Rise to Peace wishes you joy, happiness, peace, and prosperity on this blessed occasion. #EidMubarak!
https://www.facebook.com/Rise2Peace/videos/308022160079818/
Rise to Peace wishes you joy, happiness, peace, and prosperity on this blessed occasion. #EidMubarak!
https://www.facebook.com/Rise2Peace/videos/308022160079818/
Source: The Washington Post/Alex Gomes/AP
Author: Cameron Cassar
The newly elected right wing president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, had just been newly inaugurated when he had to deal with his first security crisis; terrorism attacks led by prison gangs in the Brazilian state of Ceara. The attacks have been centered on the capital of Ceara, Fortaleza, which is a metropolitan home to about 4 million Brazilians. These attacks have destroyed homes, businesses, modes of transportation, and has left many residents stuck in their homes due to threats of violence.
All of these attacks have been motivated by a desire to get the Brazilian government to end the practice of segregating gang factions in the Brazilian prison system. This goes completely against Bolsonaro and his ideologies. In fact, a major point of his political platform was that he vowed to enact strong policies to combat crime in Brazil. These policies include military takeovers in crime ridden Brazilian cities and shoot to kill policies for violent criminals.
This current wave of violence in Brazil shares many similarities to the wave of violence led by Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel during their reign of narcoterrorism in Colombia. However, while the Brazilian prison gangs have opted to mainly use violence, the Medellin Cartel not only committed violence to instill fear in lawmakers in Colombia, but they also bribed police officers to turn a blind eye towards their criminal activities. Importantly, both of these organizations have used “violent lobbying” tactics to scare lawmakers into implementing policies that benefit them. Pablo Escobar wanted to get rid of extradition while the Brazilian gangs want to eliminate desegregation in prisons. The gang leaders want to end the prison reform which includes ending the separation of rival gang members and the blocking of cell phone service in the prisons.
These reforms would hinder the effect of the gang leaders who are locked up inside of the prison by disconnecting them from the outside world, which gives them the chance to coordinate their attacks. However, many gang leaders do not want desegregation in the prisons because they fear for their safety amongst the other prisoners who are often times rival gang members with a personal vendetta against one another. Incidentally, the violent lobbying of the gangs has united them in an unusual alliance due to the “common enemy”. The First Capital Command and the Red Command, two of the biggest gangs in the area have already formed a pact and there are plenty more that will be formed as the conflict ensues.
Brazil has the third highest prison population behind China and the US (of course). The problem is that President Bolsonaro wants to be even tougher on crime, which will result in even more Brazilians being sent to prison. Some of the policies he wants to implement include lowering the age of criminal responsibility from age 18 to age 16, which will only increase the number of Brazilians in the prison system. More Brazilians in the Brazilian prison system will not help reform the broken prison system. If anything, the country needs less prisoners so they can focus on improving the conditions in the prisons due to the overcrowding. The point of prison is to rehabilitate the prisoners so they can be reintegrated into society when they are released, but a prison in bad condition and ran by the prisoners instead of the guards is not suitable for rehabilitation.
President Bolsonaro must now deal with the crisis that has begun to unfold in his country. However, many members of the left saw this wave of terror coming. As Renato Roseno of the Socialism and Liberty Party stated, “This crisis was entirely predictable, we were sitting on a barrel of gunpowder and it just needed someone to light the fuse”. It is now up to him to decide if he will counter these actions, if he will send in foreign help, will peacekeeping troops be deployed, and will he still be able to stick to his tough on crime policy? It will be interesting to see how Bolsonaro deals with his first major crisis as a president. Will he be able to stick to his hard right policies or will he be pressured to renege on the promises that got him elected as president in the first place?
Source: The Tico Times (2019)
Author: Billy Baker
Colombia has a bloody history of political violence (La Violencia, FARC, ELN). But after the peace agreement with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016 and the peace talks with ELN (National Liberation Army), many thought that this would be the end of the bloodshed.
That was until January 17th, 2019, when a vehicle drove into the National Police Academy in Bogota, Colombia. The truck, armed with explosives, sped into the facility until hitting a wall. This triggered the detonation, killing 21 people (including the driver) and injuring 68 others. This marked the deadliest attack in 16 years.
Shortly after the bombing, ELN members in Colombia claimed responsibility for the attack. This has stalled peace talks currently being held in Cuba, although ELN chief negotiator, Pablo Beltran, has denied involvement in the attack. Colombian President Ivan Duque is now calling for the Cuban government to arrest and extradite the ELN negotiators in the country.
The Cuban government has responded by stating that they will follow the previously agreed protocol for a break in the dialogue. The protocol for this situation allows ELN negotiators to travel back to Colombia through Venezuela in a safe manner. It also requires the Colombian military not to engage any identified rebel strongholds for a 72-hour period during their return.
So what does this mean for the future? This single attack has damaged prospects for peace between ELN and the Colombian government, with the possibility of bringing back an escalation of widespread violence that Colombia has not experienced for years. This is unfortunately a possibility for a variety of reasons (low popularity for President Márquez, widespread disgust against ELN’s attack, need to respond to the attack).
It is necessary for the Colombian government to respond to the violence and crime that ELN has committed over the years. Along with the attack in Bogota, ELN has committed numerous attacks since peace talks began. Peace talks have proved difficult due to the group’s decentralized structure. This most recent attack by ELN has caused uncertainty about the future of political violence in Colombia.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were hosting global events, including incidents at the Munich Olympics in 1972 and at the Atlanta games in 1996. Since then, the risk of violence and terrorist attacks have become a growing concern for nations hosting these high profile events as well as the international community attending the events. However, on the occasion of Brazil hosting both the 2014 Soccer World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, the context and the problems experienced by Brazil and most Latin American countries became evident.
During the Cold War, the vast majority of these countries were under brutal military dictatorships that oppressed the people and labeled every opposition group as terrorists, whether they were peaceful or not. Brazil was among the countries where opposition groups were labeled as terrorists for the simple act of opposing to the government; in many cases protesters were interrogated and tortured by military officers. As a result, following the democratization in 1985 and its consolidation four years afterward, the term terrorist was removed from the vocabulary of Brazilian leaders due to its strong connotation and alignment with the military dictatorship.
As Brazil prepared to host the two most popular events in the world, the World Cup and the Olympics, the international pressure for security was so strong that the country had to pass more extensive anti-terrorism legislation. President Dilma Rousseff, fought in a guerilla during the 1970s and 1980s, and her successor, Michel Temer, is of Arab origin, both common among Brazilians. This resulted in the Brazilian law being much broader and ambiguous than ones in other Western countries, leaving many organizers and security professionals related to the events unhappy.
The consensus at the time was that Brazil was not prepared for an attack the scale of Munich in 1972. As an example, Brazil focused its preparation on so-called lone wolves, which act alone rather than having a group or cell supporting and coordinating the attack. At the time of organizing these events, the Islamic State was publishing videos and statements in Portuguese, creating fears that it could be behind an attack during these events, while the eyes of the world would be fixed on Rio de Janeiro.
Another issue of concern as noted by the New York Times was that the Brazilian soldiers in charge of protecting the various event sites were not prepared to deal with various terrorist scenarios. Not only was the training to counter terrorist attacks or violent insurgency insufficient, but the soldiers and police officers were poorly paid and inadequately equipped, as the state lacked the financial support for basic supplies and equipment, such as gasoline for police cars.
Luckily, there were no terrorist attacks during the World Cup or during the 2016 Olympics. However, the problems remain, and the event highlighted the inability of the Brazilian government to properly respond to terrorist activity. In fact the same factors limiting efficacy for terror response actions such as insufficient training, lack of equipment, and poor pay, are also partly responsible for the high incidence of violence in Latin America. Thus, the region is unprepared to deal with terrorism and violent extremism, as well as to the day-to-day violence, with few resources invested in police which can counter violence, and even less devoted to tackling the issues that create and enable the rise of violence and drug trafficking. The World Cup and the Olympics exposed the lack of preparation and weakness of Brazil in terms of public safety, but until it becomes a priority for the state, nothing will change and Brazil will not be able to transcend its drug trafficking or homicide epidemics, let alone be prepared for a terrorist event.
Brazilian Army Forces soldiers patrol on Copacabana beach ahead of the 2016 Rio Olympic games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 18, 2016. REUTERS/Ricardo Moraes
When a nation is invaded, or succumbs to an authoritarian government, its people usually are no match for either foreign or national military; these well trained troops would likely defeat them on a battlefield. However, as the road toward victory using conventional warfare is blocked, a side road featuring unconventional guerilla warfare can open. Many revolutions and resistance movements have used these side roads and more unconventional tactics to achieve great success. They paved the way for Yugoslavia’s President for almost the entirety of the Cold War, created chaos for the Colombian government, and even challenged the great military mastermind of Napoleon.
Guerrilla warfare, or unconventional war, occurs when a small group of combatants use military tactics such as sabotage, raids, landmines, and hit-and-run operations, to fight a traditional and often less mobile conventional army. Their aim is not only to kill enemy troops, but to attack the psyche and moral ensuring the enemy or oppressive government understands that they may occupy the territory, but they will not be able to control it. After they strike, guerrilla forces often go back to their hiding place, and wait for the next attack. This type of warfare is successful in irregular terrain, thick forests, caves, or hills which provide cover and places to hide.
Historically the tactic has been successful against more well-trained larger armies. The Roman Empire struggled with the hit and run tactics of Germanic Tribes, the Crusaders struggled against the lighter equipped mamelukes, and Napoleon suffered during the Peninsular War, between 1807 and 1814. More recently, during World War II the Nazis faced guerrilla tactics from local resistance in the Western Front, with an honorable mention to the French Resistance that was crucial for the operation of D-Day, and by Partisans in the Eastern Front, usually fighting against SS divisions. In more modern warfare, the Vietnam War quickly became an unconventional war between the U.S. and the Vietcong, and tribal guerilla combatants have successfully fought in Afghanistan against the Russians and more recently the U.S.
Latin America has been plagued by guerilla factions which challenge existing governments. In Mexico, these groups, such as the Zapatistas, affected the revolution; while in Brazil, guerrilla movements occurred throughout the 20th century, starting as early as the 1930’s in the so-called Coluna Prestes and continued with the Guerrilha do Araguaia, during the military dictatorship. More recently, the FARC guerillas in Colombia and the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, have shown the impact that small bands of unconventional troops can have on standing governments. The most successful, however, was the Cuban Revolution, led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara.
In the Cuban Revolution, before the guerillas could properly engage in opposition to Fulgencio Batista’s oppressive regime, they went to Mexico to learn how to fight. It was in Mexico where Guevara joined Castro, and strengthened his movement. Although Guevara initially joined as the medic of the group, he played a key role in the eventual overthrow of Batista. Once the group concluded training, they want to Cuba and entrenched themselves in the mountainous region of the island, using radio as their primary propaganda tool and voice to the people, they waited for Batista’s army to come after them. Little by little, Castro and his fighters beat the regime’s armies and gained popular approval. A common misconception is that Castro’s regime was born a socialist, but that only occurred when the U.S. sent a guerrilla group formed by Cuban refugees that had fled when Castro took over and was decisively defeated in the Bay of Pigs.
While in other regions, bands of guerrillas are usually focused on foreign occupation, in Latin America the focus has been on government troops and oppression. This type of unconventional warfare is also related to socialist models, and more specifically, the Chinese model. One of the reasons why this approach has failed to inflict definitive change in Latin America is that they target the wrong population by focusing on peasants rather than urban dwellers, or the proletariat, as Latin American societies have a radically different organization to the Chinese ones, based on rural peasants.
Guerillas are much like terrorist organizations. Repression and counter-conflict may work to disband them in the short term, but it does not address the reasons why these groups are formed. In Latin America, like many other places in the world social unrest is caused by the marginalization, corruption, and lack of opportunities for people. Guerilla warfare has many parallels to terrorism including tactics and outcomes. In theory, guerilla warfare does not involve civilians, and is focused on groups of paramilitary individuals fighting another military group. Civilians may get caught in the cross-fire, but they are generally not the targets. In fact, many governments will not violate the Rule of Discrimination, by killing civilians together with guerrilla fighters, thus when they hide out in civilian areas, it is difficult for the government to retaliate. While terrorists have less regard for the distinction of civilian and military, and in fact often engage with or met out their violence against civilian targets. Despite this distinction, the outcome is often the same, communities engulfed in violence. While guerillas often seek to protect and be protected by the community, terrorists direct their efforts on expelling an enemy. In Latin America, the guerillas have traditionally sided with the common people in hopes of greater opportunities, and thus it is imperative that governments understand the distinction and work with these guerrillas to create a more peaceful and just society in the Latin American countries.