Afghanistan

Current Afghan peace talks taking place in Moscow, Russia.
 by Ahmad Mohibi

What To Expect From The Moscow Peace Conference On Afghanistan

The Moscow conference peace talks are being attended by the Troika group, which includes; Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, and the United States. And it may provide a preview for what could take place in Istanbul. The current Moscow summit and the upcoming conference in Turkey are the result of the ongoing stalemate in the Doha peace talks that began last September. 

The upcoming Turkey peace conference has the potential to determine the future of the Afghanistan peace process. The conference signifies a collective and international interest in creating a peaceful Afghan nation. The head of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah seems to regard the Moscow conference in this way. Abdulla’s office has gone on to state that “We strongly believe that the Moscow conference will boost the Doha peace talks, and the upcoming Turkey conference on Afghanistan”. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the aim of the Moscow conference is to help move forward the peace talks in Doha. 

The Bonn Agreement

In order to understand the potential future Afghanistan peace agreement, we can look to previous agreements like the Bonn Agreement. The proposals established by the Bonn Agreement can give us a clue as to what we can expect from current discussions. It resulted in the creation of an interim government which was the foundation for a new constitution and political system. Otherwise known as the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (S/2001/1154), the Bonn Agreement sought to build lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

What is important to note is that the creation of the interim government was left to the decision of the Afghan people, through the creation of an emergency Loya Jirga, and not by international actors.  The expectation of an interim government was for a new constitutional government to emerge and for key institutions to reemerge. The Agreement also proposed the creation of a Human Rights Commission as well as equal representation of women, ethnic, and religious groups.

International Influence During Peace Talks

For example, Russia supports the creation of an interim government and the inclusion of the Taliban. According to the statement given by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova “the formation of an interim inclusive administration would need a logical solution to the problem of integrating the Taliban into the peaceful political life in Afghanistan”.

On the other hand, the current Afghan government is not in agreement with the dissolution of the current administration. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s President, has gone on to say that: “if the Taliban are ready for elections tomorrow, we are also ready to participate in the elections, but I am not ready to transfer the power to my successor without elections”. 

Ghani has stated that he does not want a future peace settlement to be made outside of Afghanistan. Secretary of Defence Antony Blinken’s recent letter outlines the Biden administration’s expectations for the Afghan peace process. Even though the main political actors involved in the Afghan peace process may have differing views on certain issues, they all have one thing in common: they want to create a peaceful Afghan nation. The question is how that peace will look like and how it will manifest. After all, the Bonn agreement did not turn out like the participants expected. 

What Does This Mean For The Future Agreement?

Two important elements to consider are first, what a future peace agreement may mean for Afghanistan’s administration? And second, what role the players involved in the peace process will place in the event of a peace agreement? Furthermore, will peace talks result in an interim government? And will the current Afghan administration be willing to give up their power? The Taliban’s involvement in Afghanistan’s future peace agreement is critical to both its inception and its success. The impact of these separate groups will also affect the peace agreement’s nature. It will affect whether the new administration will follow a secular route or become an Islamic Republic.

Inclusion will also be paramount to the success of the Afghan peace agreement. The equal participation of women, ethnic, and religious groups is as important as the creation of a new political system. This is also true for the reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan society and its potential future political system. It is crucial that peace talks continue to finally end the violence being perpetuated by the Taliban. These conferences and peace talks may allow the international community to come to an inclusive and successful peace agreement. The most important thing is to continue to build on the momentum that is currently taking place. 

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 by Ahmad Mohibi

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad Visits Kabul For Afghan Peace Talks

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, has left Washington DC for a trip to Kabul. His trip aims to resolve the stalemate on the Afghan Peace Process and resume the discussion with the afghan technocrats, the afghan warlords, the Mujaheddin and the Taliban representatives. 

The trip comes just a few days after the anniversary of the Afghan Peace Process, which in the last year has experienced some back and forth. Many factors have affected the process including, a lack of interest from the Taliban in the process overall, a domestic rivalry to the government, and the call from the opposition parties for the current government to be dissolved and replaced by an interim government. All of these factors have posed challenges with compliance to the Afghan Peace Process. 

Amid the looming deadline for the US troops to withdraw from the area, the US government has organised this trip intending to create the conditions necessary not to leave Afghanistan in chaos as it has happened with the cessation of Soviet foreign aid in 1991. All due to the concerns about the increasing violence, the uncertainty, and the stalemate between the negotiation parties.

In fact, as the US State Department has announced, the aim of Khalilzad’s trip was to resume the discussions with all parties in order to achieve “a just and durable political settlement and permanent and comprehensive cease-fire.”

The result of the trip was the request from the US envoy for an UN-hosted conference on Afghanistan in order to have a regional and international debate on the establishment of peace in the area. Eleven major international conferences concerning Afghanistan have already taken place since the insurgence of instability in the area, with the last one held in November 2020 in Geneva and the first being the one held in Bonn in 2001. 

The Bonn conference took place with the aim of re-creating the State of Afghanistan and defining a plan for governing the country following the U.S. invasion in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks. The agreement sought to establish a government with a strong, centralised power, a new constitution and an independent judiciary. But also to hold free and fair elections, a centralised security sector, and the protection of rights of women and also minorities, such as religious and ethnic groups. 

One common critique on the Bonn conference is the exclusion of the Taliban from the negotiations, to which Brahimi refers as Bonn’s “original sin,”. The next conference would be a Bonn-style meeting, where to discuss at the international level the prospect of a participatory government, but that this time it would include the Taliban in the debate. 

As Shahzada Massoud, a close aide to former president Hamid Karzai, has said: “A grand international conference that will be similar to the Bonn Conference will be held, in which the Taliban and the republic side will participate at the leadership level. At the same time, the international community, including the United States and the regional countries, will reach a political agreement that will take its legitimacy from the international community,”.

The strength of setting up international conferences lies in the ability to involve international actors and regional actors, like Pakistan and Iran. The conference lays the groundwork for multilateral discussions and negotiations between parties, encouraging Afghanistan’s neighbours and international actors to support the end of violence and to create stability in the area. The involvement of international and regional actors is pivotal for the creation of peace in Afghanistan. Pressure from the US on the Taliban to cease violence and on state response to terrorism, as well as Pakistan cooperation, are determinants of the future of Afghanistan. 

 

 

Photo Credit: Afghan foreign ministry

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 by Arman Sidhu

What Is Next for Afghanistan’s Sikhs and Hindus?

Before it earned its moniker as the ‘Graveyard of Empires’, the Durrani Empire of Afghanistan ceded a significant amount of its territory to the neighboring Sikh Empire throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries, an event remembered today for being the last successful foreign invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the gains made by the Sikh Empire would prove short-lived, following their defeat at the hands of the British East India Company, which would go on to consolidate similar empires scattered across the Indian subcontinent.

Beyond its relevance to Afghan history, the legacy of the Afghan-Sikh Wars, and the colonial period that followed, helps explain the presence of both Sikhs and Hindus in Afghanistan today. The country’s strategic location as a trading hub, its independence from colonial powers, and its secularist orientation, encouraged hundreds of thousands of Sikhs and Hindus to emigrate from British India to bustling commercial hubs like Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar. Though most Sikh and Hindu arrivals worked as merchants, these families would go on to lay multi-generational roots, taking citizenship and serving in the civil service, the armed forces, and even in political positions as advisors to the Afghan monarchy.

Yet, like most Afghans, the prospects for Sikhs and Hindus swiftly changed amid the deposition of King Zahir Shah in 1973, and the Communist-led Saur Revolution against Mohammed Daoud Khan in 1979. The insecurity that ensued would have a remarkable and disproportionate impact on Afghanistan’s religious minorities, with informal censuses suggesting the Sikh and Hindu population went from over 700,000 in the 1970s to just 15,000 in the first years of Mujahideen rule in the early 1990s. Since then, decades of instability and religious persecution have exacerbated the exodus of Afghan Hindus and Sikhs, leaving their combined population with under 1,500 members today.

The setbacks incurred by the Afghan Sikh and Hindu communities has encouraged them to cluster geographically, lobby collectively, and even share places of worship. For those that remain, the present obstacles to integration have seldom been greater than under the incumbent Afghan republic. During the brief rule of the Taliban, Sikhs and Hindus were considered a tolerated minority, albeit with the expectation of paying the jizya tax for non-Muslims. But the American invasion and the subsequent installation of the Afghan republic saw a sizable spike in the reported grievances of Hindus and Sikhs. These grievances include targeted attacks, asset seizures, and systemic discrimination by the Afghan state and society.

From the security side, the proliferation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which has successfully recruited fighters from hardline elements of the Taliban, has targeted Sikhs and Hindus on multiple occasions over the past 3 years. These incidents include a 2018 suicide bombing that targeted a Sikh and Hindu neighborhood in Jalalabad, and last year’s deadly massacre of Sikh worshipers at a gurdwara (Sikh temple) in Kabul, both attacks were claimed by ISIL.

In addition to the incessant security threat posed by non-state armed groups, the woes of the Afghan Sikh and Hindu communities are acutely felt in day-to-day life. Reports of seized assets, including businesses and property, have largely gone unanswered despite persistent calls for an inquiry into the matter. Sikhs and Hindus have also reported discrimination in obtaining and using government services, including in judicial recourse, and even in sending their children to government-run schools, where they face chronic taunting and bullying. Finally, endemic religious persecution has nott abated much since the fall of the Taliban, with the major sticking point revolving around cremation practices, which are considered standard in the Sikh and Hindu faiths, but heretical to Islamic beliefs.

Such conditions have forced Hindus and Sikhs to insulate themselves, by establishing their own schools, and using temples to house those who have been forces to forfeit their property. The Afghan government’s efforts to redress these grievances has done little to dissuade the community from leaving. A presidential decree reserving one seat in the Wolesi Jirga to represent the Sikh/Hindu community was finally passed by President Ashraf Ghani, after similar measures floundered under his predecessor Hamid Karzai.

But with its members still fleeing in droves, parliamentary representation is unlikely to alleviate the impediments to religious freedom and protection of property. One longstanding demand from Afghan Sikh and Hindu refugees in India has focused on their path to citizenship. Known as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), the legislation crafts a fast-track route for minority religious groups who emigrated from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh before 2015. Though controversial for leaving out Muslims from its criteria, the CAA was well-received by Afghan Sikhs and Hindus and even supplemented with additional Indian initiatives to extend visas to those still residing in Afghanistan. A similar resolution was floated in the United States House of Representatives last year, and aimed to resettle some Afghan Sikhs and Hindus in the US, describing the groups as ‘endangered minorities.’

In the absence of formidable protections of minority religious groups from the current or a future Afghan government, the barriers faced by Afghan Sikhs and Hindus are likely to endure and encourage more to permanently leave, despite familial ties and the strength of their Afghan-influenced culture and identity. Like the Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and Jains that preceded them, the rich history of Sikh and Hindu contributions to Afghan society is all but certain to only be visible in books and museums within the next decade.

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 by Arman Sidhu

What Does Future Trade Look Like in Light of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement?

Following several months of talks between trade representative from Pakistan and Afghanistan, the two countries appear poised to finalize a preferential trade agreement (PTA) by the end of January, just one month before the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) is set to expire. Previous discussions have struggled to resolve numerous trade-related concerns raised by both sides, leading to a sharp decline in bilateral trade between the two countries last year.

Trade remains one of the more complex aspects of the relationship between Islamabad and Kabul. Complaints of extortion by government officials, customs obstacles, and insecurity has culminated in frequent border closures, compelling both sides to seek costlier alternative transit routes and ink multilateral trade deals that exclude one another.

For Pakistan, the opportunity to cultivate strong trade linkages with Afghanistan has little to do with access to the Afghan market. Instead, Pakistan views Afghanistan as a gateway to the more lucrative markets found in China and Central Asia. Having borrowed billions to improve its own transport infrastructure, Pakistan’s economic success is contingent on directing the flow of goods to its maritime ports, particularly the port of Gwadar. As the flagship project of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the port of Gwadar is particularly useful to landlocked Central Asian states like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, each of whom have seen their South Asian trade aspirations hindered by over 40 years of instability in Afghanistan, which remains the critical bottleneck in linking South and Central Asian supply chains.

Though it has spearheaded a near 26-year old attempt to circumvent Afghanistan via the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA), Pakistan still remains Afghanistan’s primary trading partner, accounting for over 40% of all Afghan exports. Furthermore, Pakistan’s motives in maintaining a stable relationship with the Afghan government stems from its stake in the outcome of ongoing intra-Afghan dialogue. Given the strong possibility of the Taliban converting into a recognized political party in a potential peace deal, Pakistan’s post-conflict relationship with Afghanistan will depend on its ability to operate within the Afghan state, giving it an opportunity to supplement its support base from the Taliban by appealing to a wider coalition of parties and officials.

In spite of their differences, both sides continue to affirm the need and desire to strengthen bilateral trade ties, particularly as it relates to formalizing border markets across the porous and insecure Durand Line. Border skirmishes remain a critical point of contention, as seen with instances like the July 2020 clash that resulted in the deaths of 15 Afghan civilians as well as Pakistan’s unilateral decision to build a 2,600-kilometer border fence that is scheduled to be completed in less than two months. For decades, trade talks have zeroed in on border issues, including the desire to formalize the booming black markets that have proven profitable for traders and militants that traverse the Durand Line to traffic stolen goods, arms, drugs, and humans.

To Pakistan’s chagrin, the Afghan government has been unwavering in its demand to incorporate the trade of Indian goods in the terms of its deal with Pakistan. Lobbying pressure from Afghanistan’s private sector and industry groups have demanded that their government work out an arrangement that would allow Afghan traders to use overland routes through Pakistan to access India via Wagah border, which splits the Indian and Pakistani halves of Punjab province.

Among the main gripes cited by the Afghan business community include inadequate market access and expensive transit costs in its trade with India, which is Afghanistan’s second largest trading partner. The existing trade routes available to Afghanistan and India include an expensive air corridor and the circuitous use of Iran’s Chabahar Port. Barring an abnormal modification in its foreign policy, Pakistan is unlikely to grant accession to such a provision, making it likely that the status quo will persist unless Afghanistan can make several favorable concessions to Pakistan.

The nature of the Pak-Afghan trade relationship underscores the formidable obstacles to both intra-regional trade within South Asia and extra-regional linkages between Southern and Central Asian supply chains. In spite of its natural geographic advantages and the potential for mutually beneficial trading arrangements, the essential prerequisite lies with the trajectory of intra-Afghan talks, where Pakistan remains the most important foreign stakeholder. In the absence of a political compromise, the litany of trade woes afflicting both sides are unlikely to fade, exacerbating infrastructure gaps and the ability to attract and sustain investment to the region, putting it at a further disadvantage to other emerging markets.

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 by Jonad Anderson

Afghanistan: Peace Talks and an Increase in Violence

Since peace talks in Doha commenced in September, violence has escalated in Afghanistan, however, recent developments could present a way to turn this around. It is appropriate to examine what has changed and how it could have positive effects.

Breakthrough

Shortly after the intra-Afghan talks commenced, they were stalled due to both technical and fundamental differences. Afghan representatives and the Taliban could not agree on how they should be referred in the agreement (as they do not recognize each other) and they did not hold similar views on the political future for Afghanistan.

Since then, the parties have now agreed on how to conduct the talks and the negotiators are now likely able to move forward on issues such as a political roadmap and a ceasefire. The three page agreement is an important step, and will be a stepping stone, for the future discussion of peace in Afghanistan and was immediately welcomed by the United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Escalating Violence

As noted, violence escalated in Afghanistan once the talks got underway in Qatar. According to a report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), there has been an increase of violence since the peace deal between the Taliban and the U.S. was signed. The attacks have increased by more than 50% compared to the quarter before the talks began.

During this quarter, the report stated there have been 2,561 civilian casualties, including 876 deaths. This is an increase of 43% compared with April to June. On November 2, an attack on Kabul University killed at least 22 people of which many were students.

The violence is affecting the talks in Doha, as mentioned in the SIGAR report: “NATO Resolute Support (RS) and USFOR-A commander, General Austin Scott Miller said the high level of Taliban violence around the country ‘is not consistent with the U.S.-Taliban agreement and undermines the ongoing Afghan peace talks’”.

Comments

Violence negatively affects the legitimacy of the current peace process both from the perspective of the negotiating parties and the civilians. Trust between the relevant parties and civilians is an important factor for the peace talks to continue. Without trust, further delays may be expected. Consequently, in combination with an U.S withdrawal and more violence, the result may be an even more violent Afghanistan.

Another factor that can affect violence in the country is the withdrawal of American troops. If most of the American troops leave Afghanistan this might create a power vacuum which in turn can be used by violent groups to harm civilians and the peace process. As stated, the violence undermines the ongoing peace talks and raises the lack of trust within the country.

For the peace talks to move forward it is necessary that violence deceases. When one of the actors at the negotiating table keeps on fighting, it creates a more difficult situation for the negotiators.  Therefore, recent progress can hopefully bring more substantive issues to the table, such as a ceasefire, which can rapidly decrease the violence in the country.

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