Nigeria

Examining Militancy in Nigeria: Mistakes of the South and Lessons for the North

On June 25, 2009, then President of Nigeria, Umaru Musa Yaradua, made a proclamation granting amnesty and unconditional pardon to everyone who directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences, including those facing prosecution at the time, associated with militancy activities in the Niger Delta region. The requirement for this pardon to be effected was dependent on simply: the surrender of weapons and renunciation of militancy forms by concerned individuals at collection centres established for this purpose by the government. For about sixty days only, this proclamation stood valid, and in that time, over 20,192 individuals had accepted the terms of this amnesty offer.

In the same year, Boko Haram began an armed rebellion against the Nigerian government with multiple attacks across parts of northern Nigeria. Years later, Boko Haram became categorized as a terrorist group both in Nigeria and internationally, launching several attacks within Nigeria and neighbouring countries. For the last 12 years, Nigeria’s government steadily increased its responses to counter-terrorism, albeit widely perceived as counterproductive. More recently, the Nigerian government’s execution of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) program raises questions about its effectiveness.

The Identical Problem

The Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Insurgency are two main threats Nigeria has dealt with since its independence in 1960; both cases led to significant economic losses. Although the ideologies behind the two conflicts differ, the basis on which these ideologies come to be is very similar. In both scenarios, there is an ongoing deprivation of some sort, whether it be a functioning system where communities have access to basic amenities, or perceived injustice and marginalization, resulting in grievances that then form the ideological structure of these groups.

For the Boko Haram insurgency, endemic corruption is often cited as a menace in the Northern region that deprives the communities of even the basic needs that the government should provide. Widespread unemployment, lack of primary health care, massive poverty, and a general absence of the State all served as drivers for Boko Haram’s campaign in the North, especially in attracting recruits.

Similarly, unemployment, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic and political marginalization are unfortunate realities that communities in the Delta region face, leading to overwhelming amounts of militant activities. Between 2007 and 2009, the agitations in the Delta region worsened so much that Nigeria recorded an estimated daily loss of $58 million. The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) was an attempt to salvage the economic crisis and deteriorating security situation in the region.

Lessons for the Nigerian Government

A decade after PAP, security in the Delta region seems to be taking a new turn with the high rise of illicit markets, such as oil bunkering, as a means of survival. The underlying issues that fueled agitation in the area remain; unemployment rates have worsened, the perceived marginalization is still very much present, and the environment continues to suffer. By and large, the goal of the Amnesty program was bound to fail the moment it didn’t prioritize addressing the grievances that led to the agitations in the first instance.

With the surrender of over 37,000 repentant Boko Haram members thus far, and the ongoing DDRRR program, one can only hope that there is a plan to address the underlying issues that have fueled the Boko Haram campaign to avoid a repeat of the situation in the Niger Delta. Presently, there is a worsening insecurity dilemma due to the noticeable rise in illicit markets in the northern region, including those not linked to Boko Haram. In effect, it may be the worst of its kind should the government fail to be deliberate in preventing a recurrence of the northern conflict.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Oil

The Effects of Oil Production on the Niger Delta

Peaceful, full of life, resource-rich, and green are all features that were once attributes of the Niger Delta. The region, located in Nigeria, comprises a few states in its southern area. The region’s economic buoyance dates back to its pre-colonial days when it boasted of trade explorations extending beyond its borders. With such magnificent antecedents, expecting the Delta to attain far-reaching heights in infrastructural development at the least is not exactly out of place. Unfortunately, the rightful expectation is far from reality. Regardless of its several positive attributes and resources such as oil, the region remains underdeveloped; and continues to fall victim to challenges which worsen its state.

Why is the Region Important?

After almost half a century of exploration, the year was 1956, and oil was discovered in Oloibiri, Niger Delta. The discovery led Nigeria to join the ranks of oil-producing countries in 1958, with a production output of 5,100 barrels per day. Over the years, Nigeria continued to reach a significant record in its production output, recording up to 2.5 million barrels per day in 2004. With the discovery of oil in 1956, Nigeria, which had a vibrant agricultural sector, slowly began to overly focus on oil and gas at the cost of developing other potential industries.

According to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the body charged with covering the spectrum of all petroleum industry operations, the petroleum and gas industry accounts for about 90% of Nigeria’s gross earnings, though this figure has significantly reduced. Simply put, the oil industry is a significant player in Nigeria’s economy, and the Delta is home to this crucial resource.

Twenty-Six Years Ago

On November 10, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel, and John Kpuine, commonly referred to as the Ogoni Nine, were hanged at a prison in Port-Harcourt under the military rule of Sani Abacha. These men were leaders of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). The crimes of these men were that they demanded better environmental practices and oil revenue sharing for the region. The response was imprisonment and eventual execution.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

In 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility for kidnapping four foreign workers in the region. MEND’s demands are very similar to those made by the Ogoni Nine, howbeit through a different means. The group expressed concern for environmental pollution, underdevelopment, and perceived unfair revenue sharing that belittles the oil-producing communities. The group’s continued attacks on oil facilities and oil workers impacted Nigeria’s economy significantly, reducing its oil outputs by one-third.

Overall, MEND has become a prominent militant organization posing significant challenges to oil production through its relentless efforts to undermine the oil industry in the Delta.

Truth or Imaginations

The continuing long-term struggle that has dominated the region for decades in various forms is not misplaced. Even though oil accounts for most of Nigeria’s earnings, making it the largest oil producer in Africa, the region bears significant environmental pollution.

In the last six years, the Nigerian Ministry of Environment has recorded an alarming 5,000 cases of oil spillages, with a record event occurring a few months ago. In November of last year, members of a community in the region where the devastating effect of a leaking wellhead had become unbearable held a protest. The leak, which began about a month before the demonstration, had continued to spread into nearby communities and extended into neighbouring states. Unfortunately, such cases are not uncommon and have left a lasting impact on the environment.

The environmental impact is multi-layered affecting lands, rivers, air quality, and income sources for residents. So devastating are these effects that accessing clean and safe water is nearly impossible. Unsurprisingly, the overall consequence is unequivocally visible in the significant difference in the life expectancy rate in the region, which is ten years lower in the Delta region in comparison to other parts of Nigeria.

Beyond the Obvious

Jonah Gembre, an activist from Iwhrekan, stated, “we were thinking the oil companies were coming to elevate us from poverty, but they only give us poverty, and the economy is dying.”

The statement above reveals the expectation of many others living in the region. Sadly, the reality is farther away from the desires of the Delta people. Another overwhelming disappointment that further makes their desires for change seem unrealistic is the rise and fall of emancipators, whose sole goal, it would seem, is self-enrichment. 

A Blink of Hope

In January 2021, a Dutch court indicted a famous oil giant for spills in the region, ordering it to pay $111 million to affected communities. With the long history of exhaustion, frustration, and exploitation of the advocacy journey, January 2021 remains noteworthy to the people of the Niger Delta. Perhaps, there may be left, a remnant of truly devoted patrons that would bring to an end the critical dilemma of the region.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Insurgency

Ending Insurgency in Nigeria

October 1, 1960 was a significant moment in the history of Nigeria; finally, this nation would become an independent, self-governing entity. Accepted with a remarkable mix of hope and doubts, Nigeria set off on a journey that thus far has been characterized by many pleasant and unpleasant events.

Regrettably, the unpleasant events continue to reoccur on this journey, becoming a definitive part of Nigeria’s identity.  One such event was the over-a-decade-long insurgency in the northeast. From 2009 until today, the expenses of the Nigerian government on defence are well more than six trillion Naira. Despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, the country continues to face diverse threats from various groups, spiraling its development in a downward plunge.

Take Them Out?

“Those who are behind this insurgency will be taken out. They are being taken out one after the other, and it will get to a point that the last of them will be taken out, and then we’ll get to the end of it. It can be done within 17 months, that remains for this institution,” declared Femi Adesina, Media Adviser to the President of Nigeria.

The recent statement by Femi Adesina in response to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria is quite revealing. Interestingly, his view on taking the insurgents out to end the menace is not foreign to the government and has hitherto fueled its defence efforts.

Nothing short of an illusion is the premise that eliminating the insurgent group members is the solution to ending the bane of insurgency in the country. The current strength of the insurgency in Nigeria emanates from the same error of the government to eliminate members of the group in 2009. The lessons from the outcome of the government’s devastating error are still not learned, hence the repetition of the same failed strategy.

A Complex Situation

Considering the nature of the insurgency in Nigeria, it is not solely a matter of eliminating those behind it. Its sustainability thus far is mainly a function of the platform and the existing gaps in society it thrives on; so long as that platform exists, it is only a matter of time before another wave of insurgency awakens. Besides, the conflict in Nigeria is far too complex for the current proposed strategy.

The multifaceted nature of the insurgency poses a dire challenge to counterterrorism efforts. For instance, the famous terrorist group, Boko Haram, is highly defragmented with numerous cells, operating independently from various bases across Nigeria and other neighbouring countries in the West African region.

The continuity and the progression of Boko Haram’s operations and activities are clear indicators of the complexity of the problem. With the support and funding from other international terrorist groups, the activities of terrorist groups, like Boko Haram, in Nigeria continue to grow. Attempting to end insurgency in Nigeria without considering this essential aspect is more or less illogical.

The Way Out

The only way out of the problem Nigeria faces lies in a simple statement ascribed to the Chinese general Sun Tzu, “know thy enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.”

Until Nigeria understands itself first and then its enemy, its efforts in achieving any progress in security and development will only meet setbacks. The weak structures and system failures are areas that the government must urgently monitor. The diversity of Nigeria, which underlies many of Nigeria’s conflicts, is a potential strength for its unity if rightly harnessed.

The insurgency in Nigeria feeds off the weaknesses and gaps present in the country. Identifying these gaps and sealing them off is key to ending the insurgency. The government must be wary in developing strategies to avoid conflict with other efforts. A take-them-out approach raises many questions on the purpose of governance and directly opposes the de-radicalization efforts that the government accords a high success rate.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Nigeria

History Replay: What’s Next for Nigeria?

One Nigeria, a phrase capable of setting off sparks depending on whom you address. Is Nigeria one? Or is this merely wishful thinking? Since its creation and independence, Nigeria has witnessed violence and conflicts; however, none of these threatened its existence as much as the 30-month long civil war from July 6, 1967 until January 15, 1970.

The civil war between the Nigerian-led government of General Yakubu Gowon and the Republic of Biafra, a secessionist state led by Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, is one that left the country more divided than ever before.

Often referred to as a genocide by the sympathizers of Biafra, the civil war saw the death of well over one million children due to starvation and diseases. It is a widely held belief that the casualties from hunger and starvation during the war were far more than those caused by combat.

Almost every ethnic group has its version of the war, blaming different individuals or citing failed strategies as the problem. However, the reality is evident in the unfortunate cruel segregation and oppression of the Igbos, which persists today.

New Agitations

Fifty years after the bloody civil war, new agitations for secession from Nigeria have rekindled, with the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leading the charge. IBOP claims that the desire to secede from Nigeria is due to their treatment as slaves and second-class citizens in Nigeria.

The Nigerian government’s response has been to use violence to attempt to quell the agitations. As expected, the government’s response has only succeeded in spiraling things out of control, committing worse crimes and atrocities in their bid to safeguard the country’s unity.

Like most groups that adopt violent approaches, the recent agitations started peacefully. With the constant maiming and killings of members of the group by the Nigerian security forces, the group’s switch to violent means came as no surprise.

Today, the combat activities in some of the southeast states bear much resemblance to an ongoing war. The Nigerian government’s dogged approach towards quelling the agitations of Biafra in comparison to the extremism of terrorist groups in the northeast and northwest raises questions.

Python Dance II & the Dance of Peace

Operation Python Dance II was a military operation launched in late 2017 in the southeast region of Nigeria. The Nigerian Army publicly stated that this operation aims to curtail the activities of kidnapping, which have plagued the region. Consequently, operation Python Dance II began to take on a different form, looking like an attempt to suppress the agitations of Biafra.

The activities of the Nigerian Army raised fears among the people of the southeast, with several claims of indiscriminate killings of unarmed civilians and pro-Biafrans by the Nigerian Army.

Two years after operation Python Dance II, the Nigerian Army has renamed the operation Dance of Peace. Renaming the operation appears to be the most significant change since the activities of the Army largely remain the same.

Alleged killings of unarmed civilians are still highly reported; arrests and detainments of Biafra agitators are also on a steady rise. With these events, the agitations continue to intensify, with the IPOB group, now designated as a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government, launching both offensive and defensive attacks.

Secession?

Following the unrest in the southeast region, civil groups have called on international actors to intervene in the situation. While the likelihood of secession via dialogue seems slim, the agitators are also unlikely to back down due to the current administration’s opposition.

In the words of Chief Cyprian Okoye, the leader of the IPOB in Australia, “we derive strength in the fact that we are already down, and a man that is down does not need to fear nor fall. You cannot beat a baby and ask him not to cry. If they have beaten us and deny that we are not members of the same country, it is our duty to cry, and I know those who have ears will not let the tears drop from our eyes to be in vain in the end.”

The fear of another civil war is slowly building among Nigerians, with many hoping that these fears never come to pass. Sadly, it seems that history is replaying itself again; grievances are uncapping, the government’s perception of unity is still the same, and the country is in a worse state than it was over 50 years ago. Rather than wait to initiate a disaster or crisis response, a better step is to prevent a disaster and crisis altogether.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Radicalization

Understanding the Drivers of Radicalization in Nigeria

Violent extremism in modern-day Nigeria dates back to pre-colonial days; from the far north to the deep south, historical records show the presence of violent extremism that lingered on to the colonial era and continues to date.

A unique point to bear in mind is the multifaceted nature of violent extremism, especially in Nigeria, where multiple criteria usually form the cause of extremism. Like many other closely linked concepts, defining extremism remains somewhat difficult, mainly owing to the varying perspectives of what may or may not be considered extreme.

Regardless of the existing disagreements in conceptualizing extremism, certain key factors appear to be comparable. Extremism is an ideological phenomenon that vehemently opposes a widely accepted, usually age-long, belief or perception, conceiving the views as wrong and seeking to replace them with a preferred alternative. Violent extremism is the attempt to fulfill extremism by an intended use of violence.

After the conception of an extremist ideology and subsequent goal, furthering that goal involves a process often referred to as radicalization or also known as a violent extremist social trend.

According to a UNHCHR Report, “the notion of ‘radicalization’ is generally used [by some states] to convey the idea of a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations.”

Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Nigeria

While violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, the recent phase of extremism, religious extremism, is not specific to Nigeria. It is, in fact, a global challenge that managed to find a footing in Nigeria and continues to gain ground, threatening security while also hampering development in the country and the entire region.

In Nigeria, the goal of extremist groups is to replace the present democratic system of government, which is viewed as Westernized, and thereby infringing on and directly challenging the tenets of their Islamic faith with a Sharia style of governance. Most proponents of this extremist view have, at one time or another, attempted to impose these views on other Nigerians, radicalizing as many as possible to join in the efforts to achieve their goal.

Boko Haram, which is more or less the face of terrorism in Nigeria, was inspired by such an extremist movement and continues to grow its base throughout the region. The majority of the members of extremist groups come from youth and children, both within and outside northern Nigeria. Researchers, stakeholders, and the government of Nigeria continue to seek to understand the factors that aid radicalization in Nigeria, and as expected, there is much confusion on the possible cause.

Ahmed and Many Others

Some schools believe that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures are drivers of radicalization in Nigeria. However, other schools object to this premise, as members of extremist groups also include wealthy, influential, and educated people. Besides, much of the population of Nigeria fall into these categories, yet they do not directly or indirectly support the extremist ideologies of Boko Haram.

Ahmed, an alias, is an illiterate Muslim youth from a poor background in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram had made attempts to recruit him, which he declined. During one of the many attacks and attempted forced recruitments by Boko Haram, Ahmed watched as his father was gruesomely murdered. Eventually, Ahmed found his way to the country’s capital, Abuja, where he began a new life as a bus driver, staying focused on living a peaceful and crime-free life. Like Ahmed, when many Nigerian youth face challenging conditions they continuously refuse to accept the extremist views forced upon them by extremist groups.

The Principle Driver of Radicalization in Nigeria

Regardless of the disagreements on the drivers of extremism in Nigeria, one key element that continues to resound in schools of thought is the government’s unintended role in fostering extremism. The failure of the government to execute its duties creates several conditions and grievances that enable extremist ideologies to thrive.

The government’s inappropriate response widens existing gaps, giving extremist groups a campaign tool and an added advantage to garner support from susceptible individuals. Beyond these factors is the state’s alleged role in aiding the longevity of extremist groups, like Boko Haram, by political actors, in hopes that they would garner public support.

Conclusion

Poverty, illiteracy, and a lack of religious teachings are not the cause of extremism in Nigeria, as some research claims. A survey by the Pew Research Centre showed that 94% of Nigerian Muslims hold a negative view of Boko Haram. Unfortunately, most assertions on the drivers of extremism are founded upon stereotypes fuelled by actors on and behind the scenes.

Ultimately, the principle driving force of extremism in Nigeria remains the state; and, many other push factors for individuals can be attributed to state failures.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow