Ahmad Mohibi

 by Ahmad Mohibi

Narcotics and Insecurity: How the Afghan-Tajik Drug Trade Derails Peace

A special field report by Rise to Peace. 

Taliban makes 10 million Afghanis daily via drug trafficking in northern Afghanistan. For years, the Taliban continue to smuggle and traffick narcotics — such as heroin —  along the Kukche River in the Darqid and Khawaja Bahawuddin districts of Takhar province.

This highly lucrative black market venture relies on two important branches. Armed smugglers transport heroin to the Dasht-e Qala district of Takhar, however, the Taliban facilitate the transnational nature of these particular shipments as they cross the border into Tajikistan.

As a result, the Taliban profits 10 million Afghanis ($127, 800 US) from this black market venture daily, excluding the shares diverted to drug traffickers and armed guards.

Heroin is not the only illicit product peddled by the Taliban. In coordination with narcotics traffickers and gunmen in the province, the Taliban import alcohol, and tablets known as “tablet K” (a synthetic drug with an unclear composition that acts as a stimulant) from Tajikistan. Many Afghans have died in recent years due to the use of such synthetic drugs and their intoxicating effects. Once narcotics such as these tablets are imported to Takhar, they are easily distributed across Afghanistan.

The Taliban control trafficking routes and cooperate with narco-traffickers based on mutually beneficial terms. The importation of alcoholic beverages (such as wine) and illegal drugs (such as tablet K) typically occurs in the north-eastern provinces of Afghanistan because they offer fewer impediments. Only a body of water — the large Kukche River —  separates the borders between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 

Is the Afghan experience unique versus other drug hotspots?

Afghanistan is the top cultivator of opium globally and a major player in the heroin trade. Countries with similar narco-agricultural portfolios, such as Mexico and Colombia, reveal that the drug trade has certain similarities no matter a state’s location. Traffickers use violence and armed groups to ensure preferred corridors remain under their control. This often conflicts with the involvement of national security forces positioned to counter this broad human security threat. 

Furthermore, like their foreign counterparts engaged in the narco-trade, the Taliban and Tajik drug lords rely on state instability and unstable socioeconomic factors to lure individuals — such as border guards, insecure infrastructure, government officials and those in poverty — to ensure the safe passage of their contraband goods. Transnational black market schemes typically ensure the largest profits.

How do officials conspire with the Taliban to garner profits?

Drug smugglers and some former government officials work together with the Taliban to smuggle Afghan heroin to the vast market of Central Asia through Tajikistan. A former Takhar governor, who does not wish to be named, stated the following to a Rise to Peace journalist: “the war beyond Takhar is a war between the mafia of power and the heroin war that the Taliban have been able to coordinate with unarmed Marines.”

Mullah Qadar — a top Taliban commander who is also a graduate of the Shariah department at Takhar University —  told an unarmed man, who was later interviewed by Rise to Peace, that the Taliban’s leadership strongly controls the districts surrounding Kunduz province to ensure a continuous stream of income from drug trafficking and taxes imposed on the people.

Kunduz is a key province in northern Afghanistan that connects Kabul with Takhar and Badakhshan province. As it is a strategic point, the Taliban usurped control over the region from the Afghan government three times in the past 18 years

The Taliban taxes farmers in these areas under their influence to acquire funding for military operations to ensure their presence remains. According to Mullah Qadar, who worked as deputy governor of Takhar for a long time: “Taliban have various ways of income in Kunduz. When I was with them, we collected revenue from textiles, taxed farmers, and charged small fees for some businessmen selling their products or goods in an open market.”

Further insight into the northern Afghan-Tajik drug trade was offered by those interviewed.

Why did you import wine from Tajikistan when you know it’s unlawful and illegal?

We had a deal with the heroin traffickers. They gave us the goods, we transported them and made revenue to keep our resistance going. The export of heroin to Tajikistan and the import of alcohol and tablet K into Afghanistan generated the most revenue for us and the Taliban are still doing it.

How does the Taliban smuggle heroin to Tajikistan?

Taliban receives the product from Afghan drug traffickers and then coordinate with Tajik smugglers who are on the other side of the river. According to a smuggler: “Taliban have close coordination with Tajikistan’s border guards. After they get our heroin, they ship the stuff through small boats, or in most cases, via a localized water technique called Kema that has the ability to transfer drugs. 

