Blog two columns

May 31, 2022June 2, 2022 by Rise to Peace

Five Years After the Philippines’ Marawi Siege: Lessons from Within

It has been almost five years since armed militants from two ISIL-affiliated organizations, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute, battled with Philippine government forces on May 23, 2017. The siege ensued when the military attempted to arrest senior ISIL leader Isnilon Hapilon.

As a result, attackers retaliated, proclaiming the city a nascent caliphate of ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant, more commonly known as ISIS. Before capturing the city’s major thoroughfares and significant bridges, the armed militants caused severe damage to Catholic churches, the city jail, and two schools. Militants also beheaded a police officer and took churchgoers and residents hostage.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte imposed martial law across the entire island of Mindanao on the evening of the assaults. Initially, President Duterte expected the fighting to finish in a matter of weeks. However, he had no idea that this was simply the beginning of a more bloody and horrific assault.

Who Were the Perpetrators?

The main commanders of this unprecedented assault, Isnilon Hapilon, and brothers Abdullah and Omar Maute were members of the local armed groups, Abu Sayyaf and Maute. Both groups have historically been responsible for bombings, attacks on government forces, and hostage-taking in the Philippines. However, foreign militants participated in the war, including those from Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Chechnya. There is also evidence that the terrorist members involved in this attack enlisted a significant number of radicalized children and teenagers, many of whom were recruited from Marawi’s local schools.

During the conflict, an estimated 1,200 people were declared dead. Although the majority of these were militant extremists, Amnesty International claimed that the militants also carried out kidnappings and extrajudicial executions.

Mission Accomplished

The capture of Marawi prompted the Philippines’ most prolonged armed combatant insurgency. Government troops seized a stronghold on October 16, 2017, killing both Hapilon and Maute. After troops subdued the remaining ISIS fighters on October 23, 2017, five months after the siege began, Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said there were no more “militants” in Marawi, which ended the long, weary battle.

The Aftermath of the Marawi Siege

The Marawi crisis, which affected many residents, had a significant impact on the local market and the daily needs of Marawi families. According to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Philippines, the Marawi armed conflict between government troops and pro-ISIS insurgents has internally displaced 98% of the area’s overall population, as well as villagers from nearby municipalities, who were forced to flee due to severe food scarcity and political and economic restrictions.

How is Marawi Now?

After years of planning and reconstructing the country’s sole Islamic city, Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) is nearing the completion of the major rehabilitation operation for internally displaced families. Even within Marawi’s most impacted area, or “ground zero,” the Maranaws, particularly those displaced by the 2017-armed war, are now reaping the first dividends of the government-led rebuilding.

Meanwhile, the Marawi Fire Substation, a Maritime Outpost, the Rorogagus Barangay Health Station, the Marawi Central Police Station, and a solar power irrigation system were all completed, to help the Maranaws embrace a complete and secure community with peace and stabilization.

Furthermore, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) administration has set aside P500 million for Marawi’s reconstruction in 2021 as part of the newly-formed government’s 12-point priority plan.

Lessons Learned and Reflections as a Filipino Counter-Terrorism Practitioner

I have learned that the scars of this historic siege will undoubtedly persist in the hearts of those who were affected, as well as the troops who were determined to defend the people, even if it meant risking their lives. The standard narrative is that it is their job. However, I am referencing their fortitude in the midst of their weapons’ failure; terrorist groups have also leveraged technical advancement in plotting, recruiting, and networking, making it even more difficult to obverse.

Filipinos are known for their “resilience.” Most people define it as the ability to bounce back from setbacks, embrace change, and persevere in the face of adversity. It is meaningless to be resilient if the Philippine government’s response to these issues is ambiguous. How eager and probing is the government to promote research to fight atrocities in the aftermath of the Marawi Siege? Is this enough, if there is a movement at all? What was the intensity of the response to the Marawi crisis?

We should not box our belief that resilience is the only chance. There is also hope, the ability to recognize important goals, the measures required to achieve them, and the willingness to take those steps. This requires an extensive effort of the government to connect with the civil society in order to prioritize their goals in the field of local security. Although the resilient superhero is often thought to be preferable, it has a dark side; it possesses the same characteristics that hinder self-awareness and, as a result, the ability to maintain a realistic self-concept.

As a Filipino, I believe we should start by assessing where we stand in terms of counter-terrorism operations, such as preventing and suppressing terrorism financing, and encouraging constructive dialogue on counter-terrorism challenges, particularly based upon the principles between state officials and the private sector, social service organizations, and news outlets. Although there is evidence of a deterrent, the government should always consistently take action to prevent such unprecedented happenings.

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

May 29, 2022 by Rise to Peace

The New Fight Against Al Shabaab

To counter the growth of Al Shabaab in Somalia, the Biden Administration has made the decision to deploy U.S. troops to Somalia. This decision came with a request from the Department of Defense to provide a persistent presence in Somalia. In the previous administration, former President Trump withdrew all 700 U.S. troops from the country, a decision made during his last weeks in office. It is estimated that 450 special forces troops will be deployed to continue U.S. counterterrorism operations within Somalia.

Al Shabaab’s Rise to Power

Al Shabaab came to power in June of 2006 when they overtook Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. After an invasion in December of 2006 by Ethiopian forces into Somalia to counter Al Shabaab, the terrorist organization was forced to flee to the south of Somalia. Following this invasion, from 2006 to 2008, Al Shabaab’s membership skyrocketed from the hundreds to the thousands. By 2012, the group also announced its allegiance to Al Qaeda. As of 2020, there are an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 members of Al Shabaab in Somalia and its surrounding countries. The objective of Al Shabaab is similar to that of the Islamic State being that their ultimate goal is to create an Islamic State in Somalia and rule with their interpretation of Sharia Law.

Differentiation from the U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan

Comparing this issue to that of Afghanistan, President Biden’s statements about ending the “forever war” in Afghanistan by withdrawing all troops contradict his actions of redeploying U.S. troops to counter yet another Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization, Al Shabaab. This troop deployment is justified due to the more direct threat of Al Shabaab and its affiliation with Al Qaeda, which pose a greater risk to U.S. security. Al Shabaab presents a more direct threat to the U.S.; its strategic relationships and location make this terrorist organization an increased threat in comparison to the Taliban. Thus far, the Taliban does not have the capacity nor stated desire to presently become a danger to the U.S. and its allies. However, Al Shabaab’s intentions for this have been made clear and entirely possible.

The Plans of the U.S. Government

All soldiers planning to redeploy will be U.S. Special Operations forces. This operation aims not to engage in direct combat but to train local Somali forces to counter Al Shabaab and its affiliates effectively. This decision was a part of a larger request from the Department of Defense to have the U.S. military establish a base of operations in Somalia; they believe that a persistent presence from the United States military could help mitigate the growth and spread of Al Shabaab and their ideology. In support of this strategy, Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby stated, “our forces are not now, nor will they be directly engaged in combat operations. The purpose here is to enable a more effective fight against al-Shabab by local forces. The pattern of popping in to conduct limited operations was inefficient and increasingly unsustainable.”

Growth of Al Shabaab Without Any Intervention

It has been argued that from the perspective of Army General Stephen Townsend, head of U.S. Africa Command, that the initial withdrawal of troops from Somalia in January of 2021 hindered the ability of local and international forces to counter Al Shabaab. If no efforts to counter this group’s exponential growth are applied, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates the group’s violent attacks are set to rise by 71%.

Newly Elected Somali President’s Stance on Working with the West

This decision to redeploy troops is in conjunction with the election of a new president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, on May 15, 2022, following a five-year hiatus from the presidency. Mohamud is set to align with the West and has a desire to collaborate with the international community to counter the growth of Al Shabaab. During Mohamud’s hiatus, Al Shabaab spread throughout Somalia, fending off African Union Forces. The African Union will be one of the confirmed affiliate organizations that U.S. forces will work with in tandem.

Outlook for Future Mitigation

This growing threat of terrorism in East Africa, specifically from Al Shabaab, has fueled President Biden’s administration’s decision to redeploy U.S. Special Operations forces. The chaos that ensued through the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan makes another invasion to counteract terrorism worrisome that the U.S. will be caught in another never-ending war.

As the U.S. deploys troops, a clear plan is essential with clearly articulated end goals to ensure that the U.S. military does not get involved in another decades-long war. This deployment of troops brings hope to the people of Somalia that they may finally be able to live in their country without fear of constant terrorism. Nonetheless it is unclear exactly when we will see tangible results from redeployment, training of Somali troops, and coordination with other international entities.

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

May 26, 2022May 26, 2022 by Rise to Peace

The U.S. Removed Five Extremist Organizations From Its Terrorism Blacklist

The U.S. is expected to remove five extremist groups from its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) blacklist, all of which are thought to be defunct, including several that formerly represented substantial risks, killing hundreds, if not thousands, of people across Eurasia and the Middle East. Although terrorists have different reasons for being inoperative in these circumstances, patterns emerge in why they decide to abandon the terrorist or extremist organization. Some members have left after growing disillusioned with the organization’s planning and strategy. Aside from that, the group is undeterred because it lacks strong leaders or is unable to make a public impression, which makes them undaunted in civil society.

Despite the fact that the five organizations are no longer functioning, the judgment is politically controversial for President Biden’s administration and the nations in which they operate. This is because many of their victims are still plagued by the attacks they perpetrated, and it could lead to backlash from casualties and their families who have lost loved ones. However, the decision has come under speculation as to understand why these groups are now no longer considered a threat.

The State Department said in special notices to Congress that the five groups’ terrorism classifications will be legally withdrawn when the conclusions are released in the Federal Register, which is likely to occur this week. According to Secretary of State Blinken, the common motivation for the revocation is the same in each case: they were constituted based on a five-year administrative review of the designations, as required by law. On Sunday, the State Department said that revoking FTO designations ensures that the terrorism prohibitions are current and credible. It does not reflect any change in policy toward any of these organizations’ previous activities.

Removing the organizations from the FTO list immediately lifts a slew of restrictions that had been imposed as a result of the designations. Asset freezes and travel bans are among them, as is a prohibition on any American supplying material aid to the groups or their members. All but one of the five organizations were recognized as FTOs for the first time in 1997 and have opted to stay on the list for the past 25 years. Officials familiar with the case said the choices were made after lawmakers were consulted some months ago about whether the latest five-year reviews should go forward.

Only the classified parts that prompted the notifications, which are not classified on their own, provide the particular reasons for each of the removals. These portions are marked “SECRET/NOFORN,” indicating that U.S. officials can only disclose their information with appropriate security clearances, not by foreign governments. The Basque separatist group ETA, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, the radical Jewish group Kahane Kach, and two Islamic groups active in Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt are among those being removed from the list.

Final Thoughts: Classification Over Emotions

It is critical to remember that a terrorist organization has always had the option of deterring, surrendering, and redeeming itself. When the government continues to subjugate these groups, it encourages these organizations and individuals to grieve and retaliate with additional attacks, even if they lack resources. One essential counterterrorism lesson learned is that terrorists, no matter their ideology or objectives against the government and society, still have weak points. Their inactivity could indicate that the government’s counterterrorism actions are effective and efficient.

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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May 24, 2022November 1, 2022 by Rise to Peace

The Taliban’s Opium Ban Will Prove Unsustainable

In 2020, around 85% of all opium was grown in Afghanistan. The Taliban has previously exploited this trade by placing taxes on the movement, production, and sale of opium. Officials estimate these taxes amounted to nearly $200 million per year for the Taliban. However, the Taliban have just placed an outright ban on opium production, usage, transportation, trade, export, and import. As Afghanistan’s economy continues its freefall, opium production remains the only reliable option for impoverished Afghanis. Some interpret this ban as an optimistic sight for counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism measures, as high rates of opium production are one of the strongest predictors of high levels of terrorist activity in Afghani Provinces. The banning of opium could have significant implications on economic and terrorist activity in the region. Still, it remains doubtful that this ban will be sustainable.

Since the recent Taliban takeover, there have been increasing pressures from the international community to halt the opium trade in Afghanistan. The U.S. has already spent nearly $9 billion on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, signaling this issue’s importance to U.S. politicians. The Taliban see this ban as a step toward gaining international recognition and the humanitarian aid they lost. This move also comes amidst a severe humanitarian and economic crisis and likely will have some counterintuitive effects.

For one, banning the production of opium eliminates one of the last resorts for some of the poorest farmers. As Afghanistan’s economy continues to fall, farmers turn toward illicit crops, primarily opium, to bring quicker and higher returns. The enacting and enforcement of a ban will leave these farmers with little to no options. This will also lead to a significant backlash against the Taliban, which could increase the risk of radicalization to oppose the Taliban. Should this backlash prove strong enough, the Taliban may even begin to change their stance on drug production. This was the case following the poppy ban at the end of their last rule, which faced severe popular outrage and led the Taliban to almost entirely change their stance.

Secondly, this ban is challenged by market forces. Over the past few months, the prices of opium have skyrocketed out of uncertainty in the market. As the ban was just announced, the prices will likely continue to increase dramatically. In 2001, when the Taliban previously banned opium, its price quadrupled from $87 per kilogram in 2000 to $385 in 2002. This creates massive incentives for farmers to continue to grow opium. While production comes with a newfound risk of opposing the Taliban, farmers have few options. They are already at risk of food insecurity and starvation. This short-term, drastic reduction in opium production is likely unsustainable and could in fact increase opium production in the long term.

Next Steps

Counter-narcotics face a bleak future in Afghanistan. While the Taliban’s ban is likely to reduce production in the short term, a truly effective solution would address the root causes of the opium trade. Poverty and food insecurity remain commonplace, forcing individuals to find alternative sources of income. Political instability makes restrictions and governance unpredictable and inadequate. And the lack of humanitarian aid provides no lifelines to this crisis. Until these underlying issues are addressed, measures to reduce the production, trafficking, and sale of narcotics will be inhumane and unreliable. While future U.S. policy to address the opium trade is unclear, policymakers should act under the assumption that the Taliban’s current ban on opium will be unsustainable and a quick fix to a complicated issue.

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments

May 21, 2022November 1, 2022 by Rise to Peace

Afghanistan’s Economic Crisis Means Rapid Growth for Terrorist Cells

On May 7, 2022, the Taliban enacted a measure stating that women must wear face coverings in public. This is seen as yet another example in the long line of punitive restrictions on women and religious minorities by the Taliban. This trend signals the Taliban’s lack of willingness to uphold human rights, which will result in the loss of remaining aid from foreign donors. The World Bank previously suspended over $600M dollars worth of development projects, citing their obligation to women’s rights. These cuts in funding come amidst a severe economic and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, with nearly 95% of families experiencing food insecurity, and mark the loss of one of last lifelines for Afghanistan. These economic conditions are likely to accelerate the growth and capabilities of terrorist nodes operating in Afghanistan, primarily the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) and Al-Qaeda.

For both organizations, failed economic development creates a larger pool of young individuals that have very few alternative options, or nearly zero opportunity cost. While this is not a direct predictor of terrorist action, these individuals are natural targets for radicalization. It is expected that Al-Qaeda and IS-K will enjoy accelerated growth in the coming years, resulting in part from the higher volume of potential recruits.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda, which has close relations with the Taliban, is also likely to build new training camps in Afghanistan. These training camps, bolstered by more recruits, will increase the capabilities of Al-Qaeda. While it is unlikely that Al-Qaeda is currently capable of an attack on the U.S. homeland, increased capabilities could lead to attacks on U.S. and Western targets in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, or Africa in the coming months. U.S. intelligence agencies predict, under current circumstances, Al-Qaeda may be capable of an attack on U.S. homeland within one to two years.

Islamic State-Khorasan Province

IS-K, which is a sworn enemy of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, will receive the same overall increase in recruitment prospects. However, economic conditions also contribute to increased dissatisfaction with the Taliban. IS-K is likely to exploit this dissatisfaction and attract individuals that look to oppose the Taliban. For example, some previous Afghan soldiers and intelligence professionals are turning to IS-K, the only armed group opposing the Taliban. While the Taliban will apply pressure on IS-K, the organization is expected to grow rapidly. By some estimates, IS-K has doubled in size in less than a year from two to four thousand operatives. They have already conducted more than seventy-six attacks against the Taliban this year, as opposed to eight the year before. While an attack against the U.S. homeland is unlikely, an act against the U.S. or Western countries abroad is feasible, as evident by the bombing of Kabul Airport on August 27th. U.S. intelligence agencies estimate, under current conditions, IS-K will be capable of an external attack on U.S. homeland in as little as one year.

Next Steps

Regardless of future U.S. policy in Afghanistan, each U.S. response suffers from a lack of intelligence in the region. In an interview with the Associated Press Frank McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, said “we’re probably at about 1 or 2% of the capabilities we once had to look into Afghanistan.” The next step for counter-terrorism measures in the region is rebuilding the intelligence infrastructure necessary to monitor terrorist organizations. This requires a two-pronged approach.

Firstly, The U.S. should reestablish connections with internal, anti-Taliban networks in Afghanistan. These contacts are key for confirming and generating intelligence on the location of terrorist cells, training camps, and activity. With local partners, the U.S. will be able to conduct counter-terrorism action more effectively in Afghanistan.

Secondly, the U.S. should negotiate access to air-bases within neighboring countries. These bases will help intelligence and surveillance gathering within Afghanistan. This will also serve to compliment HUMINT efforts, allowing the U.S. to confirm on-the-ground intelligence. This may require time and effort, but it remains a necessary step for effective counter-terrorism measures.

As the Taliban continues repression, isolating Afghanistan from the international community, the economic and humanitarian crisis continues to compound. In this crisis, Al-Qaeda and IS-K are quickly growing their ranks and capabilities. While both organizations’ capabilities do not yet match their ambitions of a U.S. homeland attack, U.S. intelligence agencies predict this may change within 12 to 18 months, barring intervention. Without decisive action by the U.S. to rebuild intelligence and counter-terrorism infrastructure, the U.S. will be unprepared and in the dark for the next large-scale attack.

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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May 19, 2022 by Rise to Peace

Saudi Arabia Executed Three Men: Alleged Terrorism Operation

According to the official Saudi Press Agency (SPA), two Saudi natives and a Yemeni were executed after being tried and convicted of terrorism charges. Mohammed bin Khodr bin Hashem al-Awami pled guilty to being a member of a “terrorist cell,” defined as a terrorist operational network that conducts espionage and surveillance. According to the interior ministry, security has been interrupted, turmoil has spread, security forces have been targeted, and state buildings have been destroyed. Awami’s residence reportedly housed RPGs, Molotov cocktails, and other explosive-making tools and items.

These three men have separate operational roles, but they all wanted to undermine Saudi Arabia. Hussein bin Ali al-Abu Abdullah, a Saudi national, was convicted of collaborating with terrorists, killing a member of the security forces, and sponsoring terrorist operations by acquiring arms and ammo to suppress security in the Kingdom.

Mohammed Abdelbaset al-Mualmi was indicted for joining the Iran-backed Houthi group and unlawfully infiltrating the Kingdom to carry out a terrorist operation. So, what exactly are the Houthis? The Houthis is a movement fighting for “things that all Yemenis desire: administrative transparency, the end of injustice, access to basic services, and the elimination of Western imperialism.”

Mualmi was also charged and convicted of spying for the Houthis and transmitting military location information to the Houthis in the Kingdom.

According to the ministry, the public prosecutor condemned all three men to death, and the Appeal’s Court and Supreme Court upheld the conviction. A royal decree was given to carry out the sentences. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s legal system, which comprises both civil and criminal matters, is grounded in Islamic law, commonly known as Sharia. The King, who serves as the final court of appeal and source of pardon, sits atop the legal system.

Terrorism in Saudi Arabia: Closing Thoughts on the Issue

Saudi Arabia also executed 81 people in just one day on March 12, 2022, on terrorism allegations. According to state news agency SPA, the group, which included seven Yemenis and one Syrian, was found guilty of “many horrendous crimes,” notably terrorism. Several were suspected of being militants of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, or Yemen’s Houthi rebels. They were accused of orchestrating operations on major economic targets, murdering or targeting security staff, abduction, assault, rape, and bringing firearms into the nation.

However, various activists and human rights organizations have spoken out against the killings, doubting the fairness of the proceedings and claiming that they excessively violate human rights. According to Human Rights Watch, the widespread and pervasive abuses in Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system lend to questioning the justness and fairness of these executions. According to Saudi activists, most of the family members and friends said they were not informed of the killings beforehand or given the opportunity to say their final goodbyes.

As a result, the system’s abuse might have a wide range of consequences, including a strong “appeal” to back groups within their networks to fight the government, as it only encourages them to strike back against the country’s injustices.

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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May 18, 2022 by Rise to Peace

Why Right-Wing Extremism Has a Strong Presence in Eastern Germany

Germany has been reunified since 1990, yet tensions remain between West and East Germany that right-wing extremist groups, parties, and movements exploit in the more vulnerable half: East Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall brought the promise of democracy and better economic conditions. In the past 30 years, certain issues in East Germany have been left unresolved and unaddressed, allowing right-wing extremism to prey on the grievances of East Germans. East Germany is still affected by the policies and challenges of reunification. According to a 2019 poll, almost 60% of residents in Eastern Germany regard themselves as second-class citizens, and more than half stated that German reunification was not a success.

For the past decade, right-wing extremists have gained momentum and have become a priority security threat for the German government. According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), at the end of 2020, the number of right-wing extremists classified as “violence oriented” rose to 13,300, an increase of almost 4% from 2019. Eastern states such as Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Brandenburg have noticeable voting trends different than their western counterparts, particularly in favor of the right-wing AfD Party (Alternative for Germany). Right-wing extremists such as the National Socialist Underground (NSU), Third Path, and the social movement Pegida, either stem from eastern states or have a large support from Eastern Germans who identify with their movement.

Economic Structures

Preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall, West Germany absorbed the remains of East Germany’s weak political and economic structure. East Germany only contributed 8% of the total GDP as productivity was weakened by unemployment upon reunification. Without consensus or debate as to how to reunify, the East was forced to assimilate into the West. East Germany had no option but to undergo an extensive privatization through an agency known as Treuhandanstalt (“trustee agency”) with the intention to privatize and liquidate every firm in the former GDR (German Democratic Republic) within the span of five years. As a result, it was all in West Germany´s favor as Western investors had better access to financial capital, more experience in managing companies, and better economic and political connections than investors in the former Soviet regime. Since the Western German government set the Treuhandanstalt measures, Western investors were perceived more suitable as future company owners. The redistribution among these companies was asymmetric, providing the West more financial benefits. Western investors were able to make major profits from this privatization program, while the majority of Eastern Germans gained little to nothing from their labor and were forced to move west, a divide which continues today through East Germany’s young adults.

Thirty years after reunification, there is still a stark social divide between East and West Germany. East Germany is well known to have consistently lower employment and wage levels than its western counterpart. The East German economic output is almost always a third lower than the West, with incomes being 10% lower, and overall, it lacks the West’s economic structure. Due to the lack of proper investment into building a lucrative East Germany, resentment from East Germans is still felt today.

Immigration

Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, immigrant rhetoric in the GDR led to right-wing attacks and news of violence against foreigners was frequently not reported. Many urban areas of West Germany became more diverse in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas East Germany remained largely homogenous. During Soviet Occupation, the GDR attempted to form bilateral relations with other socialist states. Agreements were made to allow foreign workers from Vietnam, Mozambique, Cuba, and Angola to work in coal mining, kitchens, consumer goods industries, and others in the GDR. Most foreign workers soon experienced vicious amounts of xenophobia, as unskilled East German workers blamed them for taking their jobs and for a shortage in consumer goods. During reunification, that xenophobia and racism did not leave. One famous incident is the 1992 Rostock Riots, where neo-Nazis targeted asylum seekers as well as Vietnamese and Mozambican workers in the town of Rostock.

As East Germany struggled with internal migration to the West and adjusting to a new political system, immigration that supported West Germany ́s manufacturing industry slowly crept into Eastern Germany. While struggling to transition into a new political and economic system, adding a new population fueled public dissatisfaction and resentment towards new immigrants and refugees, which is still felt today.

Weak Institutions

The collapse of the Soviet Union left an authority vacuum in East Germany. State institutions were weakened by the period of transition. Police officers were associated with the former regime, therefore, discredited. Dierk Borstel, researcher of right-wing extremism at the University of Bielefeld, links the lack of functioning institutions, “the police force was destabilized and the church had little influence anyway. The eastern German trade unions and the PDS, the successor party to the former ruling communist SED, had little authority, and the trade unions and industry associations coming in from the West were all very weak in the east.”

Right-Wing Extremism

During the Soviet occupation, the GDR laid an extensive and thorough denazification process in terms of a remembrance culture. However, with its own agenda to push, the communist regime imposed its ideology so extensively that East Germans were ready to renounce socialism by the 1990s. However, the reunification they anticipated didn´t exactly come to fruition, as many East Germans were unemployed, and conditions seemed to become worse than before. With disappointment and poverty, these semi-anarchic conditions were fertile ground for far-right activists and extremists. Originally, many neo-Nazi cadres were from West Germany. Many of these neo-Nazi groups moved to the east, a strategy still used today, with the intent to mobilize and recruit. Although there were right-wing groups present in Germany before reunification, the addition of more right-wing extremists amplified their views. When the transition period betrayed the trust of East Germans in western democracy and having a market economy, right-wing extremist perspectives became more prevalent and normalized.

Recommendations

The rise of right-wing extremist violence has become alarming and is not losing any momentum. As a response, the Cabinet Committee for the fight against right-wing extremism presented a list of 89 measures to combat right-wing extremism and anti-Semitism. From 2021 to 2024, the German government will provide over one billion euros to aid these measures. The funds will be used to provide research and prevention, and reinforce cooperation between security authorities, the judiciary, and relevant state and civil society bodies.

According to Anetta Kahane, an East German who runs the Amadeu Antonio Foundation, which seeks to combat racism and right-wing extremism throughout Germany, extremist views are the result of a lack of civil society infrastructure. Kahane states, “in the West there are large churches, and labor unions: powerful institutions that ensure a certain kind of social stability. In the East after reunification, we didn’t have that. Civil society infrastructure has to be built from the ground up and be made stable so that they can withstand right-wing extremism.”

While these solutions are a great investment, it does not heal the bridge between the psychological divide between the East and West. It is easier said than done, but restarting the economic convergence process may fully bridge this gap. Through economic incentives for foreign investment in Eastern Germany, policymakers could help bring the economic vibrancy East Germans once hoped for. In addition, economic recovery could persuade East Germans to be less likely to vote for extremist parties or support extremist groups.

Camille Amberger, Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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May 15, 2022 by Rise to Peace

The Ecuadorian Security Crisis

Ecuador is currently experiencing its worst security crisis in a decade. The actions of various illegal groups, the presence of Mexican cartels, prison violence, and drug trafficking are some of the reasons why the government has recently taken measures to mitigate the law and order crisis.

The violence and insecurity in the Latin American country are elements that show a tendency toward an increase in criminal actions in Ecuador. If Ecuadorian authorities fail to adequately intervene on the factors that generate instability in the country, Ecuador faces a dark and dangerous future, as other countries in the region have already experienced.

The Crisis, Its Factors, and the Government’s Response

Ecuador’s security indicators have worsened exponentially in recent years. In 2021, reports indicated that Ecuador reached its worst homicide figures in the last 10 years. A homicide rate of 13.13 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants was recorded, which is above the world average rate of 5.8. In 2021 Ecuador experienced one homicide every three and a half hours. In addition to violent deaths, there was an increase in the number of assaults, which rose by 27.9%, vehicle thefts increased by 55%, burglaries recorded a growth of 14.2%, and robbery of commercial premises increased by 17.3%.

The situation in 2022 has not improved. The country has registered 1,255 violent deaths so far this year, according to police figures. Also, in January alone, the number of violent deaths tripled compared to the previous year, while drug seizures doubled. In fact, Ecuadorian authorities have recorded events of such magnitude as 18 murders in less than 24 hours in the city of Guayaquil.

One of the main factors generating insecurity in the country is drug trafficking. Analysts have pointed out that Ecuador has gone from being a transit country to a drug distribution center in Latin America and that more than one third of Colombia’s cocaine production arrives in Ecuador and eventually leaves Ecuadorian ports, mainly for the U.S. and Europe. Portals such as Insight Crime have mentioned that Ecuador is a convenient “superhighway” for moving cocaine shipments around the world.

Drug seizures reveal the nature and extent of the drug trafficking problem. In January of 2022 alone, 17.9 tons of prohibited substances were seized, compared to 8.4 tons during the same period last year. In this same month, 758 operations have been carried out in which 857 suspects were arrested, 63 weapons, 11,798 ammunition, and $25,450 in cash. Of the drugs seized during January 2022, 98% were cocaine, the rest was primarily comprised of marijuana, cocaine base paste, and heroin. Likewise, in a 72 hour timespan, 2.5 tons of drugs were seized in the ports of Guayaquil, equivalent to a total of 2,597 packages of cocaine.

In addition to local gangs that benefit from criminal activities, such as Los Choneros, Ecuadorian authorities have also reported the presence of Mexican cartels in the country, which have increased levels of violence. For instance, Giovanni Ponce, head of the Anti-Narcotics Division of the Ecuadorian police, says there is already evidence that the Sinaloa Cartel has been operating in Ecuador since 2009, and that in recent years the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) has also infiltrated the country.

Ecuadorian authorities have captured several emissaries and links between Ecuadorian gangs and Mexican cartels and seized drug shipments allegedly belonging to illegal Mexican organizations. Moreover, the former director of security of the Ecuadorian Army, Mario Pazmiño, has indicated that 37.5 percent of Colombia’s coca production passes through Ecuador and that the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel have outsourced their presence through the local gangs such as ‘Los Choneros’, ‘Tigretones’, ‘Chonekillers’, ‘Lobos’ and ‘Lagartos’, which maintain control of the routes, storage centers, and international drug distribution platforms.

The violence generated by gangs and drug cartels has also spilled over into prisons. In 2021, two massacres occurred in the Litoral prison that left nearly 190 dead, both of which were carried out by members of criminal gangs fighting for control of the prison. In April 2022, the Turi prison massacre in the city of Cuenca resulted in the death of at least 20 inmates. Other clashes between gangs have occurred in various prisons throughout the country, evidencing a serious risk factor for the prison population and prison guards.

In addition to prison violence and the increase in murders due to drug trafficking and gang confrontations, the current security crisis in Ecuador has resulted in other violent events. For example, in April 2022, a car bomb exploded near a prison in Guayaquil, causing material damage but leaving no victims. In September 2021, a drone attack with explosives was carried out in a prison in Guayaquil. In February 2022, also in Guayaquil, a 21-year-old man was abandoned with an explosive device strapped to his head, exploding moments later. Finally, in early 2022, in the city of Durán, two bodies were found hanging from a bridge, a practice that is common in confrontations between Mexican cartels.

In the face of rampant violence and crime, the Ecuadorian government opted to decree a state of emergency in three provinces and deploy 9,000 police and military personnel. The government seeks to counteract the violence generated by drug trafficking and high crime rates. Security forces have also carried out various operations to reduce gang capabilities, arrest gang members, seize drugs and weapons, and restore security in areas affected by violence.

A Dark Future Ahead?

Ecuador is currently undergoing a serious deterioration of its security conditions and stability. The strategic context of the South American country is composed of a diversity of criminal actors that benefit from illicit businesses such as drug trafficking, leading to the income generated from illegal activities serving as fuel for violence and instability in Ecuador.

For this reason, the Ecuadorian government should focus its efforts on correctly identifying potential risks, the structural causes that allow the proliferation of drug trafficking, and carrying out operations in critical areas such as ports and prisons to reduce the capacity of criminal gangs. It is necessary to reduce the sources of income of illegal groups to stop their growth.

In the event that the Ecuadorian government fails to adequately intervene in the current crisis of violence and insecurity in the country, it is highly likely that Ecuador will face a dark and uncertain future, similar to that of countries such as Colombia during the 1990s. The trend indicates that illegal groups, gangs, and cartels will continue to strengthen their capabilities and commit criminal acts, which will likely lead to an era of narco-terrorism in the country. Therefore, Ecuadorian authorities must confront the crisis with all the means at their disposal and overcome the actions of illegal groups.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments

May 12, 2022 by Rise to Peace

Insurgency and the Narcotic Chain in India and Myanmar

Moreh is a small commercial gateway between India and Myanmar. It rests on the Northeastern side of the Indian border and is linked with Tamu, a small town in the Sagaing region in Northwest Myanmar. It is here that 99% of all land-based trade takes place between the two countries.

Amid the commercial exchange, the gateway also serves as a smuggling route for illegal trade and human trafficking. Narcotics like heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants are illegally smuggled across borders through this route. Other goods such as teak, gold, and firearms which are banned for trade without official license are also illegally traded.

A report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GIATOC) stated that serious smuggling ‘which has the potential to destabilize the wider Northeast’ takes place despite the counteractive measures taken by the state. The Northeastern region which is highly reliant on informal economy makes it arduous for state policies to be strictly enforced. It is for this reason that concerned officials, at times ‘tacitly ignores’ the illegal flow of contrabands which do not pose ‘political threat’ to the country. Given, the recent pandemic crisis which devastated the formal economy, it has been reported that the smuggling cases in the region have been exacerbated.

Act East Policy and its Challenges

New Delhi’s plan is to fast track the development process in the Northeast through the Act East Policy, which paves the way for locals to gain more income opportunities and employability. However, in such a region which is overwhelmed with insurgency and illegal trade, major challenges arise for the implementation of developmental policies.

Developmental funds tend to indirectly finance insurgent groups through extortion and ransom demands by insurgent groups. Insurgent outfits who operate in these regions extort significant sums of money for every cargo truck that passes through National Highway 102 and 37. The GIATOC reported that for every cargo truck that passes through the NH, a sum of 50,000 Indian rupees (680 US Dollars) is being extorted. In cases of failure to make such payments, workers and truck drivers are often kidnapped for ransom.

In the case of developmental projects, extortions take place in the form of percentage demands. The department responsible for setting up any projects are illicitly levied taxes on a range of 2-10 percent. With such illicit activity thriving in the region, it curbs and delays development initiatives taken up by the government or multinational corporations.

The ongoing India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project which aims at linking India with the Southeast Asian countries has potential in creating ample opportunities for the region. However, the issue of insurgency and illegal trade can run parallel and can be exacerbated with the outset of new roadways to the region if such activities are not counteracted.

The thriving drug trade through the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos) can further expand its domain through these new linkages, influencing the wider northeastern region in India. It is reported that 80 unofficial crossing points exist between Moreh and Tamu. These crossing points are primarily used for smuggling. Hence, a substantial amount of drugs makes its way to Imphal which further leads to Kohima and on to Dimapur where, through its railroad, the drugs end up in Assam. From there the drugs are further distributed to the rest of India. Accordingly, the insurgents from the region make the best use of this opportunity and actively participate in this chain of narcotic supplies.

Extortion and the illicit trade of narcotics continue to destabilize both countries economies. The rising number of unemployment and the fatality rate of youths can both be attributed to these factors. Hence, a joint effort needs to be taken by both the countries to contain and curb such activities.

Recommendations

The Indian government has strategic approaches to tackle the supply of narcotics and drugs in the country, through both domestic policies and diplomatic approaches. However, with the thriving narcotic supply and extortion through the Moreh-Tamu roadways, it is evident there is more to do and that India along with Myanmar need to develop ground-level economic and security policy approaches in tackling the issue.

Though India has already elicited corporation from Myanmar in a bilateral agreement on narcotics control, more efforts are needed on the ground level. The exchange of intelligence and information is crucial; however, they are insufficient to tackle an issue which is linked to the heart of the narcotics trade.

Both India and Myanmar should set up more checkpoints on the newly established roadways and pay close attention to the 80 unofficial crossing points between both countries. For the Myanmar government this would be arduous, given, the Arakan Army and other insurgent group’s strong control over the region. However, with India, who has a slight upper hand in tackling the insurgency issue in the Northeast through its political approaches, security measures can be taken by strategically intensifying the presence of Border Security Forces and Paramilitary forces like the Assam Rifles in the border roads. Further, joint military operations with proper intelligence, the likes of Operation Sunrise in 2019, can be effectively utilized.

It should also be noted that economic measures are also paramount amid the security issues in both India and Myanmar. Hence, identifying the narcotic production and supply chain and further initiating better employment drives for the farmers and youths engaged in the illicit activity should also be prioritized.

With the ongoing political dialogue with some insurgent groups in the Northeast, there is potency in curbing the extortion and drug trades in the future. Hence, once a final settlement is reached, India can utilize the intelligence and manpower of the ex-insurgents to curb future drug trades and contraband supplies.

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Asia / India / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments

May 9, 2022 by Joan McDappa

Examining Militancy in Nigeria: Mistakes of the South and Lessons for the North

On June 25, 2009, then President of Nigeria, Umaru Musa Yaradua, made a proclamation granting amnesty and unconditional pardon to everyone who directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences, including those facing prosecution at the time, associated with militancy activities in the Niger Delta region. The requirement for this pardon to be effected was dependent on simply: the surrender of weapons and renunciation of militancy forms by concerned individuals at collection centres established for this purpose by the government. For about sixty days only, this proclamation stood valid, and in that time, over 20,192 individuals had accepted the terms of this amnesty offer.

In the same year, Boko Haram began an armed rebellion against the Nigerian government with multiple attacks across parts of northern Nigeria. Years later, Boko Haram became categorized as a terrorist group both in Nigeria and internationally, launching several attacks within Nigeria and neighbouring countries. For the last 12 years, Nigeria’s government steadily increased its responses to counter-terrorism, albeit widely perceived as counterproductive. More recently, the Nigerian government’s execution of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) program raises questions about its effectiveness.

The Identical Problem

The Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Insurgency are two main threats Nigeria has dealt with since its independence in 1960; both cases led to significant economic losses. Although the ideologies behind the two conflicts differ, the basis on which these ideologies come to be is very similar. In both scenarios, there is an ongoing deprivation of some sort, whether it be a functioning system where communities have access to basic amenities, or perceived injustice and marginalization, resulting in grievances that then form the ideological structure of these groups.

For the Boko Haram insurgency, endemic corruption is often cited as a menace in the Northern region that deprives the communities of even the basic needs that the government should provide. Widespread unemployment, lack of primary health care, massive poverty, and a general absence of the State all served as drivers for Boko Haram’s campaign in the North, especially in attracting recruits.

Similarly, unemployment, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic and political marginalization are unfortunate realities that communities in the Delta region face, leading to overwhelming amounts of militant activities. Between 2007 and 2009, the agitations in the Delta region worsened so much that Nigeria recorded an estimated daily loss of $58 million. The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) was an attempt to salvage the economic crisis and deteriorating security situation in the region.

Lessons for the Nigerian Government

A decade after PAP, security in the Delta region seems to be taking a new turn with the high rise of illicit markets, such as oil bunkering, as a means of survival. The underlying issues that fueled agitation in the area remain; unemployment rates have worsened, the perceived marginalization is still very much present, and the environment continues to suffer. By and large, the goal of the Amnesty program was bound to fail the moment it didn’t prioritize addressing the grievances that led to the agitations in the first instance.

With the surrender of over 37,000 repentant Boko Haram members thus far, and the ongoing DDRRR program, one can only hope that there is a plan to address the underlying issues that have fueled the Boko Haram campaign to avoid a repeat of the situation in the Niger Delta. Presently, there is a worsening insecurity dilemma due to the noticeable rise in illicit markets in the northern region, including those not linked to Boko Haram. In effect, it may be the worst of its kind should the government fail to be deliberate in preventing a recurrence of the northern conflict.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Africa / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments

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