Afghanistan

Taliban
 by Ahmad Mohibi

The Taliban Kingmaker: Haqqani or Durrani?

Author’s note: The Taliban group was founded in the 1990s by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and appointed Mullah Omar as founder and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as co-founder–the two Pashtun leaders from the Durrani tribe of Afghanistan from heavily populated density provinces in western Afghanistan (Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan regions). In 1996, after the Taliban’s first victory, the Haqqani Network joined the Taliban and since then have committed some of the deadliest bombings and have advanced terrorist targeting capabilities. 

A key factor for the prolonged war in Afghanistan has been the thirst for power among the groups and, subsequently, within those groups, other factions, who all want to rule but are unwilling to compromise. There is a layer of interest within each group. The Taliban are a majority-dominated Pashtun-led group that emerged in the 1990s and are now on their second attempt to form their government. However, they are struggling to unify due to tribal, religious, regional, and political differences.

The Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021 but have struggled to maintain power in their second attempt at forming a government. However, the dynamics of the Taliban government have changed.

While the Taliban seeks global recognition, a political dispute between its factions is occurring. Although the Taliban Islamic Emirate is characterized as radical, anti-democracy, and anti-Western values, there are some differences in how Taliban factions view social norms, politics, and governance. The Mullah Baradar Ghani Group is keen to compromise. At the same time, the Haqqani Network is a hard-core extremist group that is unwilling to deviate from its path of an Islamic emirate. The Haqqani Network is considered an extreme faction of the Taliban with no desire to engage with the world, particularly the West.

In general terms, the Haqqani Network, a designated terrorist organization per the U.S. State Department, is considered a more conservative and radical wing of the Taliban. In contrast, Baradar’s group is more liberal and seeks greater rapprochement with the international community.

Current Taliban Leadership. Source: The Counter Extremism Project, United Nations, Taliban, Pakistan Foreign Ministry, US Treasury, US State Department Photos: Handout/Taliban, Getty Images, The Counter Extremism Project, US Federal Bureau of Investigation Graphic: Henrik Pettersson, Laura Smith-Spark, Saleem Mehsud, Kara Fox and Tim Lister, CNN

Background

The Haqqani Network was founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a Sunni Islamist, and ex-mujahidin warlord during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. During the 80s, Jalaluddin’s group was aided and supported by several members of the international community, becoming one of the most influential groups in Eastern Afghanistan. Furthermore, Jalaluddin had close ties to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and to Osama Bin Laden.

Despite the fact that Jalaluddin died in 2018 from illness, the group continued under the command of his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

The Haqqani Network is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. During the Afghan war, they were responsible for some of the highest-profile terrorist attacks against U.S. forces and civilians. For instance, the June 2011 assault on the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel and two major suicide bombings, in 2008 and 2009, against the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

The military and financial power of the Haqqani Network derives from its involvement in illegal activities such as smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion. However, they also receives financial support from agencies such as the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and other wealthy donors, which makes the fight against this organization complex.

On the other hand, the Mullah Baradar faction is also seeking political control of Afghanistan. This group seeks to represent the interests of historical Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar and his son, Mullah Yaqoob, who are originally from the Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan; unlike members of the Haqqani Network, who come from the northeastern region of the country.

Mullah Baradar is the co-founder of the Taliban and participated in negotiations with the United States in Doha during 2020, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. Also, Baradar met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing this year. Mullah Baradar is considered a respected negotiator among the organization and his faction is perceived as the moderate and more liberal wing of the Taliban.

Mullah Baradar’s faction seeks greater rapprochement with the world and is open to negotiation, exemplified by the U.S. negotiations in Qatar. Additionally, this faction proposes a more inclusive government that allows for the participation of ethnic minorities. This approach to foreign policy contradicts the Haqqani Network’s ideals, which, form a more conservative perspective and prefers that other states not interfere in the Taliban government.

The differences between these two factions have led to a current dispute within the Taliban. Mullah Baradar hoped to head the government but instead, he was appointed as a deputy. In fact, on September 21st 2021, there was an armed confrontation between the two groups, resulting in Baradar’s brief disappearance and subsequent move to the Kandahar region.

One of the perpetual afflictions plaguing Afghanistan in the modern era has been an inability for Kabul to consolidate governance over their entire territory. While geography has played a considerable role in this hindrance, it cannot be understated how tribal differences have obstructed the peace process.

In Afghanistan, a significant portion of the Pashtuns are a part of the Durrani confederation and have comprised a large number of the Taliban’s political elite, such as Hamid Karzai. Their power base extends into Pakistan, providing refuge to rebuild strength for future campaigns.

Presently the Durrani are represented by Mullah Baradar, who hopes to continue their monopoly of power within the country. Moreover, with their policy of rapprochement with larger powers, such as China, they can benefit from substantial capital. They could also benefit from arms, which could be used to consolidate power within the country and further transnational infrastructure projects, like the Belt and Road Initiative.

At the moment their primary rivals within Afghanistan are the Haqqani Network, which is primarily composed of the Zadran tribe. The group has traditionally used armed opposition against conflicting foreign powers. Their strength draws from this resistance as well as past alliances with the most dangerous Islamic fundamentalist groups in the region, such as Al Qaeda.

They may see their opposition as only a conduit for foreign influence, and thus feel emboldened to conduct a prolonged conflict against the Duranni faction. Without reconciliation by a third party, the nation may devolve into devastating conflict along tribal and ideological lines, leaving civilians caught in the crossfire.

The most affected: The civilian population

While the Afghan government internally disputes over which Taliban faction should prevail, the civilian population suffers.

Afghans are currently experiencing widespread famine throughout the country. This is due to the current drought, difficult economic climate, and cessation of international food aid.

Today, Afghanistan has a poverty rate of 72%. However, even more worrisome is the notion that the quality of life will continue to decline due to the current political instability, uneconomical public finances, freezing of foreign aid, and the COVID-19 pandemic. If current conditions persist, 97 percent of Afghans could plunge into poverty by mid-2022.

What is next?

The internal dispute between the Haqqani Network and the Mullah Baradar faction is likely to jeopardize the government and consequently negatively impact the civilian population.

Therefore, while the political confrontation between the two factions continues, it is necessary to think about solutions in public policy to prevent and stop the ongoing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan. It is necessary to evaluate alternatives to intervene on problems such as generalized famine and extreme poverty.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace and a former US Counter-Terrorism Adviser in Afghanistan @ahmadsmohibi

Christopher Ynclan Jr, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Daniel Ruiz, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Evacuation
 by Chris Ynclan Jr

Prioritizing the Evacuation of High-Risk Afghans

With the last American troops leaving Afghanistan this year, there are many questions regarding what the future holds for the Central Asian country. Afghanistan has been beset with conflict for much of recent memory, which has been to the detriment of its citizens. They have once again been put under the harsh rule of the Taliban, erasing years of progress for Afghan rights. Since this has occurred, their future has been thrown into danger and uncertainty.

Women’s Rights

While the Taliban has eroded much of the progress made in the past two decades, it is important to acknowledge previous achievements. Chief among them has been the increase in the number of women educated within Afghanistan. This achievement has allowed generations of young women to take advantage of opportunities, benefiting both themselves and their families.

Moreover, there has been a decrease in the infant mortality rate within Afghanistan with the help of the USAID. However, without a meaningful attempt by the international community to address these issues, the country will likely backslide in these key areas, which have proven instrumental in the progress made thus far.

Taliban Reprisals

More troublingly, the Taliban has engaged in a campaign of reprisals of those who worked with the United States and those deemed as subversive to their ideology. A prime example of this violent campaign was the attack on an interpreter’s brother by the Taliban to send a message to their perceived enemies.

Such attacks are not isolated incidents but rather an attempt to consolidate their power without any opposition to their radical governance. Although there have been successful evacuations of high-risk Afghans out of the country, a significant population remains left behind.

Economic and Political Challenges

In the aftermath of the American withdrawal, the country has faced economic and political woes due to the power vacuum created by Ashraf Ghani fleeing the country. This instability has caused the local currency to depreciate at an alarming rate, thus creating a dire situation for Afghans. To make matters worse, many Afghans are on the verge of starvation as food prices exponentially increase.

It is evident that such instability is troublesome for the region and, more importantly, for the Afghans themselves. This instability will also weaken the state from protecting against the onslaught of attacks from more radical extremist groups, such as ISIS-K. Therefore, it is imperative for policy to be enacted to remedy the situation and ensure the safety of Afghan nationals.

The United States’ Impact

Because the United States has evacuated its military from Afghanistan, it has lost considerable leverage within politics; however, this does not mean that they have run out of policy options. Once the Taliban is unable to feed those under their governance and are defunct of international financial funds, the United States can use its soft power within international organizations to renew negotiations. By doing so, the United States would be able to operate from a position of strength in which they can advocate for policy that would ensure Afghans’ well-being.

Such policies which would ensure this outcome would include the participation of Afghans who share opposing views within their government. Considerable resources have been expended to extract and evacuate Afghans with the highest risk of Taliban retaliation.

However, due to the number of individuals who have worked in the United States during the war, it would be logistically impossible to retrieve everyone. These policies would allow for their safety to be guaranteed through negotiations. The United States should also advocate for the safe evacuation of the last remaining operations underway, to evacuate Afghans at highest risk of attack. The Taliban government would also have to make a commitment to ensure the human rights of its citizens under the aforementioned policy regime.

Looking Forward

These policies potentially represent the last remaining window to ensure the Afghans’ safety and well-being of those who have spent their lives enveloped by conflicts. The dire situation has the possibility of devolving into a humanitarian crisis on par with that of Yemen. Moreover, the lack of capital by the Taliban would most certainly lead to the growth of groups like ISIS-K, who would be able to gain permanent footholds in the regions of the country with the harshest terrain.

The policies would also provide the last possibility of a democratic Afghanistan, where Afghans would be able to decide their future for the first time in decades. More importantly, the country would not forgo the progress which has been made through the sacrifices of both Americans and Afghans alike.

 

Chris Ynclan, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

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ISIS-K
 by Ahmad Mohibi

ISIS-K Grows as the Taliban Struggles to Maintain Power

According to a senior Afghan intelligence officer who spoke with Rise to Peace, ISIS of Khorasan (ISIS-K) is growing rapidly in the Char Bolak district of the Balkh province in Afghanistan, notably since the Taliban’s takeover. Recently, ISIS has claimed responsibility for two other attacks, one occurring outside of a women’s hospital in Liverpool, U.K., killing only the ISIS member himself.  The second attack occurred in Kampala, Uganda, killing three people and injuring 36. These attacks illustrate the rapid expansion of ISIS’s growth and activities.

Additionally, ISIS-K’s attacks have been characterized by violent expansion and retrenchment combined with periodic clashes with the Taliban, international forces, and Afghan security forces.

ISIS-K has been responsible for nearly 100 attacks against civilians in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as around 250 clashes with U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani security forces since 2017.

A senior Afghan intelligence officer informed Rise to Peace that ISIS-K is getting stronger due to a concentrated focus on increasing capabilities and power after the recent Taliban takeover.  There are no current counter-terrorism operations; however, the previous Afghan government used to have many counter-terrorism resources and operations, such as drone attacks. In addition, due to the Taliban takeover, there is no significant resistance against ISIS-K, leaving them with plenty of room to grow rapidly.

Furthermore, poverty is rampantly increasing in Afghanistan. So, not only does this make people more willing to join a terrorist organization, but also results in former Afghan security forces joining as a means to financially support their families. For example, an Afghan intelligence officer informed Rise to Peace that ISIS-K will pay 15,000 AFG to new recruits with no experience and 25,000 AFG for those with experience. Likewise, many top-level ISIS-K commanders who were captured during the previous five to six years were released after the Taliban takeover.

ISIS-K/Daesh Techniques

ISIS-K’s techniques are known to be chaotic and devastating.  ISIS-K strategically creates chaos and uncertainty through guerilla tactics in an attempt to discredit a government’s ability to provide security for its citizens.  Additionally, through these tactics, ISIS-K seeks to shift fighters from other groups into their own.  Through these efforts, ISIS-K aims to position itself as the leading jihadist organization in the region by recruiting new members, and poaching members affiliated with other groups.

Moreover, ISIS-K engages in various tactics to incentivize recruits, varying from marriage arrangements to threats.  One example includes sending out nightly letters to recruit people to join their cause.  They have even sent letters to Taliban soldiers, warning them to leave the Islamic Emirate or ISIS-K will assassinate them.

According to a senior Afghan intelligence officer who spoke with Rise to Peace, a new group within ISIS-K operates at night to kill members of the Taliban.  The unique aspect about this group is not only do they live seemingly normal lives, fighting at night while continuing to be farmers during the day, but they conduct their operations barefoot.  Thus, they have become known as the “barefoot fighters” among locals.  The “barefoot fighters'” tactics are comparable to those that the Mujahideen used during their existence, since the Mujahideen were referred to as “guerrillas” or “mountain men” and were similarly excellent in night combat.

Who are the targets?

Ever since ISIS-K’s founding, it has usually targeted Kabul with sophisticated and complex attacks.  In the majority of the attacks, ISIS-K has a high proclivity to target civilians whom they regard as infidels of Islam.

Capabilities

Most analysts and researchers, including the United Nations, gauge that ISIS-K’s capabilities have reached about 2,000 fighters, and increased when the Taliban released prisoners from the Afghanistan jail. This amount is somewhat comparable to the Taliban who have around 10,000 fighters at their disposal.

Financial Routes

It is not exactly evident where ISIS-K receives its funding, but the public U.S. government assessments provide the clearest understanding.  ISIS-K primarily receives funds by extorting the local population and businesses, taxation, illicit criminal commerce, donations, as well as support from the ISIS-core.

ISIS-K moves its money around the world and throughout Afghanistan via the Hawala. The Hawala is an alternative or parallel transfer system which exists outside of traditional finance channels. Hence, it has been used widely in funding terrorist groups and activities both in Afghanistan and abroad. Further, ISIS-K has cultivated relationships with specific Hawala dealers who store thousands of dollars for them.

The response from the international community

The international community has taken several steps to combat ISIS-K.  For example, the UN Security Council established an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze in 2019 against ISIS-K by all UN member states. Additionally, the US government has implemented strategies such as economic sanctions and counter-terrorism efforts to inhibit ISIS-K’s operational and financial capabilities.  However, since the Taliban takeover, it has become increasingly difficult for the international community to combat ISIS-K and terrorism financing in general.

Looking forward

With both financial and membership increases, ISIS-K is growing extensively, especially after the recent Taliban takeover. Not only are their attacks violent and chaotic, but they also target civilians to convey their message of jihad.

In order to face the challenges posed by both ISIS-K and terrorism in Afghanistan, the international community needs to strengthen its coordination on impeding terrorism financing in Afghanistan.  In addition, concrete steps must be identified and articulated for the Taliban to take against ISIS-K’s financing practices. Ultimately, until the international community is able to create a tangible strategy, ISIS-K will continue to grow in size and power.

 

Krista Tammila, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

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Afghan refugees
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Afghans Stuck in Limbo at Emirates Humanitarian City Seek Answers to their U.S. Entry Status

Tens of thousands Afghan Evacuees at Emirates Humanitarian City Seek Answers to their U.S. Entry Status. Many are now in limbo in overflowing processing centers, fearful of what comes next.

Unlike other Afghan refugee camps in Ramstein Air Base in Germany and US army base in Qatar where evacuees have had relatively quick entry processes into the U.S., these individuals live in a state of fear and uncertainty as to their futures.

Afghan Evacuations

Thousands of Afghans were evacuated and fled Afghanistan after the Taliban regained control on August 16, 2021.  After the fall of Kabul, the United States began evacuating Americans and Afghans, sending refugees across the globe to camps in Germany, Qatar, Spain, Uzbekistan, and UAE.  While thousands of Afghans have already been vetted and brought to the United States, a much different situation has unfolded at the Emirates Humanitarian City refugee camp. 

Emirates Humanitarian City Refugee Camp

An estimated 9,000 Afghan evacuees are currently housed at the Emirates Humanitarian City refugee camp in Abu Dhabi. These refugees were among the initial wave of evacuations by U.S. forces after the fall of Kabul. Ultimately, these evacuees have been housed at the Emirates Humanitarian City for three months and have since observed new Afghan refugee arrivals come and go in a matter of days. 

While the Afghan refugees are grateful for the U.S.’s assistance in evacuating them from Afghanistan, the conditions at the refugee camp have become untenable, causing them to raise their voices and demand answers.

Living in Limbo

One of the loudest concerns from the evacuees at the Emirates Humanitarian City is the uncertainty of when they will be processed and brought to the United States, most notably for those who have valid documents or family sponsorship.  

Evacuees have criticized the insufficient amount of personnel at the site to process and transfer them out of the camp. 

Thus, the undefined timeline at Emirates Humanitarian City coupled with threats of deportation has resulted in a state of anxiety and distress among refugees. On top of this, reports from inside Emirates Humanitarian City state that several refugees have died from unknown causes. The news of their deaths has been intentionally suppressed by the media. 

Ultimately, the situation at Emirates Humanitarian City has risen to a level where the refugees feel compelled to voice their concerns, especially regarding the camp’s educational, financial, and health issues. 

Educational Concerns

One concern raised by the refugees is the now three-month, and seemingly indefinite, hiatus in education for the children at the Abu Dhabi camp.  Since arriving, the children have lacked the opportunity to continue their studies, causing concern that they will fall behind educationally.  While students have already had to navigate educational barriers caused by the coronavirus pandemic, this interruption in education at the refugee camp will exacerbate academic delays in students.

Financial Concerns

Another concern for individuals is that time spent in the refugee camp equates to money lost, due to the inability to work. This three-month gap in income negatively affects these individuals’ success once they immigrate to a new location and financially hinders family members from relying on their financial assistance.

One Abu Dhabi camp member voiced her concerns about employment impediments posed by the prolonged immigration delay. 

Mina 45, was the breadwinner of her family as a governmental employee in Afghanistan but was forced to evacuate on August 21st as a result of the resurgence of the Taliban. Consequently, without Mina’s income, her family remaining in Afghanistan is impoverished. 

Mina’s story is not unique, as countless individuals and families at Emirates Humanitarian City are unable to work and earn money to support their families.  The refugees are eager to work and therefore motivated to transfer out of the camp to find employment and provide for their families.

Health Concerns

While at the Abu Dhabi camp, refugees have voiced their concerns over inadequate health care. Not only have several individuals died at the camp, but a handful have been deported back to Afghanistan due to mental health concerns. It is no surprise that the stress and anxiety of living in the refugee camp, in combination with the strains of fleeing one’s home, has led to mental health concerns and a state of depression among many Afghans at the camp.  

To recap events, individuals at the Abu Dhabi camp have previously lived in a war zone, were forced to flee from their country, and are now placed in a refugee camp with no set date for leaving. Research has found that refugees often experience high levels of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.  This is undoubtedly true for the refugees at Emirates Humanitarian City. 

Going Forward

Ultimately, while the evacuees are deeply grateful for the help from the United States, they seek transparency on whether they are being processed for entry into the United States. However, being left in a state of limbo for the past three months, while thousands of other refugees have had speedier transfer processes, has left the Abu Dhabi camp refugees confused and frustrated.  As a result, the refugees are calling for increased personnel at their camps to expedite their vetting and transfer process by U.S. officials.  

Presently, the Afghan evacuees at Emirates Humanitarian City have reached a point where silence and inaction are no longer an option.  And while their gratitude remains, their patience has dwindled, leading to plans of a hunger strike if continued inaction persists.

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Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder Rise to Peace

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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 by Rise to Peace

Neglecting Afghanistan: Lessons to be Learnt From the 9/11 Attacks 20-Years Later

Exactly two decades ago, the United States witnessed a deadly attack that transformed the international security landscape overnight. Only six weeks following the attacks, the Patriot Act was passed by Congress in an attempt to catch ‘terrorists among us,’ on both an international and domestic scale. Consequently, then US President George Bush launched the global War on Terror. This resulted in a 20-year war in Afghanistan, led by US coalition forces which cost the US over $6.4 trillion dollars.

It is believed that if US intelligence had been able to puzzle the pieces together sooner the attacks – which claimed the lives of almost 3,000 individuals – could have been prevented. This may have likely been the case, had the US not turned their backs on Afghanistan only 10-years earlier in the 1990s.

Cold War Origins

Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, US forces began to engage in Afghanistan by proxy. Through Pakistani intelligence services, then President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, initiated a programme to arm the mujahedeen. In 1981, Operation Cyclone became the largest covert operation, which saw the US supply money and weapons to the mujahedeen. In total, it is estimated that the operation cost approximately $3bn US dollars.

Only 8-years later, politically, socially and mentally drained, the Soviet Union gave up on Afghanistan. In the Geneva Accords, signed in 1988, the US agreed to cease funding to the mujahedeen whilst the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan completely. Only three years later, the Afghanistan government had collapsed. The country was subsequently enveloped in a civil war between the older mujahedeen factions. As a result, the Taliban quickly gained power, whose interpretation of Islamic sharia laws made life repressive and brutal for various women, opponents and ethnic/religious minorities.

The political climate in Afghanistan leading up to the attacks was a result of both the US and Soviet Union abandoning their foreign policy in the Middle East. As the Soviet Union Ambassador recognised, “We meddled in Afghanistan, and then we stopped paying attention.” Only 10-years later, al-Qaeda orchestrated the deadliest terrorist attack in history on American soil. The group’s involvement with Afghanistan was brought to light in the weeks following the attacks. From 1996-2001, then leader of the Taliban, Mohammed Omar, had developed close ties with Bin Laden as he plotted the deadly attacks.

9/11 stands as a stark reminder that for policymakers, walking away from the problem is not the solution. Instead, it can exacerbate existing issues and create significant security risks. In light of this, it is imperative that policymakers do not repeat the same mistakes 20-years later.

Two Decades Later

The Taliban have a poor track record of sticking to their promises, often stating one thing then doing another. In turn, they promise actions but do not follow through. Currently, the US has placed a great deal of faith in the Taliban.  Whilst the group has advocated that they will not harbour terrorists, they still maintain a close relationship with al-Qaeda. Consequently, many of the new leaders announced in Afghanistan’s interim government have former ties to the group.

If the Taliban are not monitored closely, US national security may face severe security threats in the near future. It is a prominent possibility that under Taliban control, radical Islamist terrorism could resurge, with attacks aimed at democratic societies. The 9/11 attacks should act as a forceful reminder, that US citizens safety is not guaranteed if the Taliban are allowed to operate on their own terms.

Intelligence

Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban is an indicator that US intelligence needs revising. The Biden administration hugely underestimating the magnitude and speed of the Taliban’s ability to conquer cities and towns across Afghanistan. As Richard Fonataine from the Centre for a New American Security recognised, “the key miscalculation was the assumption that the US would have the luxury of time.”

This is not the first time that American intelligence has failed to predict and prevent such security failures. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the US Department of Defence failed to recognise the magnitude of the threat from al-Qaeda. In 1997, the US intelligence community regarded Bin-Laden as a financier of terrorism, but not as a leader himself. Domestically, the FBI had little to no knowledge of the broader national security risks. Those working on counterterrorism strategies did so in spite of limited intelligence, which was worsened by legal barriers between both the CIA and FBI in intelligence sharing. If both organisations were able to do so, a comprehensive picture of al-Qaeda’s strategic framework may have been uncovered and disrupted.

The US must engage and have a prominent diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with intelligence that focuses strongly on the region. If not, an attack comparable to the magnitude of the ones witnessed on 9/11 may be a dominant possibility.

The Future of Afghanistan

The Taliban’s ideology has not fundamentally changed. However, their strategy has. Instead, the Taliban are engaging in a much more persuasive game of psychological warfare. The lessons learnt from the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, demonstrate that neglecting Afghanistan can have grave consequences for international security. The US must ensure they have a strong diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with adequate intelligence closely monitoring the political landscape in the upcoming months.

 

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