Karghan Tapeh, which is the capital of Khatlan province of Tajikistan, is the destination of these particular contraband materials. It acts as a transit point where alcohol and tablet K are loaded and transferred to the Taliban.

Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense spokesman Fereidun Muhammad Aliev states that ‘more than ten’ Afghan smugglers are targeted along this route annually and their bodies are surrendered to Afghan authorities. Nonetheless, he continued that the prevention of further smuggling on this lucrative route is difficult given the Taliban’s presence in the shared forests and river areas between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

A strong Taliban presence correlates to increased trafficking in the area.

Local authorities in Takhar also confirm that the majority of regional heroin smuggling occurs along this route with help from the Taliban. Afghan officials arrest numerous smugglers attempting to transport drugs via trucks or import heroin and wine in the districts each year. A border police officer told a Rise to Peace journalist, “the presence of the Taliban has made it difficult for us to stop the import and export of illegal stuff.”

After years of presence and major funding, the Taliban now have a bazaar (market) known as Omari Town in the districts of Darqid and Khawaja Bahawuddin. This market is unlike many others in Afghanistan because people can easily buy and sell arms, ammunition, drugs, and wine. They control more than a thousand shopkeepers. Afghan security forces have destroyed most of the shops in operation, but the market continues once they are gone.

The Taliban’s next move is to create a transnational market where Afghans and Tajiks cross the border to buy each others’ goods without getting visas as is common in northern Afghanistan. They would maximize their finances and control over surrounding districts under this scenario.

Like the Afghan-Tajik border, the Taliban continuously uses Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan and Iran for clandestine purposes. For instance, the boundary with Pakistan is typically used to facilitate the transfer of guns, donations and foreign fighters. As a result of this, the United States’ government suspended aid to Islamabad over their harboring of terrorism. 

The likelihood of the peace process is significantly reduced if the Taliban continues to fund its operations through illicit resources and narcotics while negotiating with the American and Afghan governments. It is vital to cut their finances (especially assistance from wealthy foreign donors) and block their drug trafficking routes. As long as drug trafficking remains profitable, the Taliban will continue to buy weapons, ammunition and pay fighters, which leads to a continuous cycle of war. Bankrolling the Taliban means they will not enter peace process negotiations in good faith.

Making peace at the macro-level is good, but it is imperative to pay closer attention to the sources of Taliban financing. This is important to stop the insurgency from gaining strength and subsequently challenging local governments.

It is apparent that these Taliban fighters engaged in the drug trade are self-serving bandits uninterested licit employment. Simply put, they do not care about the Islamic faith and manipulate the concept of jihad to suit their narrow personal interests. Their greater mission is accomplished as long as they make money and live in luxury. 

A copy of this report was provided to the Afghan National Security Council and the local government in Takhar province. For full reports and inquiries, please contact Rise to Peace.

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Taliban
 by Ahmad Mohibi

A revival of peace talks between the US and the Taliban

A revival of peace talks between the US and the Taliban

Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, his chief negotiator and a team of 12 influential members recently engaged in meetings with the United States’ geopolitical adversaries. In less than a month, they have met with the regional powers of Iran, Russia, China and now, Pakistan, in efforts to secure their political and military support ahead of negotiations with the United States. The backing of regional powers could potentially lead to a favorable political solution for their organization and cause.

As noted, these encounters are closely timed alongside the resumption of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban in Islamabad, Pakistan. Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special envoy for Afghanistan peace and reconciliation, is currently in Pakistan to meet with Pakistani officials and government heads as the Trump administration looks to restart the negotiation process on a positive note.

Negotiations between the United States and the Taliban were placed on hold last month after a Taliban-coordinated attack killed a US soldier. The goal of renewed diplomatic discourse is to overcome the political setbacks of recent months and salvage the possibility of a political settlement for the Taliban in a new, modern and democratic Afghanistan.

President Trump remains confident in his relationship with Imran Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, and in the ability of the Pakistani government to play a positive and productive role in the negotiations between the United States and Talibani stakeholders.

Recently, the two leaders were able to hold a joint meeting at the United Nations as the global community gathered in New York City for the 74th General Assembly (UNGA). Khan expressed that “Stability in Afghanistan means stability in Pakistan.” At UNGA, President Trump echoed similar sentiments in his statement, “With that goal in mind, my administration is also pursuing the hope of a brighter future in Afghanistan.”

