by Rise to Peace

What We Can Learn About the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan in Anticipation of the U.S Troops Withdrawal

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, signaling the end of a nearly decade of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the beginning of a period of uncertainty.

As in 1989, the upcoming U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan on September 11, 2021, fosters much of the same uncertainty concerning the competence of the Afghan security forces and their ability to prevent the Ghani government from collapsing. According to U.S intelligence assessments, this may be as soon as six months after U.S withdrawal. Like their predecessors, the Afghan security forces and their foreign supporters will experience similar challenges.

In the aftermath of the Soviet force withdrawal, the Afghan security forces continued to be fully dependent on the USSR. The USSR continued supporting the security forces with advisors, ammunition, fuel, and funds. Furthermore, with the main raison d’être that unified all Mujahideen factions together, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan disappeared. Soviet agents managed to leverage those tensions and reach agreements with different factions to support the security forces.

Whilst security forces were successful in holding off Mujahedeen for three years, the dependence of the Najibullah government on Soviet support eventually led to its demise. Consequently, the government collapsed shortly after Soviet support ceased. This demonstrated the failure of the USSR to develop an Afghan security force that could sustain a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan. In part, failure is a product of the USSR and the Afghan government’s inability to develop a functioning Afghan state.

The security structures implemented by the Soviets in Afghanistan raised public distrust, which were frequently prone to corruption and bureaucracy. Consequently, many structures established by the Soviets collapsed shortly after their withdrawal. Others, such as the interior ministry structure, survived, however, they became components of militias, receiving orders from strongmen.

KhAD, the government’s intelligence agency, was the most successful and effective of the security forces. Consequently, the government was heavily dependent upon KhAD for regime survival. Nevertheless, even KhAD couldn’t prevent the government’s collapse.

One might question, whether the security structures implemented by the Soviets were appropriate for the mission they were designed to accomplish. As effectiveness is not merely a measure of the number of arms or quality of forces but rather of mission compatibility, some believe the answer is probably not.

Currently, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are supported by international funds and substantial U.S. support. However, the ANDSF is undermined by lack of capacity, corruption, factorization, high casualty levels, poor intelligence, lack of willingness to launch offensive actions, and more. Consequently, the government heavily relies upon the Afghan Special Security Forces, its most competent force. The central government’s control of the country continues to erode as the Taliban captures more territories and local warlords assemble militias to confront the Taliban.

The U.S. has poured more than $70 billion in weapons, equipment, and training into the Afghan security forces. Yet, the competence of these forces to survive a massive Taliban offensive post-U.S. and NATO withdrawal is unclear. All of the above, resemble the challenges the Afghan security forces experienced following the Soviet withdrawal. The U.S should honestly and openly ask itself if the current ANDSF structure is the right one for the mission. As in 1989, the answer is probably not. The recent Taliban successes and territorial gains strengthen that assertion.

In anticipation of September 11, the U.S and Ghani governments should work together to reform the ANDSF. A framework should be considered to confront the challenges that the Afghan security forces will face, post-U.S withdrawal. The collapse of the ANDSF will raise the probability of President Ghani sharing a similar fate to former President Najibullah, scenes that nobody wishes to witness again. Furthermore, it will plunge this war-turn country into further chaos. This may result in renewed terrorist threats to the U.S and its allies.

By learning from the Soviet withdrawal experience, the U.S could structure and prepare the ANDSF in such a way, that they could effectively and independently sustain peace and regime stability in Afghanistan.

Rise to Peace
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 by Sydney Neuman

The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Park Bombing and it’s Influence on the 2021 Olympic Games

With the 2021 Summer Olympics less than a month away, there remains a lot of hesitancy from athletes, governments, and fans as many countries are still suffering from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Security officials will have their hands full this year not only worrying about the looming presence of the global pandemic but the major security issues they deal with every year to keep the athletes and the thousands of fans that pack into these facilities safe. 

Unfortunately, the Olympics, intended to demonstrate international solidarity, has always attracted the attention of terrorist organizations and individuals, who view them as an opportunity to turn the attention to economic, politics and social issues between countries. 

The Centennial Olympic Park bombing in 1996 came as a shock to the world when a 40-pound pipe bomb, equipped with nails and screws, exploded at the outdoor venue in Atlanta, Georgia. In the early hours of July 27th, around 1:00 in the morning, there was an anonymous 911 call claiming “there is a bomb in Centennial Park. You have 30 minutes.” As police began to clear fans out of the park, hundreds of people remained blissfully unaware of the potential risk as they were still gathered in the park celebrating the games.

A short 25 minutes after the call, before they could clear everyone out of the park area, the homemade bomb exploded killing one and injuring at least 111 people. 11 people were hospitalized and a majority of the others who were wounded suffered from shock and minor wounds. President at the time, Bill Clinton, denounced the bombings as “an evil act of terror” and vowed to punish those responsible. 

Immediately following the explosion, the only person in custody for the incident was Richard Jewell, the security guard who discovered the backpack containing the explosive device.  Originally deemed as a hero, Jewell was quickly vilified. He denied any role in the bombing but was not cleared as a suspect until three months later in October 1996. 

Former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Louis Freeh, stated that “within the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism Program, there is no higher priority than the capture of Eric Robert Rudolph.” It wasn’t until 1998 when the FBI captured and arrested 32-year-old, North Carolina native, Eric Rudolph, in connection with the bombing as well as others during this time. This bombing was the first of four acts of domestic terrorism committed by Rudolph. When he was arrested, he was charged for the Olympic Park bombing, bombings in an Atlanta health clinic and a nightclub as well as an explosion at a women’s clinic in Alabama. 

In a special statement to congress about “the Lessons Learned from Security at the Past Olympic Games” then Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, said, “the after-action reports we received from Atlanta, and the lessons that were passed on to us by the public safety community indicated that many of the problems in Atlanta reflected how slow we were as a nation to begin to recognize that terrorism was becoming a security issue inside the United States.” 

This attack at the 1996 Olympics was the second deadly incident that has taken place at the Olympic games. At the 1972 Summer Games in Munich, Germany, nine Israeli athletes were taken hostage and killed by Palestinian terrorists. However, since there were no major security incidents following the events of 1972, not many of the security protocols were changed until after the attack in Atlanta. While safety planning and implementation still varies from country to country, there were many operational lessons that have become a standard in the following years. 

One of the biggest improvements made to the functionality of the Olympic Games was the communication and coordination between the local law enforcement and the organizing committee, which can be difficult to maintain due to the public/private sector partnership. Without this alliance, there is no clear command structure often causing many issues.

The Olympic Organizing Committee must work hand in hand with government officials at state, and local levels to ensure public safety during the games. From the strategic layouts of the venues to athlete transportation, every detail is planned out along with contingency plans in place in the case of a security threat. Another precaution taken was much stricter background checks on the 40,000 employees and volunteers at the games.

Terrorism, natural disasters, and public disorder are constant security threats no matter the games’ location. However, there are unique local security risks that also pose threats to the safety of the games. Especially relevant to this year’s Olympics, public health precautions were put into place following the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan when a small outbreak of the flu affected almost one million people who had attended the games.

The Olympic games have been canceled for 2 reasons: world wars and COVID-19. This shows just how seriously the International Olympic Committee takes the safety and security of all attendees at the games and this year will be no different. 

 

Sydney Neuman
risetopeace.org
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 by Rise to Peace

The Islamic State of Khorasan and the Afghan Peace Process

The recent attack on the girl’s school in a Hazara neighborhood warrants discussion concerning the threat of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 85 and wounded over 100. However, IS-K has conducted similar operations in the past. The Hazara Shia are particularly threatened because IS ideology considers them to be more problematic than foreign actors. The group challenges the implementation of the delicate peace process between the Taliban and Afghan government. IS-K can also strain trust within the Taliban as more radical factions join the group to continue a successful insurgency. Due to the challenges of controlling territory, more civilian attacks are likely as the group struggles to maintain relevancy amid the American withdrawal. Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will also serve as a recruiting bed for the group to make inroads in the border region. The future of the Afghanistan after US troops leave is unclear, but IS-K may unify Taliban and government forces against a shared threat. To understand where IS-K fits into Afghanistan’s recent history, we must explore its beginnings.

IS-K History

Like other IS franchises, IS-K gained disaffected members of other terror groups. These groups operated autonomously until several high-ranking Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders pledged allegiance to IS in 2014. These initial defections created a domino-effect of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan joining the group. IS’s increasing notoriety in Iraq and Syria catalyzed its expansion. The Taliban and IS-K eventually declared war on each other because of ideological differences and competition for resources. From its stronghold in Nangarhar province,, IS-K began a campaign to overrun Taliban positions to consolidate its power. At one point, it controlled over one-third of the province. By 2015, the group began losing popularity because of its policies banning poppy cultivation and harsh interpretation of Sharia Law. Taliban, US, and Afghan offensives have weakened IS-K control over Nangarhar. Despite this, the group has responded with horrific suicide bombings on minorities and election centers around the country. Although it has little support in Pakistan, TTP defectors in the group have utilized Islamabad’s intelligence apparatus to increase its strategic depth in Afghanistan. 

Challenge to the Peace Process

Although IS-K is a mid-level threat in Afghanistan, it still poses challenges to the implementation of a peace settlement, fostering trust between the Taliban and Afghan governments, and maintaining 2-decades of progress for women and minorities. For radical Taliban who disagree with peace negotiations, IS-K represents an alternative in order to continue their campaign against the central government. They will not negotiate a settlement, especially if the opponent approaches defeat. Tragic attacks on minority communities like Hazaras and Sikhs, women, and schools undermine public confidence in the government to maintain safety. Little faith in government motivates Afghans to join terror groups as well. These attacks reduce trust between the government and Taliban leaders if the latter provided support to IS-K. Although the two groups are technically at war, IS-K attacks provide Taliban leadership plausible deniability when they conduct attacks on security forces or “illegitimate” institutions. The recent attack on a girls’ school highlights the danger of losing hard-fought gains. The resilience of these institutions is unclear, but these attacks will quicken their deterioration. If a group threatens political rights, a civil war between ethnic militias jostling for influence could occur. A disenchanted public could prevent Afghanistan from overcoming its challenges and reaching its economic and social potential. Education is important to increase mobility and de-radicalize, but Afghanistan’s decades-long problems will persist without addressing these concerns. 

Future Cooperation

The sincerity of the Taliban in peace negotiations is debatable, but IS-K presents an opportunity to fight a mutual threat. Beyond prisoner exchanges, the two parties do not trust each other. However, cooperating on this issue could set the foundation for greater security cooperation in the future. It would also mitigate radicalization concerns because people will not join extremist groups out of concern for safety. Here, the government will cooperate with an extremist group to counter an even greater threat. Like Afghanistan in the 1980’s, both sides must put aside differences to defeat a common enemy that complicates their negotiations. After each group deal with the external threat, a compromise in achieving their respective goals in Afghanistan becomes possible.

Link for Photo

مركز المستقبل – Is ISIS-Khorasan Province Seeking to Consolidate its Role in Afghanistan? (futureuae.com)

Rise to Peace
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The Red Brigades and far-left terrorism
 by Rise to Peace

The Red Brigades: What We Can Learn From Italian History

Origins of The Red Brigades

The Red Brigades, an Italian far-left guerrilla group, were active between the 1970s and 80s. They represent the most important terrorist group in all Italian history. The Red Brigades are also known for the abduction and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The group grew in universities of the north of Italy. Its aim was to change Italian politics and law to create a revolutionary state according to communist principles. They saw themselves as the continuation of the Italian Partisan Movement, and they opposed both the right and capitalism.

Political Background

The group began by expressing its dissatisfaction with the status quo through the sabotage of industries and private properties. Then, their strategy changed to the carrying out of high-profile political kidnappings in order to obtain resources, capture attention, and fight the state and capitalists. The Red Brigades were against the state because they believed that the state was an “Imperialist collection of multinational corporations.”

Instead, their aim was to guide the working class towards revolution. To recruit people, they distributed propaganda in factories to attract the “proletariat” to join their fight against capitalism and power. The killings of high-profile figures and propaganda were their main tactics to attract attention and new recruits. Their most well-known act was the abduction and killing of Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Moro was the main mediator between the Christian Democrats Party and the Communist Party. The killing of the Prime Minister was defined by the group as the last expression of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary action. They believed that Aldo Moro was the symbol of the imperialist counter-revolution.

Violence and Political Agenda

Though the violence of the Red Brigades has to be understood in its historical context. The Red Brigades grew during the Italian Years of Lead, a period of political turmoil and violence in Italy. This period was marked by violence from both the far-right and the far-left. Far-left groups drew inspiration from Communism and the far-right sought to push Italy back towards Fascism. This far-right agenda grew from the fear of Communism during the Cold War.

The group’s growth happened in a period when the Christian Democrats had ruled since the early 1940s. And it was during a time when there was no prospect of change. The Christian Democrats Party contained many ideas, it integrated many different political figures and maintained a hold on power. This created a sentiment of inability to change politics. This, together with the influence from other ideologies spreading in Europe, pushed some groups towards extremism and violence.

The Red Brigades and Terrorism

The theory of terrorism arising from the inability to change the status quo, legally, was developed by Professor Deniz Aksoy. Aksoy hypothesised that some opposition groups have no access to a legislature, they are more likely to turn to terrorism. According to her empirical findings, there is a positive correlation between the presence of an opposition party in the absence of a legislature and the emergence of terrorist groups. This was not the precise case during the Italian Years of Lead, due to the presence of a legislature and the opportunity to compete in politics. However, the political scenario in Italy seemed stagnant to many young people. For this reason, they engaged in violent means to change the status quo.

The Red Brigades existed in a specific Italian historical context in which democracy was new and there was a lot of instability across Europe. However, we can learn from this case how the inability to change politics and express ideas can be a source of frustration and means towards violence. In order to have peace, it is important to listen to different actors and to take them into account. Implementing new reforms and being open to political debate may be a source of strength moving forward if we want to create peace.

Rise to Peace
www.risetopeace.org
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 by Rise to Peace

Reciprocal Radicalisation – What Is It And How Do We Fight It?

With the tragic deaths of five and injury to over 150 people during the storming of the Capitol Building, ISIL propaganda channels became predictably awash with posts hailing the crowds as “great symbolism”. 

The Capitol Insurrection provided us with a recent reminder of the need to explore reciprocating narratives between extremists of differing ideology. Whether Islamist as in the example above or between the predominantly domestic movements of far-right and far-left groups, and how these narratives can aid one another, allowing us to better understand how to counter the threat.

Definitions

Reciprocal radicalisation refers to the purported reliance of terrorist organisations upon one another, sharing and feeding in narratives. According to the organisation CREST, based in Lancaster, U.K., the concept emerged initially during analysis of the 2001 Race Riots in England, and further embedded following the establishment of the EDL, a far-right Islamophobic movement. The EDL itself had formed in response to controversial protests by Ahle Sunnah al Jamah, an Islamist offshoot publicly opposing parades for soldiers returning from Iraq. 

Similarly, when the Finsbury Park Mosque was targeted in June 2017, the perpetrator shouted “this is for London Bridge”, referencing an attack that occurred three weeks prior. The resulting investigation found he was directly influenced by far-right material which called for retribution for those prior attacks. This is where the crux of the argument for drawing parallels presents itself; whilst a range of terrorising motives may exist mutually exclusive in terms of their ideological background, they often share in the modus operandi of their actions, to cause and sow division.

Challenges

Widely understood amongst academia, the term has held less recognition within political circles where support for counterterrorism policy can often fall along partisan lines, rather than out of altruistic concern for best practice. Critique has been applied to the extent to which these acts are linked, viewing a natural source of conflict between extremists of differing motivations rather than any premeditated or implicit interoperation. Supporters argue such analysis is valuable beyond the actual acts of terror, in assessing a movement or individual’s propensity towards violence – thereby evaluating the ‘powder-keg’ type incidents which do not necessarily constitute attacks, but which may be utilised to further radicalise those involved.

Whilst a reluctance to empirically adopt such processes as the norm is understandable, there are strong denominators which explain why such prevalence is apparent. After the Christchurch attacks, ASPI argued there were a number of pervasive, “eerie similarities” in the perpetrator’s far-right manifesto with Jihadist propaganda preceding and following the attack. These include the terrorists portraying their actions as a defence mechanism against ‘foreign invaders’, seeking revenge for previous attacks (further continuing the spiral of violence) and an apparent ‘restoration of glory’, drawing on historical narratives of conflict between East and West and a wish to preserve the status quo ante. Hence where the far-right position themselves in opposition to immigration, Islamists view themselves at war with ‘infidels’ and external forces, whether non-believers or other Muslims who do not subscribe to their brand of fundamentalism.

Conclusions

The road towards committing acts of terrorism is influenced by a range of factors. Rather than spreading panic in the aftermath of attacks we need legislators to take stringent action and provide measured responses. We should look to those in a position of power to reassure communities, irrespective of personal opinion.

This duly applies to any in a position to do good, for it is only with cooperation and education on a much wider scale that we can hope to defeat terrorism. The truth is no single approach will ever work in preventing extremism or the dynamics underlining it, but by raising awareness of these issues and setting a firm example of how best to respond to terror, we can progress towards stymieing these movements from gaining further traction. 

Rise to Peace
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