by Sonia Lay

Toy Soldiers on a Mission: The Training and Indoctrination of Children for Jihad

Image result for child jihadist

On September 26, a children’s show aired on Iran’s Channel 2 to commemorate the Iran-Iraq war. Translated by The Middle East Media Research Institute, it shows children of different ages dressed in conservative Muslim clothing and military uniforms while praising martyrdom and jihad. In the video, the young protagonists wear badges of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on their chests and sing a song about their fathers fighting in the Iranian army, willing to die “in the path of God”[1]– presenting a disturbing example of youth indoctrination.

Another recent example of early indoctrination comes from the Indonesian city of Probolinggo, where a kindergarten has been accused of promoting radicalism for dressing children in ISIL-style costumes during an independence day parade.[2]

It is widely known that training is a fundamental component in the strategy of extremist and terrorist groups. The basis for the conservation of the jihadist ideology is to find new proselytes and to plant the seed of hatred in the next generations of jihadis. However, the data reveals this phenomenon to be an increasingly alarming one.

According to a Secretary-General report on children and armed conflict in Nigeria, since 2009 at least 8,000 young soldiers have been recruited by Boko Haram and, by the end of 2016, their army included many boys between 10 and 18.[3] Disconcerting data also suggests that in 2017, the number of recruited children in Somalia (2,127), South Sudan (1,221), the Syrian Arab Republic (961) and Yemen (842) was still remarkably high.[4]

Image result for child jihadist

We are all well aware that socio-cultural backgrounds play a leading role in shaping peoples’ future attitudes towards violence, especially in the early years of life. The reason is simple: social groups pass values, customs, beliefs, and rules from one generation to another to ensure a degree of uniformity and the survival of dominant ideologies.

What we often forget is that the transmission of cultural heritage can be both conscious and unconscious, because youth both unintentionally absorb the habits of those around them and deliberately follow instructions given to them by family, schools, peers, and media. This is such an effective means of imparting violent ideology that the innocence of children has now become a matter of grave concern for all of us.

Children are undoubtedly more suggestible than adults; their brains are not yet equipped with knowledge consolidated by past learning processes and experiences. As a consequence, they are extremely receptive to any information which could warp their worldview. The condition of children used as spies and suicide attackers[5] clearly exemplifies the above-mentioned concept: during childhood, critical thinking faculties are underdeveloped, making it difficult for youth to evaluate risks and personally assess the information given to them by jihadis.

Furthermore, jihadi strategists are fully aware of the role emotions play in learning. For this reason, they design specific media content to manipulate children, including songs, cartoons, and games which offer children jihadi role models and spread extremist ideas.

In the face of all this, the outlook seems bleak- so what can we do to prevent children from being drawn to terrorism?

De-radicalization strategies should be targeted at children and primarily based upon human variability because there are different types of extremist movements and the motives involved in joining them vary from person to person. Presumably, no single program could cover them all. In the case of children, we have already discussed how the origins of their radicalization process mainly lies in those people that provide them with role models to identify with. In order to keep children away from violent extremism, it is therefore absolutely necessary to stop adults from supporting or becoming terrorists.

In this digital age, new media has also become a powerful tool for spreading terrorist narratives to children. However, reacting to this threat merely by carrying out cyber attacks or playing the blame game will not help us develop the most effective counter-strategies. To be efficient, any approach should include three main operations: providing an in-depth analysis of terrorist narratives, preparing counter-narratives able to foster intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding, and disseminating counter-narratives (especially through social media and learning institutions.) This will help to reduce the effectiveness of the radical messages children and youth are currently being shown.

Cultural changes require time and cooperation to effectively eradicate dangerous norms and beliefs. But growing the seeds of hope and tolerance will provide our society with a positive foundation for future generations, and it all begins with protecting the youth.

[1] Iranian TV Children’s Show: Standing Next to Missiles, Children Sing in Praise of Jihad and Martyrdom, 9-26-2018, https://www.memri.org/tv/iranian-tv-children-show-children-glorify-fathers-jihad-martyrdom.

[2] Kindergarten dresses children as jihadis for parade in Indonesia, 8-20-2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/20/kindergarten-dresses-children-as-jihadists-for-parade-in-indonesia.

[3] Cf. Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Nigeria (S/2017/304), 4-6-2017, p.6, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1709682.pdf

[4] Cf. Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/70/836-S/2016/360), 5-16-2018, p.2, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1815109.pdf

[5] Cf. UNODC, Handbook on children recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups, Wien, 2017, p.11, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf

Sonia Lay
www.risetopeace.org/about-us/mee-our-team/
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 by Rise to Peace

Defining the Problem and Reaching a Solution: A Reflection on How to Counter Violent Extremism

“Violent extremism knows no boundaries.” That was the message that Rise to Peace founder Ahmad Mohibi used to open “How to Counter Violent Extremism,” the latest Rise to Peace panel discussion, which took place this Tuesday at the Elliott School of International Affairs. With that in mind, the panelists – Leanne Erdberg, U.S. Institute of Peace; Jesse Morton, Parallel Networks; and Edward Burkhalter, U.S. Department of State – offered their perspectives on the best ways to counter violent extremism.

The panel’s first challenge was defining extremism and terrorism. Leanne Erdberg offered a legal definition: terrorism is limited to action, while extremism also includes violent thoughts. Jesse Morton focused on the definition’s practical implications. Terrorists, he poses, are cemented in their action, and thus countering terrorism is necessarily catching and punishing those who commit violent acts. An extremist is undergoing a cognitive radicalization process and can pulled away from extremist movements. Counterterrorism, he says, is the realm of law enforcement, but CVE is more complicated, and requires the engagement of more stakeholders.

Conversation then moved to how the problem of extremism has grown. Jesse Morton observed that mainstream media informs social media radicalization. For example, Islamophobic narratives in news media fuels polarization narratives used by radicalizers online. In a similar vein, Edward Burkhalter noted that A 24-hour news cycle can make problems seem more severe than they really are, and it is important to focus discussion on proven research.

Panelists then discussed the shortcomings of past efforts to curtail violent extremism. Jesse Morton provided historical background by discussing the roots of the “hearts and minds” in marketing campaigns and advertising.

Leanne Erdberg built on this theme by questioning the framing of programs and success in general. She argues that CVE that operates within an advertising scheme, which treats the communities they serve as an audience rather than giving them agency over the process. Programs that abandon that approach and instead emphasize people taking their future into their own hands are more empowering and more successful.

Ahmad Mohibi discussed CVE shortcomings in the context of Afghanistan. He said that CVE is impossible without trust, and in Afghanistan the trust between the Afghan and American government and the Afghan people is lacking. As long as people feel disconnected and distrustful of their leaders, extremism will continue. Edward Burkhalter provided a U.S. government perspective, acknowledging the futility of trying to improve a community without consulting its members. He elaborated, saying that the U.S. tries to follow a “do no harm” approach, and be sure that CVE or development efforts do not have unintended consequences. The only way to accomplish that is by relying on local partners.

Rise to Peace
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 by Liam Timmons

The Threat of Drone-Based Terror

On August 4, 2018, President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela was attacked with explosive-laden drones during a political rally. Although the drones were not successful in assassinating the Venezuelan leader, they managed to injure seven national guardsmen who were at the rally.

A few weeks earlier in July, the Public Safety Secretary of Mexico’s Baja California was also targeted by an armed drone, although the attached IED did not detonate. Attacks such as these are indicative of the burgeoning threat that drone-related terror can play in today’s world.

No longer is drone technology limited to the militaries of countries like the United States, Nigeria, or Pakistan. Instead, groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels, and the Islamic State are getting in on the action. In fact, ISIS recently threatened Paris with a drone attack. As drones become easier to obtain and use, attacks using this technology will become more frequent, more sophisticated, and more deadly.

The barriers to carrying out a drone-based terror attack are lower than ever. Lightweight hobby drones are cheap, easy to purchase and allow terrorist groups to carry out attacks from a distance. While military drones are less accessible and harder to operate, they do provide a higher operational capacity and have a number of avenues by which terrorist groups can obtain them. In this way, drone-based terror is comparable to nuclear terror.

Hobby drones, like a dirty bomb, can easily be weaponized, but have a relatively small impact, while military drones, like a weapon of mass destruction, can be stolen, bought from a rogue state or corrupt official, and has a high potential impact. Additionally, improvements in battery and camera technology will only increase the negative impact of drone-based terror as groups learn to harness these ever-increasing capabilities. In recent testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that drones, “will be used to facilitate an attack in the United States against a vulnerable target, such as a mass gathering.”

The Security Challenges of Drone-Based Terror

Drone-based terror presents unique security threats and challenges. The particular tactical flexibility inherent to drones forces a rethinking of current security strategies. Traditional notions of perimeter defense and target hardening no longer apply when the threat is as maneuverable and flexible as a drone.

Small drones can be used in swarms to destroy commercial airliners, disrupt military operations through hyper-local targeting, or inflict asymmetric damage on civilian targets. Additionally, drones can and have been used in conjunction with more traditional methods of terror.

During the Islamic State’s defense of Mosul, drones were used to guide suicide bombers and improve the accuracy of rocket and mortar fire. The coalition’s anti-drone no-fly zone was quickly counteracted by a do-it-yourself solution implemented by fighters on the ground. Further, drones can conduct both intelligence and counterintelligence operations: terrorist groups could use drones to jam military communications, survey battlefields, and download sensitive data.

In addition to conventional attacks and military-based operations, drones could be engineered to disperse chemical weapons, biological agents such as viruses or Anthrax, or even radioactive material. A September 2018 National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin warned that, “some terrorist groups overseas are [pursuing] new technologies and tactics, such as unmanned aerial systems and chemical agents,” while Hezbollah may have the ability to carry out biological warfare using drones.

Finally, aerial drones are not the only technology terrorist groups can exploit. In January 2017, Houthi rebels killed two Saudi soldiers with a sea-based drone. As aquatic drone technology continues to proliferate, terrorist capabilities may widen to include attacks on coastal cities. Aquatic drones maintain the security challenges of aerial drones but can dramatically widen the target range of drone-based terror. Land-based drones may pose a threat as well, since “fighters in Syria and Iraq have been […] experimenting with remotely controlled vehicles and small robots for nearly a decade.”

Countering Drone-Based Terror

US doctrine focuses on active and passive defense, as well as a proactive intelligence-based approach, to countering air threats. Because of the small size, speed, and maneuverability of drones, they may not be detectable to forms of active defense reliant on radar. However, communication jamming may be a particularly effective form of defense against drones, reducing targeting accuracy and thus the potential threat.

Additionally, acoustic and radio detection methods can make up for radar’s shortcomings in countering drone incursion. On the passive side of defense, simple behavioral changes like hosting high-profile events indoors, varying arrival and departure agendas of potential target personnel, and changing transport routes can make all types of terror, not just drone-based attacks, more difficult. Finally, greater control and oversight of the supply chain, through the monitoring of suspicious purchases and cooperation with manufacturers, would decrease the likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring drones in the first place.

Drone-Based Terror Takeaways

Drone-based terror can be seen as an emerging threat to the global security environment which demands immediate and creative solutions. Terrorist groups are already making use of drones in the air, at sea, and on land in a variety of situations and capacities. The barriers to acquiring, arming, and using drones are lower than ever, and drone-based attacks come with their own unique security challenges. As drone technology improves, becomes cheaper, and proliferates, militaries will have to reckon with new security paradigms to combat this rapidly-evolving threat.

Liam Timmons
risetopeace.org
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 by Haoyu Huang

Thailand Proposal

Thai bomb squad officials inspect the site of an explosion in Bangkok Feb. 14, 2012. Three minor blasts rattled the Thai capital Bangkok, leaving a foreigner seriously wounded when a grenade he was suspected of carrying exploded, police said. (NICOLAS ASFOURI / AFP)

The Thai government has employed multiple methods to combat the rising insurgency in Southern Thailand.

One includes a plan proposed by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in March 2005.  This article discusses the long-term solutions embedded in the work of the NRC which were designed to deal with the increase in violence.

Much of the unrest in Southern Thailand has been ascribed to the region’s high density of ethnic and religious minorities. 35% of the population identifies as Muslim and most of these Muslims as Malays. This high concentration of minority individuals creates greater religious and ethnic tension in the region. The tensions are fueled by the spread of extreme Islam in Southeast Asia. As extremist ideology has increased, so too has violence in the region. Since the insurgency’s start in January 2004 more than 6,500 people have lost their lives in southern provinces.

The National Reconciliation Commission, led by Anand Panrayachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand, provided a framework for managing the conflict and curbing the violence in the southern provinces.  

The commission was formed under the command of the King and Prime Minister, and was, “…charged with recommending policies, measures, mechanisms conducive to reconciliation and peace in Thai society. Particularly in the three southern border provinces.” The NRC was tasked with putting an end to daily violence. It is to serve as a catalyst for long-term changes around violence reduction. Finally, it is tasked with building institutions and programs for sustainable peace. The NRC suggested immediate and long-term proposals to combat the ongoing conflict.

In the short-term, the NRC mandated government-initiated peace talks with insurgents and advocates for non-military regional groups to maintain peace. The commission proposed three goals for conflict de-escalation. First, find common ground between the Muslim majority and Buddhist minority in southern Thailand, helping these groups live together peacefully as equals.  Second, create a common understanding of the majority population in Thailand. Third, create a larger, more harmonious and diverse Thai society.

To achieve these goals, the NRC noted the importance of conversation between the Thai government and militant groups.

The NRC noted it, “…believes it is necessary to engage in dialogue, freely exchanging views with people, both at home and abroad, who may subscribe to ideologies different from that of the state.”  In addition to the peace talks, it was suggested that an unarmed peace-keeping unit, known as Shanti Sena, be formed to defuse daily tensions through non-violent means. The mandate of this unit is to, “…prevent existing conflicts from escalating.”

As UN peace-keeping forces have demonstrated, these types of efforts can be effective, but they need sophisticated training and exemplary community relations. The NRC hoped the Shanti Sena would mediate to help re-establish trust between the people and their government. Thus, in the short-term, the NRC advocated for both a political solution and a common security policy.  

The long-term proposals accounted for greater post-conflict reconstruction, including five measures from the structure and seven from cultural and economic perspectives.   

Lastly, the proposal called for a better understanding of the situation in Southern Thailand. It wants to ensure that all parties understand the insurgency was not a simple rebellion against the government. The civil conflict was complex and rooted in historical injustices regarding religious identity, economic inequality, unequal power, and local governmental corruption. Southern Thailand was in a state of civil conflict for a long time.

There were obvious abuses of power in the region. In order to combat this, the NRC suggested, “…a transfer [of] state officials out of the area against whom abuse of authority complaints had been issued, an investigation guided by facts, and transparent legal action taken against such officials when appropriate.”  The NRC also proposed these transferred officers never again be deployed to southern provinces.

The NRC report makes clear that dealing with the crisis would require political will and input from all parties. However, it does not have realistic expectations or frameworks regarding how this might be accomplished.

This may stem from the composition and activity of the NRC. Unlike most conflict resolution boards, this group did not seek testimony beyond the 50 member commission. The commission was comprised of a cross-section of individuals including Muslim leaders and civil society agents both from within and outside the region. However, testimony from individual citizens was not sought. This is in contrast to similar commissions in South Africa and El Salvador. Finally, in other regions, such commissions were effective in post-conflict times, not during conflicts.

Haoyu Huang
www.risetopeace.org/about/mee-our-team/
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 by Ahmad Shah Mohibi

What Afghanistan Needs to Move Forward: National Unity

Brigadier General Abdul Raziq, Kandahar Chief of Police, speaks to the assembled locals of Kajran in Daykundi Province during a shura on October 22. DoD photo by Cpl. Mark Doran, Australian Defence Force/Released.

Afghanistan’s hero, General Abdul Raziq, was killed just days before the parliamentary elections, leaving a wide power vacuum in the Taliban’s birthplace, Kandahar.

General Raziq was shot and killed as he was leaving a U.S.-Afghan meeting in Kandahar, where Gen. Austin S. Miller, the Commander of American forces in Afghanistan, the Kandahar provincial governor, and other leaders were present.

General Raziq had survived dozens of life-threatening attacks but continued to fight against terrorism in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. He was proactive and took a strong stand against Pakistan, accusing it of providing sanctuary to the Taliban. The Taliban feared him terribly and he was regarded as a rampart against insurgents in the area.

His death is a significant loss for Afghanistan and the southern provinces are likely to be significantly impacted. Not only did General Raziq keep Kandahar and the southern provinces safe, but he also worked hard to facilitate Afghan consensus despite longstanding, intense conflicts between ethnicities and tribes. He had hoped for a bright and peaceful Afghanistan.

He was effective in fighting extremism, in encouraging Afghan unity, and in coordinating with leaders in the U.S. coalition.

Gen. Raziq was an influential American ally in the south where he was loved by Afghans for his patriotism and passion for bringing peace through eliminating insurgency. He was known for hunting and killing Taliban insurgents. Gen. Raziq said repeatedly that the goal was to, “kill them, not capture;” he was keenly aware of their destructive potential.

Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, commander of International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, greets Maj. Gen. Abdul Raziq, police chief of Kandahar province

Gen. Raziq joined the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan, led by Ata Mohammad Noor, Gen. Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqiq, and other reps from 34 political parties to vouchsafe a transparent election, and a legitimate government that fights extremism and serves the public.

An attack like the one that killed Gen. Raziq provokes doubt and despair. It spurs suspicions of governmental coordination behind such attacks and others like it: Gen. Daud Daud, Burhan-Uddin Rabbani, the former president of Afghanistan, the bombing of the Ministry of Defense, and others since 9/11. The Taliban leverages such paranoia for its purposes.

What’s next?

Over the past two weeks, America’s special envoy for Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, held talks with the Taliban’s political office in Qatar for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan conflict.

Next, Khalilzad met with senior officials in Saudi Arabi, Pakistan and Afghanistan to facilitate the Afghan peace process. All the while, the Taliban continues to execute deadly attacks, eliminating key figures, suggesting they do not want to negotiate, and undermining any hope for peace.

Going forward, Afghanistan stability relies on the following factors: 1) transparent parliamentary and presidential elections wherein a legitimate government is formed without foreign intervention, 2) a national peace process that includes all of the tribes in Afghanistan with meetings taking place only between Afghans, and 3) creation of a counter-insurgency policy that is three steps ahead of the enemy.

Help From Outside

The international community can foster change by supporting more education, helping with infrastructure redevelopment, and monitoring progress against corruption and social injustice. This would empower Afghans to build resilience against the terrorists who jeopardize national security.

Ultimately, the future of Afghanistan depends on its people. Good governance, transparent elections, economic development, education, and ethnic harmony all lie along the path to peace.

Afghans must realize that discrimination is ruining the nation, corruption is feeding terrorism, and division is eroding the values that ought to unify Afghans. When they recognize those challenges and commit to overcoming them, they can begin taking steps toward a lasting peace.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism, served as a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and later supported national security initiatives in Washington, D.C.
www.ahmadshahmohibi.com/
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