The political environment has somewhat shifted since talks stalled. Negotiations are set to resume in the immediate aftermath of Afghanistan’s fourth Presidential Election; an election that was often debated in intra-Afghan dialogue prior to reaching a prospective deal.

Despite the fact that the 60,000-strong Taliban were outnumbered by security forces, Afghan voters still feared the threats issued by the Taliban. The Afghan presidential election produced a dismal turnout as only 2.2 million out of 9.6 million registered voters cast ballots.

Following a ceasefire in June of 2018, the United States opened lines of communication with the Taliban in an effort to end the Afghan conflict through a negotiated settlement by way of intra-Afghan dialogues.

The US and Taliban met nine times and an agreement was reached between them at the last meeting held in August 2019. If the agreement was bilaterally approved, the US would withdraw its 14,000 forces from Afghanistan over a timeline and the Taliban would have participated in the elections. Additionally, the Taliban would have agreed to no longer harbor terrorists in their controlled territories and cut ties with al-Qaeda.

A negotiated settlement is in the best interest of Afghanistan given the situation that Afghans remain hopeful for peace, yet remain in fear for their lives. The noticeable low voter turnout depicts this. “I did not vote because I did not want to get killed,” said a 25-year-old shopkeeper in District 11 of Kabul City to a Rise to Peace researcher.

Conditions of negotiation and set agreements must be implemented in the case that peace talks are to be restored between the Taliban and the US. It is unfair to discuss peace in Doha while innocent civilians continued to be killed in Afghanistan because the Taliban feel emboldened enough to carry out such attacks whilst engaged in negotiations. This type of manipulation and plays for power are futile as they will instill hate and fear among Afghans instead.

Over 84 percent of Afghans believed President Trump’s decision to call off peace talks with the Taliban was correct. This number must be placed into context because a similar number of respondents believed that negotiations were in the best interest of the country prior to a series of deadly Taliban attacks. Public opinion shifted due to the Taliban’s barbaric attacks on congested areas, therefore Trump’s decision became well-regarded.

It must be acknowledged that the past four peace agreements over the last four decades with different actors and regimes were unsuccessful in all regards. Rather, they triggered further violence and war that undoubtedly created the contemporary situation — an unstable Afghanistan with over 22 terrorist groups operating across its territory that pose a serious threat to the national security of Afghanistan, the region and the rest of the world.

Peace is on the agenda for every candidate and political leader in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, but its achievement remains problematic. Historically speaking, Afghans create their own impediments to peace, such as difficulties in accepting defeat, aversion to power-sharing and an unwillingness to compromise.

Afghans are the key to a peaceful Afghanistan; therefore, all parties must be dedicated to that unitive goal. For instance, Ashraf Ghani, the incumbent Afghan president, expressed cynicism towards the peace talks and citizens viewed this skepticism as a “thirst for power.” At the same time, the Taliban accepted the US offer to negotiation, took it for granted and engaged in attacks against innocent civilians that just in one week over 500 people were killed in Afghanistan.

A lack of cohesive rhetoric and actions is undoubtedly apparent; thus Afghanistan remains in a perpetual state of disorder.

Finally, it must be expressed that previous examples and this most recent case are prime examples of how selfishness and a lack of compromise can lead to crisis. The United States and the greater international community are greatly invested in efforts to aid Afghans to achieve peace, but Afghans need to contribute to the goal as well. Those in leadership positions must compromise and factions of Afghan society should cooperate towards the objectives of national unity, peace, and prosperity.

Conflict based upon ethnic allegiances — such as identification as Tajik or Pashtun, rather than Afghan — will foment civil grievances and extinguish any hopes for peace.

Ahmad Mohibi is the founder of Rise to Peace. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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reintegration
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Afghanistan

Taliban reintegration into Afghan society is a precarious topic, thus it is prudent to devote weighty discussion towards barriers emboldened by corruption, terrorism, and political instability, as well as seek legitimate localized solutions.

Research conducted by Rise to Peace in regard to the Afghan situation strongly correlates with the educated opinions expressed by the panelists and the USIP. Reintegration is an important step for the creation of peace at the local level. Former fighters are presented with the opportunity to re-enter their communities and consequently build hope for a better life.

Afghanistan is plagued by the significant issues of corruption, terrorism, and political instability manifested in its upcoming election on September 28, 2019. Each of these matters must be highlighted and thoroughly discussed prior to the implementation of policies that seek to stabilize the Afghan situation. The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducts such imperative analysis that must be considered by all with a keen eye towards Afghan affairs.

SIGAR recently released its report ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan’ and subsequently held a panel discussion in conjunction with United States Institute for Peace. Esteemed panelists offered in-depth knowledge and understanding in regard to the current political impasse and security situation in Afghanistan. They included Kate Bateman (Project Lead for Reintegration, Lessons Learned Program, SIGAR); Erica Gaston (Non-Resident Fellow, Global Public Policy Institute); Timor Sharan (Deputy Minister for Policy and Technical Affairs, Independent Directorate of Local Governance); and Johnny Walsh (Senior Expert, Afghanistan, US Institute of Peace). Their insights generated astute discourse.

The ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants’ report offered such inclusive knowledge. SIGAR’s Inspector General John Sopko summarized that, “the goal of today’s report is to help U.S., Afghan, and other coalition policymakers and agencies as they prepare for the daunting task of assisting with the reintegration of an estimated 60,000 full-time Taliban fighters, as well as numerous other non-Taliban combatants, in the event that the Afghan government and the Taliban enter negotiations to reach a political settlement.”

One key point became apparent: No reintegration in the absence of a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban with the ongoing insurgencies in Afghanistan.

Rise to Peace strongly supports SIGAR’s conclusions. Further, the findings of the Office of the Special Inspector General align with Rise to Peace’s research focused on peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Programs implemented in the past, as well as those currently in place, have irrefutably failed for many reasons, primarily the lack of an intra-Afghan peace agreement. Security threats faced by communities and those fighters who lay down their arms follow as a secondary impediment to a peaceful solution. Lastly, substantial economic barriers due to a weak Afghan economy also contribute to the failure of other reintegration initiatives.

It is fair to summarize that corruption, terrorism, and political instability — especially during an active election campaign — remain in a nexus that feeds one off the other in such an environment.

Nonetheless, failure does not mean an end, but rather, an opportunity to create a tailored solution from lessons learned. SIGAR’s report provides a series of recommendations to the US Congress and the Afghan government, that could ideally achieve a successful reintegration program if implemented.

What’s Next for the SIGAR Report?

Findings in the report provide a foundation for further action to be taken in the case that political will permits it. For example, Rise to Peace founder and president Ahmad Mohibi asked, “Where are you taking all the lessons learned? What’s next? Will be there possible action that will drive into policy? We have seen the great work SIGAR has done, so what should be done?” In response, Mr. Sopko replied:

 We try to get Congress to focus on this issue and we have been successful. SIGAR pushes for action since it continues to hold the attention of Congress, however, the Office understands that other agencies must adopt best practices for implementation in the future. Simply put, the United States government must amend its policies towards Afghanistan to demonstrate the collective lessons learned since its involvement in the country.

Some solutions remain complex and difficult. SIGAR suggests that a transitional program to reintegrate militants into a society free of fighting is a definite need in Afghanistan. Such an endeavor would foment the development of mutual connections within communities and decrease instances of regional violence. Continued support for the Afghan government is considered vital to this process as well. Nonetheless, SIGAR’s reporting advises that reintegration projects may be futile at the current time because of the lack of a peace plan and a ceasefire. It is especially difficult to pursue reintegration of fighters when the Taliban and Afghan forces remain engaged in an active conflict.

Therefore, the lack of an infra-Afghan peace agreement with the Taliban complicates any resolutions going forward. It is reasoned that the US Congress may not fund Department of Defense, State Department, and USAID programs because neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban cannot guarantee security, especially for those militant fighters seeking reintegration into civilian society. Policy decisions have real and actual repercussions on the ground.

Any attempt of reintegration in the current political environment may jeopardize any chances for peace talks as the Taliban considers such counterinsurgency initiatives to weaken their forces. Additionally, the lives of former fighters are at risk in areas controlled or contested by the Taliban. There are no guarantees that militants who choose to no longer fight will escape with their lives. For instance, most would meet an end like Zabet Khan; a Taliban commander who changed the direction of his life chose not to fight and made decisions to take care of his family. He migrated to Greece where he earned a living working on a farm until he returned to Afghanistan. The Taliban killed him and left his four children without a father.

