Africa

Boko Haram
 by Joan McDappa

What Went Wrong with Nigeria’s Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Mission?

Nigeria has continued to grapple with the issue of terrorism, and as expected, has had to launch many counter-terrorism missions. While domestic conflicts and extremism were not exactly new phenomena to a fragile state like Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram would understandably raise concerns, mainly because of its religious ideologies and fatal potentialities in constituting an existential threat.

Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda’wati Wal Jihad, fondly known as Boko Haram, has in its almost two decades of existence; carried out several attacks targeted at civilians, security officials, infrastructures, security facilities, international organizations etc. All these attacks, Boko Haram claims, are done to drive their mission of establishing a caliphate – a goal it briefly achieved during their brief occupation of large swathes of territories in the North East region.

Counter-Terrorism Operations

For the period that this group has existed, counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria seem to have substantially focused on the use of force, however extreme it may be: chiefly on the defensive and occasionally on the offensive.

With the military at the forefront of this campaign, alongside the collaborative efforts of other security agencies, the tactics employed to solve one problem often create a much bigger problem for the nation. Unfortunately, looking through history, this is becoming a pattern in Nigeria. The lack of restrictions in using excessive force by security agencies as a response tool (regardless of the situation, whether it is a peaceful protest or terrorist incident) significantly hampers their genuine efforts.

For instance, Boko Haram initially started as a religious sect with somewhat radical ideologies that were of no significant risk (at the time) to the nation’s security. Although there was a need to be wary of the group, at that point, perhaps a softer approach would be ideal, but this was not the case.

An unnecessary military operation that saw the maiming and killings of members of the ‘religious sect,’ and worst of all, the extrajudicial killing of the then leader of the group Mohammed Yusuf by the police; birthed a mountain of problems that have only complicated things for the Nigerian counter-terrorism campaign. Gradually, translating from a religious sect with Yusuf, the reluctant fighter as the leader- to an unstable group led by the highly erratic Abubakar Shekau, the outcome of counter-terrorism operations in the North East is visible.

The instability in Boko Haram resulted in many offshoots notable among them are Ansaru, which shares links with Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) with links to ISIS. Regardless of how the choice of strategy to counter terrorism seems to be multiplying the problems rather than reducing, it seems Nigeria has still not realized the glaring lessons before them.

Current counter-terrorism missions still have the military at the forefront, with its recent operations recording the elimination of leaders of terrorist groups. Again, we see the same mistake made with Boko Haram repeated, and in this case, the consequences are far graver as these groups now have international links and are not necessarily working on their own. These operations by the military may widen access for these international terrorist groups to further launch their campaigns, and in turn, gain more grounds in the already fragile region.

Recommendations

While these military operations may have their usefulness, we have seen over time that they are usually short-lived. There has been a rise in terrorist activities in the North East region, despite all the efforts and revenue invested in countering it. These groups still manage to onboard voluntary recruits amid the heated military operations.

A successful counter-terrorism approach should encompass strategies that focus on addressing development issues such as poor governance, low literacy, poverty, and unemployment; that these groups readily take advantage of to promote their campaigns. The failure to pay as much attention to extensively resolving developmental issues in the region while intentionally minimizing military tactics (which only infuriates terrorists and does nothing to deter or disengage them); continues to foil Nigeria’s counter-terrorism campaign.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Islam vs Islamism? The Realpolitik of Islamic Jihadism in Africa

Decades of internecine conflicts, and bloody civil wars have left inedible scars across Africa, and the consequent weakening (or failure) of multiple nations across the continent. Islamist terrorist groups such as Ansar Dine (Mali), Boko Haram (Nigeria) and Al-Shabab (Somalia) have found fertile ground by exploiting the specific deteriorating political and economic conditions of individual African states. Jihadist groups have positioned themselves as a superior alternative to the corruption of central governments across Africa, and in doing so allowed them to win the support of some of the most desperate communities on the continent.

Why is Islamism able to spread?

In the past twenty years alone almost a hundred political conflicts have occurred in West African states alone. In north Africa Chad and Sudan are still witnessing a fratricidal war that has been going on and off for more than forty years. While in central Africa Angola has experienced thirty years of civil war. This instability and violence mean that the threat to regional peace and security posed by Islamist terrorist groups often goes overlooked. During the same period, more than 40,000 people have lost their lives in more than 9,000 terrorist attacks by religious extremist groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

Regional conflicts, prolonged internal violence, and civil wars nearly invariable leads to collapses of governance.  Throughout history, in any country whose central government fails to guarantee the security and welfare of its citizens, its people are driven to alternative organizations to fulfill such basic needs as food, shelter, and security. Often in such crises smaller entities (ethnic groups, tribes, clans, armed insurgencies, criminal gangs, and religious sects) find it necessary to step in, to cover many essential statal functions. And across all African regions Jihadist groups have done so too. Organizations such as Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Mali, have all established some forms of para-state structures within their territory.

One of the primary motivations behind such moves is it endears support for the Jihadist groups among regional populations. The support generated by such “hearts and minds” operations will be crucial for further Jihadist insurgent operations within this territory. And crucially jihadist organizations are heavily reliant on discontented young recruits drawn from local populations to sustain their forces. Jihadist terror groups often provide a form of hope and agency to those mired in endemic poverty and desperate social inequality. 

Regional Disparities

In the countries of the Sahel region, where the population mainly resides in marginal rural areas, the people are heavily reliant on the complex network of organized crime that was already embedded in the region before Islamist ideology. None the less jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), have also exploited the regional power vacuum to engage in both people and drug trafficking already rife in the region. This vacuum has also allowed Jihadist groups in the Sahel to recruit, train, and arm the local population, undisturbed by government interference.

If potential recruits in the Sahel are drawn to Islamist groups primarily by social and economic reasons, in East Africa and Somalia, decades of petty tribal conflicts and endemic corruption have stripped the traditional regional clans of legitimacy. Into this void Al-Shabaab have stepped in, recruiting among the disillusioned and those already vulnerable to Islamist ideology.

In cases like central Mali and western Niger, jihadists offer protection against bandits, justice against abuses by central governments, training, and armaments to address territorial disputes between local ethnic groups. In the north of Burkina Faso, on the other hand, the jihadist occupation of rural areas through intimidation and violence has had the effect of provoking clashes between locals and jihadists, rather than basic cooperation.

Islamist groups have been able to exploit not just political instability but specific regional rivalries between clans, ethnicities, and religious groups to their advantage. Clashes, such as the ethnic conflicts between Sufis and Islamists in Nigeria and Senegal, often dating back to the times of European colonialism continue to ensure Sufi’s political dominance and has been the source of much ethnic tension and violence

European nation’s influence on the African continent continues to this day such as the French intervention of 2013. While regional national governments have coordinated anti-terrorist operations such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger combined intervention, also changed the impact of Islam in the sub-Saharan region. The immediate result was a weakening of their jihadist groups and their removal from the city centers. The jihadist groups have retreated to their base of support among the population of rural areas, where Islamist ideology is prevalent among the most marginal ethnic groups.

The impact of ideology

In addition to the lack of social mobility, religious education must also be considered, since spreading basic Islamist education can predispose (or prime) the population to jihadist doctrine. In Somalia after the collapse of its state education system in, private Islamic schools proliferated. Often funded by Saudi Arabia, many of these schools are heavily focused on religious studies, were Wahhabism ideology dominants.

However, the presence of a strong tradition of the Islamic faith in a country is by no means a prerequisite for Islamist terrorism.  Senegal, where about 90% of the population is Muslim, has experienced relatively minor religious conflicts. In comparison, Nigeria, where Muslims make up 50%  of the population, Islamist extremism ideation has featured in many disturbing episodes of regional violence.

Conclusion

The impact of Islamist ideology in Africa is highly context-dependent on the specific geopolitical realpolitik of their base of operations. Individual Jihadist groups have adapted their strategies and tactics to exploit the unique characteristics of regions, and the specific needs of its ethnic groups. Such significant disparities mean it is both useless and unhelpful to apply a unified and singular explanation for the rise (and impact) of Islamist ideology in Africa.

When developing anti-terrorist and anti-extremist policies rather than focus on forced military interventions, the international community should focus on measures that enable regional governments to peacefully manage local conflict. And to limit the ability of Jihadist recruit by supporting efforts to improve the provision of services, and governance to marginal communities in rural areas throughout the sub-Saharan Region

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: Mali’s Challenging Future

The Long Road Ahead

The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Mali faces an uphill battle to stabilize the country, made even more difficult by recent events. The peace that this operation hopes to keep stems from a 2015 peace agreement between northern Tuareg and Arab rebels and the government of Mali. But the civilian government was deposed in an August 2020 coup, hampering mission goals and further destabilizing the country. This article highlights three challenges to the mission mandate and how best to respond to them. 

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in April 2013 by Security Council resolution 2100, has become the UN’s most dangerous current peacekeeping operation. To date, there have been 253 fatalities out of the 15,209 authorized personnel in-country. On April 2nd, four peacekeepers were killed and nineteen wounded in a direct assault on their camp in Kidal region. Significant challenges abound for this mission aiming to implement its transitional roadmap and seven-part mandate. Its main goal since June 2015 has been safeguarding and implementing an Algiers peace agreement signed between the government and the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA) rebel coalition. Further complications come from jihadist insurgents such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as well as brutal communal violence in central Mali. Understanding these hurdles, concrete strategies must follow. 

Dual Military Coups

The most immediate challenge facing MINUSMA’s mandate is the August 2020 coup, which saw the resignation of President Keïta and Prime Minister Cisse after they were detained by the Malian Armed Forces. On January 18th, 2021, the military junta’s transitional National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) was disbanded, with interim president Bah Ndaw supervising an 18-month transition back to civilian rule. This promise of civilian rule gave cause for optimism, but the second coup in late May saw the removal of Ndaw by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who also organized last year’s coup. Goïta has since become Mali’s new president while maintaining that elections and the release of Ndaw and his prime minister will eventually occur. 

Both coups have demonstrated the militarization of politics and the weakness of government legitimacy in Mali, and have significantly undermined item 2 in MINUSMA’s mandate; to support “national political dialogue and the electoral process.” Though protestors before and during the first coup had been calling for Keïta’s resignation due to economic woes and ongoing violence, a coercive resolution to an unpopular administration undermines national stability. Credibility has been damaged twice now among key allies of both Mali and MINUSMA, with the African Union (AU) suspending Mali twice, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposing sanctions for the first coup, the United States cutting off military aid, and the UN Security Council condemning the military’s actions all throughout.

Close coordination with the government in Bamako is required for MINUSMA’s continued operation. Mission policymakers have the unenviable task of cooperating with the self-preservationist military regime while simultaneously upholding item 1’s ideals of “constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” The strategy moving forward must be one of continued pressure on and agreement with Goïta’s government on the timeline and specifics of a transfer back to civilian rule. The real power brokers in Mali must be identified and engaged, and the UN must not be satisfied with easy promises from the military. Together with AU, EU, and US partners, MINUSMA’s liaisons must extract from the military firm dates for elections and guarantees that they will be “inclusive, free, fair, and transparent,” as per the mandate.

Protection of Civilians

Alongside the tragic loss of 253 UN peacekeepers since 2013, MINUSMA has also witnessed a great deal of civilian casualties in areas outside of government control. Peacekeepers have been patrolling and expanding social services in these areas, in line with items 1 and 3 of the mandate; supporting “reestablishment of State authority throughout the country” and “protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.” But as peacekeepers navigate deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes, the multitude of violent actors, vast expanses of contested land, and complicated communal dynamics have allowed thousands of civilian casualties to slip through their fingers since 2013. Atrocities and possible war crimes have been well documented, further driving a wedge between hostile communities in central Mali. This continued violence against civilians undermines mission legitimacy and the 300+ development projects it has carried out.

Protecting civilians is often an issue of policing. Protecting them from separatists requires greater policing of the vast, contested northern regions, while population centers must be protected from jihadists. Communal violence in central Mali must be lessened by policing the boundaries between feuding communities. The number of police on mission should be increased, as MINUSMA has a 13-2 split of soldiers and police. More importantly, peacekeepers should step up technical assistance and recruitment drives for local police; this is a classic method to build peace and is included in the mandate. 

A new, complex frontier in peacekeeping

The final challenge concerns a relatively important shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine. Of sixteen active UN missions, MINUSMA is the only one authorized to conduct counterinsurgency. Its mandate allows it to use “all necessary means… [to] deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” Resolution 2164, an update to the mission, identified “asymmetric threats” as spoilers of peace; military jargon for insurgent groups. This has created challenges on the ground and great debate in the policy world. Strategically, peacekeepers appear not to have been deployed to keep the peace, but to reach peace through force, conducting counterinsurgency alongside France and the G5 Sahel (soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Tactically, counterinsurgency requires specialized training and equipment, two things that are far from standardized or even guaranteed in the UN system. Mission effectiveness is hampered by the unique challenges and confusions presented by this dissonance between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. And with France recently announcing the end of its eight-year campaign in the Sahel, now is the time for MINUSMA to take up the mantle with clear and confident policy.

Any good counterinsurgency must clearly lay out its strategy. An understanding of the insurgents and of one’s own capacities is essential in choosing how to train soldiers and allocate resources. The 9 experts on-mission and 514 staff officers need a proper division of labor and understanding, including programs for intelligence, search-and-destroy, and public relations. All of this can only come from a unified, top-down doctrine. That is why this new arena for UN peacekeeping needs a field handbook that systematically demarcates tactics and limitations of action. This also lowers MINUSMA’s high death rate: training troops not for pitched battles but for countering IEDs and ambushes is vital, as argued by former mission commander Michael Lollesgaard.

Overall, much needs to be done. Two coups in under a year, the protection of civilians, and counterinsurgency strategy must be addressed through diplomatic pressure, increased police efforts, and tactical guidance, respectively. Relative peace is not on the immediate horizon, but these strategies will push the situation in Mali in a constructive direction.

 

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: South Sudan’s Quest for Stability

Background

On July 9th, South Sudan celebrated ten years of independence, remembering how its people overwhelmingly voted for independence from Sudan in 2011. But another entity, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), is also marking ten years of existence this year. Initially meant to consolidate peace and development in the world’s youngest country, UNMISS has grown into the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, currently deploying 19,233 personnel. With a budget of over $1.2 billion for the 2020-2021 fiscal year, it is also the second most expensive ongoing UN mission. This is after the mission in Mali. This article hopes to analyze this monumental mission that has shaped a country.

Early UN attempts at state-building were violently reoriented by a civil war between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar and by broader communal violence between (and within) their respective Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. Though a 2018 peace agreement facilitated the tenuous formation of a unity government in 2020, a recent UN report found that violence has only gotten more brutal, unaccountable, and decentralized since the end of the country’s civil war. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has failed to implement major security and accountability measures from the peace agreement. Consequently, its security forces are frequently accused of obstructing peacekeepers and violating civilians’ human rights. With the UNSC recently renewing UNMISS’ mandate until 2022 and establishing a three-year “strategic vision” for the country, practitioners are tasked with interpreting mission effectiveness within the four key pillars of the mandate. 

The UN Mandate

Keeping in mind the centrality of the mandate to any UN mission, this article uses UNMISS’ updated mandate as a point of departure for evaluating mission effectiveness. It will also keep the 2018 peace deal as an additional guideline. The terms of the mandate reaffirmed in 2021 are essentially the same as those in Resolution 2155 (2014), which was updated when the nascent country fell into civil war. With some important clarification in the language in the 2021 resolution, the four pillars are broad: protection of civilians, monitoring of human rights abuses, facilitation of humanitarian aid delivery, and supporting the active peace agreement. 

Sadly, these four pillars look nothing like the original mandate from 2011. This is because UNMISS has had to drastically scale its ambitions back from consolidating the state to alleviating and containing a multi-dimensional crisis. Using the mandate itself to measure effectiveness is essential. In part, it reflects the wishes of concerned multilateral actors and frames what the mission is actually allowed and expected to do. This article distills the goals of the mandate into two broad, dynamic criteria for evaluating UNMISS: providing protection and facilitating aid to civilians and promoting institutional stability and security. These have been constant, salient challenges facing UNMISS, and they encompass much of what the mission is there to achieve.

Providing protection and facilitating aid to civilians

Though UNMISS can only exist with the consent of the GoSS, one might forget considering how often peacekeepers are blocked or even attacked by government forces. The UNSC acknowledged this in 2014 and again in Resolution 2567 (2021), when it “[condemned] the continued obstruction of UNMISS by the GoSS and opposition groups, including restrictions on freedom of movement, assault of UNMISS personnel, and constraints on mission operations.” Government intransigence amid vast civilian suffering presents UN personnel with difficult decisions and frequent occasions of paralysis in the face of violence against civilians. Since it cannot achieve protection of civilians (PoC) in every case, UNMISS has also been tasked with reporting on government privations, hoping for long-term accountability through documentation and human rights pressure.

Though UN missions are frequently criticized for the lives they fail to save, a critical analysis must try to understand what would have happened had peacekeepers not been there. As of 2020, there were almost 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside UN-administered PoC sites. UNMISS’ recent focus has thus been protecting civilians and administering aid and basic services in and around these sites. This establishment of veritable peace corridors is reminiscent of early visions of peacekeeping, but even through this lens, UNMISS can only be viewed as semi-successful. This is because it has frequently been unable to protect civilians and aid workers within its own PoC sites. Subsequently, it has had little success expanding the domain of its PoC sites outwards. There remain 1.5 million IDPs outside of PoC sites. Ultimately, violence against civilians and aid workers has continued and even worsened since the end of the civil war. 

Similar things can be said for humanitarian aid. The UN has estimated that 8.3 million South Sudanese are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase of 800,000 from 2020. Both sides were known to intentionally starve communities during the civil war, and the GoSS continues to block access to peacekeepers and aid workers seemingly at will. Though a great deal of aid has moved through roads restored and protected by UNMISS, GoSS corruption and violence and the frequent pilfering of humanitarian goods have deterred major international donors in recent years. UNMISS should leverage these once-eager financiers against GoSS intransigence, putting economic pressure on a government reliant on international support.

Promoting institutional stability and security

In terms of building a stable and responsive state in South Sudan, the 2018 Revitalized Agreement offers valuable metrics, such as refugee resettlement, rebuilding of physical infrastructure, and finalization of a permanent constitution. Unfortunately, any traction on these issues is largely out of the hands of UNMISS. This is because African regional organizations have led the way in mediation and implementation. Relations with the GoSS have soured ever since the 2014 mandate said UNMISS would protect civilians “irrespective of the source of…violence,” tacitly pitting it against government troops. 

But the mission is not completely ineffective on the political front. At a community-level, UNMISS-facilitated dialogues have deescalated violence in numerous areas recently. There is significant potential to partner with communities instead of the GoSS, but UNMISS has yet to hire a sufficient number of community liaisons to foster engagement. Subsequently, its patrols have been notably hesitant to engage on foot in communities. These are tangible policies UNMISS must correct if it is to overcome the challenges posed by the government. UNMISS should institutionalize and expand these often-successful dialogues for reconciliation and deradicalization in local South Sudanese communities.

Conclusion

It is certainly better for hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese that UNMISS was deployed, but with its resources, the mission could do far more to push the country in a constructive direction towards peace. From a strictly peacekeeping lens, UNMISS receives a somewhat passing grade for establishing areas of relative protection. But with the post-Cold War pairing of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, UNMISS has fallen flat. Frequently marginalized from the peace process, it has largely abdicated its role in shaping post-war South Sudan. 

Most South Sudanese remain susceptible to factional violence and dire humanitarian need, and little has been done to grow state capacity or even state interest in helping them. As much good as UNMISS has done in specific areas, it can only be national stability that helps those millions of South Sudanese still living on the precipice. And now that UNMISS has begun transitioning its PoC sites into GoSS-controlled IDP camps, it is unclear what major tools are left for this mission to fulfill its mandate. 

Overall, UNMISS has a great deal of experience and success to pull from but has not been bold enough in tackling one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The UN must either recommit to the political process in South Sudan or accept that it is merely being used to protect a civilian population ignored by the government. It should also expand and standardize conflict resolution initiatives of the kind frequently highlighted in its own reports. Much of the violence in South Sudan stems from specific, community-level disputes. Engaging with at-risk communities and investing in specialized civilian personnel would go a long way towards saving lives in South Sudan.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: Introduction and Analysis

Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping operations are meant to help countries down the complex path of peace and reconciliation. Such peacekeeping missions are mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A smaller subset of peacekeeping missions, stabilization operations, are not regulated by the UN Charter, but make-up three of the four largest ongoing peace operations. Their legitimacy rests between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (use of force to restore peace), constituting the so-called “Chapter VI and a half.” These operations are a joint instrument of the Security Council (the highest political authority) and the Secretary-General, the highest administrative and functional authority of the organization.

Peacekeeping interventions are based on some strategic points, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and the possibility of deploying and integrating police forces and civilian personnel. The work that the UN conducts during peace operations is based on three fundamental principles, namely consent to intervention by countries in conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force (unless in self-defense or in defense of the mandate).

Thousands of “Blue Helmets,” the military body belonging to member states and “loaned” to UN missions, have over time morphed from mere observers limited to logistical and technical support to being assigned sensitive functions. They now operate more complex programs including political mediation, de-mining, public affairs and communication, protection and promotion of civil rights, and reintegration of combatants into society. The missions have thus become multidimensional and integrated.

Instability is not just a military fact, with a truce to guard or a cease-fire line to patrol, but has many causes. Stabilization operations thus include ever greater responsibilities, including the democratization of local institutions, economic and social development, environmental and natural resource protection, and the retraining of military forces, police, and prison services, according to modern, democratic criteria.

Africa 

An example of these new and expanded functions are assistance and support missions, which are deployed in countries that have seen the total collapse (or almost total degradation) of state structures, countries such as Libya, Sierra Leone, Mali, Central Africa, and South Sudan. UN functions are also diversified and no longer restrained to patrolling truce lines. They have been involved in such diverse efforts as decolonization in Namibia, independence in Eritrea, protection of populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the transition to democratic regimes after years of civil war in Angola, Mozambique, Central America, or West Africa. All these missions see not only the change in the profiles and structures of the missions but also their composition. 

In West Africa, there are two very different missions, MINURSO and MINUSMA. The first aims to ensure, sooner or later, the holding of a regular referendum in the territories of Western Sahara, still disputed between Algeria, Morocco, and the local population. The mission has been active since 1991 and has 485 units, of which 245 are military.

MINUSMA, in Mali, started in 2013 shortly after the French military operation Serval, which halted the advance of Tuareg and other armed groups towards Bamako. Despite the collaboration with Operation Barkhane (formerly Serval) and the G5 of the Sahel, the area is still deeply unstable. MINUSMA’s annual budget exceeds one billion dollars and over 15,000 military personnel are deployed. The states that support the mission militarily are interested in containing the Malian crisis (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal).

As for Central Africa, MINUSCA is the stabilization mission of the Central African Republic. It was born in 2014, following the outbreak of civil war. Despite numerous peace agreements signed between parties, skirmishes and structural violence remain. The mission has an almost exclusively “regional” character since the troops present are Rwandan, Egyptian, Zambian, Cameroonian, and Senegalese. MONUSCO, on the other hand, is an operation that started in 2010 and aims to stabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo, devastated first by spillover from the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and then by its own wars from 1998 to 2003, which left over 5 million dead.

Additionally, three peacekeeping missions are active in the Horn of Africa, two in Sudan and one in South Sudan. The last one, UNMISS, was born in 2011 in South Sudan. After gaining independence, the country fell into a bloody civil war, dictated by patriotism and exploitation of ethnic tension, which have been intensifying since December 2013.

Analysis

Over the years, this United Nations instrument has been criticized extensively but has also received some positive feedback. Too often, in the initiatives of the powers that act in the name of the so-called international community, in which Africa, politically speaking, seems to be considered more an object than a real subject, the goal of “security” prevails. Very often, the issues of jihadism and human mobility towards Europe are considered separately from other issues plaguing African governments. There is a need for a repositioning of international diplomacy that considers the constant and progressive modification of the African geopolitical chessboard in the age of globalization.

The colonial and postcolonial models, to the test of facts, no longer represent a paradigm of reference in Africa for the control of aid institutions or even investments. The traditional partners of African countries (the former colonial powers) must now compete with the low index of “conditionality” strategies of emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Turkey, and Russia itself, which is reappearing in Africa after the withdrawal imposed, about thirty years ago, by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is precisely within these parameters that the United Nations, as an organism of peoples, is called to play an indispensable role. It is worth recalling what happened in the early 1960s with the wave of African independence movements. At that time, the UN, established as an organization after World War II with the aim of preventing future conflicts by replacing the ineffective League of Nations, played a politically relevant role.

In particular, the recognition of the principle of self-determination of peoples, sanctioned by the United Nations Charter, received a warm response. International law also outlawed war, in particular, due to Articles 2 & 4 of the Charter, declaring that member states must renounce war and resolve their conflicts.

To weigh negatively on these missions are a series of factors found in many investigations. The first of these factors is the lack of discipline among Blue Helmets and the fact that the contingents are sometimes composed of soldiers from countries where training standards are not adequate for modern crises in Africa. There have also been pervasive issues of sexual violence against women and minors.

Regardless, the United Nations has taken a central and irreplaceable role in the building of congenial international relations in the modern era. In the case of the African continent, the UN provides international legitimacy and an irreplaceable and indispensable forum for negotiation at global level on the issues of development, peace, and security.

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