Latin America

Ecuador
 by Rise to Peace

The Ecuadorian Security Crisis

Ecuador is currently experiencing its worst security crisis in a decade. The actions of various illegal groups, the presence of Mexican cartels, prison violence, and drug trafficking are some of the reasons why the government has recently taken measures to mitigate the law and order crisis.

The violence and insecurity in the Latin American country are elements that show a tendency toward an increase in criminal actions in Ecuador. If Ecuadorian authorities fail to adequately intervene on the factors that generate instability in the country, Ecuador faces a dark and dangerous future, as other countries in the region have already experienced.

The Crisis, Its Factors, and the Government’s Response

Ecuador’s security indicators have worsened exponentially in recent years. In 2021, reports indicated that Ecuador reached its worst homicide figures in the last 10 years. A homicide rate of 13.13 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants was recorded, which is above the world average rate of 5.8. In 2021 Ecuador experienced one homicide every three and a half hours.  In addition to violent deaths, there was an increase in the number of assaults, which rose by 27.9%, vehicle thefts increased by 55%, burglaries recorded a growth of 14.2%, and robbery of commercial premises increased by 17.3%.

The situation in 2022 has not improved. The country has registered 1,255 violent deaths so far this year, according to police figures. Also, in January alone, the number of violent deaths tripled compared to the previous year, while drug seizures doubled. In fact, Ecuadorian authorities have recorded events of such magnitude as 18 murders in less than 24 hours in the city of Guayaquil.

One of the main factors generating insecurity in the country is drug trafficking.  Analysts have pointed out that Ecuador has gone from being a transit country to a drug distribution center in Latin America and that more than one third of Colombia’s cocaine production arrives in Ecuador and eventually leaves Ecuadorian ports, mainly for the U.S. and Europe. Portals such as Insight Crime have mentioned that Ecuador is a convenient “superhighway” for moving cocaine shipments around the world.

Drug seizures reveal the nature and extent of the drug trafficking problem. In January of 2022 alone, 17.9 tons of prohibited substances were seized, compared to 8.4 tons during the same period last year. In this same month, 758 operations have been carried out in which 857 suspects were arrested, 63 weapons, 11,798 ammunition, and $25,450 in cash. Of the drugs seized during January 2022, 98% were cocaine, the rest was primarily comprised of marijuana, cocaine base paste, and heroin. Likewise, in a 72 hour timespan, 2.5 tons of drugs were seized in the ports of Guayaquil, equivalent to a total of 2,597 packages of cocaine.

In addition to local gangs that benefit from criminal activities, such as Los Choneros, Ecuadorian authorities have also reported the presence of Mexican cartels in the country, which have increased levels of violence. For instance, Giovanni Ponce, head of the Anti-Narcotics Division of the Ecuadorian police, says there is already evidence that the Sinaloa Cartel has been operating in Ecuador since 2009, and that in recent years the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) has also infiltrated the country.

Ecuadorian authorities have captured several emissaries and links between Ecuadorian gangs and Mexican cartels and seized drug shipments allegedly belonging to illegal Mexican organizations. Moreover, the former director of security of the Ecuadorian Army, Mario Pazmiño, has indicated that 37.5 percent of Colombia’s coca production passes through Ecuador and that the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel have outsourced their presence through the local gangs such as ‘Los Choneros’, ‘Tigretones’, ‘Chonekillers’, ‘Lobos’ and ‘Lagartos’, which maintain control of the routes, storage centers, and international drug distribution platforms.

The violence generated by gangs and drug cartels has also spilled over into prisons. In 2021, two massacres occurred in the Litoral prison that left nearly 190 dead, both of which were carried out by members of criminal gangs fighting for control of the prison. In April 2022, the Turi prison massacre in the city of Cuenca resulted in the death of at least 20 inmates. Other clashes between gangs have occurred in various prisons throughout the country, evidencing a serious risk factor for the prison population and prison guards.

In addition to prison violence and the increase in murders due to drug trafficking and gang confrontations, the current security crisis in Ecuador has resulted in other violent events. For example, in April 2022, a car bomb exploded near a prison in Guayaquil, causing material damage but leaving no victims. In September 2021, a drone attack with explosives was carried out in a prison in Guayaquil. In February 2022, also in Guayaquil, a 21-year-old man was abandoned with an explosive device strapped to his head, exploding moments later.  Finally, in early 2022, in the city of Durán, two bodies were found hanging from a bridge, a practice that is common in confrontations between Mexican cartels.

In the face of rampant violence and crime, the Ecuadorian government opted to decree a state of emergency in three provinces and deploy 9,000 police and military personnel. The government seeks to counteract the violence generated by drug trafficking and high crime rates. Security forces have also carried out various operations to reduce gang capabilities, arrest gang members, seize drugs and weapons, and restore security in areas affected by violence.

A Dark Future Ahead?

Ecuador is currently undergoing a serious deterioration of its security conditions and stability. The strategic context of the South American country is composed of a diversity of criminal actors that benefit from illicit businesses such as drug trafficking, leading to the income generated from illegal activities serving as fuel for violence and instability in Ecuador.

For this reason, the Ecuadorian government should focus its efforts on correctly identifying potential risks, the structural causes that allow the proliferation of drug trafficking, and carrying out operations in critical areas such as ports and prisons to reduce the capacity of criminal gangs. It is necessary to reduce the sources of income of illegal groups to stop their growth.

In the event that the Ecuadorian government fails to adequately intervene in the current crisis of violence and insecurity in the country, it is highly likely that Ecuador will face a dark and uncertain future, similar to that of countries such as Colombia during the 1990s.  The trend indicates that illegal groups, gangs, and cartels will continue to strengthen their capabilities and commit criminal acts, which will likely lead to an era of narco-terrorism in the country. Therefore, Ecuadorian authorities must confront the crisis with all the means at their disposal and overcome the actions of illegal groups.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Mexico
 by Rise to Peace

A Growing and Changing Threat: The Evolution of Narco-Warfare in Mexico

The levels of violence associated with drug trafficking in Mexico are critical. The country has several security challenges due to the presence, activities, and strengthening of drug cartels. These illegal organizations continually seek to innovate their methods to ship drug shipments around the world, expand throughout the country and the region, and contest control of illicit markets against other criminal groups.

However, one factor relevant to drug cartel violence Mexican security forces must address is the modernization of cartel equipment, vehicles, and weapons. The evolution of narco-warfare in Mexico is extremely threatening as it exponentially increases the firepower of these illegal organizations, their warfare, and their defenses.

Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico

Mexico is currently experiencing one of its most violent periods. Drug cartels have intensified violence in the country, either through confrontation against other illegal organizations or against State forces.  In fact, it has been reported that in 2021 Mexico registered 33,315 homicides after the two most violent years in its history, under Andrés Manuel López Obrador, with 34,690 murder victims in 2019 and 34,554 in 2020.

Drug cartels are perhaps the biggest threat to the country’s security and stability.  Presently, 16 cartels are vying for control of the country; and the criminal organizations with the largest presence are the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), which has a presence in 24 states, and the Gulf Cartel, which has a presence in nine states. There are also other cartels with a large presence in the country, such as the Sinaloa Cartel or the Northeast Cartel, who have allied with the Zetas. Other criminal organizations with a presence in the country are Los Beltrán Leyva, La Familia Michoacana, Los Caballeros Templarios, Juarez Cartel, Arellano Felix Cartel, Tlahuac Cartel, Unión Tepito, Guerreros Unidos, Los Rojos, Los Viagras, and Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel.

Drug trafficking is the main source of financing for these groups and fuels the violence in the country.  According to the annual report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mexican criminal organizations continue to control much of the import of cocaine into the United States and wholesale cocaine trafficking within the country. They rely heavily on local criminal groups and street gangs for retail distribution.

According to U.S. authorities, Mexican criminal groups often procure multi-ton shipments of cocaine from drug traffickers in South America. The report also notes that according to U.S. authorities, the main cocaine trafficking routes, the eastern Pacific route and the western Caribbean route converge in Mexico, from where the drug enters the United States, mostly by land across the country’s south-western border.

However, Mexican drug cartels also engage in other types of illegal activities beyond drug trafficking to finance and fortify themselves. Some of these include human trafficking, migrant smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, piracy, fuel theft, vehicle theft on federal highways, illegal logging, extortion of mining companies, water trafficking, trafficking of medical equipment and medicines, including unregistered and counterfeit products, and loans.

Evolution of Narco-Warfare: An Emerging Threat

The millions in revenue from drug trafficking and other illegal activities have allowed Mexican cartels to modernize their equipment and weaponry, leading to increased firepower and warfare capabilities. This is a significant risk factor for Mexico’s stability and security, as the trend indicates that the cartels will seek to strengthen themselves.

In 2011, Mexican authorities in the state of Tamaulipas found two dump trucks, such as those commonly used for transporting goods, converted into tanks with armor up to 2.5 centimeters thick.  The “narco-tanks” have continued to be used ever since, and with their use among drug cartels appearing to be increasingly common. In 2021, in the state of Tamaulipas there was a confrontation between two narco-tanks of the Gulf Cartel and the Northeast Cartel, both of which were also equipped with high-caliber weapons. In March of the same year, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) exhibited two of its narco-tanks on the streets of Michoacán, which were two large trucks armored from the wheels to the roof with iron plates, transformed into homemade tanks.

The drug cartels’ new capabilities are not limited to the creation of narco-tanks but are also reflected in the acquisition of better weaponry. During the failed operation to capture Ovidio Guzmán López, son of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, it became evident through videos that the Sinaloa Cartel was in possession of weapons such as machine guns, assault rifles, grenades, pistols, and mortars. The gunmen were further known to be in possession of the fearsome Barrett M82 rifle, which is known as “the weapon of choice of the narcos terrorizing Mexico.”  As for the acquisition of these weapons, Mexican authorities found that seven out of every ten weapons seized from criminals are of U.S. manufacture, with many manufactured in Arizona and Texas gun shops.

There have also been innovations in the use of technology and explosives. In 2022, alleged members of the CJNG used drones to drop explosives in Michoacán. The cartel members dropped explosives and are likely to employ this technique again in the future as drones are capable of autonomous flight, are lightweight, and cheaper than traditional aircraft.

Mexican cartels have also improved their human talent and the quality of their troops. For example, a few years ago it became known that the Los Zetas cartel offered huge sums of money to former members of the Mexican Special Forces (GAFES), an elite military special mission corps created by the National Defense Secretariat and trained abroad to confront rival cartels and law enforcement agencies.

Other cartels across the country have replicated this practice. In 2020, the Mexican Army dismantled an alleged Sinaloa Cartel training camp in which five alleged former Mexican Army soldiers were training the cartel’s new recruits.  The training camps have also been used by other cartels and have been described as places where new cartel members are taught to “handle long and short weapons, to set ambushes, to respect the rules, not to be a gossip and also to kill.”

The cartels themselves have also shared the evolution of narco-warfare through online videos. In 2020, the CJNG shared a video showing more than 80 people carrying different caliber weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, military equipment, and several armored cars. The individuals in this video shouted slogans in support of the cartel’s leader, alias “Mencho,” and claimed to be members of the organization’s elite group.

Present and Future Implications

Improvements in the capabilities of Mexican cartels demonstrate that the risk posed by these organizations has increased exponentially, which is likely to further increase levels of violence throughout Mexico.

The cartels’ technological, warfare, and tactical advances indicate a high capacity for innovation. They have large sources of financial resources to fund such advances, have infiltrated Mexican security agencies, and will use their improvements to increase their profits, zones of influence, and power within the Mexican state.

The cartels’ equipment, weapons, vehicles, and fighters will make it more difficult for the Mexican security forces to operate since they will have to use more resources to combat illegal organizations, which are no longer simple criminal groups. Instead, they are organized groups with the ability to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks, mobilize large numbers of men and resources, and confront state forces with large-caliber weapons.

Therefore, despite the fact that today there is no clear solution to end the war on drug trafficking, it is necessary for the Mexican government to propose effective strategies to dismantle drug cartels, tracing high-caliber weapons, monitoring retired soldiers, and anti-drone and anti-armored vehicle capabilities. The risk that the cartels continue to improve their equipment and weapons is latent, so effective measures need to be taken as soon as possible to mitigate this risk and prevent the cartels from reaching the military capabilities of a conventional army.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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ELN
 by Rise to Peace

The Rise of Urban Terrorism in Colombia? ELN Involvement in Citizen Protests

During the last few years, there have been multiple protests in Colombia against the government. Thousands of people have taken to the streets to protest against issues such as tax reforms, government management, and police performance. However, although the ability to protest is a legitimate right, there have also been events that have affected security conditions in the country.  Colombian authorities have indicated that the National Liberation Army (ELN), one of the oldest terrorist groups in the country, is likely participating in the protests.

The Protests

Colombia had serious episodes of protests and riots throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021. Their objectives and motives were distinct, but they shared in their international recognition for their levels of violence and destruction.

The first major protest during the government of President Iván Duque was the national strike of November 21, also known as 21N. Some of the reasons that led to these protests included economic proposals, such as eliminating the state pension fund Colpensiones and increasing the retirement age. Also, protesters demanded more investment in public education, combating corruption in several universities, effective protection measures for indigenous and social leaders, as many have been assassinated, and the full implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, which was reached in 2016. The protests lasted until the beginning of 2020 and left approximately 769 people injured, more than 100 arrested, and six dead.

The next major series of protests in Colombia were those against the death of Javier Ordoñez in September 2020. The main reason for the protest was the murder of Javier Ordoñez by members of the national police in Bogota. Throughout September, there were clashes between protesters and police and multiple burnings of police stations, known as CAI. The protests resulted in 13 deaths, 72 CAI affected, and 581 injured, 75 of which were the result of firearms.

Finally, the most recent wave of protests occurred in April 2021 and was labeled the National Strike. These protests were primarily against a tax reform promoted by the government. The protests were characterized by their levels of violence and destruction. In fact, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between April 28 and July 31, reports attributed 63 deaths to the protests. To date, the UN has verified 46 deaths, of which 44 were civilians and two were police; 76% of victims died from gunshot wounds.

The Infiltration of the ELN

Colombian authorities have indicated that there is a high possibility that ELN militants infiltrated the protests to destabilize the country, attack members of the security forces, and cause damage to private and public property.

According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, the protests against police brutality in September 2020 were infiltrated by the ELN and other terrorist groups. The then Minister of Defense, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, stated that the acts of violence were systematic and aimed at destroying public property and citizen infrastructure dedicated towards security.

A few days after the Defense Ministry’s statements, the ELN acknowledged its participation in the protests against police brutality. Through a video on social networks, alias “Uriel,” an ELN leader, stated that the group sought to “put an end to the torture and death centers called CAI (Immediate Action Commandos) of the police”; also that the ELN’s urban militancy actively participates in protests and incites the use of homemade explosive devices.

ELN involvement in protests was also registered in the 2021 National Strike. In June 2021, ELN member alias “Fabian” was captured and storage devices were seized. The devices contained instructions from the ELN central command to inspire acts of vandalism, instructions to attack the police, and money transfer orders for individuals to attack security forces.

Eventually, the Colombian Ministry of Defense indicated that the ELN and FARC dissidents continue to act with the intention of financing violent and criminal activities, including vandalism and violence across Cali and Bogota. Also, reports indicate a potential presence of ELN members at the anti-government protests on July 20th, 2021.

Finally, in 2021 the Colombian National Police found evidence that the ELN had given protesters $70 million to organize attacks against the police and execute riots.

Urban Terrorism: A Challenge that Must be Addressed

The evidence that the ELN was involved in the protests in Colombia seems conclusive. Financing, infiltration of riots, incitement to cause destruction, and the distribution of propaganda are just some of the actions carried out by the ELN.

The ELN’s actions are of particular relevance as they demonstrate the existence of a challenge for the country’s authorities: urban terrorism that can be executed in Colombia’s main cities.

This modality of terrorism is particularly dangerous for the security of cities due to its characteristics. Urban terrorism can be carried out by a small number of people, its perpetrators can camouflage themselves among other demonstrators, it causes great damage to security forces for a low cost, and terrorists can use their propaganda to legitimize it because it occurs within citizen protests.

For this reason, it is necessary that Colombia, and other countries in the region with similar situations, strengthen their intelligence, terrorist identification, terrorist financing, and anti-riot capabilities to mitigate the risk posed by the presence of guerrillas and terrorist groups acting within citizen protests. State action must protect the lives of demonstrators, and public and private property, and avoid the deterioration of security conditions across the country.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Plan Colombia
 by Rise to Peace

Strategies to Combat Narco-Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Plan Colombia

During the 1990s, the U.S. and Colombian governments entered into a security and counternarcotics assistance agreement, known as Plan Colombia.

The strategy has been criticized both in favor and against due to its multiple impacts on security conditions in Colombia. For this reason, it is worthwhile to analyze its development and results in order to show how the strategies against drug terrorism have been implemented and what their effects have been.

What is the Plan Colombia?

At the end of the 20th century, the security situation in Colombia was extremely complex. The presence of drug traffickers, communist guerrillas, and the enormous extensions of coca hectares made it difficult for the Colombian State to guarantee territorial control and security throughout the country.

That is why in 1999, Colombian President Andres Pastrana and his U.S. counterpart, Bill Clinton, entered into a bilateral agreement called Plan Colombia. According to the Colombian National Planning Department, the Plan was an integral strategy of bilateral cooperation. The general objective is to combat illicit drugs and organized crime, in order to contribute to economic reactivation and the achievement of peace in Colombia, while strengthening control over the supply of illicit drugs on U.S. streets.

Plan Colombia had a 15-year duration and its initial budget was $7.5 billion, of which $1.6 billion was contributed by the United States. Between 2001 and 2016, the United States has reportedly provided an average of $404 million per year, prior to 2001 it was $262 million per year on average, to Plan Colombia.

However, in 2016, following a meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the transformation of the program and its nature was announced. Former President Obama stated that the new chapter of the U.S.-Colombia partnership would be called “Paz Colombia”, whose economic aid would be more than $450 million during 2017, in order to support human rights and victims’ rights in the framework of the Colombian peace process.

Plan Colombia’s Achievements

The implementation of Plan Colombia had considerable achievements and successes, which explain its continuity for 15 years. Some of its positive results include an improvement in special operations, intelligence, professionalism of the Armed Forces, respect for human rights, strengthening of the means to fight drug trafficking, and state presence with social investment in remote regions. Likewise, in terms of coca hectares, in 1999 there were about 200,000 hectares of coca cultivated, while in 2016 there were only 60,000 hectares.

Other positive impacts of the program were the continued strengthening of the country’s military forces as never before in history, advances in social policy, and improvements in security conditions.

In fact, according to the INDEPAZ foundation, Plan Colombia allowed the government to go on the offensive, retake initiatives, neutralize the guerrilla advance and change the correlation of forces in Colombia. Under the shadow of Plan Colombia and the Southern Command, the military and police forces in Colombia were restructured. Mountain brigades and battalions were reorganized. The army was professionalized and sustained tactical operations were defined in previously forbidden territories. The war and national defense budget tripled as a share of GDP and the force level reached the highest level in the history of six decades of counterinsurgency.

Likewise, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Philip Goldberg, pointed out that Plan Colombia was a successful strategy that should now be a beacon to solve the multiple problems still burdening Colombia. This is due to the fact that the Plan had positive effects such as the improvement in the supply and logistics systems, communications, intelligence planning and military and police equipment, resulting in more effective operations against the guerrillas.  Between 1999 and 2014 Colombia went from having 35 military helicopters to more than 200 and the number of professional soldiers increased from 23,000 to 88,000 in the same period of time.

In addition, the FARC guerrilla weakened from 25,000 men in 2002 to about 6,000 in 2013 and went from maintaining a presence in 555 municipalities to only 103 by the end of 2014.

The improvement in security conditions was reflected in the reduction of coca crops, the fact that violent actions by illegal groups decreased 66% between 2002 and 2015, and that attacks on physical infrastructure such as oil pipelines, energy towers, bridges and roads plummeted by 85%.

Finally, the program had a social investment component, as social policy programs such as Familias en Acción, Jóvenes en Acción and Empleo en Acción were created.

Critics of Plan Colombia

Despite its achievements and successes in improving security conditions in Colombia, Plan Colombia has also been criticized.  The Plan’s implementation has had negative consequences, such as that drug trafficking deepened and fragmented during the Plan Colombia, making it more difficult to combat, and there was a marked increase in the number of victims of Colombia’s internal conflict, with more than 800,000 people said to have been victimized in 2008.  In addition, there was an increase in illegal mining, which allows for the financing of illegal groups.

However, the greatest criticism of Plan Colombia has to do with the aspect of respect for human rights during its execution. The Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination (CCEEU) noted that Plan Colombia had serious human rights costs, such as since the beginning of the Plan, more than 6 million people were victimized, more than 4 million people were displaced, more than 4,300 civilians were allegedly killed by government military forces to increase the number of casualties, more than 1,000 trade unionists and 400 human rights defenders were killed, and countless women suffered sexual violence.

Some additional criticisms point out that Plan Colombia gave priority to military assistance over social programs, the lack of resources allocated to programs for the substitution of illicit crops, attention to the vulnerable and displaced population, reform of the judicial system and environmental protection, and that the fight against drugs in Colombia transferred the problem of drug trafficking and increased the levels of violence in several countries of the continent.

Balance of Plan Colombia: A Successful Strategy?

The figures show that Plan Colombia was a decisive factor for the Colombian State to overcome the critical public order situation at the end of the 1990s and to exponentially improve its capacity to confront the guerrillas, reduce coca crops and improve security conditions in a large part of the national territory.

In fact, the results achieved by Plan Colombia allowed the program to evolve and become “Peace Colombia”, since, thanks to the advances in military capabilities resulting from Plan Colombia, the Colombian State weakened the FARC guerrillas so much so that they had to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On the other hand, Plan Colombia also had negative consequences, especially in such sensitive aspects as the violation of human rights. Therefore, it is worth evaluating the achievements, vulnerabilities, lessons learned and failures of such a program in order to implement similar strategies in Colombia’s future or in other countries struggling in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism.

Finally, it must be understood that Plan Colombia is a strategy that was specifically designed to Colombia’s needs. Therefore, the implementation of similar programs in other regions must take into account the particular characteristics of their countries in order to achieve optimal results and impacts.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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GTI
 by Rise to Peace

The Global Terrorism Index: Results and Implications in Latin America

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2022 was recently published. Terrorist attacks in Latin America, the terrorist groups that perpetrate the attacks, and the relationship between terrorism and conflict are highlighted within the GTI.

The results of this document can provide valuable information for decision-makers to address terrorist threats in the region and mitigate their impact.

The GTI Report

According to the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), the GTI is a comprehensive study that analyzes the impact of terrorism in 163 countries covering 99.7% of the world’s population. This report is compiled using data from Terrorism Tracker and other sources.

The GTI produces a composite score to provide an ordinal ranking of countries in terms of the impact of terrorism. The GTI scores each country on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 representing no impact of terrorism and 10 representing the highest measurable impact of terrorism.

A notable finding from the 2022 GTI includes that despite the increase in attacks, the impact of terrorism continues to decline. In 2021, deaths from terrorism decreased by 1.2%, while attacks increased by 17%, highlighting that terrorism’s lethality is decreasing.

Two-thirds of countries recorded no terrorist attacks or deaths, while 86 countries recorded an improvement in their GTI score.

The number of deaths has remained roughly the same over the past four years. The GTI also notes that terrorism remains an ongoing threat and is becoming increasingly concentrated, compounding in countries already suffering from violent conflict.

Latin America’s GTI Results

The GTI revealed that there are challenges in Latin America’s terrorism and security.  Although some countries have improved compared to 2021, some countries have worsened, which is a risk factor for their national security.

According to the report,  five South American countries improved their GTI score, four worsened, and two countries had no change.  Additionally, terrorism-related deaths declined by 41% between 2020 and 2021.

“However, the overall level of terrorism remains much higher than a decade ago, with Chile, Peru and Argentina significantly increasing their levels of terrorism in 2021, compared to 2011. In total, there have been 1,835 deaths from terrorism in South America since 2007, the fourth lowest total of any region.”

Also, common actors involved in the terrorist acts include Mapuche extremists and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN).  In fact, the GTI notes that Colombia has the highest impact of terrorism in the region, a position it has held for the past decade, despite a minor improvement between 2011 and 2021.

Whereas Peru recorded one terror attack in 2021, which killed 16 people.  The attack was perpetrated by the Shining Path, a communist terrorist organization.

Finally, Colombia ranks 14th, Chile 18th, Peru 37th, Venezuela 46th and Ecuador 56th in their global GTI rankings.

Implications for the Region

The GTI report provides valuable information to analyze the number of terrorist attacks, impacted regions, casualties, annual changes, trends, and improvements or deteriorations in a country’s status.

Therefore, with the information from the GTI policymakers can make decisions focused on the challenges of their country or region.

In the case of Latin America, countries such as Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela must implement security policies focused on reducing the impact of terrorism in their states and reducing the capacity of terrorist groups operations.

Countries such as Brazil and Bolivia should continue to implement their existing practices and improve on their current vulnerabilities, in order to not drop in ranking.

Multilateral organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) should focus their efforts to provide assistance to the most affected countries.

Additionally, some of the countries most affected by terrorism have already taken action.  Colombia has taken counter-terrorism measures such as increasing the security footprint in cities like Cali, In Peru, President Castillo urged to prioritize the fight against terrorism and pandemics. Also, the recently elected President of Chile, Gabriel Boric, seeks to improve on counter-terrorism efforts in southern Chile.

In conclusion, Latin America faces threats from various terrorist groups, yet the threat level and impact varies between each country. Ultimately, terrorism is still an ongoing challenge in in Latin America and although efforts have been made to combat terrorism, it continues to affect the lives of countless innocent Latin Americans.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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