Afghanistan

Civil War
 by Rise to Peace

How Likely is Another Civil War in Afghanistan and What Would it Mean for Pakistan?

For the second time, the Taliban captured Afghanistan putting an end to what is known as the United States’ longest war in the country. Though touted as the end of a twenty-year-long war, the Taliban’s return to power triggers other grave issues – a probable civil war. This results in the country again turning into a haven for regional and global terrorism, and thus threatens regional and global security. Another factor is the Taliban’s unaltered temperament toward Afghans which further increases the possibility of a public revolt against the group.

Besides the Taliban’s fundamentalist approach, Pakistan’s blatant endorsement is a likely driving force behind the prospective political and economic crises to accelerate in Afghanistan. As a result of such crises, the flames will inflict on Pakistan as well.

Additionally, the Taliban’s religiously inclined fundamental policies that are inspired by Pakistani madrasas engender a Taliban’s pro-Pakistan approach, enticing political turmoil against the group. Two major standpoints such as economic and political perspectives are therefore considered to highlight the likelihood of a prospective civil war in the Taliban-led Afghanistan.

The Economic Standpoint

The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Kabul was instantly followed by a sprint in the slowdown of the Afghan economy – an estimated 40 percent. As a result, with 500,000 job losses, the unemployment rate rampantly spiked. Such an unprecedented hike in the unemployment rate is becoming a provoking driver behind Afghans’ willingness to revolt against the Taliban’s rule, since the people might have no other alternative for survival, as the poverty rate has already spiked to 97 percent.

The exacerbating high rate of unemployment has also led to an aggravating fall in the public financial condition. As per the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, an imminent prospect of a one-third decline in the per capita incomes was warned based on the facts over the last months of the year 2021. Vulnerable to such economic catastrophe, many civilians are now stranded in destitution and even have been forced to put their children on sale in desperation for life.

The Political Standpoint

The Taliban bears the brunt of political and military challenges from the Islamic State (ISIS) militants, the National Resistance Force (NRF), and the Liwa Fatemiyoun militia.

Since the fall of the elected government in Afghanistan in August 2021, terrorist groups such as ISIS unprecedently emerged stronger. Meaning that the Taliban’s return is still seen as a welcoming note by the world’s other renowned terrorist groups to reestablish in Afghanistan. This could be an undermining threat to the Taliban’s rule. Nonetheless, in the case of the fight against ISIS, Afghans are less likely to back the Taliban given the group’s nationwide negatively perceived image created by its tenacious policies.

Vulnerable to the Taliban’s ideology, the Hazara community, which comprises 9 to 10 percent of Afghanistan’s total population, is thought to be Iran-backed pro-Liwa Fatemiyoun. After fighting ISIS alongside Bashar-al-Assad in Syria, the Fatemiyoun has now turned its eyes on Afghanistan. The Fatemiyoun’s intention to target the Taliban becomes more feasible now. This is due to the Taliban’s anti-Shia ideology and the growing number of attacks on Shia Muslims in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal. The Fatemiyoun militia will not only target the Taliban but also ISIS, as they do in Syria, which would go beyond one for the Taliban’s leadership to thus manage such a complicated triangular skirmish.

This saga turns even more perilous as the newly established Panjshir-based NRF targets the Taliban. This is primarily due to the Taliban’s reluctance to form an inclusive government and welcome the former politicians, government employees, and other prominent figures to their government circuit.

Implications for Pakistan

Driven by the Taliban’s pro-Pakistan stance, Afghans have opposed and feared the Taliban’s return. Despite such nationwide despise among Afghans, the group’s all-weather supporters, Pakistan’s military, and religious leadership warmly welcomed the Taliban’s return in August 2021. The people of Pakistan even celebrated the Taliban’s return and considered it as an indirect victory for Pakistan in Afghanistan. Given this, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan also went on to endorse the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul during a press conference in Islamabad, stating that “Afghanistan has broken the shackles of slavery.”

However, the Taliban’s religiously inclined ideology could turn into a Pashtun ethnocentric ideology or diverge its political route, possibly to India. Recently a blend of Indian diplomats made a surprise visit to Kabul, a red sign for Pakistan. While there are already hints that the Taliban cordially provides congenial hospitality to the key Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) figures who were detained in the previous administration.

Second, Pakistan plays a double-faced game as more of a broker between the global superpowers vis-à-vis China, Russia, and the U.S. For Pakistan, leaning on and accompanying one will entice the other to recoil, as Pakistan’s brokerage role may not sustain longer given the dynamics in the world geopolitical order.

Third, Pakistan is already severely indebted and could become a buffer zone sandwiched between the great powers. Ties with the U.S. are already deteriorating with the aid flow decreasing, while the all-weather ally China’s aid does not come without huge interest rates. Already drowned in huge debts, Pakistan could face a similar fate as Sri Lanka, should the country fail to withstand such enormous debts and avoid the role of a broker and supporter of terrorist groups.

Conclusion

The controversial quell to the U.S.’ twenty-year-long war, coupled with the Taliban’s hold on power, serves as a stepping-stone to another likely political tumult in the country. Other renowned terrorist groups leverage this new phase in Afghanistan’s political scenario. The entry of these terrorist groups is a turning point for regional and global security. Additionally, Afghanistan would be devastated by another civil war. Being a significant Taliban supporter, Pakistan is going to get inflicted the most as the country may remain stuck in the great game.

The Taliban is recommended to form an inclusive government, and welcome professionals and prominent policymakers from the previous government. Also, the group needs to adhere to national interests such as retaining the national anthem, and the national flag while keeping in mind women’s rights, particularly girls’ education.

The Taliban also needs to stop solely depending on Pakistan both politically and economically, especially concerning policy level national matters. For Pakistan, it is important to shun lobbying and brokering for the Taliban on international platforms. Instead, Pakistan needs to critically examine the issues it faces.

 

Hamayun Khan, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Pakistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Opium
 by Rise to Peace

The Taliban’s Opium Ban Will Prove Unsustainable

In 2020, around 85% of all opium was grown in Afghanistan. The Taliban has previously exploited this trade by placing taxes on the movement, production, and sale of opium. Officials estimate these taxes amounted to nearly $200 million per year for the Taliban. However, the Taliban have just placed an outright ban on opium production, usage, transportation, trade, export, and import. As Afghanistan’s economy continues its freefall, opium production remains the only reliable option for impoverished Afghanis. Some interpret this ban as an optimistic sight for counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism measures, as high rates of opium production are one of the strongest predictors of high levels of terrorist activity in Afghani Provinces. The banning of opium could have significant implications on economic and terrorist activity in the region. Still, it remains doubtful that this ban will be sustainable.

Since the recent Taliban takeover, there have been increasing pressures from the international community to halt the opium trade in Afghanistan. The U.S. has already spent nearly $9 billion on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, signaling this issue’s importance to U.S. politicians. The Taliban see this ban as a step toward gaining international recognition and the humanitarian aid they lost. This move also comes amidst a severe humanitarian and economic crisis and likely will have some counterintuitive effects.

For one, banning the production of opium eliminates one of the last resorts for some of the poorest farmers. As Afghanistan’s economy continues to fall, farmers turn toward illicit crops, primarily opium, to bring quicker and higher returns. The enacting and enforcement of a ban will leave these farmers with little to no options. This will also lead to a significant backlash against the Taliban, which could increase the risk of radicalization to oppose the Taliban. Should this backlash prove strong enough, the Taliban may even begin to change their stance on drug production. This was the case following the poppy ban at the end of their last rule, which faced severe popular outrage and led the Taliban to almost entirely change their stance.

Secondly, this ban is challenged by market forces. Over the past few months, the prices of opium have skyrocketed out of uncertainty in the market. As the ban was just announced, the prices will likely continue to increase dramatically. In 2001, when the Taliban previously banned opium, its price quadrupled from $87 per kilogram in 2000 to $385 in 2002. This creates massive incentives for farmers to continue to grow opium. While production comes with a newfound risk of opposing the Taliban, farmers have few options. They are already at risk of food insecurity and starvation. This short-term, drastic reduction in opium production is likely unsustainable and could in fact increase opium production in the long term.

Next Steps

Counter-narcotics face a bleak future in Afghanistan. While the Taliban’s ban is likely to reduce production in the short term, a truly effective solution would address the root causes of the opium trade. Poverty and food insecurity remain commonplace, forcing individuals to find alternative sources of income. Political instability makes restrictions and governance unpredictable and inadequate. And the lack of humanitarian aid provides no lifelines to this crisis. Until these underlying issues are addressed, measures to reduce the production, trafficking, and sale of narcotics will be inhumane and unreliable. While future U.S. policy to address the opium trade is unclear, policymakers should act under the assumption that the Taliban’s current ban on opium will be unsustainable and a quick fix to a complicated issue.

 

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Economic
 by Rise to Peace

Afghanistan’s Economic Crisis Means Rapid Growth for Terrorist Cells

On May 7, 2022, the Taliban enacted a measure stating that women must wear face coverings in public.  This is seen as yet another example in the long line of punitive restrictions on women and religious minorities by the Taliban.  This trend signals the Taliban’s lack of willingness to uphold human rights, which will result in the loss of remaining aid from foreign donors.  The World Bank previously suspended over $600M dollars worth of development projects, citing their obligation to women’s rights.  These cuts in funding come amidst a severe economic and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, with nearly 95% of families experiencing food insecurity, and mark the loss of one of last lifelines for Afghanistan.  These economic conditions are likely to accelerate the growth and capabilities of terrorist nodes operating in Afghanistan, primarily the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) and Al-Qaeda.

For both organizations, failed economic development creates a larger pool of young individuals that have very few alternative options, or nearly zero opportunity cost.  While this is not a direct predictor of terrorist action, these individuals are natural targets for radicalization.  It is expected that Al-Qaeda and IS-K will enjoy accelerated growth in the coming years, resulting in part from the higher volume of potential recruits.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda, which has close relations with the Taliban, is also likely to build new training camps in Afghanistan.  These training camps, bolstered by more recruits, will increase the capabilities of Al-Qaeda.  While it is unlikely that Al-Qaeda is currently capable of an attack on the U.S. homeland, increased capabilities could lead to attacks on U.S. and Western targets in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, or Africa in the coming months.  U.S. intelligence agencies predict, under current circumstances, Al-Qaeda may be capable of an attack on U.S. homeland within one to two years.

Islamic State-Khorasan Province

IS-K, which is a sworn enemy of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, will receive the same overall increase in recruitment prospects.  However, economic conditions also contribute to increased dissatisfaction with the Taliban.  IS-K is likely to exploit this dissatisfaction and attract individuals that look to oppose the Taliban.  For example, some previous Afghan soldiers and intelligence professionals are turning to IS-K, the only armed group opposing the Taliban.  While the Taliban will apply pressure on IS-K, the organization is expected to grow rapidly.  By some estimates, IS-K has doubled in size in less than a year from two to four thousand operatives. They have already conducted more than seventy-six attacks against the Taliban this year, as opposed to eight the year before.  While an attack against the U.S. homeland is unlikely, an act against the U.S. or Western countries abroad is feasible, as evident by the bombing of Kabul Airport on August 27th.  U.S. intelligence agencies estimate, under current conditions, IS-K will be capable of an external attack on U.S. homeland in as little as one year.

Next Steps

Regardless of future U.S. policy in Afghanistan, each U.S. response suffers from a lack of intelligence in the region.  In an interview with the Associated Press Frank McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, said “we’re probably at about 1 or 2% of the capabilities we once had to look into Afghanistan.”  The next step for counter-terrorism measures in the region is rebuilding the intelligence infrastructure necessary to monitor terrorist organizations.  This requires a two-pronged approach.

Firstly, The U.S. should reestablish connections with internal, anti-Taliban networks in Afghanistan. These contacts are key for confirming and generating intelligence on the location of terrorist cells, training camps, and activity.  With local partners, the U.S. will be able to conduct counter-terrorism action more effectively in Afghanistan.

Secondly, the U.S. should negotiate access to air-bases within neighboring countries.  These bases will help intelligence and surveillance gathering within Afghanistan.  This will also serve to compliment HUMINT efforts, allowing the U.S. to confirm on-the-ground intelligence.  This may require time and effort, but it remains a necessary step for effective counter-terrorism measures.

As the Taliban continues repression, isolating Afghanistan from the international community, the economic and humanitarian crisis continues to compound.  In this crisis, Al-Qaeda and IS-K are quickly growing their ranks and capabilities.  While both organizations’ capabilities do not yet match their ambitions of a U.S. homeland attack, U.S. intelligence agencies predict this may change within 12 to 18 months, barring intervention.  Without decisive action by the U.S. to rebuild intelligence and counter-terrorism infrastructure, the U.S. will be unprepared and in the dark for the next large-scale attack.

 

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Kabul
 by Rise to Peace

Deadly Attacks Target Schools in Western Kabul

On April 19, 2022, at least nine individuals died, and more than 50 were injured, per UNICEF’s report, after a series of coordinated attacks occurred in Western Kabul in the Dasht-e-Barchi neighborhood, home to a large Shia and Hazara population.  The first attack struck the Mumtaz Education Center early Tuesday morning, followed by three explosions, one caused by a grenade, at the Abdul Rahim Shaheed High School, where elementary school girls are still allowed to attend.

While no group has yet claimed responsibility for the attacks, violence is not a new phenomenon for the Shia community, which has previously been the target of attacks by the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).

Immediately following the attacks, various government and organizational figureheads spoke out, regarding the attacks as reprehensible and senseless.  Attacks against civilians, especially innocent children at schools, has struck an international nerve.  Ramiz Alakbarov, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, reiterated that violence against schools is never acceptable, as schools should be a source of physical and emotional safety.  Moreover, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric stated that “attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools, are strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law.”

Hazara Shia Community in Afghanistan

In 2019, the U.S. Department of State estimated that 10-15 percent of Afghanistan’s population are Shia, and of the Shia population, 90 percent are ethnic Hazaras.  The Hazara community predominantly resides in central and western Kabul.  Due to the minority status of Afghan Shias, they are frequently targeted by Sunni-based organizations, such as the Taliban and IS-K.  Ultimately, the Hazara community has “encountered persecution and systematic discrimination in their chronicle for more than a century.”

Initially, hopes rang high for the Hazara community when the Taliban collapsed 20 years ago.  The prospect of a democracy resounded throughout Afghanistan; however, attacks persisted against the Hazara Shia community, especially with the rise of IS-K and their mission to purge Afghanistan of any Shia Hazara Muslims.  Now, with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the Hazara Shia community is fearful that any progress they have made within society will be shattered and that attacks will steadily increase against their community.

Other Attacks Against the Hazara Community

While the attacks on April 19th in Kabul are horrific, sadly, they were not unprecedented.  Afghanistan’s Hazara community has been continuously and brutally targeted by both the Taliban and IS-K, from being the victims of targeted killings to discrimination to kidnappings.

Recent attacks include those in July 2021, when Hazara men in the village of Mundarakht were massacred by Taliban fighters “during a  two-day killing spree.”  Additionally, the attacks of April 19, 2021, are not the first-time schools have been targeted in a largely Hazara community.  In May 2021, at least 90 individuals were killed after a car bomb was detonated outside he Sayed Ul-Shuhada High School, targeting female students.  Also, the IS-K detonated a group of suicide bombers at a Shia mosque in October 2021, killing 47 and injuring at least 70.

Moving Forward

Ultimately, attacks against innocent children, especially at schools, should never occur.  The ruthlessness of these attacks must be met with a thorough investigation and changes within Afghanistan to protect the Shia and Hazara communities.  This is a moment in which the Taliban can demonstrate to the international community that they have truly changed by providing safety and security for all Afghans.  Finally, the international community must pay careful attention to the unrelenting attacks against the Hazara Shia community and take actionable steps to secure their well-being and prosecute any human rights violations.

 

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Ring Road
 by Rise to Peace

Afghanistan’s Ring Road: Challenges and Failures in its Improvement

The Ring Road in Afghanistan begins at the capital of Kabul and continues to its second-largest city, Kandahar. The focal point of the U.S. plan was to improve Afghanistan following the invasion in 2001. However, the damages exceed $200 million to repair the road, and many lives were lost protecting it. The highway from Kabul to Kandahar is severely damaged.  In 2016, a comprehensive report revealed that the Ring Road was impossible to repair, and it would need to be rebuilt. If the Ring Road became inaccessible and unusable, the state administration would collapse.   The U.S. determined to change that by helping improve the Ring Road.

The Ring Road

The Soviet Union partially developed the Ring Road during the 1960s; however, war has degraded it over the years. Beginning with the Kabul to Kandahar Highway, the U.S. and many other nations committed $1.5 billion to rebuild the Ring Road, which would operate in a 3,200-kilometer loop. The Ring Road links Afghanistan’s four major cities which include Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-I-Sharif. Linking communities together via the Ring Road established a sense of community and allowed enterprise and hope to increase within Afghanistan thereby decreasing Taliban influence.

The Ring Road also enabled the U.S. and NATO military establishment to send armed forces and supplies quicker throughout the country, thus keeping the Taliban controlled. In 2003, the focus of the U.S. shifted from Afghanistan to the war in Iraq. As a result, financial support for the Ring Road Highway was decreased by $1.2 billion; and Taliban activity increased from 2004 to 2009 with roadside bombings, ambushes, and other displays of strength resulting in the Taliban regaining control of substantial key territories.

Former President Obama’s Plans for the War

In 2009. former President Barack Obama determined to recommit to the war in Afghanistan and he sent large numbers of troops in an effort named The Surge. The U.S. and NATO had achieved progress in the southern area. It became evident that the Taliban could not be gradually defeated. A number of troops were deployed to Afghanistan, and the Taliban increasingly carried out attacks.

Repair to the Ring Road were next to impossible due to the increased attacks by the Taliban. The construction company deemed this job the most dangerous one of all time 21 fatalities, 51 injured, and four missing. The construction enterprises were forced to employ security escalating their budget. The road from Khost to Pakitia cost nearly $5 million per mile for security purposes.

President Obama’s Decisions

President Obama had declared to bring armed forces back home. Despite the fact that the U.S. armed forces withdrew, Afghanistan was left with supervision of infrastructure plans, in addition to the roads. The United States Agency for International Development reduced the budget to rebuild the roads, and the Ring Road was neglected in 2012.

Road development and maintenance turned out to be the responsibility of the Afghan administration that was crippled by corruption. Many professionals projected several billions of dollars were lost to corruption in Afghanistan. In 2015, with approximately 11,000 U.S. armed forces, mostly in the major cities, the Taliban was swept back in Afghanistan. This involves substantial portions of the Ring Road and was among the leading causes why the road is in terrible shape. In a 2016 inspection report, the roads were 20% destroyed and the remainder were deteriorated.

President Trump’s Decisions

The U.S. has no plans to rebuild Afghanistan. In 2017, President Trump dedicated more armed forces but clearly expressed that the U.S. is not proposing construction again. During the government meeting, President Ghani mandated that the missing parts be built in the future months, highlighting the seriousness of the road for Afghanistan’s trade and economy. The State, USAID, and DOD require to implement on a regular basis the impact assessments to measure the effects of contracted reconstruction and other foreign support programs, including sectors of security assistance.

 

Mildred Miranda, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments