Rise to Peace blog

 by Cameron Hoffman

Could US Retaliation for ISIL Strike Influence Afghan Peace Talks?

On April 9, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant -Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) claimed responsibility for rocket strikes on an important United States airbase. The strikes resulted in zero casualties, but have the potential to spark retaliation from the US while it negotiates troop withdrawl as part of their deal with the Taliban. This could derail already fragile negotiations.

ISIL-KP has been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks targeting the Taliban, Afghan citizens, and the US-backed Afghan government in the past few years. Though they control little territory, their strength has been assessed at approximately 2,000 fighters limited to North-East Afghanistan. Stalled peace talks and the recent prisoner release debacle offer ISIL-KP a window of opportunity and indicate why the group chose to strike now — nearly six months since its last claimed major attack. Simply put, ISIL-KP is trying to disrupt the peace talks to keep the US in Afghanistan.

Terrorist groups like ISIL-KP thrive on instability and chaos as they develop in the shadows of larger players and conflicts. These groups utilize destruction and economic disparity to increase their numbers and influence. However, if the US leaves Afghanistan, ISIL-KP lose the cover of the US-Taliban conflict to hide their actions.

The Taliban can focus on dismantling smaller insurgent and terrorist organizations as a consolidation of power in the case that the US leaves Afghanistan. ISIL-KP is not an exception to this rule as they are unable to match the strength of the Taliban. Therefore, it is assumed that the ISIL-KP attack was an attempt to keep the US in the region by destabilizing the peace talks.

If the Taliban and the US continue to fight each other — in the battlefield or the negotiation table — then ISIL-KP survival is expected. It is very likely that violent attacks of some kind will continue because deterioration of the peace talks is crucial to the longevity of ISIL-KP. Now is not the time for the US to be sidetracked and fall into a trap set by ISIL-KP.

Any strikes in Afghanistan can be used as pretext for the Taliban to retaliate as well as lose whatever little trust they have in the US. The Taliban could pull out of the already fragile negotiations and this is not something the US can risk. Too much is at stake and too much can go wrong.

In order to demonstrate that the US will keep its troop withdrawal commitments, now is not the time to retaliate against ISIL-KP. Energy must be focused toward the present negotiations and building trust with the Taliban. The strike on the US airbase may be cause for concern, but it cannot be a distraction from the mission at hand: leaving Afghanistan.

– Cameron Hoffman

in Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Disparate Positions Stall Afghan Peace Talks Yet Again

Although the United States-Taliban agreement outlined the release of 5000 Taliban prisoners, the Ghani regime stalled the process before they reluctantly agreed to the release of 100 fighters. The Taliban remain upset that the entirety of their jailed fighters have not been released and such reversals prompted the Taliban technical team charged with prisoner swap negotiations to leave the discussion table frustrated days prior.

Peace seems impossible as both sides push partisan agendas and a serious political stalemate has derailed any intra-Afghan dialogue. As a consequence of this perennial dirty politicking, violent attacks on military personnel across Afghanistan began shortly after talks collapsed.

Undoubtedly, this is a fraught period for Afghanistan in general. Citizens struggle with COVID-19 while political crisis hampers any wider development. The Afghan government has been cynical of any peace talks from the start as they consider this development as a threat to their power.

Further, the Taliban seek the complete release of their prisoners. Tremendous effort has been applied in this regard, such as the recently released list of negotiators with the Taliban and a decrease in suicide bombings after the United States and the Taliban signed a peace deal in late February. On top of this, Washington decided to boycott integral aid as a method to pressure Afghan leaders to power-share through compromise.

The United States Has Stakes in the Peace Process

Presidential administrations have different objectives in Afghanistan. Under the George W. Bush administration, the 2001 US intervention sought to topple the Taliban, eliminate Osama bin Laden, and free Afghanistan. President Trump simply wants to end the US’ longest war he deemed as a “waste” and fulfill his 2016 campaign promise to bring troops home. As a result, his administration introduced a series of policies, such as the South East Strategy and the appointment of a special envoy to sign a deal with the Taliban. In a meeting with Afghan representatives, Zalmay Khalilzad once expressed, “I’m not a representative of Bush who asked me to restore Afghanistan, I’m a representative of Trump who wants our troops out.”

The Afghan government cannot understand or refuses to grasp that Washington will fulfill its stated objectives even if Kabul refuses to release prisoners or delay intra-Afghan dialogues. As Fawzia Koofi (member of the negotiating team and former MP) states, “The Afghan government is pressuring the US to recognize the Afghan government and in return, they will release the prisoners.”

Afghans will pay the price if the current government continues to delay the peace process — such as the $1 million cut in aid and suspended projects after US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo failed to resolve the turmoil between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Anytime the government postpones the release of prisoners or stall the peace process, the Taliban retaliate violently. In one single attack in Zabul last month, 28 Afghan forces were killed by the Taliban.

Are the Taliban Willing To Make Peace?

The US agreement signified victories for which the Taliban fought for 18 years: recognition and the withdrawal of US troops. Consequently, the Taliban have used it to disseminate propaganda against the weakened Afghan government. However, a lack of unity among the Taliban remains a barrier to peace though leadership and a sizable portion of the group are interested in further gains through diplomatic negotiations.

Taliban leadership and their masterminds understand that there is no return to the Islamic Emirate of the 1990s; therefore, they are willing to compromise on an Islamic type of regime — one that is acceptable to the wider Afghan government and Taliban interests. This is a principal topic of the peace process that is explicitly puzzling and debatable.

Something that remains misunderstood, primarily in Afghanistan, is that the Taliban agreed to a reduction of violence, but not a ceasefire. Violence remains the Taliban’s preferred tactic and remains vital in their power plays to force the Afghan government to retaliate militarily. Without violence, the Taliban is nothing.

Until they reach a deal with the Afghan negotiation team, the Taliban will continue on a violent path towards their ultimate goal of an Islamic Emirate. Peace will not prevail in the sole context of a US-Afghan agreement, as 22 other terrorist organizations, such as Daesh and increased activity by Chinese militants in new groups, continue their battles.

The route to peace in Afghanistan is complex and it will not be easy. Nonetheless, there is a sense of hope among Afghans that decades of civil war and extremist regimes, like the 1980s and 1990s, are behind them. The peace process will go nowhere if the current political stalemate does not come to an end. Leadership and cooperation are key to any ceasefire and the start of intra-Afghan dialogues.

in Ahmad Mohibi / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Afghan Negotiators Are Ready To Talk to the Taliban

The Afghan government finally released the list of negotiators that should discuss peace with the Taliban. Afghanistan has been drifting from one hardship to another for over 19 years, and keeping sight of priorities amid great turmoil has become everyday practice. As the country contends with 170 confirmed cases of COVID-19 as a current hurdle, the Afghan government delivered a list of delegates intended to start intra-Afghan negotiations and secure a ceasefire.

Khalid Noor, among the designated members of the newly announced negotiating team, told Rise to Peace in an exclusive interview: “Members of this negotiating team come from all walks of society, and especially from the new generation. I think this team will work to defend the rights of Afghan women and men, their freedoms and their gains over the past 18 years, while also protecting the Republic of Afghanistan and its constitution.” Addressing Afghan citizens, Noor continued, “we are representing all Afghans in Afghanistan. To anyone in any corner of Afghanistan, we will defend and represent them. Our address is our people and our regime.”

The move shows important progress has been made towards achieving the goals stipulated in the United States-Taliban agreement. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo denounced the two competing presidents — Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah — for their incapacity to resolve the disputes that hinder the peace process, and suspended $1 billion worth of US aid for Afghanistan. Notwithstanding, after months of controversy and disagreement, Afghan leadership mobilized and put together a list of negotiators for holding peace talks with the Taliban. The list was also endorsed by Abdullah Abdullah. The start of intra-Afghan dialogues would be a premiere for the peace process, as until now Afghan parties only interacted indirectly.

The team of negotiators is part of a two-fold effort to further peace in Afghanistan. Whereas the announced negotiation team will engage directly in talks with the Taliban, the decisions regarding the substance of the discussions and their strategic goals will be decided by a High-Level Political Conciliation Committee. Consultations for the establishment of the Committee are ongoing, but government representatives have agreed already on appointing Abdul Rasul Sayyaf as the head of the High Level Committee. The decision making committee should include all major political leaders of Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the negotiating team is itself a major breakthrough, presenting diversity among negotiator profiles and political affiliations. The list contains 21 persons coming from political parties, local leaders, civil society organizations, and the Afghan government. Both European Union representatives and the US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad congratulated the Afghan Government and expressed support for the newly established team, recognizing the importance of diversity.

The negotiating delegation is headed by Masoom Stanikzai — former head of the Afghan intelligence agency — and includes representatives of both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, as well as five women and youth. The proposed negotiations team also accommodates Kalimullah Naqibi, the deputy head of Jamiat-e-Islami party, Amin Karim representing Hizb-e-Islami in the delegation and a member of the Ulema Council (full list here).

The Taliban responded to the negotiation team proposal with reservations. While they do not contest the assignment of most of the team members, they oppose the appointment of Masoom Stanikzai, especially because of his cooperation with the communist regime in the 1980s. The list was also criticized for not being inclusive enough, and for failing to ensure participation of local community leaders and of representatives of Afghanistan’s multiple ethnicities. Nevertheless, the Taliban have no option than to accept the negotiating team proposal.

But Taliban resistance to accept negotiation goes far beyond who the negotiators are – they are fighting for broader political gains and violence is the way to it. While progress seemed to be made for the release of Taliban prisoners, the government was compelled to postpone the release once more over Taliban violence. The US-Taliban Agreement stipulated that up to 5000 prisoners of the Taliban should be released by the Afghan government before the beginning of negotiations, and during the most recent talks the release was set to start on March 31. Extensive clashes between Taliban and government forces took place across Afghanistan, Taliban terrorism culminating with the killing of 28 Afghan soldiers in four provinces.

Whereas consistent progress has been made towards achieving peace, the road ahead is complex. “It is a positive step towards peace, it is an inclusive team so far, but it is hard to predict how this is going to go” said Khalid Noor. Even if this team may not achieve a ceasefire, it can work towards a reduction of violence.

Three key challenges most likely lie ahead.

  • The type of political regime to be instituted in Afghanistan will be among the most contentious issue that will arise during intra-Afghan talks. The country’s constitution is already Islamic, but the Taliban will be reluctant to accept any form of political pluralism, further complicating decisions over the country’s future.
  • No Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) plan for the 50 to 60 000 Taliban fighters has been discussed, and peace depends largely on DDR. Amid the gradual withdrawal of the US military, the Afghan government will remain — rightly so — reluctant to the release of Taliban prisoners. Peace is a trust building exercise, and the Taliban have shown little reasons to be trusted.
  • Neighboring countries are likely to influence talks, and for now external intervention remains the most uncertain and ambiguous component of the peace process.
in Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Rise to Peace

Potential Risks and Rewards of the Impending Mass Taliban Prisoner Release

As a primary development arising from the United States-Taliban peace deal (now earmarked as the ‘Doha Deal’), on February 29, Afghanistan’s government agreed to the release of 5000 Taliban fighters from prison, coupled with the Taliban release of 1000 Afghan National Security Force soldiers. The approaching mass release of political prisoners is being heralded as a major step towards the relieving of extreme tensions between the Afghan government and the Taliban across the region, as well as a precondition for future intra-Afghan peace talks. However, questions arise regarding the potential consequences of such a substantial development in the Afghan Peace Process.

Concerns Regarding the Release of 5000 Convicted Taliban Fighters

The agreed upon mass release of the imprisoned Taliban fighters has raised major concerns throughout Afghan society, frightened at the potential threat that could be posed to national security upon their release. This is especially relevant when considering that, in the case of the Doha Deal, it is not only the release of the Taliban prisoners that has been agreed upon, but also the steady withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan, which could leave a growing security vacuum in its wake.

As a measure to prevent the feared threat of post-release violence, Afghan authorities demand a written, pre-release statement from each convicted Taliban fighter, which acts as an assurance that they will not return to the battlefield. However, the signing of an agreement, of course, does not produce an absolute guarantee that the released prisoners will not ultimately go back to fighting. This issue has been further accentuated as it also seems as though no clear strategies have been developed to counter this possible eventuality, meaning that the Afghan government’s only insurance is the written promise of 5000 convicted Taliban fighters.

Regardless of these overarching issues, the whole deal has already been overshadowed with concerns from the Afghan government regarding the time-span and numbers of the eventual release of prisoners; arguing that the release of the prisoners must be a major element of the intra-Afghan negotiations, instead of acting as a precondition.

All of these aforementioned points have one thing in common; concisely, there is major concern regarding the trustworthiness of the Taliban in this deal.

Is the Mass Release of Convicted Taliban Fighters a Major Step Towards Peace?

Certain historical comparisons can be made to illustrate the potential positive outcomes that could arise from the utilization of the mass release of political prisoners as a tool for establishing peace; a lesson that can be learnt from Ethiopia’s recent mass release of political prisoners in 2018.

Throughout the latter half of 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed pardoned 13,000 political prisoners that had been charged with terrorism or treason. Many of whom were affiliated with the secessionist groups the ‘Oromo Liberation Front’ (OLF) and the ‘Ogaden National Liberation Front’ (ONLF), both of which were previously considered to be terrorist organisations.

One of the primary intentions of this decision was to establish more peaceful relations with the OLF & ONLF groups. And in this regard specifically, the benefits of this decision turned out to be highly successful. Alongside the pardoning of many of its convicted-members, and the legalization of the two secessionist groups, major steps towards peace transpired. The widespread disarming and reintegration of previously convicted prisoners, ceasefires, and an eventual peace agreement between the Ethiopian state and the OLF & ONLF subsequently came almost directly after the widespread pardons.

This example can be used in many ways, especially when compared to that of the current ‘Doha Deal’ of the Afghan Peace Process, and allow the development of certain predictions as to how the events following the mass release of prisoners may transpire. This is just one of many comparisons which can be made in order to highlight that the mass release of political prisoners in Afghanistan could result in the immediate easing of tensions between the Afghan state and the Taliban. With the agreed upon disarmament of released Taliban prisoners, ceasefires and further peace agreements would simply follow-suit if one is to draw comparisons between the Afghan situation and that of other similar cases in modern history.

However, when considering the differentiating situation in Afghanistan, in which the Taliban have violently responded to the Afghan government’s failure to immediately release all prisoners, the current instability is potentially extremely detrimental to the future progress of the deal. Steadily increasing violence, and political bartering between the parties of the agreement, could spell disaster for future negotiations; and in the midst of such turmoil, the idea of the establishment of ceasefires and further agreements between the parties seems almost too far beyond reach.

What Conclusions Can Be Drawn from the Current Situation?

The mass release of political prisoners in Afghanistan as a component of the ‘Doha Deal’ can be considered to be a major step in the Afghan Peace Process. When looking for answers from comparable historical cases, one can suggest that this could be one of the most important decisions for the pursuit of an eventual peaceful conclusion to one of the most controversial and influential conflicts in modern history.

However, considering the extreme violence and tension already arising from the newly conceived deal, and the need for mutual trust and flexibility for the success of this agreement, a predictable outcome to this prisoner release perhaps seems farfetched. Or perhaps it is all too predictable when considering the various collapses which have plagued the many attempts at peaceful negotiation throughout the ever evolving Afghan Peace process.

in Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Ahmad Mohibi

US Cuts Aid to Afghanistan as Leaders Fail To Create a Unity Government

On March 23, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made an urgent trip to Kabul, Afghanistan in an effort to end the ongoing political turmoil in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. This political stalemate is rooted in the rivalry between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah and their inability to reach an agreement to form a unity government. As a result, subsequent negotiations with the Taliban are on hold until this issue can be resolved.

Hopes were high in the Afghan capital that an inclusive government could be formed under the circumstances of Pompeo’s visit, but in return, the US cut $ 1 billion in aid for 2020 and yet another $1 billion for 2021. In addition, American involvement in certain projects would be reduced. This latest incident induces a state of fear and uncertainty in the Afghan population over the future of their country as half of the population lives in poverty.

US-Taliban Agreement

Last month, the US and the Taliban reached a ‘historic agreement’ in the presence of the international community. It was set to pave the way for intra-Afghan dialogues.

As per the agreement, the US agreed to a reduction of its forces from 12,000 to 8,600 within 135 days of the agreement and a withdraw all of its troops in 14 months. Further, the Afghan government was obliged to release 5000 prisoners and intra-Afghan dialogues were originally set to commence on March 10.

After the agreement, the Taliban demanded the immediate release of their prisoners before March 10. The Afghan government did not release them and delayed the process while preoccupied with the election results. As a consequence, the Taliban engaged in a series of violent attacks and carried out operations across Afghanistan. In a single attack in Zabul province this week, 36 Afghan soldiers were killed by the Taliban.

“The release of prisoners in the current situation has turned into a pressure tool where the Afghan government is pressuring the US to recognize the Afghan government and in return, they will release the prisoners,” said Fawzia Koofi, former MP and leader of Movement for Change in Afghanistan.

What do the two doctors — Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah — want?

Simply put, both seek power. In the presidential elections of September 2019, 1.82 million votes (out of 9.5 million registered voters) were counted with 300, 000 of them disputed. As a result, President Ghani was declared victorious with 50.64% of the vote in comparison to the 39.52% achieved by his political rival. Abdullah Abdullah claims that the disputed votes were not in the biometric system and should not have been counted even though they were.

This is only the beginning of the political disorder, but surely not the last example. In 2014, both candidates nearly twirled Afghanistan into a political crisis as the US Secretary of State John Kerry brokered a deal to create the National Unity Government (NUG).

Abdullah Abdullah, a Tajik by ethnicity, is a three-time presidential nominee while Ashraf Ghani is a Pashtun technocrat. While Ghani has foreign donors due to his strong Western ties, Abdullah Abdullah is linked to a wide range of political leaders, including ‘warlords.’ Therefore, political connections complicate any resolution to the election impasse. Besides this, mass election fraud occurred and realistically speaking, 700,000 votes are not a true representation of Afghanistan. It is imperative that the country create an inclusive system of governance given the prior situation of the failed 2014 elections and the creation of a National Unity Government. This is in the best interest of Afghanistan.

Only the US can create peace in Afghanistan

There is a strong sense in Afghanistan that the Afghan conflict could be brought to an end in weeks if the US truly wanted and decided this outcome. Behind every new government or major decision, most Afghans blame or place responsibility on the US, just as they do for the presidential elections.

“Nobody knows the future of peace in Afghanistan because the deal between the US and Taliban is classified. The two sides must be honest in their intentions of peace,” said Mohammad Almas Zahid (Haje Almas), Presidential Senior Advisor and Special Representative for National Solidarity Affairs, to Ahmad Mohibi of Rise to Peace.

While the two leaders blame each other for the US decision to cut aid, it is critical for the Afghan leaders to comprise and avert the cancellation of any further aid as the drawdown of financial support will critically hurt Afghanistan. This is akin to the Soviet cut of support to the last communist regime in the early 1990s. Removal of aid at that time was one reason directly correlated to the collapse of the Najibullah government. To put this in a modern perspective, Afghan National Security Forces Salaries, as well as others, depend on US support.

“If the government does not pay the soldiers, they will leave the army the next day”, said Ainuddin Bakir, a former commando officer who is now working in a private security company in Kabul.

It is wise for the two leaders and broader political community to set aside their differences and work towards unity. They must unite in order to save lives from Taliban attacks and the ongoing pandemic. Secretary Pompeo’s visit in the wake of COVID-19 to mediate demonstrates strong US interest in ending the US’ longest war and jumpstarting the Afghan peace process. Afghan leaders failed to do their homework and now face the risk of losing the US as a strategic partner.

in Ahmad Mohibi / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments