Dividing The Union: How Terrorism Has Changed European Unity

Since the refugee crisis’ start in 2015 Europe has been under considerable strain. Tension and anger commingle as Europeans grapple before the world with their humanitarian duty and concern over their increased risk at the hands of Islamic terrorism. There were only two reported terrorist attacks linked to Islamic extremism in 2014. That number has multiplied many times since the refugee crisis’ start. There were 17 attacks in 2015, 13 in 2016, and 33 in 2017.

The EU’s Approach to Migration
The European Union’s grand migration strategy states that, “…rising to the migration and refugee challenge — and doing so in full respect of human rights and international law — is a vital interest at the core of the EU’s values.” But the statement has been challenged within the EU itself.

The grand strategy attempts to address concerns about terror’s growing threat in Europe, but it does imply that it is the EU’s duty to welcome those in need. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, however, have actively resisted accepting large numbers of refugees. The Czech Republic and Poland may soften their stance. But Hungary continues to resist EU migrant norms. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has been accused — in a conspicuous breach of EU core values — of anti-immigration policies, attacking the rule of law, and minorities in the media. While unlikely to lead to real punitive action, the accusations lead to Hungary’s losing its vote.

The EU is known for implementing the Schengen Agreement among 26 countries to abolish borders within the Union. The agreement is a cornerstone of European unity. But six EU countries including France, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway have agreed, in light of increased terrorism, to temporarily reinstating internal border controls.

The agreement is surprising and the rationale, startling. “Persistent terrorist threats,” “security situations,” ”threats resulting from continuous significant secondary movements,” and, “continuous serious threats to public policy and internal security,” represent some of the verbiage being bandied about. The most significant citation, “…significant secondary movement” relates to the Schengen Agreement’s position regarding free movement between states.

Populism in Europe and the Anti-Immigration Argument
Italy, Sweden, and Germany are now pushing back against EU immigration policies. The four nations have seen their politics become more nationalistic and anti-immigration. While not every country is experiencing a populist turn like Italy, right-wing populist groups are ascendant elsewhere. One of Europe’s most notable changes in the past decade is the disintegration of support for established, left-wing parties. There has been a commensurate increase in right-wing, populist affiliation. And such groups traditionally hold anti-immigration stances. In 2018, Pew research found that social democratic parties are hitting all-time lows over most of Europe.

Circumstances have put Italy’s no-boat policy to the test repeatedly

Italy’s new populist government took power over the summer and has made moves to boldly enforce anti-migration policies. Interior Minister Matteo Salvini said on record, “Not one more person arrives in Italy by boat.” In a more nuanced pronouncement later Salvini said he doesn’t oppose helping refugees, and he has pledged to allow refugees, especially pregnant women, and children stay in Italy. But he added that he continues to see migrants traveling by boat as a serious threat to Europe.

Circumstances have put Italy’s no-boat policy to the test repeatedly. In June, before Salvini’s statement, the Italian government refused disembarkment to a ship carrying 600 migrants. This led to a standoff between Rome and the EU. The tension abated when Spain volunteered to receive the ship. While that represented a win for Salvini, two months later, in August, Rome caved to EU pressure and allowed a ship with 150 migrants to dock.

Germany and Sweden too have seen increases in populism and anti-immigration rhetoric. The Sweden Democrats, an anti-immigrant, pro-welfare-state party, won 18% of the vote. Comparatively, political powerhouse, the Social Democrats suffered 11% losses in union support. This saw them drop to the third most popular party in Sweden. It is noteworthy that the Social Democrats received few youth votes. These developments suggest a long-term political shift in Sweden.

Germany experienced similar political seismic shifts in 2017. The success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) makes it the first far-right group to hold seats in the Bundestag in 50 years. AfD mirrors other right-wing groups throughout Europe: each embraces a platform of anti-immigration and emphatic German nationalism. A striking aspect of AfD’s success is that since 2013, the party gained 7.9% growth in support. It draws from all German regions, while the country’s traditional parties such as Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, CDU) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD), suffered substantial losses all over the country.

EU policy should protect European citizens without turning its back on a humanitarian crisis.

Looking Forward
In light of immigration trends, increasing terror attack rates, and populist waves plaguing Europe, the EU must unify behind the values, and goals its member states share. It must continue counteracting growing populism movements. And it must reassess how it can address the refugee crisis. Recently, President Jean-Claude announced that the EU would deploy 10,000 armed border police — with the freedom to use force — on the EU’s external borders to tackle unlawful immigration. While this is a step in the right direction for European security, it is imperative that the EU listens to all member states. It must not deny the real dangers caused by unchecked immigration. But fear should never outweigh the moral responsibility to help fellow humans in need. EU policy should protect European citizens without turning its back on a humanitarian crisis.

This cartoon by Patrick Chappatte appeared in the April 25, 2015 International New York Times. He titled the cartoon “Migrants and the European Union,” and added the caption, “Europe looks for an answer to the migrants reaching for its shores.”Credit Patrick Chappatte

An Invisible Problem in Plain Sight

Riot police patrol Zhanaozen in December.

Within the realm of counter-terror, governments focus on preventing attacks at the source as well as at the target. Often, western governments define the target as their own backyard.

Likewise, they define the source as some far-off region at war. That point of view is not illegitimate. However, experts recognize extremist ideology is on the march across north and west Africa, southeast Asia, and Eurasia. And attacks tend to be on government or religious targets within the attacker’s own region.

Before an ISIS-linked cell in Tajikistan killed four cyclists from Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States there was scant information about the rise of extremism there.

Are we noticing? Well, western media has vested interests in Nigeria and Mali thanks to French and British influence. Similarly, western media have vested interests in the Philippines thanks to former US dependency. But what about Eurasia? Despite emerging from under the Soviet shroud it remains poorly understood. Before an ISIS-linked cell in Tajikistan killed four cyclists from Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States there was scant information about the rise of extremism there. And yet, when it comes to extremism, Central Asia is now firmly caught between Europe and Asia.

States like Kazakhstan, for example, are experiencing a problem. But not one not for which they can scapegoat immigrants — one from their own backyard. Autocratic Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has kept his state isolated from everything except foreign investment in technology and oil. He has turned Kazakhstan into a regional powerhouse, one in which other Central Asian countries see hope. But Kazakhstan may be on the verge of self-implosion given the rise in extremist ideology and a lackluster response to it. Recent attacks on national guard bases, police stations, and public transportation in oil-rich cities such as Aktobe in the northwest or the cosmopolitan Almaty have revealed socioeconomic and religious fissures that should have been addressed years ago.

We are where we are because the government turned its back on Kazakhstan’s youth.

Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, is in the midst of a religious revival. After years of Soviet suppression, 70% of Kazakhs identify as Muslim now and there has been a steep rise in ultra-conservative extremist ideology coming from Syria and Iraq. Central Asians feature prominently in infamous attacks in Stockholm, Saint Petersburg, Istanbul, and Boston. They target public events and public transport with methods akin to Al-Qaeda and ISIS. It would be disastrous if small cells like the former connect online with large groups like the latter.

Extremists have hit Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbor Uzbekistan the hardest. But Uzbekistan’s security services have been able to repel them outward to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kazakhstan has proven itself capable of no such strategy.

We are where we are, however, because the government turned its back on Kazakhstan’s youth. Watching their leaders inveigle foreign investment has left young Kazakhs feeling disaffected. Extremism always brings government corruption and poverty and Kazakhstan is no exception.

Extremists have hit Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbor Uzbekistan the hardest. But Uzbekistan’s security services have been able to repel them outward to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kazakhstan has proven itself capable of no such strategy. Experts are questioning its counterterror preparedness and methods. The government’s mission to engage the religious community with proper Islamic literacy may help. But President Nazarbayev’s vast surveillance and his calls to ban the wearing of all black will likely be seen for what they are. They are an encroachment on religion and it could alienate more of the populace. Kazakhstan’s comparably superior quality of life and moderate lifestyle have not immunized it against terror attacks. It is the reaction of its own disaffected people, not someone from a far-off, war-torn land, that reverberates ominously now.

How Foreign Critics Led the IRA to Disarm

For more than half of the 20th century, violent conflict between pro-British Unionists and Irish Nationalists – a period referred to as the Troubles – decimated communities across British-controlled Northern Ireland and the self-governing Republic of Ireland. 

Violence even occasionally spilled over into England itself. In counties bordering Northern Ireland and the Republic, violence was an everyday phenomenon. Crossing the border often proved a fateful endeavor. Much of the violence was driven by the IRA, or Irish Republican Army, an organization determined to end British rule of Northern Ireland and restore political autonomy to all of Ireland’s 32 counties. 

Though their aim was noble, they used violence – including bombings, kneecappings, and violent intimidation – to achieve it.

At the height of IRA violence, their bloody campaign instilled terror in the Irish people, claiming hundreds of innocent lives. Irish people with relatives in Northern Ireland, like my grandparents, were thwarted from communicating with or visiting family across the border. Crossing in the wrong sort of car, or entering the wrong neighborhood would guarantee harm at the hands of violent nationalists. Things carried on this way for half a century.

If the IRA was so powerful, why has it ceased to be a source of violence in the 21st century? After declaring a ceasefire in 2005, the IRA lost its status as a major Irish political player. The IRA’s r reasons for disarming are complex, but they are entwined with events outside of Ireland, surprisingly. 

It’s not too much to suggest that Irish-Americans were complicit in the deaths of hundreds of Irish civilians.

Irish-American support buoyed the IRA throughout its history, even as its leadership faltered, and its mission’s clarity flagged. IRA allies across the Atlantic ranged from middle-class Americans of Irish descent to Irish expatriates, and even to high-ranking members of the US Congress. Such ideological and financial support held powerful sway over IRA activities. 

Preceding a 1970s crackdown, these were the IRA’s primary sources of funding. As such, Irish-American sentiment had a clear connection to IRA tactics. For decades, this informal Irish American lobby aided and abetted the IRA’s bloody pursuit of independence. It’s not too much to suggest Irish-Americans were complicit in the deaths of hundreds of Irish civilians.

The Belfast Telegraph headline on the day of the IRA ceasefire in 1994

 

9/11 reminded Irish-Americans how painful terrorism is.

The 1990s and early 2000s brought about an ideological shift. After decades of support, an increasing number of Irish-Americans shunned violence in favor of peaceful, political negotiations. 9/11 reminded Irish-Americans how painful terrorism is. 

The US government arrested a number of IRA operatives trafficking weapons on American soil. And three IRA bombers were arrested in Colombia while training FARC rebels to fight US forcesThese developments turned Irish-American opinion against the IRA’s use of terrorism and support for the group waned.

As the IRA lost American funding and connections, the pressure to disarm mounted. The loss of the Irish-American street wasn’t the only consideration in the IRA’s disarmament, but it surely factored into the 2005 decision.

These are not bygone days we’re discussing. These shifts occurred in the 21st century, and as such the implications are profound. Foreign support was crucial to the IRA’s survival. Likewise, it is integral to the operations of terrorist organizations like ISIS and Latin American cartels. Foreign support comes from individual donors, government agencies, and front charitiesEven Bitcoin has become a means of financing extremism as terrorist organizations increase their reach and diversify their resourcesForeign money and connections are used for weapons, education, outreach. Absent these resources, all these activities would be limited.

Undermining terrorism by cutting off foreign support is demonstrably effective. If we’re serious about ending radicalism, we must penalize overseas supporters as ardently as we oppose terrorists themselves. 

The War on Terror tends to focus on terrorist recruitment, disarmament, and direct combat. But it must also address the connections terrorist organizations have to secondary agencies funding them. In the case of the IRA, by cutting off foreign support was demonstrably effective. 

If we’re serious about ending radicalism, we must penalize its overseas supporters as ardently as we oppose terrorists themselves. This works, whether the supporters are Saudi officials, European civilians, or members of the Irish-American middle class. 

Brexit and Northern Ireland, Troubles Afoot?

As the United Kingdom prepares to leave the European Union in March 2019 there remain many who are concerned about what this will mean for the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Twenty years after the end of the ethno-national Protestant and Catholic paramilitary conflict known as The Troubles, the British Isles once more fear the start of the terrorist violence. In 2016, when the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, one of the most pressing questions regarded what to do with Ireland and Northern Ireland border – and how to keep violence from reemerging there.

The Troubles were a 30 year (1968 – 1998) ethno-conflict over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The two sides to this territorial conflict had distinct visions for Northern Ireland: the majority Unionist Protestants fought to keep Northern Ireland a part of the United Kingdom.

While the minority Catholic Unionists fought to unite Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 3,600 people were killed, thousands more were injured, and an intolerable unease lingered for three decades. 

Fears of Troubles-era violence and the paramilitary groups’ reemergence grow daily as Brexit negotiations continue. According to the United Kingdom’s domestic counterintelligence and security agency, MI5, Northern Ireland violence is now classified as severe, indicating the belief that chances of attacks in the region are high. In Britain the threat level is moderate.

Violence in Northern Ireland never ended completely. Despite the Good Friday Agreement, radical Protestants and IRA splinter groups (such as New IRA, formerly known as Real IRA) consistently, violently attack one other.

Examples of such attacks include early July attacks in Derry wherein a group of boys, some as young as eight, fired AK-47 rifles and threw IEDs at police officers. The attacks were claimed by New IRA. On the other side, an office at the Irish Republican party Sinn Fein was targeted in an arson attack. No one was harmed, and no one claimed the attack, but the party publicly stated that the attack was anti-democratic.

There is legitimate concern that Brexit negotiation tensions will exacerbate this unending Troubles Epilogue, provoking broader terror operations and ubiquitous violence. But what is it about these negotiations that they can re-ignite great contention in Ireland? 

The reintroduction of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, a border where citizens from both countries would have to go through customs to enter the other side. Among other things, The Good Friday Agreement stipulated that the Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland border remain open to the point of figurative invisibility. No stopping travelers and traders, in other words, at Customs to awkwardly hand-over paperwork.

Brexit negotiators have borne this in mind, but lately, news outlets, political analysts, and political leaders alike opine that there is a growing possibility of a “No Deal Brexit.” Such a thing would mean the UK and EU agreed to shrug off the unresolved nature of the border problem and proceed regardless, triggering the installation of a hard border – imagine what this will do to trade alone.

According to recently released technical papers, the British government’s publicly stated opinion on trade and travel hardships caused by a prospective hard border boils down to, “…ask Dublin.” The rhetoric exasperates leaders on both sides unsettled by a lack of deference for the seminal Good Friday Agreement.

The looming threat of a No Deal Brexit is not the only cause for concern. A bill passing through Parliament allows for stops and searches within a mile of the Irish border in Northern Ireland for purposes of combating terror. Unsurprisingly, there has been backlash over this bill in Northern Ireland and Ireland.

Fears are based on the growing perception that the British government isn’t even interested in putting a good face on violating the Good Friday Agreement’s spirit which seeks to defuse tension rather than fuel it with hard borders. London must redouble its investment in resolving the border question lest it reignites an old fire. With tensions on the rise and violence already occurring in the area, the scars of the past are opening. A No Deal Brexit could be a straight shot to terrorism’s reappearance on the British Isles.

Picture by Margaret McLaughlin

 

Legal Difficulties May Loom: Arms Sales Between The West and its Gulf Allies

According to John Irish and Emmanuel Jarry at Reuters, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E., “…are leading a coalition fighting the Iran-aligned Houthi group that controls most of northern Yemen and the capital Sanaa.” According to human rights groups’ legal counsel, “France faces heightened legal risks for supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. despite warnings such arms could be used in the war in Yemen,” (Irish). France’s arms sales to its two Gulf allies have been criticized for being used by the pair to take civilian lives, interfere with peace prospects and generally fuel the conflict in Yemen. France’s weapon sales to the two Gulf states could bring legal headaches in the months to come.

The conflict in Yemen between the Houthis and the international Saudi-led coalition has killed 10,000 people as of March 19th, 2018. Three million others are displaced. The conflict has shown few signs of de-escalation. More death, destruction, and displacement are expected unless the international community, the militias, and the countries engaged in the conflict agree to a ceasefire and peace-seeking dialogue. Unlikely. Each actor is committed to emerging victorious. Clearly, for the war to end, someone will have to lose or unlikely but significant concessions will be necessary from all.


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Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. see France as one of their most reliable sources for arms in the world. Each state purchases tanks, armored vehicles, munitions, and artillery. The U.A.E. alone purchases fighter-jets from France. The United States and France have continued selling arms to the Saudi-led coalition, while other participants have reduced their weapon sales fearing their use in the conflict. France and the United States agree that Iran and its proxy rebels are threats to stability and peace in Yemen. Therefore, it is unlikely they will roll back their coalition arms sales.

According to Amnesty International, “France’s arms transfers are contrary to its international commitments. The French government has authorized exports of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. in circumstances where these weapons can be used in the conflict in Yemen and could be used to carry out war crimes,” (Irish).

France would be wise to avoid seeming out of step with its stated commitment to human rights. It should adopt measures to more closely monitor the weapons it exports. Thusly, it can avoid selling to parties who use weapons on civilians as a matter of course. In turn, France’s beneficiaries in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh should be allowed to purchase on the condition that they candidly report how the weapons are being used to U.N.S.C.A.R. (the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation).

France’s foreign ministry described government’s processes as, “…robust and transparent,” in response to questions about France’s licensing system for exports. To be clear, France does have a proven track record of supporting and cooperating in efforts to strengthen peace and security in Africa for years. This will most likely continue to be the case. In light thereof, a priority should be made of ensuring its weapons are not used in the service of violating international law.


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Privately, French officials have divulged that France has already told weapon suppliers to exempt themselves from pursuing new Saudi and U.A.E export licenses. This is, at a minimum, a symbolic attempt to reduce its weapons transfers to Gulf states. “I don’t think you’ll see a clear pushback from us,” one French diplomat told Reuters, “What’s more likely is an informal message to companies to not bother asking for licenses. It will be a de-facto restriction but without saying it publicly, so as not to annoy the Saudis,” (Jarry).

The probability that the Saudi-led coalition will use French weapons in operations that could take the lives of innocent Yemeni civilians is high. France should make clear to its Gulf allies that such eventualities are intolerable. As stated, it has taken steps but it must be explicit about protocol so missteps aren’t made during the anarchy and, so-called, fog of war.


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The Yemen war has already cost too many lives. France and the United States have stated their commitment to returning Yemen to its people. The two western powers should commit themselves to pursuing a roadmap to reconstruction. They mustn’t leave the African nation in the tragic tatters that it finds itself in today.

Works Cited

Irish, John, and Emmanuel Jarry. “France Faces Legal Risks over Saudi, UAE Arms Sales: Lawyers.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 19 Mar. 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-france/france-faces-legal-risks-over-saudi-uae-arms-sales-lawyers-idUSKBN1GV2ME.

“UNSCAR: UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation – UNODA.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/disarmament/unscar/.

Aohruk. “UK Complicit in War Crimes through Arms Export to Saudi Arabia and UAE.” Arab Organisation for Human Rights in UK, aohr.org.uk/index.php/en/all-releases/item/7204-uk-complicit-in-war-crimes-through-arms-export-to-saudi-arabia-and-uae.html.