Rise to Peace Crime, Punishment and Deradicalization

Crime, Punishment and Deradicalization

Deradicalization programming is an essential element in wider reintegration efforts of individuals who have fallen victim to extremist philosophies, however analysts often critique any inefficiencies of such initiatives. This is often the case when individuals convicted of past terrorism infractions later go on to commit subsequent acts. A legal case earlier this year of a Bosnian citizen and the emergent deradicalization process inherent in the Balkan nation reiterate the actuality that any such initiatives are complex and require multifaceted solutions.

Legal Precedence

In a European context, Bosnia presented a unique situation as the small Balkan nation exported the most foreign fighters per capita in comparison to other continental states. Attention later transitioned to how the fragile nation would manage complicated issues related to repatriation,  trying citizens through appropriate legal channels, and deradicalization programming in the immediate post-caliphate period.

The case of Munib Ahmetspahić is not unique in the context that an individual was tried and convicted for terrorism-related offences. Ahmetspahić had travelled to Syria to fight on behalf of Daesh twice and received a three-year prison sentence for these actions upon his return to Bosnia. Rather, the legal proceedings are notable because Ahmetspahić is the first foreign fighter to be medically certified as deradicalized.

Psychologists and psychiatrists reached this conclusion after seriously studying the statements made by the former foreign fighter. Ahmetspahić spoke bluntly about his regrets and expressed that he had been manipulated to take part in the terrorist campaigns through false propaganda. Once on the battleground in Syria, he witnessed a corrupt situation in which specific individuals fought for personal power and advancement, rather than the promotion of wider objectives for the Muslim people, as he originally thought. The loss of his brother, amputation of a leg, and wanting to be a part of the lives of his children initiated the first pangs of a deradicalized mindset. Any sort of rehabilitation cannot proceed without a serious reflection of conscience and personal acknowledgement of guilt.

Faulty Programming and Better Approaches

More often than not, anytime a previously incarcerated individual with terrorist-related convictions makes headlines, critics highlight the failures of the penal system and its deradicalization programming. This is an extremely ‘low-hanging fruit’ sort of critique as anyone with knowledge of how prison programs work knows that they are often underfunded, understaffed, restricted to a set amount of sessions that often do not cover all aspects, and success is dependent upon the attentiveness of the inmate. Perhaps, this is an issue with academic analysis because those trained in academia often present detached abstract solutions based on theoretical outcomes without first-hand experience or little to no contact with those personally influenced by the criminal underworld.

Deradicalization programs in this setting may be beneficial to those willing to absorb the lessons and engage in an examination of self, but recidivism in other aspects of crime with specific programming, such as narcotics offences and addiction counselling, teaches prison is indeed a revolving door. For instance, psychologists speaking in reference to the Ahmetspahić case highlight that, “neither radicalization nor deradicalization can happen overnight” and “little can be done if an individual has not already come to question their own actions.”

In both cases, inmates are asked to shed either a philosophy or a chemical that has taken a hold of their psyche, physical being and how they engage with their communities. And thus, any remedy requires an intensive and holistic approach that extends beyond punishment, but into the realms of intensive mental health services, social work, and supportive frameworks post-release.

Further, specific needs of the individual must be tailored into such programming and this cannot be done in a prison setting with its aforementioned issues. It is clear that these elements require not only a long-haul approach, but devoted resources too. For this reason, neuro-psychiatrist Ćemalović states that, “there is no patented deradicalization procedure” and such an endeavour requires systemic cooperation with society and religious communities.

The Wayward

It is prudent to acknowledge that not all radicalization cases can be effectively neutralized as hardcore proponents of extremism become so enmeshed with ideologies that they never relinquish hate or violence. Nonetheless, the Ahmetspahić case presents as one that has similar characteristics to many others.

In 2013, he was acquitted of destroying evidence connected to an armed attack on the United States Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011 and this experience fostered a sense of disillusionment with the Bosnian state. Ahmetspahić was a resident of Gornja Maoča — a village known as a stronghold of Islamist extremism in the Balkans. Employment opportunities were offered to wayward young men in the battlefields of Syria and it seemed like a profitable idea. A lawyer that worked with Ahmetspahić contends that he was not religiously radicalized, but rather, looking for a path.

The same conclusion can be applied to young people in other parts of the world that feel as though they have few prospects ahead of them. As an example, it has been noted that extremist groups often focus their recruitment drives in areas of economic downturn or working-class neighbourhoods. Arthur Snell, a former government official in the United Kingdom in charge of an anti-extremist program, once stated in an interview that, “They almost universally were young men without much sense of direction or status, and by joining the insurgency… they felt for the first time in their lives that they mattered, that they were doing something important, almost heroic.”

Similar feelings of disillusionment and the inability to escape environments that cause one’s psyche to question social arrangements often lead to the adoption of extremist thinking or alignment with others that feel the same way. However, it does not mean that this cannot be overturned with the proper resources that direct individuals to education, gainful employment, and positive social interactions. As such, it is difficult to ask a radicalized person (or released prisoner, for that matter) to make the transition to a peaceful existence if they are released from prison without adequate tools for the job market and return to the same communities that stoked extremist thinking in the past. These are resource-heavy solutions, but they must be examined and acknowledged as imperative.

Incarceration is an integral part of the crime and punishment of terrorism offences in societies with punitive legal systems. However, significant attention must be focused on the rehabilitative aspects not only behind bars, but especially when an individual has been released. The prison environment is one in which convicts become used to routine and program completion is often a mandatory part of release preparation, but reentry into communities is more difficult than it appears. It is this period of deradicalization programming that is indeed the most important and while ‘one size does not fit all’, networks focused on mental health care and skills development are primary needs.

Afghan Peace Talks: Interests and Uncertainties

It has been more than a month since inter-Afghan negotiations started in Doha, Qatar. Within this period, they have come close to an agreement on procedural rules and this is important as direct negotiation will commence once both parties agree on a framework at the negotiation table.

Right now, two disputed articles are a source of dispute resolution during negotiations and highlight the relevance of the United States-Taliban agreement. The Taliban want Hanafi Fiqh to be the only source for dispute resolutions and insist that the US-Taliban agreement should be treated as the ‘mother deal’.

Progress in negotiations, however slow, is obvious. It may take time but there are hopes among both parties that an agreement can be reached. Yet, reaching an agreement will not be the end of the road. The Taliban have failed to deliver on their promise of reducing violence. Recently, the US military targeted Taliban strongholds in Helmand province stating that their actions have not been consistent with the deal. This is not a large-scale conflict, but it indicates that the Taliban are not honest about their agreement with the US. It would be hard, therefore, to be optimistic about their honesty with the Afghan government if an agreement is reached.

Recently Amrullah Saleh, the first vice president of Afghanistan, reemphasized that the Taliban are a terrorist group based in, and supported by, Pakistan. He foresaid with confidence that the Taliban would melt in the society after a peace agreement and would soon have no public support at all. This may not be 100% accurate, but it signifies an important point about the interests of the negotiating parties. The Taliban understand that they can well secure their interests and goals through war, extremism, terror, and tyranny.

The Afghanistan government, on the other hand, knows that they win through peace, democracy, and ensuring civil and political liberties. Peace for the Taliban would mean giving up on their key means of coming to power (i.e. war) as gaining power through democratic institutions seems very unlikely for them not to say that it is against their religious systems of governance and liberties. This makes reaching an agreement hard if not impossible.

Both parties will need to meet in an intersection where their interests overlap. Perhaps, this could be achieved through a balance in political and military power which is more easily said than done. If forced to a political settlement, the Taliban would definitely propose special structures of governance to ensure they remain in power later on.

The US approach to bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table has probably intensified problems. Now, they have a deal with the US and have had 5000 prisoners released. Yet, they have not reduced violence in spite of their participation in the negotiations with the Afghan government. Apparently, the Taliban are misusing US diplomacy as well as the fact that the Afghan government has failed to bring all political parties under a united umbrella. Currently, the leading political parties such as Jamiat-e-Islami, led by the former foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, Junbush-e-Milli led by Marshal Dostum, and Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, are the government oppositions after the controversial results of the 2020 presidential elections.

An alternative approach would have been regional pressure on the Taliban as well as increasing military attacks on them temporarily in order to force them to negotiate. Such an approach could have signaled to the Taliban that war is not their dominant strategy and their only option would be giving in to a political settlement. Particularly, international pressure on Pakistan to dismantle Taliban headquarters (especially the Quetta Shura) in its land would have been fundamentally effective. However, Pakistan has been a resort to all terrorist groups in Afghanistan and despite the fact that bin Laden was killed in this country, the US and international community have never exerted enough pressure on this country to take effective measures against these groups.

Pakistan could, at the very least, bring its ‘boys’ to negotiations with lower demands if this approach was used. Some analysts believe, though, that the US war against the Taliban is a sheer waste of time and resources. They argue that the US has no interest in Afghanistan anymore as the main goal of eliminating Al-Qaeda has already been achieved. They believe this is not a US war but the continuation of a civil war that started after the coup for the presidency in the 70s and, therefore, should be left to the Afghans themselves to resolve it.

One important aspect of the uncertainties is associated with ethnic and religious complexities in Afghanistan. Some analysts have highlighted the Pashtun ethnic basis of the Taliban movement as they emerged to fight a non-Pashtun government/leadership after the war against the Soviet Union. Some Pashtun elites referred to that transfer of power as the decline of the Pashtuns back then and believed it was more significant than the defeat of communism. That was probably a reason that the Taliban gained public support among the majority of Pashtuns back in 1996 and fought the resistance groups mainly consisting of non-Pashtun ethnicities. Circumstances might have changed but the complexities are still in place.

Another issue would be religious jurisdictions. As noted before, the Taliban insist on using the Sunni-Hanafi sect as the source of solving disputes in the negotiations. One can hardly predict that they accept the Shia sect, in which almost all Hazaras believe when it comes to laws and dispute resolution in the country. Considering all these diversities, some politicians from the former resistance groups (against the Taliban) ask for reforms in the political structure and believe that a decentralized system would have the capacity to include all in the future.

Prospects seem unclear at this point but time will clear uncertainties as the negotiations start. If resulting in peace, the negotiations will be an unprecedented success in the history of Afghanistan.

Rise to Peace Tik TOk

What Role Does TikTok Play in Radicalization?

TikTok is the fastest growing social media application currently available. It has surpassed two billion downloads globally and despite its typical lighthearted content, TikTok has not been immune from extremist content.

As an example, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has actively used the application since 2019 as a recruitment tool as another element in its social media networking. This development requires analysis in regard to questions of national security.

Per the Social Contract Theory, states are responsible for the implementation of measures meant to protect its citizenry from conditions that threaten their human rights.

TikTok and social media in general present unique challenges to national security policies and legislation, such as managing the risk of radicalization across demographics. For example, according to Statista 32.5% of TikTok users range from ten to nineteen years old while 29.5% range from the ages nineteen and twenty. This data is significant once placed into the context of a recent study in which the authors concluded that users of the social media platform are more likely to be manipulated by the content they see.

Per Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, internet companies are not legally responsible for the content they host if it was published by someone else. The act allows users to post about controversial political topics online.

With an increase of users on social media platforms, amendments need to be made that ensure social platforms such as Tik-Tok can be held responsible if there is evidence of negligence in the removal of terrorism-related content. Tik-Tok has addressed the use of its platform by terrorist organizations and will ban any accounts and associated devices as soon as they are identified.

It is important that social media companies implement policies and technologies that identify extremist accounts especially on fast-growing and extremely popular ones like TikTok.

Confronting terrorist organizations and stemming their propaganda will markedly impact their radicalization networks and in turn, limit the number of successful recruitments to the cause. Therefore, weakening these networks as part of a wider digital counter-extremism effort upheld by private and public sectors is vital.

The use of TikTok by terrorist organizations, such as ISIL, to spread propaganda is evident of two key issues. Firstly, they are not going anywhere anytime soon, and secondly, obtaining access to social media platforms is not an issue for them.

TikTok’s ‘no-tolerance’ response to terrorist organizations utilizing their social media platform as a recruitment and indoctrination tool provides a level of trust with TikTok’s creator ByteDance, despite other privacy concerns.

Combatting terrorism domestically and internationally is a lofty enough task for the United States government as well as for its allies.  The additional strain digital terrorism poses adds another level of concern.

Extremism on social media networks, and on the Dark Web for the matter, is even more complex as it is harder to confront unseen threats that cannot be contained. This is why it is so vital that the implementations of new policies and the amendments to old ones must include technological developments if they are to provide security for citizens of the state. It is, after all, the responsibility of the state to combat terrorism in all forms that threaten the well-being of citizens.

In conclusion, past policies that have been implemented prior to the increased variety and usage of social media platforms, such as the Communications Decency Act, should be re-examined. Amendments should be discussed, especially in the context of the fast-developing digital world.

–Clarissa Lopez

What Does Iran Get From the Afghan Peace Process?

The Afghan Peace Process involves not only the parties at the negotiation table, but also regional outside actors. Iran is recognized to be an actor with, “Enormous capacity to help or hinder the political stability of its neighbors and, thus, advance or retard U.S. interests in the Middle East.” This article will look into Iran’s involvement in the Afghan Peace Process and what exactly Iran wants.

Iranian Objectives

Firstly, Iran seeks a greater influence in Kabul so they can increase their power in the region. Researchers mention, “The U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan may lead to greater instability and a vacuum in that country. The Islamic Republic of Iran, one the most powerful regional actors in Afghanistan, is poised to exercise substantial influence there after the U.S. drawdown.”

Secondly, Iran wants economic development. The economic sanctions from the United States towards Iran affects Iran’s oil industry and development in the country. Many Iranians are also dependent on the water from the Helmand River.

Thirdly, Iran wants a stable Afghanistan as instability creates a threat of terrorism in Iran. Iran supported the American-led invasion against the Taliban and local communities in the eastern part of the country have been targeted by the Taliban.

Fourthly, Iran has close ties with the Taliban. Iran has assisted the Taliban’s with weapons, conducting military training, but also top Taliban leaders have traveled to Tehran for consultation. It is also reported that Iran paid bounties to the Taliban to conduct attacks on American and coalition troops.

Iran-Afghan Government relationship

In July, the Iranian and Afghan governments signed an agreement for “comprehensive cooperation” in the economic, cultural, educational, and security sectors.Afghanistan will “back down” from its position over the contested Helmand waters in return.

Another Iranian interest is the Afghan population with between one to three million living as refugees in Iran. After Pakistan, Iran hosts the most Afghan refugees. Therefore, it is important for Iran to maintain good ties with the Afghan government for a successful peace process.

Iran-Taliban relationship

At the same time, Iran also keeps close ties with the Taliban.Iran and the Taliban have been fighting the same enemy— the Islamic State Khorasan Province — who has gained strength in Western Afghanistan. This development compels closer cooperation and this cooperation is further entrenched as they both share the United States as a common enemy.

Moreover, there are potential limitations of the relationship between Iran and the Taliban. It is argued by the European Eye on Radicalization (EER) that most of the top Taliban leaders have stronger ties with Pakistan. Pakistan has attempted to get Taliban leaders closer to Islamabad and away from Tehran due to competing interests in Afghanistan. It is demonstrated that the negotiations between the Taliban and the United States have harmed Iranian economic interests.For instance, economic sanctions have had a strong effect on the oil industry. It has also been reported that Iran actively attempts to sabotage the ongoing negotiation efforts, especially with the Taliban faction Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami, which are based in Iran.

Conclusion

Even though Iran tries to keep good relationships with both the Taliban and the Afghan government, an unstable Afghanistan would have negative effects on security on Iran’s eastern border, development, and the economy. Matters of water resources and drug smuggling are included in these areas, too.

Reports state that Iran is, “Keen to maintain a favorable balance of power in post-American Afghanistan.” It is also argued, for the ongoing Intra-Afghan talks, that:

“Iran will in all likelihood continue on its current course of openly supporting the Afghan government while encouraging intra-Afghan talks and maintaining its ties to the Taliban to keep its options open as the United States prepares to withdraw. Ultimately, Tehran would prefer that Afghanistan maintain its status as a republic as it limits the influence that other states including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—Iran’s regional rival—can exert on Kabul, and creates a more favorable environment for Iran to protect its own interests in Afghanistan”.

From an outside perspective, it seems that Iran primarily looks after their own interests so that they can increase their regional influence. The Taliban tries to have close cooperation with Iran and this is seen as favorable from Tehran, especially in consultations with top insurgent leaders.Iran has also conducted meetings with the U.S and Afghan government and in that way Iran emerges as an important actor. For now, this is a good position to have during the intra-Afghan talks, but it will be interesting to see how they can maintain relationships with both actors during the negotiations.

Who Are the White Supremacist Extremist Groups in the United States?

In recently released documents from the Department of Homeland Security, DHS states that white supremacy extremism is “the most lethal and persistent” current domestic national security threat and expected to remain as such for the remainder of 2020 and the entirety 2021. As domestic extremism has dominated recent public discourse, it is important to delve into the key groups that attract the most membership and which specific groups pose the greatest threat to civilians.

Who are the most prominent white supremacist extremist groups in the United States?

  1. The Proud Boys

The white nationalist group was established in 2016 by former Vice Media co-founder, Gavin McInnes. The Proud Boys ideology, which condones violence, can be characterized as misogynistic, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic despite the group’s denial of any association with the alt-right. The exact membership number is unknown, but it has been estimated that there are hundreds of members in the United States. In terms of tactics utilized, they hold rallies and large events where members are armed. They also engage in hand-to-hand combat as seen when two Proud Boys were arrested for assaulting four protestors in October.

  1. Knights of the Klu Klux Klan

David Duke, the self-proclaimed ‘Grand Dragon’ of the group claims that the Knights of the Klu Klan was founded in 1956; however, the group was formally established in 1975 in Louisiana. Duke sought to re-create a new image of the Klan from the infamous white robes and hoods to suits and formal attire. In addition, they underwent a shift, as well. Their rhetoric changed from racist against African Americans to a more Neo-Nazi stance focusing more on Jews as their primary target and concern. Nationally, Klu Klux Klan membership is approximately 3,000. This figure at first glance might seem high, but it is much less compared to numbers in the previous century. Their tactics, similar to the Proud Boys, include hosting of public events and rallies. Also, they participated in the infamous 2016 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in which protestor, Heather Heyer was killed.

  1. The Base

Lastly, this organization started in Washington state around 2018 and now is composed of small cells throughout the United States and Canada. Their ideology is to implement a new socio-political order through a race war which they believe will be instigated by non-Western peoples. As of January this year, seven men, who are suspected members of the Base, have been arrested in different parts of the United States on murder and illegal firearms charges. The Base’s founder Rinaldo Nazzaro, who goes by the monikers Norman Speer and Roman Wolf online, promulgates and condones violence. Unlike other WSE groups, the group uses social media to encourage members to perpetrate lone-wolf attacks rather than adhere to a group ideology.

Analysis

The main difference between alt-right, or WSE groups, and other extremist groups abroad is that WSE groups in the West lack a global banner that unifies all right-wing extremist groups in the United States and  the world. Moreover, another difference between the two types of groups is that WSE groups do not have a main organization that funds their objectives and their attacks. Most white supremacist groups rely on crowdfunding, membership dues, and smaller donations.

Going Forward

Since the focus of this article is on domestic terrorism, specifically WSE groups, these extremists pose a threat to United States citizens and are primarily a quagmire for United States law enforcement at the local and federal level. Going forward and in light of excerpts from the DHS report, it is recommended that the United States pursue the following policies to efficiently and effectively tackle home-grown WSE actors, primarily active engagement in the counter-extremism messaging and wider education in general.

  1. The United States should make use of third-party publication companies to spread informational fliers or other forms of publications that introduce a new worldview so that radicalization is prevented and those already radicalized can learn an alternate philosophy. Additionally, better educating local and federal law enforcement agencies on this specific type of terrorism would better equip actionable counter-strategies.

The Base actively recruits members through fliers and social media as well as posting instructional material on how to commit attacks online. The Klu Klux Klan also engages in a similar tactic by leaving papers on their movement and their ideology on doorsteps, as well. Engaging in a similar tactic allows United States law enforcement to better protect civilians and critical infrastructure. Additionally, utilizing a similar tactic to those allows United States law enforcement to alter the balance of power from these radicalized groups and take power back.

  1. The United States government should introduce more legislation that aims to increase funding for Kindergarten through twelfth grade education.

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, or CARES ACT passed in March invested $16.5 billion for public schools across the nation; yet, financial and education experts say this figure is too low for what is actually needed. With several counterterrorism officials warning of the impact of quarantine and online self-radicalization, diverting more funding towards the education sector has become vital.

Conclusion

In all, United States law enforcement should focus on a strategy that simultaneously focuses on preventing WSE groups from mobilizing as well as preventing individuals from becoming radicalized. In addition to the strategy, United States federal and local law enforcement should engage in similar tactics through making use of spreading fliers or pamphlets. Lastly, the United States should formulate legislation that invests more in public education in regard to the link between the COVID-19 quarantine and online radicalization.