Burkina Faso: Local Instability, Global Implications

Figure 1 Retrieved from Nationsonline.org Link

Rampant political instability in Burkina Faso, stemming from the overthrow of dictator Blaise Compaoré, has resulted in a rapidly expanding crisis for counter-terror operations in the tri-border region between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Ongoing conflicts across the region are complicated by local issues that reach back hundreds of years, such as ethnic and tribal divisions, combined with modern global terror networks that are exploiting the instability. Efforts to solve these issues have global significance; the United States has actively trained regional security and military forces to better equip them to combat terrorists, while France has conducted ongoing military operations in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.

Since 2016, there have been 200 terror attacks in Burkina Faso, with at least 263 confirmed deaths stemming from these attacks. This is astounding considering that prior to the removal of Compaoré, Burkina Faso had never experienced a terror attack in its recorded history. While some of these attacks have been attributed to former elite special forces of the military of Burkina Faso from Compaoré’s regime, several terror networks operate in the area. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) remain the largest regional representatives of global terror operating in the region and have conducted ongoing attacks across multiple countries, capitalizing on weakened governments and ethnic and tribal conflicts. Local militias have been known to engage the global terror networks in armed conflict on occasion as the militaries and other security forces appear to be ineffective or incapable of conducting military operations against them.

The Burkinabé military, which was trained by French and U.S. special forces, has contributed to further instability. Counterterror operations conducted by the Burkinabé military have resulted in accusations of false arrests, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses- further eroding trust between local communities and the weak government. Both ISGS and AQIM will likely be able to capitalize on these strained relationships to increase recruiting capabilities as their affiliates globally have done in the past. Terror groups have begun to cement their long-term presence in Burkina Faso, operating at least partially in the open and driving the shutdown of many schools and hospitals. The closing of these establishments represents the failures of local government, and highlights the government’s inability to conduct successful counterterror operations. The school closures also decrease opportunities for local youth, increasing the likelihood that they will ultimately turn to extremism.

ISGS was created by Abu Walid al Sahrawi, who previously had allegiance to al Qaeda. ISGS still recruits heavily from al Qaeda ranks, but saw a drop in activity after recent French military operations killed several of its high-ranking members. Like so many terror groups in the past, ISGS operates most successfully in areas with weakened government institutions with weak border regions. Until further stabilization is secured in the region, counterterror operations will be unsuccessful in the long-term.

France has recognized the need to develop stability in the tri-border region as critical to African security. French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian pledged €34 million to programs that will increase stability in the areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. However, this funding will likely be insufficient to solve the vast underlying issues that are contributing to the destabilization. The U.S., who is already devoting significant funds to the region by way of military training and military equipment, must increase funding and develop solutions that will legitimize the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Corruption, which is an issue observed in each of these countries, must be addressed to ensure further legitimacy as well as to ensure that the funds being devoted to stabilization go to appropriate channels on the ground.

 

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Research Fellow with Rise to Peace and a Law Enforcement Professional.

Defining the Problem and Reaching a Solution: A Reflection on How to Counter Violent Extremism

“Violent extremism knows no boundaries.” That was the message that Rise to Peace founder Ahmad Mohibi used to open “How to Counter Violent Extremism,” the latest Rise to Peace panel discussion, which took place this Tuesday at the Elliott School of International Affairs. With that in mind, the panelists – Leanne Erdberg, U.S. Institute of Peace; Jesse Morton, Parallel Networks; and Edward Burkhalter, U.S. Department of State – offered their perspectives on the best ways to counter violent extremism.

The panel’s first challenge was defining extremism and terrorism. Leanne Erdberg offered a legal definition: terrorism is limited to action, while extremism also includes violent thoughts. Jesse Morton focused on the definition’s practical implications. Terrorists, he poses, are cemented in their action, and thus countering terrorism is necessarily catching and punishing those who commit violent acts. An extremist is undergoing a cognitive radicalization process and can pulled away from extremist movements. Counterterrorism, he says, is the realm of law enforcement, but CVE is more complicated, and requires the engagement of more stakeholders.

Conversation then moved to how the problem of extremism has grown. Jesse Morton observed that mainstream media informs social media radicalization. For example, Islamophobic narratives in news media fuels polarization narratives used by radicalizers online. In a similar vein, Edward Burkhalter noted that A 24-hour news cycle can make problems seem more severe than they really are, and it is important to focus discussion on proven research.

Panelists then discussed the shortcomings of past efforts to curtail violent extremism. Jesse Morton provided historical background by discussing the roots of the “hearts and minds” in marketing campaigns and advertising.

Leanne Erdberg built on this theme by questioning the framing of programs and success in general. She argues that CVE that operates within an advertising scheme, which treats the communities they serve as an audience rather than giving them agency over the process. Programs that abandon that approach and instead emphasize people taking their future into their own hands are more empowering and more successful.

Ahmad Mohibi discussed CVE shortcomings in the context of Afghanistan. He said that CVE is impossible without trust, and in Afghanistan the trust between the Afghan and American government and the Afghan people is lacking. As long as people feel disconnected and distrustful of their leaders, extremism will continue. Edward Burkhalter provided a U.S. government perspective, acknowledging the futility of trying to improve a community without consulting its members. He elaborated, saying that the U.S. tries to follow a “do no harm” approach, and be sure that CVE or development efforts do not have unintended consequences. The only way to accomplish that is by relying on local partners.

The Threat of Drone-Based Terror

On August 4, 2018, President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela was attacked with explosive-laden drones during a political rally. Although the drones were not successful in assassinating the Venezuelan leader, they managed to injure seven national guardsmen who were at the rally.

A few weeks earlier in July, the Public Safety Secretary of Mexico’s Baja California was also targeted by an armed drone, although the attached IED did not detonate. Attacks such as these are indicative of the burgeoning threat that drone-related terror can play in today’s world.

No longer is drone technology limited to the militaries of countries like the United States, Nigeria, or Pakistan. Instead, groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels, and the Islamic State are getting in on the action. In fact, ISIS recently threatened Paris with a drone attack. As drones become easier to obtain and use, attacks using this technology will become more frequent, more sophisticated, and more deadly.

The barriers to carrying out a drone-based terror attack are lower than ever. Lightweight hobby drones are cheap, easy to purchase and allow terrorist groups to carry out attacks from a distance. While military drones are less accessible and harder to operate, they do provide a higher operational capacity and have a number of avenues by which terrorist groups can obtain them. In this way, drone-based terror is comparable to nuclear terror.

Hobby drones, like a dirty bomb, can easily be weaponized, but have a relatively small impact, while military drones, like a weapon of mass destruction, can be stolen, bought from a rogue state or corrupt official, and has a high potential impact. Additionally, improvements in battery and camera technology will only increase the negative impact of drone-based terror as groups learn to harness these ever-increasing capabilities. In recent testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that drones, “will be used to facilitate an attack in the United States against a vulnerable target, such as a mass gathering.”

The Security Challenges of Drone-Based Terror

Drone-based terror presents unique security threats and challenges. The particular tactical flexibility inherent to drones forces a rethinking of current security strategies. Traditional notions of perimeter defense and target hardening no longer apply when the threat is as maneuverable and flexible as a drone.

Small drones can be used in swarms to destroy commercial airliners, disrupt military operations through hyper-local targeting, or inflict asymmetric damage on civilian targets. Additionally, drones can and have been used in conjunction with more traditional methods of terror.

During the Islamic State’s defense of Mosul, drones were used to guide suicide bombers and improve the accuracy of rocket and mortar fire. The coalition’s anti-drone no-fly zone was quickly counteracted by a do-it-yourself solution implemented by fighters on the ground. Further, drones can conduct both intelligence and counterintelligence operations: terrorist groups could use drones to jam military communications, survey battlefields, and download sensitive data.

In addition to conventional attacks and military-based operations, drones could be engineered to disperse chemical weapons, biological agents such as viruses or Anthrax, or even radioactive material. A September 2018 National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin warned that, “some terrorist groups overseas are [pursuing] new technologies and tactics, such as unmanned aerial systems and chemical agents,” while Hezbollah may have the ability to carry out biological warfare using drones.

Finally, aerial drones are not the only technology terrorist groups can exploit. In January 2017, Houthi rebels killed two Saudi soldiers with a sea-based drone. As aquatic drone technology continues to proliferate, terrorist capabilities may widen to include attacks on coastal cities. Aquatic drones maintain the security challenges of aerial drones but can dramatically widen the target range of drone-based terror. Land-based drones may pose a threat as well, since “fighters in Syria and Iraq have been […] experimenting with remotely controlled vehicles and small robots for nearly a decade.”

Countering Drone-Based Terror

US doctrine focuses on active and passive defense, as well as a proactive intelligence-based approach, to countering air threats. Because of the small size, speed, and maneuverability of drones, they may not be detectable to forms of active defense reliant on radar. However, communication jamming may be a particularly effective form of defense against drones, reducing targeting accuracy and thus the potential threat.

Additionally, acoustic and radio detection methods can make up for radar’s shortcomings in countering drone incursion. On the passive side of defense, simple behavioral changes like hosting high-profile events indoors, varying arrival and departure agendas of potential target personnel, and changing transport routes can make all types of terror, not just drone-based attacks, more difficult. Finally, greater control and oversight of the supply chain, through the monitoring of suspicious purchases and cooperation with manufacturers, would decrease the likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring drones in the first place.

Drone-Based Terror Takeaways

Drone-based terror can be seen as an emerging threat to the global security environment which demands immediate and creative solutions. Terrorist groups are already making use of drones in the air, at sea, and on land in a variety of situations and capacities. The barriers to acquiring, arming, and using drones are lower than ever, and drone-based attacks come with their own unique security challenges. As drone technology improves, becomes cheaper, and proliferates, militaries will have to reckon with new security paradigms to combat this rapidly-evolving threat.

Lone Wolf Bio-Terror: Are We Prepared?

It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening. However, it’s not just an increasing number of lone wolves, but the variety of tactics they’ll employ in terror’s service that makes prevention a challenge. 

[pullquote]It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening.[/pullquote]

According to Britain’s Security Minister and top counter-terrorism officer, Ben Wallace, it is likely that a biological or chemical terror attack is on the horizon. At a security conference in London, last Tuesday Wallace warned, “The only limit to the ambition of our adversaries is their imagination.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer. They have developed and worked on a better arsenal. We have to be prepared for the day when that comes to our streets.” Implicit in his remarks was the notion that counter-terror specialists, as well as governments, must be equally imaginative in their pro-activity.

One major challenge governments face in trying to thwart chemical and biological attacks is the scale. If one person releases tiny amounts of a chemical agent like Anthrax, it could have implications for hundreds, or, millions of people. Traffic flow disruptions, water supply tainting, exposure areas untouchable, these are just some of the possibilities. 

Governments and private contractors have little experience with bio-terrorism. If terrorists were to release biotoxins in civilian areas, the damage could be enormous.

A terrorist need only infect one person, who could then infect her (sic) social circles. Epidemic exposure rates could be a reality faster than you can say Cipro, bringing repercussions on a global scale. The terrorists would need to do very little. The disease would naturally spread at a velocity that grows exponentially.

The probability of these attacks is increasing, and it’s time that governments took note. Currently, there is no international system in place specifically to combat chemical and bio-terror.

If a terrorist infected someone with a biological agent in New York, and then that person flew to Germany infecting people in Berlin, German and American authorities would have no pre-existing framework within which they could cooperate, info-share about how to stop the disease’s transmission, and help those infected. 

[pullquote]The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.[/pullquote]

It is critical that such a framework is in place before the scenario unfolds. In the event of a biological or chemical terror attack, time will be of the essence. The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.

Governments use major resources to plan for shooters, suicide bombers, and other common acts of terror. Diversifying those resources and intensifying the focus on biological and chemical terrorism could, in the future, save countless lives.

Nuclear Terrorism: Threat Profile and Potential Impact

The typical profile of a terrorist attack may include gunmen storming a government building or a suicide bomber detonating his explosive vest in a crowd of festival attendees. However, arms wonks, policy makers, and scientists have long been attuned to a more sinister threat: a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb. A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive outfitted with a radiological contaminant such as strontium or cesium, which kills not only through explosive force but radioactive contamination as well.

Terrorist groups can create dirty bombs without much scientific expertise–the difficulty is not in designing the weapon but acquiring the radioactive material. However, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, radiological sources are common in commercial or medical devices and are often poorly secured and vulnerable to theft. In fact, as early as 1998, nineteen tubes of radioactive cesium were stolen from a hospital in North Carolina and were never recovered. Poorly secured nuclear facilities in Russia and former Soviet states are also at threat for theft of nuclear materials, with facilities in a number of Russian provinces and Georgia reporting theft.

A Center for Nonproliferation Studies outlined four possible threats of nuclear terrorism. These include the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon, the theft or purchase of radioactive material and subsequent construction of an improvised nuclear device, attack against nuclear power plants, and the construction and detonation of a dirty bomb. Some sources have stated that nuclear terrorism may already be a reality: documents found in Herat, Afghanistan have indicated Al-Qaeda has been in possession of a dirty bomb since 2003, and radioactive contaminants before then.

In 2017, Indonesian militants acquired low-grade radioactive Thorium-232, which they hoped to transform into more potent Uranium-233. This uranium would then be combined with a homemade explosive to produce a dirty bomb. When ISIS conquered Mosul in 2014, radioactive Cobalt-60 was housed on a university campus in the city, ripe for the taking.

While the terrorist group proclaimed they had seized radioactive material and took over laboratories at the same university, Iraqi government officials later discovered they had not touched the Cobalt-60. Terrorist groups have long been aware of the deadly capabilities of a nuclear attack and have sought to plunder, purchase, or create dirty bombs with which to carry out nuclear attacks. At the same time, governments and nuclear scientists are aware of the threat posed by terrorists to nuclear facilities and actively work to upgrade security systems to combat it.

Despite efforts by a number of terrorist groups to obtain radioactive material and build a nuclear bomb, some experts believe the threat of nuclear terrorism is overblown. A number of explanations for terrorist nuclear abstinence have been proposed. These include the difficulty of carrying out such an attack, the disruptive impact of counter-terrorism efforts, and the potential for a nuclear attack to undermine the terrorist cause rather than advance it. Since the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks to date have been simplistic strikes such as those utilizing knives, conventional explosives, or vehicles, a RAND Corporation analysis concluded, “Governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combating the spread and use of conventional weapons,” as opposed to countering nuclear terrorism.

Even assuming a terrorist group was able to carry out a dirty bomb attack, its impact may be limited. While the public may imagine dirty bombs as capable of killing hundreds or thousands of people, the death toll would more likely be limited to fewer than 100 people. If impacted civilians leave the area quickly, remove contaminated clothing, and shower to wash off radioactive debris, a dirty bomb does not pose much of a threat. However, the economic, psychological, and social costs of a dirty bomb would be much larger. As such, governments must be prepared for the long-term impact of a nuclear terrorist threat more than an initial attack. Costly, long-lasting decontamination efforts may be necessary depending on the level of radioactive contamination, and the public may be afraid of returning to the attack location, causing economic and social disruption.

Nuclear terrorism is a threat that has been underappreciated by the general public, but it has been recognized by counter-terrorism experts, governments, and scientists for some time. While the likelihood of a nuclear terror attack may be slim and the initial deadly effects small, the long-term threat of a dirty bomb attack means governments must upgrade nuclear security efforts at hospitals, power plants, and other facilities containing nuclear materials. Although prior thefts of radioactive material have not yet resulted in nuclear terrorism, it is only a matter of time before a dirty bomb or other nuclear threat becomes a reality.