by Connor Bulgrin

Iran’s Ambiguous Role in the Afghan Peace Process

On July 8, Iran hosted talks between delegations from the Afghan government and the Taliban. This effort provided a new venue for Afghan negotiators to engage one another as the Taliban advance continued and the U.S.-backed talks in Doha stalled. The Iranian position toward the Afghan war has been complex and often ambiguous. While the Iranian government is now advocating peace, its geopolitical interests in Afghanistan are much broader.

For the last 25 years, Iranian policy toward Afghanistan has been driven by a dual mandate. Iran has aimed to prevent the rise of Sunni fundamentalism while also contesting American power in the Middle East.

As a Shiite-majority nation, Iranian disdain for Sunni fundamentalism is palpable. Fundamentalist Sunni groups like the Taliban often assert that Shiites are not true Muslims and wage vicious attacks against them. In the last few decades, Iran has branded itself the “protector of Shiites” in the Middle East. At first, this made Iran an adversary of the Taliban. In 1998, Iran nearly declared war against the Taliban after the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, in which the Taliban killed many Shiites and 11 Iranian citizens. After the September 11th attacks, Iran, in alignment with American policy, supported the Northern Alliance campaign against the Taliban.

However, Iranian fear of American power has made it an inconsistent ally of America and the Afghan government. Since the initial defeat of the Taliban in December 2001, Iran has played a more nuanced role in Afghanistan, trying to cozy up with Afghan elites while also providing occasional support to the Taliban. Iranian officials fear that if America enjoys too much success in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran might become the next target of American regime change efforts. The numerous American military bases surrounding Iran and frequent calls for regime change in the American media exacerbate these anxieties. While Iran is glad to see the American presence in Afghanistan end, its policy toward Afghanistan must now chart a new course that consists of more than mere anti-Americanism.

Inside Iran, public opinion is divided regarding the ideal policy toward Afghanistan. The reformists have been hawkish regarding Afghanistan, disgusted by the Taliban’s religious fundamentalism and their recent outrageous targeted attacks against Shiite Hazaras. Etemad, a prominent reformist newspaper, recently warned of “unpleasant consequences if extremist and violent movements like the Taliban come to power.”

Iran’s hardliners have the upper hand politically and support a more conciliatory approach to the Taliban. This June, Kayhan, a paper funded by the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, remarked that “The Taliban today is different from the Taliban that used to behead people.” Statements like these are not expressions of political solidarity. While Iran and the Taliban are united in their anti-Americanism, the Taliban has much closer ties to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rivals. Instead, Iranian hardliners make these statements to signal Iran’s belief in the possibility of a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Lately, Iranian officials have been stressing their hopes for peace. Rasoul Mousavi, leader of West Asia policy in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has stated that: “Opportunities pass like clouds. The opportunity of peace must be taken today, not tomorrow, as it might be late.” Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, the Iranian special representative to Afghanistan, recently met with the Afghan foreign minister to assure him of Iran’s commitment to peace. A cursory look at The Tehran Times, an Iranian newspaper with close ties to the foreign ministry, reveals an array of headlines promoting “talks” and “peace,” a tact that is strikingly similar to American rhetoric on Afghanistan.

But Iranian policy toward Afghanistan is more interested in stability than peace. Hostilities around Herat are ongoing, and Iran is concerned that the violence could spill into its territory. This July, the Taliban captured many districts in Herat province that are adjacent to Iran’s eastern border. They have also captured the Islam Qala border crossing that leads into Iran.

Fighting in Afghanistan also poses a threat to the Iranian economy, a chief concern for incoming President Ebrahim Raisi, who made economic renewal a centerpiece of his campaign. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan totals over $3 billion annually. Fighting also renders inoperable the newly-inaugurated Khaf-Herat railroad that links Iran and Afghanistan —and which is part of the much larger East-West Railway Corridor project—.

Continued fighting in Afghanistan is also guaranteed to bring more refugees to Iran, which will place a significant economic burden on the country and exacerbate Iran’s already troublesome surge of COVID-19 cases. Iran is already home to nearly a million registered refugees and hundreds of thousands more who are undocumented. Incoming Iranian President Raisi and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, in a recent telephone conversation, made cooperating to manage the influx of Afghan refugees into their countries one of their primary goals.

The Iranian desire for stability in Afghanistan has led it to hedge its bets on the Taliban. If the Taliban can secure a decisive victory, allowing commerce to proceed and the flow of refugees to slow, the Iranian government will be glad to align with them. If the Taliban cannot win decisively, Iran is likely to promote a power-sharing agreement in Afghanistan that allows it to forego the repercussions of a protracted Afghan civil war.

To maintain a flexible policy, the Iranian government has maintained ties with the Afghan government while also pursuing its own policy, including backing an anti-Taliban Shiite militia called Hashd al-Shi’i. Much like Afghanistan’s other neighbors, Iran has not decided whether Taliban rule or a political settlement is more in line with its national interests. The most crucial factors shaping Iran’s determination will be the success of the Taliban on the battlefield and the vulnerability Iran feels to the threats posed by Sunni fundamentalism and American regime change.

Connor Bulgrin
risetopeace.org
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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The Crisis in Cabo Delgado: A Policy for a New Generation

This is the final piece in a series examining the ongoing extremist threat in Mozambique.

After understanding Cabo Delgado’s history of economic marginalization, socio-political agitation, and geographic remoteness, one might not be surprised by the government’s military-oriented approach to dealing with ASWJ. With politics dominated by FRELIMO since independence, Mozambique ranks 149th in the world on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Consequently, only 27% of Mozambicans see a difference between the ruling party and the state.

The central government has long lacked credibility in the region due to its ties to criminal networks, acquiescence to foreign companies, and a highly publicized scandal in which government officials hid and pocketed $2.2 billion in off-budget loans. Cabo Delgado is also home to the single largest private investment in Africa, Total SA’s $15 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project along the coast. But this project has provided little profit or opportunity to the locals, fueling further discontent and rent-seeking. 

Missteps and Militarization

For the past few years, the central government has outsourced its handling of the ASWJ crisis to foreign mercenaries. The notorious Russian Wagner Group was initially deployed but replaced by the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) after sustaining losses. In 2021, Amnesty International accused government forces, ASWJ, and DAG of war crimes targeting civilians, and DAG let its contract lapse in April.

The governments of South Africa, Zimbabwe, the United States, and the European Union have all expressed their commitment to resolving this crisis, and their assistance initially came as advising, training, and financing government forces. But these government forces are the same ones frequently accused of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and harassment of civilians. 

And now international military involvement is escalating. South Africa, a regional leader, initially ruled out putting boots on the ground but ended up sending soldiers to extract its foreign nationals from the siege of Palma. Last month, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the deployment of its standby force, but much of its makeup and mission remain unclear. In early July, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda preempted them, sending 1,000 troops in a bid likely meant to increase Rwanda’s sway in the region. The EU also announced its own military mission, staffed primarily by Portuguese, to provide further training to Mozambique’s armed forces.

The government and its partners seem to be making the same mistakes that the Portuguese made when battling guerrillas in the very same region. Over the course of their ten-year fight to keep their colony, the beleaguered Portuguese made various attempts at dislodging FRELIMO from Cabo Delgado. Yet, they never seemed to try the classic counterinsurgency strategy of developing communities and protecting the populace. This, local support was pulled away from the guerrillas. Instead, they swept the jungles of Cabo in the massive Operation Gordian Knot, which ultimately failed due to its onerous death toll and resource drain. This lack of community outreach, paired with blind military violence, only perpetuated the grievances fueling the insurgency. The same cycle of government rigidity and insurgent vitality appears to be the case in modern Cabo Delgado.

Attention and Investment

The chorus of international funds and troops meant to pacify Cabo Delgado has mainly reinforced this militarized approach. International partners must instead only finance those government initiatives which support rather than antagonize communities. They must also be more discerning in which squads they are funding and training, pulling support from those government forces with bad track records on human rights and battlefield conduct.

It seems that the West has yet to learn in its dealings with Islamist insurgencies that military force and weapons proliferation are not conducive to de-escalation. Throughout the war with FRELIMO, Portugal’s semi-fascist dictatorship also formed alliances with the West, yet for all the intelligence, finances, and training provided from abroad, Portugal could not pacify Cabo by the strength of arms alone. 

In the 1960s, Cabo consisted primarily of smallholder peasants growing cash crops. Today, though this region remains largely rural, there are increased opportunities in coastal trade and energy extraction. Yet, the youth see few of the benefits. The locals should be enabled to participate in their own economy, and this starts with conscious governmental policy. Instead of abusing already-marginalized communities, the government could push the conflict in a constructive direction if it took a whole-of-society approach to peace in Cabo. This involves responsive community policing, accountability for rights violations by security forces, development partnerships that include local businesses, investment in infrastructure and education, increased space for journalists and civil society, and consultative mechanisms to communicate with locals. These are the practices and institutions that international partners should be funding instead, even if they must be built entirely anew.

Conclusion: 

One can reasonably conclude that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is only going to intensify, and will remain a major security issue in southern Africa. Though international actors from the West to SADC have expressed their willingness to provide training and even troops, the history of Cabo gives little reason to be optimistic about external intervention. The people of this resource-rich coastal province have experienced purely extractive, disinterested economics for centuries, from Britain to Portugal to Total SA. And yet, when hundreds of youth take up arms under a salvationist banner of Salafism, the government and its international partners immediately opt for clumsy militarization and pacification.

Though their violence has been brutal, meeting the insurgents on the battlefield does little to solve the problems that energized them in the first place. Instead, anyone concerned with actually de-escalating the conflict must look to NGOs, local activists, and social institutions that should be invested in and listened to.

 

Stefan Bakumenko
risetopeace.org
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 by Rise to Peace

Kurdish and Chechen Women in Separatism

Women’s activities and levels of involvement in non-traditional military organizations are diverse. Because of that, it is important to approach case studies for a better understanding of the connection between women’s personal experiences, their inner environments and their work in such organizations. In this article, Kurdish and Chechen women involved in separatism will be explored, along with the sociological, historical and ideological background of the groups they joined. 

Separatist Kurdish women

Starting with the formerly Kurdistan Workers’ Party/PKK (now Kurdistan People’s Congress/Kongra-Gel), considered by some states and organizations as a terrorist, it is important to notice that Kurdish women are an essential part of its advancement in Turkey. This is evident with a participation rate of 40-50% of the whole organization.

Embedded in a paternalistic and restricted society, many Kurdish women felt the grievances of not being allowed to pursue education and secure employment. Women would have to silence their memories in fear of retaliation. Additionally, many were forced to marry when teenagers and experienced abuses and honour killings, throughout the 70s. This is similarly present in the modern day. The politicisation of women started to grow, however, when the conflict intensified in the 90s, when Ankara was destroying Kurdish villages, and when Kurdish people were killed or disappeared.

Therefore, women’s condition and their desire to escape it, following liberation beliefs, maybe the strongest factor for them to join the PKK. This may be done voluntarily the majority of times (according to ex-PKK terrorists that decided to give interviews). But different factors might also be relevant to other women, such as trauma, and/or revenge, for instance. The group’s message evoked justice, gender equality and freedom, to deter the male-dominated sphere and power in their inner circles and in the Turkish state. As a result, women perceived themselves as leaders, receiving political and military training. Subsequently, they observed the prohibition of domestic and sexual violence, conducting their own military units, between other implementations.

Those advancements came with some debates from men. They did not recognize women with enough strength for combat or as a figure of authority from the start. Women were seen to have constantly argued with them, did not obey their orders, and challenged their roles. The consequences of this reaction went from women being put in auxiliary activities to constantly trying to prove their value in harsh duties. This included volunteering for suicide bombings – until the implementation of penalties by the PKK’s board destined to men that disrespected women’s positions or instructions.

After this episode, a new code of conduct was established, reaching the Kurdish society. This is where Kurdish men could be separated from their wives if there was any denunciation of husband abuse to the PKK. 

Another characteristic involving women is that sexual relationships are not allowed inside the organization. The death penalty was utilized as a means of punishment in the past (actually banned) amongst jail sentences, disconnection from the group, or denials of leadership positions all as forms of punishments. If there are pregnancies, the newborn children are considered to belong to the group. As a result, they are separated from their parents, with only limited visits per year.

Separatist Chechen women

Although a dormant movement now, it is interesting to examine Chechen women that joined terrorist groups, with their participation rate in more than two-thirds of suicide bombings from 2000 until 2014. The origin of such an involvement relies on the Second Chechen War, where tactics by Islamist extremists started to be implemented. Consequently, one of them consisted of female suicide bombers, labelled as “Black Widows” by the media.

With a limitation to state how many groups were formed, it is not possible to detain a whole image of Chechen women’s participation. However, it is notable that the crisis was between the Russian army and semi-independent commanders from the separatists. Talking about the condition of women, some suffered honour killings, domestic violence and abductions. The ones that had opportunities to enter university and full-time jobs saw their hopes of securing them vanished by the two conflicts.

On the side of women’s reason for participation, the majority of them witnessed the brutalities of the Russian military. This included death, beating or mistreatment of relatives, and the destruction of their neighbourhoods. Against this background, Chechen women usually had a strong desire to be martyrs as the conduction of their entrance into such groups. This was largely in response to their own visions and their country’s fight to be independent of Russia. Furthermore, this was aided to have justice for them and their families.

There is also evidence that the recruitment was based on their friendship and familial ties. However, womens experienced changed their lifestyle once they joined those organizations. Mostly, they were in charge of traditional roles, such as cleaning, nursing or cooking. Furthermore, they wore the traditional Arab dress and hijab. When they took suicide missions, there was the protocol of only travelling with an older woman or designated chaperone.

Another difference from Kurdish women is that, if training existed for Chechen women, it was very short. This was due to the two weeks it took from leaving their homes and beginning to act. Their roles were also distinct, with Chechen women having traditional and subsidiary activities. However, the male-run command did not have a problem using women as suicide bombers, as it could also signify propaganda to attract more recruits.

Conclusion

The context of separatist Kurdish and Chechen women is different in terms of historical times and players. Nonetheless, the issue of women’s restrictive conditions in their societies and post-war settings are a trend in both. Although their organizations grew in ideological basis away from each other, they may reveal a large image of women’s situation, their needs, the observation of any conflict escalation in the following years, and the initial de-radicalisation strategies that have to emerge.

 

Rise to Peace
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 by Rise to Peace

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Historical Overview

The world watched as Israel and Hamas has exchanged rocket fire prior to the cease-fire issued on May 25th, 2021. The death toll stands at over 200 with 1,235 Palestinians injured. Ten Israelis were killed by rockets from Gaza. The recent tensions increased at the beginning of Ramadan as Israeli police put up barriers around Jerusalem’s Damascus Gate causing widespread protests. Israeli police say the barrier was erected to regulate people entering the plaza. Clashes increased as dozens of Palestinian families were evicted from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood inflaming longstanding property disputes between Israelis and Palestinians.  

Palestine theoretically includes the Gaza strip and the West Bank. Both Israel and Palestine consider Jerusalem as their political capital. Both regions consider the city religiously sacred. Hamas, a Sunni Islamist militant group, governs the Gaza strip. Several countries consider Hamas to be a terrorist group due, in part, to their violent attacks against Israel. 

Global protests have mobilized thousands in support of Palestine. Protests have engaged thousands in the middle east, New Zealand, Japan, Europe, Canada, and United States.

History of Conflict

The conflict has been occurring in this region for hundreds of years over land occupation and independence. The disputed territory almost found a solution in 1947 when the United Nations proposed Resolution 181, this resolution would create the two independent states of Israel and Palestine. Arab leaders rejected the resolution due to the territorial division while the Jewish leaders had satisfaction over territory lines. The resolution was adopted yet immediately Mandatory Palestine broke out the civil war between the Jewish and Arab communities leading the plan to not be implemented. 

In 1948, following World War II, Israel was established as a state when the British withdrew from Palestine. The Israel-Palestinian conflict began. As a result, this dispute is a continued fight over land occupation and independence. Since this time, there have been several wars, violent encounters, protests, and more failed resolutions from the United Nations. This is the conflict that continues today. 

Jordan had invaded this region in 1948, seizing homes from Jewish homeowners. Israeli law allows Jewish citizens to claim the land back in the West bank which their family owed prior to 1948. Palestinian residents in this region do not have the same opportunity under the law to reclaim their land. Thousands of Palestinians have lost homes due to this law. Many of these homes have been in the family for generations.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The United Nations along with countries around the world have called for a peace agreement in the region. If violence continues ally countries are considering putting conditions on weapons sent to Israel. Protecting human lives is the primary initiative needed in this region followed by peace discussions involving both Israel and Palestine leaders. The United Nations has been meeting with global leaders on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seeking resolution. The two independent state solution has been identified by global leaders as a solution to consider. 

 

Rise to Peace
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The Growth and Impact of ISIL in Mozambique: The Difficulties to Defeating their Insurgency

Mozambique’s conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has experienced a notable increase in the level of violence within the last year. Although active in the region since 2017, it is only more recently that ISIL’s attacks have escalated in both frequency and severity. The bloodshed caused by ISIL throughout Mozambique has had an alarming impact, evident from the recurring raids on innocent villagers and the growing number of casualties, as seen by the increasing rate of people beheaded or raped.

Furthermore, the details of these raids have become even more brutal and cruel in recent times, in that dozens of the decapitated victims have been young children. This not only serves to highlight the extent of terrorism within the state but its rapid escalation. This merits further discussion and analysis, as it arguably provides an indication as to the future of the insurgency, whether ISIL extremism will continue to grow and intensify, or if they will be ultimately defeated. 

All throughout the country, thousands of citizens have been reported as missing or misplaced as ISIL target their communities at a shocking rate from previous years of the conflict. The statistics reveal that the increase has multiplied several times over, with 172,000 misplaced in the spring of 2020 to over 732,000 this spring one year later. This demonstrates the impact that ISIL has had on a multitude, which has grown exponentially within a relatively short timeframe. This, therefore, illustrates the extent of their power as a terrorist organization. 

To further expand upon this is ISIL’s attack on the town of Palma last March. Although the local security forces were reported to have secured control of the town and defeated the terrorists, ISIL’s actions certainly left their mark there, with multiple buildings destroyed, several dozen military personnel killed and beheaded bodies covering the streets. The main image that can be taken from this fight in Palma is the barbarity and destructive power of ISIL. The counterinsurgencies victory and claim to have retaken the town pales in significance and impact when the atrocities of ISIL are brought to attention.

Upon examining the level of violence by the terrorists, the success of the security forces appears to be a mere detail in comparison to the widespread brutality of the insurgency. The extent of this is that ISIL activity nowadays seems to capture the spotlight whenever their presence is noted, their reputation and crimes far more prominent than the efforts of those who try to stop them.

This interpretation shows an alarming undertone as it can be argued that, regardless of whether ISIL wins or loses its battles with Mozambique’s forces, it leaves behind a clear atmosphere of death and destruction and from this an obviously daunting degree of fear. This fear is evident in that that so many citizens have been misplaced due to the terrorists; hundreds alone fled during the fighting at Palma.

So many in Mozambique clearly feel greatly threatened by the presence of ISIL. Thus, the danger that this organization presents cannot be understated. Indeed, this is apparent given that the primary goal of a terrorist is not always to overthrow a regime, but rather to spread chaos and terror amongst their victims. From this, it can be argued that ISIL is becoming more and more successful when discussing its actions, reputation, and infamy.

A worrying thought that comes from the Palma attack is that, on a certain level, the efforts of Mozambique police and military make little difference. If they are defeated in battles with ISIL, this increases the terrorists’ strength and reputation and damages the state’s morale, as well as likely resulting in a large number of deaths in both security personnel and civilians. However, even if the counterinsurgency technically defeats ISIL, as seen by the fight in Palma, the terrorists will still have been successful in their goal of causing casualties and spreading fear amongst a multitude. It can be determined from this that ISIL stands to gain whatever the outcome of their skirmishes and perceivably always one step ahead of the authorities.

In order to combat them, it has been more recently announced that multiple allies of Mozambique from other regions of Africa have promised to contribute their forces to the effort to eliminate ISIL, whilst Portugal and the United States have been providing training for Mozambique’s troops. Although the results of this are yet to be seen, it makes sense that a strong international backing is likely to increase Mozambique’s chances of defeating ISIL in the long-term. Whilst ISIL is fearsome and enjoys clear advantages in their conflict, it must be remembered that they had a similar experience in the Middle East, yet were successfully driven out. The same can occur in this current conflict. The combined efforts of multiple nations focused on overwhelming ISIL appear to be the best option to ending terrorism in Mozambique.

Overall, it is clear that the extent of ISIL activity and its impact on Mozambique is significantly growing. Furthermore, the threat they pose may also increase and become more serious. Unlike with other conflicts, ISIL terrorism is likely to continue to remain strong as the results of their fighting with local security forces appear to have less consequence for them. So long as they are able to spread chaos and fear, they remain a successful threat.

From this, it is apparent that ISIL is likely to be successful from its current methods. Their position as terrorists makes their ambitions, whilst highly cruel, simpler and easier to accomplish than those of counterinsurgent forces, placing them at an advantage. Despite this, they are not unbeatable and there is hope that the foreign support Mozambique has received will be enough to ultimately defeat ISIL.

 

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