by Kate Kleinle

Lone Wolf Bio-Terror: Are We Prepared?

It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening. However, it’s not just an increasing number of lone wolves, but the variety of tactics they’ll employ in terror’s service that makes prevention a challenge. 

[pullquote]It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening.[/pullquote]

According to Britain’s Security Minister and top counter-terrorism officer, Ben Wallace, it is likely that a biological or chemical terror attack is on the horizon. At a security conference in London, last Tuesday Wallace warned, “The only limit to the ambition of our adversaries is their imagination.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer. They have developed and worked on a better arsenal. We have to be prepared for the day when that comes to our streets.” Implicit in his remarks was the notion that counter-terror specialists, as well as governments, must be equally imaginative in their pro-activity.

One major challenge governments face in trying to thwart chemical and biological attacks is the scale. If one person releases tiny amounts of a chemical agent like Anthrax, it could have implications for hundreds, or, millions of people. Traffic flow disruptions, water supply tainting, exposure areas untouchable, these are just some of the possibilities. 

Governments and private contractors have little experience with bio-terrorism. If terrorists were to release biotoxins in civilian areas, the damage could be enormous.

A terrorist need only infect one person, who could then infect her (sic) social circles. Epidemic exposure rates could be a reality faster than you can say Cipro, bringing repercussions on a global scale. The terrorists would need to do very little. The disease would naturally spread at a velocity that grows exponentially.

The probability of these attacks is increasing, and it’s time that governments took note. Currently, there is no international system in place specifically to combat chemical and bio-terror.

If a terrorist infected someone with a biological agent in New York, and then that person flew to Germany infecting people in Berlin, German and American authorities would have no pre-existing framework within which they could cooperate, info-share about how to stop the disease’s transmission, and help those infected. 

[pullquote]The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.[/pullquote]

It is critical that such a framework is in place before the scenario unfolds. In the event of a biological or chemical terror attack, time will be of the essence. The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.

Governments use major resources to plan for shooters, suicide bombers, and other common acts of terror. Diversifying those resources and intensifying the focus on biological and chemical terrorism could, in the future, save countless lives.

Kate Kleinle
risetopeace.org
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 by Kristine Olsen

Assad Ascendant: Russia Sells Syria Missile Defense System

On Tuesday, October 2nd Russia’s Defense Minister confirmed delivery of a long-range surface-to-air missile defense system to the Syrian army. Russia has long backed Bashar al-Assad. The delivery of the system comes in response to a recent incident in which the Syrian army accidenally shot down a Russian plane, killing all 15 Russian servicemen on-board.

Russia and Syria noted that the accident was a consequence of Syria’s outdated defense system. The new system would be part of upgraded security measures to improve tracking and reliability.

It will take three months to train the Syrian army to use the equipment, but once trained it will improve its stature domestically as well as regionally. Israel and the US oppose the move. US State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert called it a, “…serious escalation.”

[pullquote]Israel worries the new system will make it harder for them to fight Iran from Syrian territory.[/pullquote]

Israeli officials expressed concern that the sale would embolden Iran’s movement of arms across Syria. Israel has used Syrian airspace to launch missiles at Iranian entrenchments in Syria as Russia and Syria looked the other way. Israel worries the new system will make it harder for them to fight Iran from Syrian territory.

Tensions between Russia and Israel flared over the shooting incident when Russia initially blamed Israel. With regards to the new missile defense system, Israel argues consistently that providing weapons to irresponsible actors inflames regional chaos. Israel promised to continue thwarting Iranian ambitions in Syria, with stealth fighters that are known to be undetectable.

The loud US and Israeli pronouncements about Syrian missile defense systems notwithstanding, that genie is out of the bottle: the S-300 launchers arrived in Syria already. The mere presence of the system has escalated tensions and shifted power; regional peace looks more distant now.

[pullquote]Despite this development, there are indicators — such as coordinated efforts to fight extremists like ISIS, and recent elections — that provide hope[/pullquote].

Despite this development, there are indicators — such as coordinated efforts to fight extremists like ISIS, and recent elections — that provide hope. Does a tinderbox like Syria need more weapons? What happens to the regional power balance? Does Russia’s gift to Assad provide him with new leverage over Israel? Or, does it impel all actors to act more responsibly in pursuit of peaceful coexistence?

S-300PMU Specifications

Each launcher vehicle carries four missile containers (two missiles per target).
A full battalion includes six launcher vehicles with 24 missiles, plus command-and-control and long-range radar detection vehicles
Special feature: Fires two missiles vertically within three seconds, making it versatile and accurate
Capability: Russian 48N6E are the standard missiles fired from S-300PMU launchers. They have a range of 5-150km (3-93 miles) at a maximum altitude of 27-30km (17-19 miles).
Response time: Vehicle stopping to missile firing is five minutes.

Kristine Olsen
risetopeace.org
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 by Unzila Qureshi

Counter Terrorism Strategy in Waziristan

WANA, PAKISTAN, Photo by John Moore/Getty Images

In recent months, Waziristan has been awash in terror attacks since the Pakistani military began new operations in the region. Ostensibly, the offensive is meant to root out TPP fighters, but physical action typically only treats the symptoms of the disease and not the cause. Without getting to the root of the problem, violent terrorism of this sort will generate here again and again.

Examine, for instance, an incident on April 27, 2018, in which a wedding in Waziristan was attacked and four people were killed, with dozens more injured. Reports are unclear who was responsible, the perpetrators identified simply as militants. Another source asserts that the TPP claimed responsibility for previous attacks, but not this one specifically. Disturbing a sacred, social rite like a wedding is significant on an anthropological level. There are many factors that allowed this to happen. They all signify that terrorist activity has become normalized, even occurring around such community activities.

Terrorist organizations tap into local sentiments to recruit on individual and community levels

Any viable solution to counter terrorism must treat it long-term, and it must learn to do so by studying how terrorism became so virulent in the first place. This is not an isolated phenomenon, working independently of other systems in place. It is part of the place and people in such a way that groups like TPP can use local systems of thought to get their way. This is evident in how terrorists recruit individuals as well as sway policies and politicians to their agenda. There is a deeper phenomenon at play, and the only way to counter it is to study it and determine what makes it work.

Obviously, religion ties in deeply with TPP and similar organizations’ activities. Experts have documented how organizations use Islam to recruit fighters and operatives and, more importantly, maintain their dedication. Terrorist organizations are canny this way because they tap into local sentiments to recruit on an individual and community level. There is a heady mix of patriotism, freedom-fighting, rebellion against Western influence and authority, anger, and religious cause. They use all of these things not to convince people that what they are doing is right, but rather to make them fear it would be wrong not to support them. This is a huge part of why these groups keep growing. Beyond the regular scare tactics (i.e. forcing people to do their bidding under threat of injury or worse), using culture and religion to legitimize themselves means that their idea will never die.

Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective: it takes little to do, but it has long-term effects on how they are treated and thought of

Terrorists take advantage of cultural and religious tensions to further their agenda and legitimize violence. Therefore, a way to counter them is to delegitimize their cultural and religious agency. In terms of policy, Pakistan’s government and media can do this easily. Change the discussion. Any engagement with or treatment of terrorists should identify them as violent criminals, not “Islamic extremists” or “insurgents.” These terms provide legitimacy in the most dangerous of ways. Destroy their legitimacy to combat them. Cut all their links with any local dynamic.

This solution is straight-forward and possibly effective. Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective. It takes little to do, and it has long-term effects on how terrorists are treated and thought of in public and private. Terrorism is a threat to millions of lives. Not the least in vulnerable rural communities. As such, Pakistan must use every weapon it has, including its words.

From there, such policies can extend to even more conspicuous efforts. Ones such as delegitimizing terrorist ideas in schools, in mosques, religious classes, in public and online forums. Leverage local systems of thought and action to do this, the same way that terrorists spread their ideas. Use these means not to normalize violence, but to normalize peace.

Unzila Qureshi
www.risetopeace.org/about-us/mee-our-team/
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 by Haoyu Huang

An Overview of SE Asian Extremism: Thailand

One of the regions people don’t usually think of related to extremism is Southeast Asia.  Yet, extremism is prevalent there, and like many other types of extremism, it is rooted in religious and ethnic challenges.  In this series of articles, I will provide an overview of extremism in Southeast Asia, starting with Thailand.

When people talk about Thailand, they often think about peaceful beaches, Buddhism, and even rice fields. Although these images are real,  Thailand is a religious and ethnically diverse country, which has led to some security challenges, particularly in Southern Thailand.

By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded and vying for power

According to the US State Department, 10% of the Thai population is Muslim, with most of the Thai Muslims living in Southern Thailand.  Starting in the 1990s, the 3 provinces in southern Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, experienced violent ethnic and religious insurgency, with tensions escalating in recent years.  These 3 provinces are predominately Malay Muslims residents, who share a different religious culture than the rest of Thailand. Beyond religion, the Pattani province was originally an independent Sultanate, conquered by Thailand in the 1700s, creating long-standing political tension.  

The historical, religious, and ethnic tensions between Malays and Thai were further heightened as Southern Thailand was left behind in economic development creating yet another division. Separatist groups from all three provinces share one goal —an Islamic Malay state centered in Patani.  

The 1960s saw the founding of the Malay separatist movement in Thailand, with the National Revolution Front and the Patani United Liberation Organization.  These early organizations were peaceful groups that sought Patani independence. However, as the situation on the ground remained difficult for the people in Southern Thailand, the organizations became more extreme. By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded. In no time flat, they were competing for power. Although these organizations were new and relatively weak compared to the earlier organizations, they chose to launch terrorist attacks to quickly build their profile and relative power.  

In the beginning, the attacks were all targeted toward Thai government officials, police, teachers, and other establishment individuals.  However, starting in 2004, the violence escalated, with a January armory raid in which 364 weapons were stolen.  Many of the weapons were M16 rifles. Later that year, separatist groups attacked 11 military and police facilities in southern Thailand to steal additional weapons.  During this time, the extremist organizations also attacked the Buddhist population in the Southern provinces, killing two elder monks in Yala. Additionally, from June 27 to July 5, 2004, five bomb attacks destroyed Buddhist-owned rubber plantations in Yala.  These extremist groups were purposefully driving tensions and divisions between Malays and Thais in the region.

Starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties

The violence continues today. According to ACLED, there were already 72 incidents in 2018.  In September this year, attackers hit an army patrol in Pattani, killing two soldiers and wounding  four others.  While earlier in the year in Yala, separatists launched a bomb attack on a market, killing 3 and injuring 24. These endless attacks lead to high casualties and continued distrust across religious and ethnic lines.  According to the Bangkok Post, from 2004 to 2015, extremist insurgency groups killed more than 6,500 people, with Muslims the majority of those killed.

There are three trends that suggest rising conflict in the region. First, the number and intensity of violent attacks are increasing. The extremist groups have become more experienced with attack tactics, and thus more deadly. Under the attacks in the 1990s, the separatists were limited in scope.  However, as noted, starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties. The groups became more sophisticated and knew where the weak points of the government were and where they could most easily obtain weapons. The attacks on military facilities in 2004 is direct proof.  

The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom

Second, the groups were becoming more connected with other outside extremist organizations in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah. These groups provided training, tactical, and financial support. Officials believe Jemaah Islamiyah is behind some of the attacks. Additionally, the groups have become more extreme in ideology. The separatist groups initially did not target other religions, but have moved beyond that mandate and have since 2004 targeted Buddhist temples, and even monks.  

In response to the increasing violence, the Thai government has offered some solutions. In 2006, the National Reconciliation Commission, led by Anand Panyarachun, proposed a solution to the Southern insurgency.  The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom. However, the Thai government rejected it. Prem Tinsulanonda, council member and former minister, said, “We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai… We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language.”  

Currently, the 4th Army of Thailand is in the region and in charge of security, with more than 25,000 troops under their command. Outside of military presence, the Thai government has also tried to create a more inclusive policy to reduce violence. For example, the Thai government explained that the white in the national flag is not simply a representation of Buddhism, but a representation of all religions. Also, broadcast TV shows images of Malay people.  More officially, peace talks between separatists and the Thai government began in 2013. Supporting these talks and the peace process, the Thai government also promoted a community-based program to reduce violence, which focused on the power of neighborhoods to report violent actions. The program has allowed for faster response to such violence.

The separatist’s goal remains the formation of a sovereign Southern Thailand. The Thai government has welcomed talks under the structure of the current Thai constitution. Thus, an independent Southern Thailand is still far away.

Haoyu Huang
www.risetopeace.org/about/mee-our-team/
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 by Liam Timmons

Nuclear Terrorism: Threat Profile and Potential Impact

The typical profile of a terrorist attack may include gunmen storming a government building or a suicide bomber detonating his explosive vest in a crowd of festival attendees. However, arms wonks, policy makers, and scientists have long been attuned to a more sinister threat: a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb. A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive outfitted with a radiological contaminant such as strontium or cesium, which kills not only through explosive force but radioactive contamination as well.

Terrorist groups can create dirty bombs without much scientific expertise–the difficulty is not in designing the weapon but acquiring the radioactive material. However, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, radiological sources are common in commercial or medical devices and are often poorly secured and vulnerable to theft. In fact, as early as 1998, nineteen tubes of radioactive cesium were stolen from a hospital in North Carolina and were never recovered. Poorly secured nuclear facilities in Russia and former Soviet states are also at threat for theft of nuclear materials, with facilities in a number of Russian provinces and Georgia reporting theft.

A Center for Nonproliferation Studies outlined four possible threats of nuclear terrorism. These include the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon, the theft or purchase of radioactive material and subsequent construction of an improvised nuclear device, attack against nuclear power plants, and the construction and detonation of a dirty bomb. Some sources have stated that nuclear terrorism may already be a reality: documents found in Herat, Afghanistan have indicated Al-Qaeda has been in possession of a dirty bomb since 2003, and radioactive contaminants before then.

In 2017, Indonesian militants acquired low-grade radioactive Thorium-232, which they hoped to transform into more potent Uranium-233. This uranium would then be combined with a homemade explosive to produce a dirty bomb. When ISIS conquered Mosul in 2014, radioactive Cobalt-60 was housed on a university campus in the city, ripe for the taking.

While the terrorist group proclaimed they had seized radioactive material and took over laboratories at the same university, Iraqi government officials later discovered they had not touched the Cobalt-60. Terrorist groups have long been aware of the deadly capabilities of a nuclear attack and have sought to plunder, purchase, or create dirty bombs with which to carry out nuclear attacks. At the same time, governments and nuclear scientists are aware of the threat posed by terrorists to nuclear facilities and actively work to upgrade security systems to combat it.

Despite efforts by a number of terrorist groups to obtain radioactive material and build a nuclear bomb, some experts believe the threat of nuclear terrorism is overblown. A number of explanations for terrorist nuclear abstinence have been proposed. These include the difficulty of carrying out such an attack, the disruptive impact of counter-terrorism efforts, and the potential for a nuclear attack to undermine the terrorist cause rather than advance it. Since the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks to date have been simplistic strikes such as those utilizing knives, conventional explosives, or vehicles, a RAND Corporation analysis concluded, “Governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combating the spread and use of conventional weapons,” as opposed to countering nuclear terrorism.

Even assuming a terrorist group was able to carry out a dirty bomb attack, its impact may be limited. While the public may imagine dirty bombs as capable of killing hundreds or thousands of people, the death toll would more likely be limited to fewer than 100 people. If impacted civilians leave the area quickly, remove contaminated clothing, and shower to wash off radioactive debris, a dirty bomb does not pose much of a threat. However, the economic, psychological, and social costs of a dirty bomb would be much larger. As such, governments must be prepared for the long-term impact of a nuclear terrorist threat more than an initial attack. Costly, long-lasting decontamination efforts may be necessary depending on the level of radioactive contamination, and the public may be afraid of returning to the attack location, causing economic and social disruption.

Nuclear terrorism is a threat that has been underappreciated by the general public, but it has been recognized by counter-terrorism experts, governments, and scientists for some time. While the likelihood of a nuclear terror attack may be slim and the initial deadly effects small, the long-term threat of a dirty bomb attack means governments must upgrade nuclear security efforts at hospitals, power plants, and other facilities containing nuclear materials. Although prior thefts of radioactive material have not yet resulted in nuclear terrorism, it is only a matter of time before a dirty bomb or other nuclear threat becomes a reality.

Liam Timmons
risetopeace.org
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