SIGAR suggests that the United States should not support any sort of comprehensive reintegration program as long as the Taliban insurgency continues. In the current situation, it is much too difficult to vet, protect and track former fighters. It is subsequently difficult to conclude who remains an active Taliban fighter versus one who seeks a peaceful existence; therefore, it creates an identifiable security risk.

Kate Bateman of SIGAR expressed that it can be difficult to trust someone who claims to be wanting to leave the Taliban when asking for assistance. Based-off her experience and research, Bateman recommends that the Department of Defense and USAID designate a permanent office handling reintegration. As it currently stands, the US has not provided the required leadership and funding to establish such a position.

The Deputy Minister for Policy and Program at Independent Directorate Local Governance, Timor Sharan, expressed that a more localized approach is appropriate to facilitate the reintegration of former Taliban fighters into Afghan society. He elaborated upon the importance of honor in Afghan societal norms and that these ex-fighters must be treated with kindness during their reintegration back into their communities. Their decision to leave the Taliban must be respected by local populations too.

Disrespect between Afghans and the Taliban complicates the social dynamics within Afghanistan as well. It fomented a sense of distrust between the two groupings and this must be resolved before any semblance of peace can be achieved. Active interactions between the two, such as in the settings of town halls and local elections, are required to initiate dialogue as well as a sense of identity.

Afghanistan’s Senior Expert at the US Institute of Peace, Johnny Walsh reflected upon the setbacks that stalled peace talks over the last 18 years. “The United States would often revert back to the tactic of attempting to split or weaken the Taliban. History demonstrates that this approach has been applied many times and it simply does not work.” Walsh acknowledged the most recent setback related to President Donald Trump ending the peace talks and hoped that it would not result in the resumption of military activities to weaken the group, as it will undoubtedly fail. Further, Walsh — along with the rest of the panelists — agreed that post-conflict integration of Taliban fighters into their respective communities was a significant need.

In the case that the United States fails to support this agenda, the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K) would benefit. Former fighters would be left without any peaceful options if they are denied a place of employment and acceptance into regular Afghan society.

Nevertheless, reintegration remains an undertaking encumbered by its fair share of problems. The Afghan economy is a significant barrier to the fulfillment of dramatic life changes, especially those associated with the stigma of being a former militant. Economic opportunities remain bleak and the Afghan fiscal situation is often unpredictable. Unemployment remains a substantial impediment to community growth.

A lack of financial support and scrutiny from local communities mean that radicalization presents the easiest path to a purpose. This is an extremely problematic condition in Afghanistan.

The World Bank states that “a quarter of the labor force is unemployed, and 80 percent of employment is vulnerable and insecure, comprising self- or own account employment, day labor, or unpaid work.” Therefore, these factors present a situation in which former Taliban fighters will be unemployed and face difficulties in hiring due to their history. A lack of financial support and scrutiny from local communities mean that radicalization presents the easiest path to a purpose. This is an extremely problematic condition in Afghanistan.

As a result, corruption and terrorism are intrinsically linked. The lack of legitimate opportunities results in a situation where those at risk are often consumed by both. This is a challenge when reintegration projects are considered. Since it is difficult to determine the true intentions of a ‘reformed fighter’, such an individual could easily reap financial benefits or resources meant for those turning away from violence and redirect them towards terrorist activities. Therefore, Rise to Peace especially promotes evaluation of all resources aimed towards such programs, to ensure they are utilized legitimately.

The Rise to Peace Mentorship and Capacity Building Program

Rise to Peace focuses its research not only on integration measures for former Taliban but also for development and economic opportunities. The Rise to Peace Mentorship and Capacity Building Program is used to help support those who are fleeing violence and to establish themselves in a safe and secure environment. Another aspect of the program empowers women and youth through connections with local elders and important stakeholders.

Former fighters need not feel marginalized, but rather sense that they are an active member in society for the greater good of their village or city.

Safety and security is not just about physical violence, but also to feel safe and secure economically. A distinct lack of higher education, such as college graduates, hinders economic prospects in Afghanistan, therefore economic diversification must focus on an already entrenched system of capital accumulation.

In this distinct case, main sources of employment remain in agriculture and small-scale production. Entrepreneurship offers an additional pathway to financial independence. Development programs, such as USAID, need have a localized focus on the systems already in place, instead of suggestions of industries that have a little foothold in the country.

When these former Taliban fighters have a sense of purpose, such as opening a market stand in town, a sense of purpose to continue their lives peacefully because they are able to take care of themselves and their family

When these former Taliban fighters have a sense of purpose, such as opening a market stand in town, a sense of purpose to continue their lives peacefully because they are able to take care of themselves and their family. A fruitful economy is not the only conduit for reintegration, but an extension of peace, acceptance, and understanding within local communities is required also. Former fighters need not feel marginalized, but rather sense that they are an active member of the society for the greater good of their village or city.

Those actively involved in working towards peace in Afghanistan must listen to what Afghans need rather than decide what would be beneficial for them.

A focus on localized solutions is imperative too. Rise to Peace often mentions its adherence to community building and resiliency principles. Solutions must have local origins instead of those created by foreign governments or organizations. Those actively involved in working towards peace in Afghanistan must listen to what Afghans need rather than decide what would be beneficial for them. Western countries often mistakenly apply their views on state-building in societies that vastly differ from their socio-political situations.

Afghans that are connected to their villages and local societies can express what resources, educational sessions and infrastructure are required in their regional settings. For instance, those exposed to radicalization rhetoric can advise which educational tools, by way of training sessions and workshops, are most effective in countering recruitment. As well, strategies that stimulate government support can be tailored to regional groups, often distinctive in their ethnicity. Afghans hold the most in-depth knowledge that can only be accumulated through the first-hand experience.

It is prudent to establish a framework and facilities for deradicalization in regions that are not under Taliban control or their influence is negligible.

A localized approach is relevant to the discussions surrounding reintegration of former militants too. While it is a beneficial proposition to hold off on vast integration policies while the Taliban remain in conflict with the Afghan government, the situation is not the same across Afghanistan. It is prudent to establish a framework and facilities for deradicalization in regions that are not under Taliban control or their influence is negligible.

An opportunity to turn away from that lifestyle, especially in a region where the Taliban would be limited to target them for retribution, remains just as important compared to those in areas with high terrorist activity. However, if training and reintegration prospects are bleak, a former fighter might question his decision or deem it unreachable.

Lastly, if Afghans hope to achieve peace and build a cohesive society, they must take responsibility for their own country. It is prudent for them to embrace an active role in shaping the future of their homeland and voting remains an important factor. Citizens are more apt to vote when they consider their government to be legitimate and not installed by a foreign power, therefore free and fair elections are vital in Afghanistan. The ability to select their own president and representatives creates a sense of belief in their system of governance. It is for this reason that the elections on September 28 are important, especially under the current political context.

Rise to Peace reached these conclusions after significant research devoted to Afghanistan and with the respected observations of those with first-hand experience. Our non-profit organization is capable of engagement in all aspects of community building and resiliency projects that will certainly benefit Afghans at the local level through the achievement of peace in multi-faceted ways.

Ahmad Mohibi is the founder of Rise to Peace. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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 by Ahmad Mohibi

Trump Called Off Negotiations with Taliban: What’s Next?

Ahmad Mohibi’s news analysis on Afghanistan’s TOLOnews in regards to the 9/11 anniversary that marks the 18 years of US war in Afghanistan. 

Since talks have been deemed ‘dead’, it is a better option for the US to take a more active stance on their South East Strategy of 2017 to counter state-sponsored terror and increase pressure on countries, such as Pakistan, who actively harbor the Taliban.

September 11, 2019, marked 18 years since the 9/11 attack — a tragic day in the history of the United States. It also marked the beginning of the US’s longest war in Afghanistan. It is a wake-up call for the western world to pay deeper attention to the rise of terrorism around the world and learn from past conflicts, as the US did in the 1990s in Afghanistan — leaving allies ally while terrorism retaliates and attack. 

The United States has not been entirely successful in its counter-insurgency operations over the past 18 years. However, progress has been made. An example would be the weakening of Al-Qaeda — a group that had the ability to reach New York and plan deadly attacks. Today, their ability to carry out such an attack has been massively hindered. On the negative side, ISIL has emerged and the Taliban has become stronger than at any point since their removal from power in 2001. Thus, we see some success but at the same time, multiple failures. 

Public opinion differs in both Washington and Kabul. In the United States, conservatives, such as Senator Lindsay Graham, are against troop withdrawal and are more in favor of hitting the enemy militarily, while liberals and the majority of Americans have grown tired of a long war in Afghanistan. Everyone is clear: they want an end to this war, but differ on how to bring about that end. So far $ 2.8 trillion USD has been spent, many lives lost and energy expended — it is hard to judge whether the US Global War on Terror was a success or a failure, so let numbers and statistics speak on the matter. 

The former head of the Afghan National Security Directorate (NDS), Masoom Stanekzai has said recently that one of the reasons that the US has failed in the war against terrorism is regional barriers. 

The Afghan case is sensitive, complex and hard, but it does have similarities to Vietnam. President Richard Nixon’s “Peace with Honor” failed due to US domestic politics, the Watergate scandal, the ongoing Cold War with the Soviets, and mass Chinese support for the communist Vietnamese. The same situation unfolded in Afghanistan.

The Afghan war is not only a religious and ethnic conflict but also a proxy war with many foreign actors. It may appear that the Taliban want to bring an Islamic Emirate and defeat western democracies, but it is more complex than that. Intra-Afghan tribal differences, US economic rivalries with China and political rivalries with Russia, as well as interference from Pakistan and Iran, have all influenced conflict in the region. 

There is no doubt that the United States proudly commands the world’s strongest economy and military. During the 9/11 memorial, President Trump said: 

We had peace talks scheduled a few days ago. I called them off when I learned that they had killed a great American soldier from Puerto Rico and 11 other innocent people. They thought they would use this attack to show strength but actually what they actually showed us is un-reluctant weakness. The last four days we had hit our enemy harder than they have ever been hit before and that will continue.

He further emphasized that he will not use nuclear weapons to show American strength, but that the strength will come from the US soldiers. 

The Afghan war is complex and the US has not been as successful in counterinsurgency operations as they had hoped, but if we look at the achievements of the past 18 years, it is satisfying. After the Taliban was toppled, from 2004 – 2005 Afghanistan was relatively peaceful, the Taliban appeared to have been defeated, but they went to Pakistan where they regrouped and came stronger. Now they claim to control over 70% territory in Afghanistan. 

Since talks have been deemed ‘dead’, it is a better option for the US to take a more active stance on their South East Strategy of 2017 to counter state-sponsored terror and increase pressure on countries, such as Pakistan, who actively harbor the Taliban. It is vital that Kabul receives military aid in the form of aircraft and advanced intelligence to combat the Taliban. 

At the same time, the US needs to increase efforts to impede Taliban financing. This includes a comprehensive strategy that includes the use of the financial and banking system levers.

Going forward, the United States will need to focus on the implementation of this strategy while creating better counter-insurgency operation strategies in coordination with the Afghan forces and the Afghan government. These include, but are not limited to:

  • Political and economic pressure on Pakistan
  • Capacity building of the Afghan government
  • Fight corruption 
  • Intelligence information sharing
  • Provide vital equipment and training to the Afghan National Security Forces  

These are important steps the US can take going forward to see progress. This way, President Trump can see the achievements he promised in his presidential campaign and bring the soldiers home.

As we are speaking, the agenda for peace in Afghanistan is lost, said Ahmad Mohibi to TOLOnews. Whilst at an event recently, when commenting on the Afghan peace process, a former State Department official smiled and said, “What peace?… Isn’t it dead?”

President Trump is serious about national security. We have seen three National Security Advisors resign or been fired since he took over the current administration. Elections are near; both in Afghanistan and the United States. President Trump wants to show achievements, however, to avoid making Nixon’s mistake, he needs to tread carefully in Afghanistan. Following the recommendations above, he may achieve what Nixon couldn’t — make peace and bring the troops home.

The United States should not consider an immediate troop withdrawal to avoid making the same mistake as Vietnam. As Senator Lindsay Graham emphasized, “If America completely pulls out of Afghanistan, I fear the Security Forces will fracture along regional lines, creating growth opportunities for Al Qaeda and ISIS.”

In conclusion, the US should avoid a troop withdrawal and direct more pressure on regional actors, mainly Pakistan, to stop harboring and financing terrorism in Afghanistan. The US needs to support a transparent election in Afghanistan and ensure the government is chosen by the people. Ideally, the US cancellation of peace talks will be a ‘slap in the face’ for the Taliban so that they may learn from their mistakes, and be open to peaceful negotiations in the future.

The military option has not been as successful as the US hoped over the past 18 years and will only work if the Taliban’s financing is cut on a macro level, which includes pressuring state sponsors. This way, there is a possibility of peace in Afghanistan. We must stress, however, it will not happen overnight. It will require generations of Afghans to work hard and build their nation back up again.

Ahmad Mohibi on TOLOnews

Ahmad Mohibi, a writer and is the founder of Rise to Peace. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi. 

in Ahmad Mohibi / Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Assassination of top commanders paves the way for Taliban to advance

Famous Afghan commander killed in Northern Afghanistan

Hours into September 1st, a mine detonated and killed General Nazir Mohammad Niazi as he made his way to watch a soccer match in Faizabad; the capital of Badakhshan province in Afghanistan. General Niazi was a well-known Jamiati commander and the former mayor of Badakhshan.

The incident occurred at the same time of other violent events and shifts in the Afghan political landscape. Kunduz province was attacked for the third time in the past 18 years yesterday. Said Husain Sarwari, Kundoz Police spoke-person — a father of four — was killed. Taliban forces were defeated after 24 hours of counter operations, but they retaliated with an attack on Baghlan soon after. They remain in an active conflict with Afghan security forces.

Further, General Niazi’s death is controversial because he met his end only hours after Hizbi Islami leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, landed in Faizabad as part of his presidential campaign. Hizbi Islami is a major political party in Afghanistan and remained in fervent dispute with Mohammad’s Jamiati party, the largest in Afghanistan, since the 1990s. 

It is prudent to mention that Hekmaytar recently returned from Pakistan and received name clearance from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s blacklist. The political implications of General Niazi’s death will consequently raise concerns. 

All of this is concurrent with the completed talks between the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar. These talks seek to achieve a pathway to intra-Afghan dialogue and solutions for peace.

Mass Taliban attacks such as these reveal important points:

1. Certain Taliban demands are not being met and they are increasing their use of military tactics to demonstrate their power.

  1. The Taliban lack unified leadership and simply does not have control over all its factions

The assassination of important Afghan figures is not a new phenomenon. Contemporary applications of targeted suicide bombings as a tactic became commonplace when two Arab journalists killed the leader of the Afghan Mujahidin, Ahmad Shah Masoud — a national hero two days before 9/11 incident. Most of Masoud’s influential people and commanders were subsequently assassinated as well in the past 18 years. 

A clear picture regarding the perpetrators behind these attacks begins to take shape. Osama bin Laden ‘hated’ Massoud because he was against al-qaeda and terrorism and his presence made it hard for Osama to operate successfully in Afghanistan with Taliban. According to evidence and criminal investigation biometrics, Pakistani intelligence and their proxies — the Taliban — can be linked to such instability.

Pakistan is typically pinpointed as the key strategic planner behind these deadly attacks in Afghanistan due to historic facts and the evidence found at the scene of suicide bombings and on arrested soldiers. 

At a closer look, all of the targeted leaders and commanders expressed critical sentiments against Pakistan as well as the role of Pakistani intelligence’s role in facilitating violent acts, especially in Afghanistan.

As an example, the former president of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, who criticized Pakistan for interfering in Afghan politics and supporting rebel factions, was publicly executed by hanging by the Taliban. Further, in 2018, General Abdul Raziq was assassinated in Kandahar province for his strong stance on Pakistan and terrorism. After his death, some units of the Pakistani military cheered and celebrated his death. 

The loss of experienced commanders is detrimental to Afghanistan’s future. Knowledgeable commanders are in dire need as the country seeks to gain the upper hand of a critical situation in which extremist groups gain vast swaths of territory.

The ongoing Afghan war is typical of guerilla warfare in that it is difficult to understand who remains engaged in the fighting and who is exactly responsible for key assassinations. Many suspects emerge: it could be the Taliban who killed General Mohammad or it could have been Hizbi Islami or ISIL. Only intelligence collection and further investigation will reveal the truth.

 

in Ahmad Mohibi / Asia / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments