Latin America

Pablo Escobar, the infamous Colombian drug trafficker with ties to the Mafia.

It is common knowledge that the Mafia engages in violent criminal activities to build their power and profits.

For decades, books, movies, and other media have secured audiences by recounting the Mafia’s global influence and detailing the scope of illegal activities, including human trafficking, money laundering, and the drug trade. Despite many fictionalized accounts, the Mafia continues to create very real conflict and engage in global acts of violence. Of particular interest is the Mafia’s involvement in the highly lucrative Latin American drug trade.

Ties between the Sicilian Mafia and Colombian drug cartels have been suspected for years, with one FBI informant, Antonino Giuffre, linking the Sicilian Mafia to Pablo Escobar. Giuffre, the former right-hand man to the chief of the Sicilian Mafia, leaked to the Italian press that the two groups had close relations. He detailed how the Cosa Nostra advised Escobar’s Medellin Cartel on military tactics and business practices for expanding the drug business and related criminal activity.

Escobar sent drugs to Sicily in exchange for advice. These drugs were forwarded to the American Mafia, which would exchange them for weapons and money. This created an efficient and highly prosperous global supply chain that was hard to track. Although Escobar was a cocaine dealer, he was adept at winning over locals by building schools, soccer fields, and hospitals. Despite that he ruled with an iron fist, he was often bolstered by the local community.  Many poor people saw Escobar as helping their community; he seemed to serve their urgent needs better than the government.

A similar process occurred in Mexico with equally strong global ties and profitable outcomes.

Mexico has borne witness to an increasingly bloody drug war. It has escalated violence in areas cartel controlled areas. The cartels’ influence is strengthened in opposition to the government. Two of the most prominent Mexican groups, the Zetas and the Drug Cartel, do business with one of the most influential Mafia organizations, the ‘Ndrangheta, which has connections to the New York and Calabria Mafia. As demand for cocaine and heroin in Europe increases, the Mafia turns to Mexican cartels for a steady stream of drugs. The ‘Ndrangheta has been successful at engaging directly with local growers and producers, eliminating intermediaries, and selling directly to the European market. Increasing pressure from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Mexican and Italian police forces are limiting some supply routes, cleaving the supply chain. This disruption to the cross-Atlantic drug trade is putting pressure on the Mafia and the cartels who are looking for new ways to reinforce existing channels of distribution and create new ones.

Outside Colombia and Mexico, drugs and Mafia-related activities are less prevalent, but still, create an atmosphere of fear and violence that crosses national boundaries. Tomasso Buscetta, a former boss of the Sicilian Mafia, was arrested twice in Brazil and extradited to Italy. After his first arrest in 1972, Buscetta was imprisoned for running a small cocaine operation in Sao Paulo’s countryside. At the time, Buscetta was extradited to Italy, where he was accused of additional crimes in relation to former Mafia business. In 1980, he escaped Italy while on parole and returned to Brazil where he reorganized his network. Buscetta’s goal was to build a drug empire that would rival Colombia and Mexico. He wanted to cement Brazil’s status as a key supplier in the large-scale production and trafficking of Latin American drugs.

Buscetta managed to organize the planting of 10 million cocaine bushes, however, before he was able to dry and manufacture the cocaine, the enterprise was shut down by the Brazilian Military Police’s Operation Frederico.

Buscetta was extradited again and as part of a 1983 plea, he cooperated with law enforcement and was instrumental in building the Maxi case which led to the arrest of 474 Mafiosi, and 360 eventual convictions for serious violent crimes. To this day, Buscetta is known as one of the most famous informants, or pentito, on the Mafia.

In a globalized world, any notion that organized crime is localized is an illusion.

As is the idea that drugs are a Latin American problem. The Mafia’s violent impact can be felt in Mexico, Italy, the U.S., the Netherlands, and Honduras. With such a strong global reach and vast financial resources, it will take international cooperation across law enforcement agencies to curb the Mafia’s violent influence and the drug trade. In the Maxi trial, authorities helped judges Falcone and Borsellino obtain evidence in other countries to locate individuals and follow the fiscal chain as they created a strong case to charge the criminals. This level of cooperation is critical for curbing the global drug trade. In addition to international law enforcement agency cooperation, a more robust legal framework that provides better enforcement and transparency will be beneficial.

Italian law enforcement authorities continue to support these international initiatives and believe they will not only help in terms of information sharing but also in combatting corruption in the supply chain and enforcement agencies as transparency and accountability are increased. This has been evident in the cooperation between the US, Colombia, and Mexico and their ability to identify, track, and prosecute drug traffickers. Finally, countries that suffer from drug violence can be incentivized to invest in community-based approaches, including better training and pay of police officers and development of community resources such as schools and hospitals, so neighborhoods are not forced to rely on cartel funding.

Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics

Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellini, Italian judges responsible for the Maxi Trails vs. the Mafia. (Wiki)

Jair Bolsonaro – Brazil’s recently elected president. (Credit AP)

On Sunday, Brazilians elected Jair Bolsonaro as their thirty-eighth president.

Bolsonaro has been described by the New York Times as the most extreme leader to ever have been elected in Latin America history. Bolsonaro has expressed radical views towards minorities, he is in favor of the war on drugs, and has promised to facilitate easier access to guns to create a vigilantism system. Bolsonaro’s populist bid gave him the support of more than half of Brazilian electors who were fed up with high rates of criminality, corruption scandals, and deep economic recessions.

But how does the election of Bolsonaro relate to violent extremism? Brazil’s main cities, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, have extremely high rates of criminality, including over sixty thousand murders yearly nationwide. Drug trafficking is also common, as these factions benefit from the absence of the state to create their own institutions and support the marginalized sectors of the Brazilian population. Some of the dominant gangs include the Comando Vermelho, in Rio de Janeiro, and the Primeiro Comando da Capital, in Sao Paulo. Many incursions have been organized in the past against them by the state or federal government, using the regular police, elite officers (such as the BOPE or ROTA), and even the Army. In other stances, the state has negotiated a truce with the drug traffickers to host events, such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games, or to win an election, such as when Lionel Brizola allied itself with drug traffickers of Rio de Janeiro.

Brazil continues to wage war against drug trafficking and countless lives are lost every day.

Bolsonaro has spoken frequently against the decriminalization of drugs, even though he argued his government would tolerate the medicinal use of marijuana. Bolsonaro, as a former Army Captain, is in favor of a more aggressive approach by the police with one of his most popular quotes being, “A good criminal is a dead one”. Bolsonaro has also, both in the past and during the campaign trail, defended torture and killing by the armed forces to fight drug traffickers, insurgents, and even politicians. In 1999, he called for the death of Congress and the then president Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Brazil has suffered for many years from drug traffickers and the failure of the state to tend to the more marginalized sectors of society, including afro-Brazilians and the poorer parts of the population. On a previous piece, it was discussed how this problem led to the torture and death of investigative journalist Tim Lopes. Most politicians have approached this problem with violence and armed counter-attacks. Some Brazilian cities have had success focusing on the community, improving the police training to tackle this issue, and investing in education. Now, with the election of Bolsonaro, these improvements are likely to be in jeopardy, as a national policy based on criminalization and the war on drugs is likely to be created.

Brazilian protests against corruption and violence (Credit AP)

The election of Bolsonaro is a frightening moment for Brazil.

Bolsonaro is undoubtedly a populist leader who propagates authoritarian notions. His actions are likely to be disastrous for the country and only produce more violence. It is imperative that the international community condemns any attempts of Bolsonaro to exacerbate the failing War on Drugs. Moreover, the Brazilian governors and mayors must be even more assertive on investing in community-based approaches, police training, and education to effectively reduce criminality and drug trafficking.

~ Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics.

BusinessInsider.com The wrapped fingers of a raspachin worker who collects coca leaves, during the harvest on a small coca farm in Guaviare province, Colombia. REUTERS/John Vizcaino

For the past century, Colombia has been embroiled in an intense war on drugs which has created a steady state of violent conflict within the country, and little impact on long-term production or drug use. This war has largely been financed by the United States. Complicating the drug war is another long-standing conflict with leftist guerrillas who have control of territory with a high density of coca plants. This piece will focus on the problems of the Colombian approach to the war on drugs and how it can be adapted into more workable solutions in the future.

At the height of their power, the drug cartels controlled Colombia, with Pablo Escobar becoming the 7th richest person in the world.

They supplied 80% of the global cocaine market. Much of the demand for cocaine came from the U.S., prompting the U.S. government and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to take action. They then sent money, supplies, and even agents to Colombia as a way to disrupt the drug production, and distribution to North America. Through a long and bloody process, which included murder, arrests, and extradition requests, the DEA and Colombian government were able to dismantle the drug cartels in Colombia.

Unfortunately, this only partially resolved the sourcing issue and did nothing to address the demand issue. While the DEA and Colombian government were able to curb the cartels’ flow of drugs from Colombia to the U.S., other sources stepped in and continued the supply. Thus, the actions of the DEA did nothing to address the demand for cocaine in the U.S. The DEA and Colombian government were also ineffective in transitioning out of the drug war and providing an environment in which those previously involved in the drug trade could otherwise make a living. There were many promises by the Colombian government to help the farmers replace their coca crops with legal commodities, unfortunately, the help never came. The government failed to adequately support these farmers with seeds and other farming assistance, so the farmers quickly went back to cultivating the coca crops. The farmers needed to support their families, and no alternatives were offered. An example of that is Wilmer Ovalle, a young man that is taking over his father’s coca cultivation in the absence of state support for other crops. Ovalle knows that with the coca crop he will have a steady income and the drug trade will go on, even if large cartels have been broken up.  (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/18/colombia-united-nations-assembly-war-on-drugs)

In an effort to diminish the supply, the DEA ran fumigation operations in which they used agricultural planes to spray herbicide over the Colombian countryside killing the cocaine crops.

Similar to the violent oppression of the cartels, the spraying forced the growers to adapt, and many moved deeper into territory controlled by the guerrillas. Ovalle’s father moved their family plantations to Colombian natural reserves, where the fumigations were prohibited. The farmers cut down trees and planted their coca in the Colombian tropical forest, exacerbating deforestation issues. 

There was a glimmer of hope for Colombia with the accession to power of Juan Manuel Santos, who promised a more community-based approach to the drug war, as well as signing a peace deal with the FARC guerrillas, which includes a workable, sustainable solution to the illicit drug business. However, like too many things in Colombia, the policy rhetoric often differs from practice and implementation, thus the war on drugs continues. With the political damage following the failures of the FARC peace deal, Santos had to leave office and was replaced by his opposition. 

In order to stop the unnecessary violence and suffering from this two-front conflict, Colombia must dedicate itself to a community-based approach.

One which helps farmers shift their production from coca to food and other crops which are profitable. The government needs to help the farmers make the transition as part of a post-conflict solution which places farmers at the center of the solution. Historically, farmers have shown willingness to cooperate, as they are concerned with the violence perpetuated by illicit drug trade as well as health impacts of coca farming. However, the government must show the political will to follow through and help the farmers. This might require farming support, subsidies, or tax incentives until the farmers are able to produce a significant yield of legal crops which can support their families and communities. The international community must also act to condemn the war on drugs, assist with community-based post-conflict practices, and look for other sustainable solutions to this conflict. The war on drugs failed miserably for both Colombia and the U.S., as production rates and prices for coca remain strong, as does drug use in the U.S.

~ Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics

Prensa Miraflores, The New Politics Papers, Transnational Institute’s Public Alternatives Project

Much is said about Venezuela and its current state, but often in isolation from processes occurring in other Latin American countries and the world.

At the same time, it’s important to avoid reducing the current crisis to solely external factors. Many elements thereof are indeed purely Venezuelan and have contributed to one of the harshest crises Latin America has ever seen. Which, in itself, speaks to the situation’s severity.

It is no secret that Latin America is a continent marked by social and economic inequality.

Venezuela is no exception to the rule. As many of Latin America countries opened their economies to capitalism after World War II, and in the context of the Cold War, it exacerbated preexisting inequalities, especially as foreign investment arrived without proper democratic institutions to provide balance. As a result, this led to social unrest and to the arrival of political insurgencies, which were violently repressed by the Venezuelan dictatorship in the middle of the 20th century. Despite that this movement failed, it changed values in the country to be more left-leaning, anti-capitalist, and fearful of foreign investment, which was only seen as benefitting the country’s elites.

The external factors are easiest to explain.

Venezuela was blessed with a huge amount of oil, arguably the most coveted resource in the wake of the second industrial revolution in the late 19th century. However, instead of using it to jump-start its industrialization like the United States, or save it, like Norway, for strategic purposes, Venezuela became a rentier state. Rentier states are those which have an abundance of valuable natural resources, like oil, which they sell in the foreign markets for huge profits.

Rentier states also tend to have authoritarian governments.

These use part of the profits they make from exporting natural resources to provide welfare services to their population, all with extremely low taxes. As a result, any social unrest an authoritarian state might normally provoke is suppressed by the low taxation and decent state services. In addition, the state uses its profits to develop oppressive apparatuses to crush opposition that may rise against it, maintaining the status quo, and not industrializing.

Venezuela is hardly alone in this respect; nearly all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member states, plus Russia, qualify as rentier states.

Saudi Arabia is a prime example as it provides services to its population, even giving away money, all while repressing its opposition and making few efforts to develop its domestic economy. It also explains the sudden collapse of Venezuela’s economy when the price of oil dropped from $100 per barrel in 2014 to less than $40 per barrel in 2016. As the commodity financed the whole Venezuelan economy, the collapse was inevitable.

When a rentier state is unable to provide services it used to provide, social unrest rises and the state must take measures to contain it, increasing state repression and brutality, often coupled with disastrous economic policies that freeze prices and the supply of goods and services requisite to the wellbeing of its population. Not long thereafter the main worry for the population shifts from daily crime and insurgency groups to state oppression and violence.

Rentier states are dangerous.

They engage in the oppression of their populations and are often responsible for state-sponsored terrorism on a global scale. Even when they focus on internal repression, it usually resembles a Robespierrian terror rule. These states are dangerous to their populations, to other states, and they finance global terror worldwide – Iran is a chief example. Their racket, providing welfare-like services to the populace without taxation is susceptible to failure and can plunge nations into chaos, as seen in Venezuela, and even civil war.

The international community should act to mitigate such disasters.

It could facilitate their entrance into international organizations, incentivizing development and domestic, industrialization of their economies, facilitating entrance into the global economy, and intervening, with sanctions on the UN Security Council, for example, to stop such states from terrorizing their populations. Thus, not only will this halt worldwide human rights violations, it will increase rentier states’ accountability to their populations, reducing their ability and incentive to fund terror organizations.

~ Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics