Terrorism in France: Past and Present

Photo: International Business Times, 2015

Of the 28 countries that make up the European Union, France has constantly been an influential force in shaping policy and taking action against extremist threats. Be that as it may, unfortunately, France also has the highest frequency of terror attacks of any EU country. The government has struggled not only to combat such provocations but also to understand why they have become so widespread.

France has the largest Muslim population in Europe and in 2015 11.8% of its population was foreign-born, compared to 8.9% in 2014. This number has risen and fallen as the EU has struggled to create and enforce strict immigration policies. Due to such bureaucratic logjams terror organizations have been able to infiltrate the country and recruit local and foreign citizens in its jails. The contagion can be traced back to a policy that was scrapped by then Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2002.

Sarkozy eliminated the “Police de Proximité,” which was a neighborhood policing policy designed to effect friendlier police work. The absence of this program resulted in resentment of officers of the law, as well as an increase in repressive tactics and arrests. Consequently, many African and Middle Eastern youth were placed in French prisons, which proved fertile grounds for radicalization. They were angry, poor, and had criminal records – all reasons why recruiters for Islamic extremist organizations like ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) were able to radicalize them.

Since the 2002 spike in arrests, many of those who were radicalized have been released from prison and have gone on to perpetrate violence in France. How best to combat this rise in terrorism? An effort must be made to halt recruitment in French prisons. As for society as a whole, an outreach program to French youth, especially in inner cities and their schools, would prove beneficial. Such programs function like an inoculation against terror, stifling recruitment and the flow of extremist ideology.

In 2013 France went to war against two Muslim governments when it invaded Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). This exacerbated tensions and widened the divide between Muslims and the French government. ISIS has carried out its deadliest assaults since this time. On January 7th, 2015 two Islamist gunmen forced their way into the Paris headquarters of satirical weekly news-magazine Charlie Hebdo and opened fire, killing twelve. Less than a year later, on November 13th, 2015, nine EU citizen members of ISIL launched a coordinated offensive at a soccer stadium, a concert hall, restaurants, and bars. 130 were killed, and 413 were wounded. On Bastille Day in 2016, an Islamic State supporter drove a truck through a crowd, killing 86 people. Just 12 days later ISIL soldiers slit the throat of an 85-year-old priest in Normandy, killing him.

Between 1980 and 2003, a span of 23 years, terror strikes killed 87 people in France. Between 2003 and 2018, only 15 years, three times as many people (250) were killed. The question remains, how can France and other EU countries stop attacks before they occur? The answer necessarily lies in policy. An anti-terrorism law was passed in 2014 that allowed the government to prevent at-risk citizens from leaving the country. The same law banned EU citizens from entering France if they were deemed a threat to society. The “French Patriot Act” passed in 2015, created a vast surveillance program. It proved a massive step in advancing French security, and it continues to pave the way for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to curb the dispersal of terrorist ideologies. 

French President Emmanuel Macron promises to tighten French immigration policy, but what’s missing, as stated earlier, is a comprehensive strategy aimed at educating the public with the intention of inoculating it against extremist views.

France is at a crossroads. Today’s legislation is vital to the country’s future. There must be a proactive strategy for countering terrorist recruitment. Those who would be affected most by such preventative measures, youth, are responsible for France’s future. Whether they step into a future that is violent or peaceful is up to lawmakers today.

Photo: yougov.uk

Sources

Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaisse. “Understanding Urban Riots in France.” Brookings, Brookings, 28 July 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-urban-riots-in-france/

Tribalat, M. “M. Tribalat.” Population, Institut National D’études Démographiques, 23 Jan. 2018, https://www.persee.fr/doc/pop_1634-2941_2004_num_59_1_18464

“Bilan Démographique 2016À Nouveau En Baisse, La Fécondité Atteint 1,93 Enfant Par Femme En 2016 .” Bilan Démographique 2016 – Insee Première – 1630, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2554860

McPartland, Ben. “Some Truths about Immigration in France.” The Local, The Local, 13 Oct. 2015, https://www.thelocal.fr/20151013/some-truths-about-migration-to-and-from-france

RFI. “Auditors Slam Sarkozy Policing Policy.” RFI, RFI, 8 July 2011, http://en.rfi.fr/france/20110708-auditors-slam-sarkozy-policing-policy

Astier, Henri. “Paris Attacks: Prisons Provide Fertile Ground for Islamists.” BBC News, BBC, 5 Feb. 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31129398

“46 Years of Terrorist Attacks in Europe, Visualized.” The Washington Post, WP Company, www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/a-history-of-terrorism-in-europe/.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/a-history-of-terrorism-in-europe/

Smith, David, and Kim Willsher. “Clashes in Central African Republic as UN Authorises French Intervention.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 5 Dec. 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/05/central-african-republic-un-vote-french

Nicolas. “Global Legal Monitor.” France: National Assembly Adopts Immigration Bill | Global Legal Monitor, 9 Sept. 2015, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-national-assembly-adopts-immigration-bill/

Loesche, Dyfed, and Felix Richter. “Infographic: Many People Expect Terrorist Attacks in 2017.” Statista Infographics, 23 Mar. 2017, https://www.statista.com/chart/8638/many-people-expect-terrorist-attacks-in-2017/

The EU Calls for Removal of all Extremist Content on Social Media

The European Union has given social media companies like Google, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter three months to demonstrate that they are making efforts to rid their platforms of extremist content in order to fight online radicalization. This has been a significant issue in Europe, and the European Commission hopes that by removing extremist content an hour after notification, social media companies can halt the proliferation of radicalization and extremist ideologies [1].

This could certainly help stop the lone-wolf radicalization phenomenon that’s been occurring online, but certain realities of this plan remain unclear. The proposal adds to the existing, voluntary system agreed by the EU and social media companies, under which social media platforms are not legally responsible for the content circulating on their sites [2].

It’s unclear how feasible the EU proposal is since companies’ attempts to deliver on the one hour mandate will be a struggle. For example, Google currently reviews 98% of reported videos within 24 hours [3].

The recommendations are non-binding, but could potentially be taken into account by European courts. For now, they are meant as guidelines for how companies should remove illegal content [4].

The next few months will demonstrate how the EU will proceed and whether tech companies will become more helpful in the fight against violent extremism. While it is certainly a step in the right direction with regard to decreasing online radicalization, there will be pushback from companies that find the increased effort and potential legal battles bothersome.


[1] Gibbs, S. (2018, March 1). EU gives Facebook and Google three months to tackle extremist content. Retrieved March 1, 2018, from http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/01/eu-facebook-google-youtube-twitter-extremist-content

[2] Social media faces EU ‘1-hour rule’ on taking down terror content. (March 1, 2018.). Retrieved March 1, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/708b82c4-1d65-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6

[3] Social media faces EU ‘1-hour rule’ on taking down terror content. (March 1,2018). Retrieved March 1, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/708b82c4-1d65-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6

[4] Gibbs, S. (2018, March 1). EU gives Facebook and Google three months to tackle extremist content. Retrieved March 1, 2018, from http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/01/eu-facebook-google-youtube-twitter-extremist-content

Vehicles as Tools of Destruction: The New Weapons of Terror

It was a day of celebration. Strolling down the waterfront with fireworks overhead. Thousands gathered to mark the holiday.  The evening was ideal, but all things come to an end.  You heard a commotion and turned.  Next, you heard screams.  You didn’t know what it was, but you knew that something was horribly wrong.  The crowd started moving, immediately it was a stampede – a rush to get away from the horrible thing causing the terror.  In your panic to flee, you looked back to see what it was.  A truck had jumped the curb and was running people over.

This could’ve been the story of any one of the hundreds who experienced the Bastille Day horror in Nice, France on July 14, 2016.  The terrorist Mohamed Lahuaiej Bouhlel, inspired by an ISIL call to arms, drove a 19-ton truck into the French crowd.  Bouhlel was able to drive a mile, kill eighty-six people and wound three hundred. Nice certainly wasn’t the world’s first vehicular terrorist attack and it wouldn’t be the last.  Attacks in Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and several other nations demonstrate the destructive capabilities of terrorists using vehicles for attacks.

Vehicular terrorist attacks are on the rise. ISIL and Al Qaeda have both called for using vehicles as weapons.  If a terrorist can’t use a bullet or bomb, they’re encouraged to use any means at their disposal. ISIL and other Islamist groups aren’t even the only ones to use cars and trucks as weapons.  In May 2017, Richard Rojas, a U.S. Navy veteran, drove his car through Times Square crowds in New York City evidently seeking suicide by cop. Fewer than three months later, James Alex Fields Jr., a  white supremacist from Ohio, used his car to run over dozens of counter-protesters during the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville Virginia.

© CNN On May 18, 2017, Richard Rojas drove his vehicle into pedestrians in New York City’s Times Square. Evidence indicates Rojas was moved by personal motivations and drug use, not terrorism.

Vehicles are used because they are easy to acquire. An individual must simply obey driving rules to obtain a license in that state or country. In Europe, guns and other weapons are hard to come by due to heavy regulation. Vehicles, however, have less stringent requirements.  In the United States, with its lax gun restrictions, terrorism has occurred with both firearms and vehicles. But, vehicle attacks have frequently occurred in cities that have tighter gun laws.

Vehicles are used because of their potential for maximum destruction. The speed, size, and power of a vehicle can exceed the destructive capabilities of other methods.  Often, vehicle attacks only stop when the attacker can drive no further. A vehicle striking a crowded street or event can easily kill dozens and injure hundreds.

Vehicles are used because they are ubiquitous. Cars and trucks are everywhere.  We cannot avoid them in our modern lives. The true essence of terror is its caprice. By turning something unremarkable into a weapon of war, the actual terror factor increases. No one knows who, what, or when something will strike.

Vehicular attacks are difficult to counter. Cities and their streets were designed before the advent of vehicular terrorism. Pedestrians walk within meters of traffic. And most open spaces – plazas, waterfronts, cultural attractions – require street access. Finally, fiscal considerations always remain primary in establishing effective prevention and mitigation protocols.

While elimination of the problem is unrealistic, mitigation is not and measures can be taken to improve the status quo. Cities can establish barriers.  These include erecting posts, fences, and planting trees alongside streets.  Many cities strategically park large trucks outside large, outdoor public events to prevent vehicular attacks. Governments can slow the speed of traffic by lowering limits and erecting speed bumps. Or, alternatively, cities can expand their car-free pedestrian zones to ensure that walkers can safety travel and enjoy areas and events designed for the public.

© Mark Metcalfe/Getty Images – A newly installed barricade in Sydney, Australia to prevent vehicular attacks like those in Nice and London

After the attack in Nice, the world united in condemning the horrors perpetrated in France’s streets.  Men, women, and children were indiscriminately targeted.  Families were forever changed by the actions of one individual moved by the violent advocacy of his terrorist group.  The world has come together too many times to mourn lives lost when trucks and cars have been used as weapons of war.  More can be done to make our streets and public spaces safe from violent actors.  More must be done to ensure citizens don’t have to fear walking along the sidewalk, partaking in public demonstrations or just living their everday lives.

Can Deradicalization Reduce Violent Extremism? This Expert Thinks So

When seeking counter-terrorism explanations and solutions, the focus is generally on why radicalization occurs. What happens after radicalization–deradicalization–is much more complicated. Deradicalisation programs are becoming increasingly important in countries that aim to avoid further violence and rehabilitate those who have been radicalized.

Deradicalization programs vary but can include counseling, theological education, and attempts to deemphasize violence in the radicalized person’s value system. There is much criticism of the programs’ effectiveness, however, since there is little evidence at this point to confirm whether or not these programs work.

The writings of Daniel Koehler, Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, and contributor to George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security are vital to understanding this new path. Despite much of the criticism leveled at deradicalization programs,

Koehler argues that arresting or killing people is not the answer to violent extremism since it leaves its appeal untouched or even strengthened[1]. Koehler argues that deradicalization is not the same as disengagement. Disengagement is a mere behavioral change ensuring that a person no longer commits illegal activities, but it does not imply a change in ideology[2].

It is important to understand what motivates a person to engage in violent extremism in the first place. A  broad survey of the literature regarding radicalization suggests that possible driving forces include lack of professional prospects, education, community support, or simply a person’s attempt to find meaning and honor in his (sic) life. Diverse schools of thought including sociological, empirical and psychological theories are converging to grapple with this problem.[3]

Koehler suggests a broad set of tools could be used to address an individual’s concerns, from vocational training to religious or psychological counseling, and even creative art therapy[4].

It is important, however, to tailor the deradicalization techniques to each individual. The ideology and identity that is ingrained during the radicalization process are deeply personal and difficult for a person to simply forget. This lack of efficiency is one of many legitimate concerns about deradicalization programs. Despite those concerns, more research and development could demonstrate that investing in these programs could significantly alter the way extremist groups operate, and perhaps, diminish their success.


[1] Price, Michael. (2017, May 26). Can terrorists be deradicalized? Science Magazine. 
[2] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 
[3] Koehler, D. (2014). The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet. Journal for Deradicalization, 0(1), 116–134.
[4] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 


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The Terrorist Threat in France: A Look at Prison Radicalization

ANNE-CHRISTINE POUJOULAT/AFP/GETTY

French counter-terrorism policy rejects the soft measures carried out by many of its European counterparts. So then, why has France, despite its aggressive stance against terrorism, seen more high-profile terrorist incidents than any other Western European country in the last six years?  An absence of terrorist attacks in France for more than a decade created a false sense of security. However, since 2012 France has been the victim of several jihadist attacks that have placed it on the frontline in the battle against terrorism. While some observers blame the attacks on France’s large Muslim prison population, citing prisons as a breeding ground of radicalization, others blame France’s delayed implementation of counter-radicalization programs. Other critics attribute the attacks to marginalized Muslim populations that find France’s secular policies stifling. None of these analyses, standing alone, provides an explanation sufficient to guide an effective strategy to end attacks. But this piece will focus on the prisons.

The notion of prison serving as a breeding ground for radicalization is not new. Khalen Kelkal, the main perpetrator of the 1995 Paris subway attacks that spurred counter-terrorism legislation, is believed to have been radicalized in prison. As of 2015, at least four men underwent radicalization while in a French prison and went on to attack locations in Europe. Furthermore, Cherif Kouachi, the Charlie Hebdo attacker, arrived at Fleury Merogis, a French prison, in January 2005. While imprisoned, Kouachi met Djamel Beghal – also known as Abu Hamza – who was serving 10 years for plotting to attack a US embassy in 2001. Kouachi also encountered Amedy Coulibaly, the man behind the 2015 Jewish supermarket attacks. In another instance still, Mehdi Nemouche, underwent radicalization in prison, traveled to Syria, and then traveled to Belgium where, in 2014, he attacked the Jewish Museum of Belgium. While these men represent only a small portion of the total prison population, their social ties to one another, as well as the magnitude of their crimes, demonstrates prison radicalization is an area worthy of counter-radicalization focus.

Radicalization can occur in prison for several reasons. It can stem from a confrontation with jail authorities, often worsened by the negative images Muslim inmates see on television and in other media regarding Islam. In addition, radicalization is molded, “by the conditions prevailing in prison, its organization and specific architecture.” Overcrowding can lead to sharing cells, restrictions on bathing, and unheard demands due to prison guards’ heavy workloads. This leads to exasperation, often exacerbated by the prison’s refusal to allow the practice of religion. Muslim prisoners believe Islamophobia runs rampant within their walls. Problems associated with prisons globally are vexing for many French Muslims and the disaffection they feel outside prison is only magnified behind bars.

Focusing counter-radicalization efforts in prisons would likely yield positive results if done astutely, and with advice from experts. As of 2015, according to authorities, French prisons held 238 inmates charged with terrorist offenses, with 152 of them classified as “dangerous Islamists.” There are approximately 67,500 imprisoned individuals in France. It is estimated that 70% of the prison population is Muslim, yet Muslims notably comprise only 8% of the French national population. Romain Quivooij, Associate Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, acknowledges that the number of “dangerous Islamists” is a very low number in comparison to the total prison population, and argues that “radicalization in prison does not only involve people singled out as ‘radical Islamists.’ Cases of ordinary criminals who adopt violent extremist views in jail and engage in terrorist activities upon their release are common.” One French prison director implemented a trial run in which the radicalized individuals were segregated from the general population. While the director deemed the segregation successful, an ex-inmate of the French prison stated, “I don’t understand the idea at all of putting all the radicals together and hoping they will change.” Some believe putting radicalized inmates together strengthens bonds and facilitates jihadist ideology. Regardless, it does seem to limit their ability to attract new recruits.

Haras Rafiq of the Quilliam Foundation states neither segregating nor allowing radicalized inmates to mix with the general population is a good model, rather he advocates for an increase of professional imams. Prison guards do receive some training, however, due to the large population of inmates in prisons, in addition to the changing profile of a radicalized jihadist, guards find it difficult to detect radicalized individuals. According to one expert the, “…lack of Muslim chaplains is thought to have created a vacuum that leaves room for self-appointed and self-taught imams and their radical ideas.” In fact, Hassan el-Anoui Talibi, Chief Imam of French prisons issued a press release advocating for more financial support and resources for prison imams, as they currently receive no pay except reimbursement for basic expenses (Alexander). One offender stated that in the six years he was imprisoned, he did not see an Imam until year five (Alexander). With a surplus of resources going into hard counter-terrorism measures, it’s reasonable to assume that France could procure an appropriate number of imams.

While an augmentation in imams, in quality and quantity, may be sound policy akin to soft measures found in other European countries, one author asserts that the majority of radicalized inmates may actually go through the process of radicalization prior to their first sentence. This indicates that prison programs may need an emphasis on de-radicalization rather than solely counter-radicalization.

Does a promising policy exist that can incorporate the two? The same author argues that increasing the number of imams is urgently needed, however so is “the integration of additional services as part of a wider interdisciplinary approach.” Effective programs can be hard to implement in a favorable setting. Creating an effective program in French prisons to hinder radicalization and promote deradicalization remains an enormous challenge. However, in light of France’s high incidence of terrorist attacks, it is likely to continue augmenting its prison programs. It would be well-served by focusing on approaches that are multifaceted and by listening to suggestions from community members and academics.