the fight will be, coalition forces and security analysts are confident that Hajin will be retaken in a matter of months, and such an outcome would be a great victory for many reasons.

First, ISIS will lose the ability to tax Hajin’s inhabitants, limiting their ability to pay fighters. Second, they will lack any operational space to train new recruits into combatants. Most importantly, a victory would mark the end of ISIS’ ability to establish a Caliphate, one of the group’s primary political objectives. Since the organization’s inception, the group has focused on taking large swaths of territory in the Middle East. However, while this would certainly be a win, there is still the question of what happens next.

ISIS membership is estimated to be anywhere from 25,000 to 30,000, and fighters are spread throughout the world. The capture of Haijin will not result in the disappearance of these members, so there is a question as to how the organization will change after the loss of its territories.

Increasing devotion to counter-terrorism efforts by governments around the world will also pose an issue. Face-recognition and biometric technology at ports of entry have made it increasingly difficult for ISIS fighters to gain access to Western nations, and the terrorist group must now adapt to the changing situation to avoid detection by state governments. Accordingly, they have decreased their emphasis on hierarchy and relied less upon territory, focusing instead on unconventional tactics. ISIS once used conventional military force to conquer its territories, whereas now, the group has lost that capability and must adapt a clandestine strategy in order to survive.

This shift in organizational structure has significant implications for ISIS’ future strategy. ISIS-inspired lone wolf attacks have increased substantially, and will likely become even more common in the future. Internet-savvy campaigns to spread ISIS propaganda have inspired attackers around the world to commit acts of terror.

These solo attackers, or “lone wolves,” are difficult to pinpoint because they either have no direct affiliation with the group or operate within a small, cellular structure which has little to no communication with other group members. The Pulse Nightclub shooting, the NYC truck attack, and the Las Vegas mass shooting are all examples of lone-wolf attacks; for example, though he was not an official member of the Islamic State hierarchy, Omar Mateen still claimed allegiance to ISIS before going into Pulse Nightclub and killing nearly 50 people. These types of incidents are exactly what ISIS wants.

Many of these lone wolves do not have the training and resources needed to pull off a 9/11-scale attack, so instead, they turn to terrorism on a smaller scale. It is disturbingly easy for an ISIS-inspired individual to rent a U-Haul and run people over by the Hudson River, but incredibly difficult for a group of official members of a terrorist organization to hijack four planes and fly them into the Twin Towers. Focusing on recruiting and radicalizing lone wolves is, therefore, the easiest and most effective way for ISIS to ensure that their mission is carried on in the future.

Notably, the greatest impact of lone wolf attacks lies in their ability to incite fear and hysteria. Though the concrete impact of a lone wolf attack pales in comparison to the carnage of a large-scale incident, the possibility of a lone wolf attack still gravely concerns millions of people around the world.

The conventional capabilities of ISIS have been reduced dramatically, but people around the world should not turn a blind eye. In the words of an ISIS spokesman encouraging lone wolves to enter the fight, “the smallest action you do in the heart of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us and more effective and more damaging to them.”

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 by Caleb Septoff

Kabul Wedding Hall Bombing

Last Tuesday, November 20, 2018, religious scholars and clerics gathered in the Uranus Wedding Hall in Kabul, Afghanistan. The hall was being used for a wedding as well as for an assembly of scholars congregating to celebrate the Prophet Mohammad’s birthday, a national, and widely celebrated holiday in Afghanistan. At 6:20 p.m. the bombing of the convocation took place, killing around 55 people and injuring 100 more, leaving many in critical condition.

The bombing is claimed to be a suicide bombing according to the Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman, Najib Danish, who also confirmed the death toll at the time. This attack, while horrific, is not remarkable in its manifestation.

Amidst a 17-year long war with the Taliban and a resurgence of suicide attacks, said to be claimed by lingering Islamist State loyalists, the Afghan government and its people are losing sight of a future that is not saturated in violence and marked by bloodshed.

Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, has continuously condemned attack after attack, labeling them inhumane, anti-Islamic, and haram, an Arabic word used to describe an act in Islamic jurisprudence that is forbidden in the eyes of God. As of 2016, it is estimated that 100,000 people have been killed since the U.S. invaded in 2001, and of that figure around 30,000 people are believed to have been civilians. Both these figures have continued to rise since then and show no signs of slowing down.

According to the United States Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report for 2017, the UN Assistance Missions to Afghanistan (UNAMA) has documented around 37 attacks on places of worship, religious leaders, and worshippers in 2017 alone.

The attack at the wedding hall in Kabul is a prime example of the terrorism that has been plaguing the region for years now, mostly by the Taliban, but also by other extremist groups that have found a safe place to operate amongst the chaos. Although the Taliban has not claimed responsibility for the attack last Tuesday, it is not unheard of for the organization to attack religious sites.

Unknown to many who are not overly familiar with Islam the term constantly regurgitated by press and media alike, jihad, is not a naturally violent nor extreme prospect of Islam. In fact, most devout Muslims will take part in some sort of jihad. Jihad is used to describe a struggle or a fight, usually against oneself in an effort to improve one’s own devotion to God.

Organizations like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State have claimed to be acting in accordance with jihad, whether it be against false Islamic practices or governments in violation of sharia. However, these groups have always been in violation themselves. They kill mercilessly and subjugate innocent people to their extreme beliefs and ways of life. Despite this, the Taliban has control of more Afghan land in their possession since 2001 insinuating that recruitment has been strong enough to keep the organization, not only afloat, but thriving.

It is important to understand that organizations like the Taliban, like most terrorists’ groups, prey on and seek to exploit youth that find themselves in exceedingly difficult situations. Youth are often disproportionately affected by war and economic strife. An example of this is evident when analyzing the birth of the Taliban in 1994.

Afghanistan has a long history of foreign intervention, first by the British, followed by the Soviets in the late 70s to the late 80s, and most recently the U.S. What this means is that during its inception, the Taliban targeted young men who had grown up in refugee camps, young men who knew nothing but war. The Taliban did not promise them a return to their homeland, rather the creation of a home they never knew.

Currently, the situation has become so dire that the Afghan government has discussed having peace talks with the Taliban in an effort to avoid more casualties. The government has even gone so far as to recognize them as a valid political entity. This has not proven fruitful but neither has violent retaliation, as seen by both the Afghan and U.S. militaries. So where then can a solution be found?

There is no easy fix, however, possible solutions could be attacking the problem at its core. In other words, citizens are the key to peace. Much of the recruitment today happens online, social media platforms have already started partnering with intelligence agencies to find solutions to limit access to the sites where recruitment takes place. In addition, educating young people, especially young men, in regions of high contestation is crucial.

Young people who decide to join extremists’ organizations often see no other option, in many of their eyes the government has failed them.

Youth must be shown another way and enlightened on the atrocities that organizations like the Taliban commit. It is critical that the government focuses on emphasizing and providing other ways to address legitimate grievances, not only to curb the flow of recruitment but also to build trust among the Afghan population again.

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 by John Wilson

Zulfi Hoxha (Abu Hamza al-Amriki): A Case Study of Radicalization

In early 2018, news emerged that a 25-year old from New Jersey was fighting as a commander for the Islamic State in the Levant. Zulfi Hoxha, who goes by the kunya Abu Hamza al-Amriki, initially became famous in jihadist circles after participating in a beheading of a Kurdish soldier. Hoxha is now a major propaganda figure in the terror network.

Hoxha’s family immigrated to the United States roughly forty years ago from Albania. His family spent much of their time in America owning and operating a restaurant in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Growing up with two brothers and a sister, Hoxha had a relatively stable upbringing. However, when Hoxha was only thirteen years old, his father passed away.

Shortly following the death of his father, Hoxha’s family sold the restaurant. Following the New York Police Department’s radicalization model, stage two of the radicalization process often begins with a catalyst event that challenges one’s beliefs. Hoxha regularly attended a mosque in Atlantic City, however, it is not immediately clear which mosque he attended. Hoxha’s mother, Ltefaji, stated that her son Hoxha “hated” the people at the mosque. 

Growing up in New Jersey, Hoxha was a member of the 1.8% of the population that adheres to the Islamic faith. Being the child of immigrants, particularly from Albania, it is possible that Hoxha felt, at times, like an outcast. Former high school classmates of Hoxha shared that he was a loner and socially ‘goofy’.

There is an Islamic Center that caters to Sunni Albanians in northern New Jersey, but it is unlikely that his family would make this commute on a regular basis. In Atlantic City, there is the Masjid al-Furgaan Mosque as well as the Muslim Community Organization of South Jersey organization. Both of these religious institutions adhere to Salafist Islamic beliefs. Hoxha had a consistent presence on social media as well as on various gaming networks. The content of many of his messages indicates that Hoxha was adopting extremist views.

Hoxha left for Syria in 2015. After arriving in the country he sent a message to a friend stating that he was “in the safe house”. This message was followed by a statement indicating that he would be engaging in three months of further training. Hoxha’s mother, Ltefaji, confirmed that she spoke with her son in early 2017. However, she has not been contacted by him since. It is believed that Hoxha is still alive, his departure and increasing isolation from family may be attributed to his further radicalization. Moreover, this could be an attempt to prevent himself from being tracked or targeted by the United States.

Hoxha demonstrated several signs of being on the path to radicalization. He should have been considered ‘high-risk’. A strong comparison can be made to Hoxha’s ‘profile’ and radicalization process and the recruitment process of various street gangs in the United States. Relative instability within immigrant communities, who have not fully assimilated to American society, often breeds a situation that drives youth from these communities to group together.

This instability is often enhanced by the social and economic marginalization of these communities.  The death of Hoxha’s father occurred during a critical developmental period of his life. This was followed quickly by the departure of his family’s longstanding business (i.e. a catalyst event). When one becomes radicalized it often follows a significant life event.

Up to 75% of domestic jihadists knew or were in contact with another jihadist prior to becoming radicalized. With Salafist organizations operating in the small Muslim community in Atlantic City, it is plausible that someone from within this community introduced some extremist beliefs to Hoxha. These beliefs, paired with perceived marginalization that Hoxha likely felt as an immigrant minority, made him highly vulnerable to further Salafist recruiting.

The proximity to Salafist organizations within the Islamic community that Hoxha belonged to cannot be ignored. Furthermore, Hoxha would have been increasingly vulnerable to online recruiting as he was a documented user of social media platforms and gaming platforms that the Islamic State uses to recruit youth.

Intervention programs, used by many major cities in an effort to address high-risk youth and young adults, could be reformatted to be applied to a counter-terrorism model. By focusing resources on major population centers, a model can be shaped and altered as it evolves. In the case of Hoxha, working with Sunni Muslim religious figures in these areas to identify behaviors, trends, and individuals, a profile of risk can be established (i.e. high-risk, moderate-risk, low-risk). Intervention models indicate that the individual has shown some warning signs that have been identified by experts previously as being indicators of potential future behavior.

Through close cooperation with religious figures within the community, social workers, and law enforcement, various intervention programs can be applied to reduce radicalization.

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