A Rallying Cry for ISIS Fighters

This week Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi put rumors of his death to rest when he released an audio recording urging the remaining ISIS followers to continue their fight in the name of Islam. The recording reminds followers and the rest of the world that ISIS is neither gone nor completely defeated. Its followers have dwindled since the peak of ISIS’s power and holding of territory the size of Britain in 2014. This week’s message is believed to be a last-ditch effort to rally followers to execute acts of terror and thus provide relevance to ISIS again. The message acknowledges losses over the past year and notes it is a test from God. In the last three years, the group lost 90% of its geographic holdings in Iraq and Syria.

The location and time of the recording are unknown, although Baghdadi mentions Eid al-Adha, which suggests the recording is recent. The message also congratulates those having led attacks in Canada and Europe and calls for followers to overthrow the governments of Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The message is said to have sparked a few isolated incidents, but these could have been coincidental. In the message, al-Baghdadi says, “A bullet or a stab or a bomb would be worth a thousand operations. And don’t forget to drive into crowds in the streets.” The recent increase in vehicular terror acts, suggests the recording is new. There are rumored to be 20,000 to 30,000 ISIS true believers in Syria and Iraq. That the group has shrunk is undeniable, but it is premature to suppose they cannot regroup and trigger real harm.

Baghdadi rarely releases messages – the last one was a year ago – and so some analysts believe he’s desperate to re-create relevance for and re-build his army. He has only appeared in public once, which suggests he feels insecure about his security. The message is unlikely to advance large, orchestrated terror attacks. But it could prompt smaller attacks, and it could catalyze ISIS lone-wolf types. The recording is a reminder to the world that the fight against ISIS is not over.

https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45277322

Malaysia Shutters Saudi-funded Anti-Terror Facility

Saudi Arabia’s King Salman speaks with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak during a Memorandum of Understanding signing ceremony in Putrajaya, Malaysia on Monday. (Reuters)

Following the Malaysian general election in May of 2018, the newly elected government decided to permanently shut down the anti-terrorism center which had been set up by former Prime Minister Najib Razak. The center, known as King Solomon Center for International Peace (KSCIP), was financed and backed by Saudi Arabia. The new government called into question the validity of a Saudi-funded de-radicalization center.

Officially, the center was closed for safety issues. The new government expressed concern that its operations would generate unwanted attention from the Islamic State. The stated purpose of the center upon creation was to, “…combat terrorist threats and the spread of propaganda and ideologies bandied about by the extremists and the terrorists.”

Some suggest closing the center will offend the Saudi government and disrupt diplomatic, economic, and political ties between Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Others believe it is a good break which comes at a good, natural time of change. So doing, those say, allows the new government to distance itself from the old government, and perhaps Saudi Arabia.

During the Obama administration, Saudi Arabia was a close, US counter-terrorism partner, yet there is also speculation that Saudis use government funds, filtered through NGOs, to contribute to radicalization and violent extremism. The previous Malaysian administration was known to be corrupt. The former Prime Minister was arrested on corruption charges twice, and one of the instances involved the Saudi royal family. The new regime’s move to distance itself from the old regime’s policies and practices is not altogether unwise.

Theoretically, it seems self-evident that an anti-terrorism facility should serve as an asset to the country and help bring about a more peaceful, stable environment. But corruption overshadows that message and the good work KSCIP promised to do. The War on Terror and Islamic extremism have featured squarely in Malaysian current events. The government has introduced several anti-terrorism bills.

If centers like the KSCIP operated beyond the reach of foreign influence, educating young people, and focusing on peaceful, global change, then that would be a palliative to countries actively combatting terror. Meanwhile, upon closing, the center’s responsibilities were absorbed by the Defense Ministry.

Imran Khan’s Five-Year Test

https://aaj.tv/2018/08/imran-khan-elected-22nd-pm-of-pakistan/

Earlier this summer Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Party was elected Pakistan’s new Prime Minister, ending the Pakistan Muslim League’s (PML-N) five-year reign. Imran Kahn’s PTI Party is forming a coalition government, promising to fight corruption and introducing austerity measures to manage government spending given the country’s dire economic crisis. Major challenges await the new government, including boosting the devalued currency and halting militant group financing. Besides security at home and foreign policy issues like Afghanistan and India, the government is expected to seek more than $10 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to balance its budget, as well as from partners like Saudi Arabia and China. The loans come with conditions which will affect the majority of Pakistanis. The economy – including ensuring the affordability of everyday items like milk and sugar – will be the biggest challenge to the incoming prime minister. Young Pakistanis who supported the cricketer have high hopes for Pakistan.

Who is Imran Khan? Now 65, Khan was raised in Lahore by his ethnic Pashtun family and became one of Pakistan’s most famous cricketers. As captain of the national team, he led Pakistan to victory in the 1992 World Cup before retiring and devoting himself to social work. Khan later founded the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Party (PTI) to vouchsafe justice for all Pakistanis. In 2002, he won a National Assembly seat in the general election. He also led protests against election fraud in 2014 and demanded Nawaz Sharif’s government resign. Khan ran on domestic promises to rout corruption, create 10 million jobs, and construct 5 million low-cost homes. On foreign policy, Khan advocates resolving the Kashmir dispute, peace talks with the Taliban, and criticizes U.S adventurism in neighboring Afghanistan.

What’s significant about Imran Khan’s victory is how his justice banner connected with voters. His pleas on behalf of ordinary Pakistanis struggling for a living paid off, which recalls   Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s slogan Food, Shelter, and Clothing. One wouldn’t be remiss for pointing out that Khan’s team lacks the experience and chops of former Pakistani leaders like Bhutto and Sharif. Khan is a breath of fresh air for Pakistan, as well as a break from tradition, but will he transform sentiment into successful policy outcomes and give Pakistanis what they need?

Seen in a particular vantage point, Khan’s team’s naivete can be seen as net neutral. Pakistan’s experienced leaders like Nawaz Sharif, as often as not, brought the country piles of debt, rendering Pakistan on the brink of bankruptcy. New people and ideas could allow it to start afresh and hopefully, Khan’s team remains dedicated to improving ordinary Pakistanis’ lives, especially in his base at Punjab. There, folks would like nothing more than contribute meaningfully to the country’s development.

The European Union Election Observer Mission found no election day vote-rigging, a real departure in this region. It found a lack of opportunity equality and systematic attempts to undermine the ruling party. Nonetheless, the elections were well organized and result discrepancies were consequences of governmental and election commission flaws rather than malice. Pakistani elections were commended by EU observers as fair, despite pre-election procedure improvements suggested for the next term.

The opposition’s criticism took three forms: first, that PTI had nothing to do with election tampering, let alone rigging. Second, the Pakistani Electoral Commission owns aforementioned administrative flaws. Khan has been transparent about investigating administrative flaws. At the end of the day, he won 116 seats in the National Assembly. The real crucible for Khan will be running a country of 200 million people – it will prove more complicated than captaining a Cricket team of 12, to say nothing of Punjab Province. It is hoped that Khan’s peace-offerings to the opposition will yield a new government which works for the people.

If Khan’s anti-corruption campaign succeeds, billions of dollars outside Pakistan could return. Will the PTI apply those funds directly to the Pakistani people’s needs? Will the nation’s powerful military give Khan the political space he needs to lead without the military meddling in decision-making? Even more, PTI is not a Pakistani ideological monolith. Rather, it is divided between activists who’ve jumped ship from parties like the PML-N and PPP. 

As regards foreign policy, Khan has been critical of the U.S.’s war in Afghanistan, especially its use of drones inside Pakistan’s Waziristan and other tribal areas. Khan is calling for better ties with Washington at a time when the U.S. has suspended Pakistani aid. The post 9/11 skepticism that defines each side’s perception of the other must be cast off for the two to find common cause on regional and global issues. Each wants what might be impossible for the other to deliver: Washington wants Pakistan to stop the arming and funding militants like the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba. And Pakistan wants the U.S. to sit for peace talks with the Taliban. This is to say nothing of Pakistan’s relationship with its neighbors, and U.S. nemeses, China and Iran.

Imran Khan wants to put aside the long-simmering dispute over with India over Kashmir. As a popular figure in India, Khan has visited that country many times as a Cricket player and social worker. If anyone is popularly situated in both countries, it’s Khan. A dialogue between Islamabad and Delhi – among the least economically integrated regions in the world – is desperately needed to benefit both sides.

Youth, Radicalization, and Rehabilitation in Northern Iraq: A Life-Skills Approach

An ISIS video apparently depicting children in a training camp in 2015. Photograph: Isis

 

The Iraqi government has initiated a series of educational programs in detention centers that focus on the deradicalization of youngsters who were once part of terror groups such as ISIS. In a detention center in Northern Iraq, teenagers who were once ISIL recruits are learning to lead productive, non-violent lives. The detention center houses 75 boys, with the youngest being only 11 years old.

The boys have been accused or convicted of crimes, in some cases, as serious as murder and rape. Rather than having them sit in jails with other criminals and extremists, the center focuses on rehabilitation. The center takes responsibility for providing what it sees as traumatized teens with education and vocational skills, as well as arts exposure in the hopes of transforming a, “…destroyed person, into someone who has a life.”

Despite its honorable intentions, rehabilitation programs like this one are controversial with some. The question asked is whether these youngsters who have lived at least part of their lives dedicated to terror and extremist ideology can change.

Tariq Noori, who works at the Security Council of Kurdistan, believes their chances of a successful outcome are 50/50, a superior stat to the recidivism rate of parolees from Iraq’s prisons. That said, last month an attack on Kurdistan Regional Government headquarters was believed to have been perpetrated, in part, by a young man released from the center.

This is the only center with the capacity to leverage multiple educational efforts to deradicalize the youth. It should be pointed out, if any of these youngsters are released from this center and commit another crime, the government’s next move is to send them to one of the federal prisons run by Bagdad.

Needless to say, there, these young men will find no rehabilitation programs. The communities into which these young men are being released must avail continued support. It will take more than their term in the center to keep such young men motivated for good, and shunning extremism’s allure.

With programs in the communities, perhaps Iraqis can push that 50/50 chance of success to 60/40 or 80/20 in peace’s favor.

To counter violent extremism governments, institutions, and the populace should counter-narratives and help victims find peace and societal acceptance. Educational rehabilitation programs like the Iraqi Rehabilitation Center are critical to deradicalizing youth and ensuring these young men avoid extremist thought – in sum, to be productive members of society.

The rehabilitation center’s providers are optimistic. They hope the program is transformational, allowing boy soldiers to just be boys. In one interview, a young boy talks about leaving the violent part of his life behind and wanting to be a football player. We cannot give up on these boys, or we risk losing another generation to extremism.

Comparing Targeted Killings Across Four Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups carry out targeted killings for a number of reasons: as a method of internal policing, in response to political repression, or domestic violence, and to exacerbate political or territorial fragmentation. The rate of political assassinations, whether perpetrated by terrorist groups or by regimes themselves, has risen since the early 1970s. Targeted killings are yet another tool in the terrorist’s toolbox, to be deployed against varied targets in the service of any number of motivations.

The Rise to Peace Active Intelligence Database identifies 269 targeted terror attacks worldwide between June 7, 2017, and July 24, 2018. Of these, 180 were claimed by or associated with at least one group, while 89 had unknown perpetrators. The attacks range from individual assassinations to election violence causing dozens of casualties, such as attacks on rallies in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. The most frequent perpetrator was Al-Shabaab with 48 targeted attacks, followed by Naxal groups with 35, and the Islamic State and New People’s Army with 21 each. Combined, these four groups are associated with nearly 70% of attributed targeted killings in the Active Intelligence Database.

 

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab was responsible for 48 targeted attacks, often using firearms and carrying out the attack in teams of two. In May 2018, Al-Shabaab released a video depicting an assassination team known as the Muhammad bin Maslamah Battalion, which operates within Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region. The video shows the battalion’s camp and training activities, as well as the group conducting drive-by shootings and assassinating targets in urban areas. Al-Shabaab focuses its assassination efforts on military officers, militia members, and government officials. These efforts have long been an important part of Al-Shabaab’s strategy. Targeted killings allow Al-Shabaab to disrupt Somali military and political operations and prevent the government from setting up a stable environment in regions seized from the terrorist group. In addition to firearm assassinations carried out by small teams, Al-Shabaab uses targeted suicide attacks to impact the Somali state. Unlike other groups such as the Naxals, Al-Shabaab attempts to avoid targeting civilians in their assassinations, which suggests an emphasis placed on strategic importance in their target selection. Examples of significant targeted killings perpetrated by Al-Shabaab include the August 2017 killing of Mohamed Ali Elmi, then-governor of the Galgadud region, and the shooting of a senior Somali general and his bodyguard in September 2017.

 

Image Courtesy: NaxalRevolution

Naxals

Naxal groups were responsible for 35 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Typical Naxal targeted killings involve a group of attackers storming a village, seizing their target, and killing them with knives or axes. The perpetrators often leave behind pamphlets advocating their cause and justifying the killing. These attacks are often carried out as a means of internal control, as many targets are killed upon suspicion of being police informants. Naxal attacks on civilians are often carried out in times of economic distress when civilians are more likely to turn to government collaboration. The Indian government offers rewards for information leading to the death or arrest of Naxals and state governments have encouraged civilians to join militant groups that work in tandem with security forces. When civilians are incentivized to become informants or otherwise cooperate with government and security officials, Naxal groups step up targeted killings in order to maintain their regional control. The frequency and brutality of Naxal targeting killings suggest a high level of concern with preventing civilians from turning informant. In addition to attacks on civilians, Naxal groups have plotted the assassination of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and were responsible for a 2003 attempt on the life of Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.

 

ISIS and ISKP

The Islamic State (including ISIS and ISKP, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan branch) was responsible for 21 targeted attacks. Most often, these attacks were carried out against political leaders and most frequently used either suicide bombs or firearms. Due to the use of suicide bombs, the Islamic State’s targeted attacks often cause collateral damage, with roughly a third of said attacks resulting in more than five casualties. Additionally, with increased targeted killings of police and security personnel, the Islamic State has marked a return to the Soldiers’ Harvest strategy it employed in 2013. The collapse of security following assassinations allows ISIS to maintain hyperlocal control, even after it has lost territory and fighters, as has been the case in recent years. With fewer fighters able to carry out large-scale attacks, targeted killings serve as a force-multiplier with outsized strategic impact, given the resources dedicated to such attacks. The Islamic State also has a history of carrying out assassination campaigns against rival militant groups. ISIS operative Abu al-Baraa al-Saheli was detained and executed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham after a number of targeted killings impacted the militant group. ISIS continues to carry out these attacks against its rivals in Syria.

 

Members of the Maoist New People’s Army. | Photo: Reuters

New People’s Army

The New People’s Army was responsible for 21 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Most were individualized attacks, with 15 causing only one casualty each, and all but one carried out with a firearm. The attacks targeted mostly low-level politicians such as village chiefs, policemen, and members of the CAFGU, an auxiliary unit within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. NPA assassination teams, known as Sparrow units, have been active in urban areas since the 1980s. In 1984, the Washington Post reported 80 policemen were murdered by the NPA. In a typical attack, Sparrow unit members “…emerged from a crowd, fired a single bullet into the policeman’s head, grabbed his pistol and merged back into the crowd.” This was an effective tactic, with police and business leaders living in fear of the NPA, but with everyday citizens viewing the rebels as their protectors. Sparrow unit tactics changed in 2012; assassins were deployed in localities to carry out assassinations instead of operating from urban safehouses. In March, President Rodrigo Duterte claimed that the Sparrow units had made a come-back, and he proposed a central marketplace for soldiers to protect against attacks.