Suicide Bombing

The Logic of Suicide Bombing: A Terrorist’s Powerful Tactic

The first recorded suicide bombing occurred in Russia on March 13, 1881. Ignaty Grinevitsky, a member of the People’s Will left-wing terrorist group, rushed towards his target Tsar Alexander II and dropped a bomb at the Tsar’s feet, killing them both. But the explosive device was not strapped around his stomach, his legs, or hidden in any part of his body, not unlike the usual tactic that prominent terrorist groups use nowadays. The night before the attack, Grinevitsky had written, “I shall not live one day, one hour in the bright season of our triumphs, but I believe that with my death I shall do all that it is my duty to do.”

The first and largest suicide bombings, however, are thought to have occurred on October 23, 1983, when a vehicle carrying 2,000 pounds of explosives was driven into a U.S. Marine base in Lebanon. The bomber, along with 241 military personnel, died unexpectedly. Seconds later, another bomber targeted the headquarters building of French commandos, killing an additional 58 people.

It was later determined that the bombing was carried out by Iranian-backed Shia militant organizations, which later became Hezbollah, the infamous violent terrorist group. In the 1980s, Hezbollah was responsible for a series of roughly 20 suicide assaults against Israeli and Lebanese soldiers. Due to this series of attacks, it gradually inspired other terrorist groups to use this tactic as a result of successful propaganda, imposition of threat, and massive media coverage. Hezbollah played an important role in the tactics then used by other terrorist groups in today’s day and age.

The United States has made significant progress since then in countering such attacks. Anti-ram perimeter walls, passive and active vehicle barriers, parking standoffs for screening cars, and window coverings such as polycarbonate, durable film, and locking devices have all been deployed by the Department of State to protect U.S. facilities overseas.

Since 1983, insurgency groups from Sri Lanka to Chechnya to Afghanistan have used suicide bombing as a favorite strategy. One indicator of this expanding predilection is the number of attacks, which increased from one in 1981 to more than 500 in 2007. This has become a significant and more powerful technique, particularly for ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, since 2003, suicide bombings have just about exclusively been perpetrated by Islamic groups.

A Martyr and a Suicide Bomber

A religious martyr, according to the conventional definition, is someone who is executed for their religious views, such as Saint Euphemia, who was martyred in AD 303 for refusing to forsake Christianity and participating in Ares sacrifices. Each of these individuals voluntarily died as a result of their refusal to renounce their faith in the face of torture, torment, or the prospect of death. When viewed through the lens of choice theory (utility), the martyr chooses to hold on to their principles and beliefs, implying that their functional form must be such that the advantage of holding on to their convictions outweighs the value they place on their own life. So, how is martyrdom interpreted by Islamic groups and why do they use this term?

Both phrases are used interchangeably, especially among Islamic groups. Explicitly put, a suicide bomber thinks that if they follow their religious beliefs to the fullest, they will be granted infinite utility, a place in heaven, and a great degree of pride in their afterlife. A martyr, on the other hand, may expect a good life after death as a result of their devotion and determination to stand for their religious beliefs. Unlike Islamic groups, they do not seek to inflict or cause death on others. A martyr is willing to die while preserving their faith, whereas a suicide bomber accepts death while believing that the more harm they wreak, the more they will be honored by God in the afterlife.

The choice is the actual distinction between the two. The martyr is forced to choose between life and death, with the probable inclination to survive, whereas the suicide bomber chooses to willfully end their own life and murder as many others as possible from a position of relative safety. The final aspect of this decision is what distinguishes suicide bombers from others: the desire to cause the deaths of others as part of their very own end-of-life decision.

The phrase “Allahu Akbar” is shouted by a suicide bomber before he detonates himself. It is both disheartening and enraging that terrorists have tainted our sacred language in a way that leaves those who aren’t Muslim terrified of common, beautiful phrases like “Allahu Akbar,” which simply means “God is the greatest,” no different than the use of “praise God” by Christians,” Rabia Chaudry said, a Pakistani-American attorney. It is saddening that the term that was previously said during Muslim celebrations can now be associated with an evil act.

How Effective is Suicide Bombing?

To begin with, the findings strongly suggest that a suicide bomber does not require extensive training to carry out the crime. Second, a suicide bomber may easily blend in with the crowd, and third, an explosive device does not cost a terrorist cell a hundred dollars; in fact, they can construct their own bombs using materials found in their barracks. Furthermore, suicide bombings can result in large casualties with little to no effort on the part of the perpetrators.

Terrorists are deadly, adaptable, and resourceful. A bomb-wielding individual is significantly more dangerous and difficult to resist than a timed device set to detonate in a public place. This human weapons system may make last-minute adjustments based on the ease of approach, the number of individuals present, and the security systems in place.

Despite two years of declining civilian losses from suicide strikes, the number of civilians killed in suicide bombings in Afghanistan increased in 2021. Afghanistan remained the country most affected by suicide attacks, accounting for 65% of all civilian deaths caused by suicide attacks worldwide. According to AOAV data, there have been 13,652 recorded suicide bomb assaults throughout history: four in Tsarist Russia, seven in China prior to WWII, 7,465 by Japan throughout WWII, 5,430 between 1974 and 2016, and 746 in 2017 and 2021.

Conclusion: Countering Suicide Attacks

To counter and deter suicide bombing incidents, Western policies must recognize the diversity of Islam, Islamism, and Jihadism, and even the ensuing internal conflict in the Islamic world over whose narrative will prevail. In order to suppress the extreme challenge, the West must support the moderate portions of this varied group.

Also, increasing surveillance operations to study people who have a history of committing suicide attacks and understanding their networks, such as friends, families, and peers. It’s also a roadblock to developing policy recommendations for stores or shops where terrorists might readily purchase materials to make an improvised explosive device.

The underlying issues that give rise to terrorist attacks must be addressed concurrently in order to decrease the incentive for such acts throughout the long run. National inter-service and collaborative international partnerships are key components of a comprehensive plan to combat suicide terrorism that should be implemented simultaneously.

Intelligence plays a critical role in averting acts of suicide terrorism from occurring in the first place. When major events occur, security briefs and digital reports should be created, especially in nations with limited resources and security agencies. Remember that a suicide bomber’s goal is to cause the highest degree of destruction possible.

Also, security officials should consider advancing social media strategies and using it as a tool to promote safety, security, and peace. Considering that social media has been rampant and successful tool for terrorist groups in recruiting members, counterterrorism efforts should also capitalize on this resource. For example, government agencies, think-tanks, and counterterrorism-oriented organizations must also continue creating symposiums, webinars, and trainings for the public, to inspire and inform people on effective strategies to combat terrorism. Ultimately, to keep up with the advancements of terrorist strategies, authorities and social media platforms must modify their counter-terrorism measures to address these foreseen issues.

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Ring Road

Afghanistan’s Ring Road: Challenges and Failures in its Improvement

The Ring Road in Afghanistan begins at the capital of Kabul and continues to its second-largest city, Kandahar. The focal point of the U.S. plan was to improve Afghanistan following the invasion in 2001. However, the damages exceed $200 million to repair the road, and many lives were lost protecting it. The highway from Kabul to Kandahar is severely damaged.  In 2016, a comprehensive report revealed that the Ring Road was impossible to repair, and it would need to be rebuilt. If the Ring Road became inaccessible and unusable, the state administration would collapse.   The U.S. determined to change that by helping improve the Ring Road.

The Ring Road

The Soviet Union partially developed the Ring Road during the 1960s; however, war has degraded it over the years. Beginning with the Kabul to Kandahar Highway, the U.S. and many other nations committed $1.5 billion to rebuild the Ring Road, which would operate in a 3,200-kilometer loop. The Ring Road links Afghanistan’s four major cities which include Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-I-Sharif. Linking communities together via the Ring Road established a sense of community and allowed enterprise and hope to increase within Afghanistan thereby decreasing Taliban influence.

The Ring Road also enabled the U.S. and NATO military establishment to send armed forces and supplies quicker throughout the country, thus keeping the Taliban controlled. In 2003, the focus of the U.S. shifted from Afghanistan to the war in Iraq. As a result, financial support for the Ring Road Highway was decreased by $1.2 billion; and Taliban activity increased from 2004 to 2009 with roadside bombings, ambushes, and other displays of strength resulting in the Taliban regaining control of substantial key territories.

Former President Obama’s Plans for the War

In 2009. former President Barack Obama determined to recommit to the war in Afghanistan and he sent large numbers of troops in an effort named The Surge. The U.S. and NATO had achieved progress in the southern area. It became evident that the Taliban could not be gradually defeated. A number of troops were deployed to Afghanistan, and the Taliban increasingly carried out attacks.

Repair to the Ring Road were next to impossible due to the increased attacks by the Taliban. The construction company deemed this job the most dangerous one of all time 21 fatalities, 51 injured, and four missing. The construction enterprises were forced to employ security escalating their budget. The road from Khost to Pakitia cost nearly $5 million per mile for security purposes.

President Obama’s Decisions

President Obama had declared to bring armed forces back home. Despite the fact that the U.S. armed forces withdrew, Afghanistan was left with supervision of infrastructure plans, in addition to the roads. The United States Agency for International Development reduced the budget to rebuild the roads, and the Ring Road was neglected in 2012.

Road development and maintenance turned out to be the responsibility of the Afghan administration that was crippled by corruption. Many professionals projected several billions of dollars were lost to corruption in Afghanistan. In 2015, with approximately 11,000 U.S. armed forces, mostly in the major cities, the Taliban was swept back in Afghanistan. This involves substantial portions of the Ring Road and was among the leading causes why the road is in terrible shape. In a 2016 inspection report, the roads were 20% destroyed and the remainder were deteriorated.

President Trump’s Decisions

The U.S. has no plans to rebuild Afghanistan. In 2017, President Trump dedicated more armed forces but clearly expressed that the U.S. is not proposing construction again. During the government meeting, President Ghani mandated that the missing parts be built in the future months, highlighting the seriousness of the road for Afghanistan’s trade and economy. The State, USAID, and DOD require to implement on a regular basis the impact assessments to measure the effects of contracted reconstruction and other foreign support programs, including sectors of security assistance.

 

Mildred Miranda, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Pakistan

ISIS Claims Responsibility for the Suicide Bombing in Pakistan

According to security officials, a suicide explosion occurred on March 4th during prayer services at a Shia Muslim Mosque in the northern Pakistani city of Peshawar, killing at least 58 people and injuring almost 200 others. On a side note, while terrorism in Pakistan has decreased in the past few years, the underlying foundations of extremism, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, remain active. Pakistan had 319 terrorism-related incidents in 2020, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, with 169 civilian casualties. This is down from roughly 4,000 such instances in 2013, which resulted in over 2,700 civilian deaths. Will this recent attack serve as a major blow in the next few months in Pakistan?

The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the blast in a statement on Friday, making it one of the group’s largest operations within Pakistan. When police stopped an armed man on a motorcycle near the mosque, he opened fire before forcing his way inside a congested hall and detonating his suicide vest, according to senior police official Haroon Rasheed. As specified by Moazzam Jah Ansari, the chief police commander for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where Peshawar is the capital, the assailant had attached a strong explosive charge to his body, containing 5 kg (12 lbs.) of explosives.

Several of the injured, according to Asim Khan, a spokeswoman for Peshawar’s Lady Reading hospital, were in serious condition. Hundreds of people were hurt by shrapnel, several had their legs amputated, and others were hit by flying debris. Doctors struggled to transport the injured into operating rooms at the hospital’s emergency department, which was chaotic. Hundreds of families gathered outside the emergency room, many of whom were sobbing and shaking their heads, desperate for information on their family members.

Shia Muslims as ISIS Targets

When reviewing the actual circumstances of earlier attacks, it is evident that ISIS, an extreme Sunni militant group, has long targeted Shia Muslims in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and now Pakistan, and has a particular interest in the Hazara ethnic minority, which is primarily Shia. Pakistan is predominantly Sunni, with 76 percent of Pakistanis identifying as Sunni and 10–15 percent of Shia, based on a 2010 estimate.

ISIS issued a statement in 2021 claiming that it would assault Shia in their homes and centers “by any means conceivable,” from “slaughtering their necks to distributing their limbs.” Murder and other inhumane acts inflicting severe pain are alleged crimes against humanity committed by ISIS. According to the group’s public statements, the violent attacks are clearly part of a determined policy.

Until recently, there was no animosity between Sunni and Shi’a religious organizations. The origins of terrorist attacks against Shi’a in Pakistan may be traced back to General Zia-ul-dictatorship Haq’s, which began in 1978 after a military takeover the previous year and lasted until his death in 1988. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, many majority Sunni states, including Pakistan, began to be concerned about the spread of Shi’a Islam. To counter this, Zia bolstered ties with Saudi Arabia and welcomed Wahhabism, a hardline interpretation of Sunni Islam.

In 2011, extreme Sunni militants published an open letter to Quetta’s Shi’a community, which is mostly Hazara, declaring that “all Shi’a are deserving of killing” and that they intend to “create a Pakistan graveyard.” These words were supplemented by a methodical wave of terror directed at Shi’a professionals, officials, and visitors traveling to and from holy places and festivals in Pakistan. Militant groups have continued to target Shi’a professionals to this day, and all of these assaults have indeed been particularly violent in recent times. Militants and terrorist organizations have destroyed social gatherings and thickly urbanized Shi’a neighborhoods with reckless abandon.

A Weak Government is a Weak Defense Force

Vulnerability in the Pakistani government has impacted the lives of the minorities, such as schooling and career opportunities. This insecurity presents itself along gender lines as well, with Hazara women’s mobility being severely limited. As ISIS gains momentum, attacks on minorities will undoubtedly become more cautious in the coming months. To state the obvious, Pakistan has poor governance, allowing extremist organizations to carry out minor to major attacks in regions and cities. Pakistan’s administration lacks transparency and accountability. Political instability and corruption are also present, and the Pakistani government’s ongoing struggles will not be enough to silence ISIS, which will continue to grow in strength.

Developing investigation protocols and the use of corroborating analysis in the formulation of terrorism cases would be extremely beneficial in combating this expanding threat. Improving state and cross coordination on intelligence, police, and counter-terrorism divisions in Pakistan, as well as strengthening capacity on terrorism-related situation plans and promoting greater judicial legitimacy and human rights for minorities, are all crucial. Regardless of the support given by other countries to counter threats in Pakistan, it would be useless if the internal system of their government was compromised.

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

India

Insurgency in India’s Northeastern Frontiers

The far northeastern frontier of India is infamous for insurgent activities which have been functioning for decades. The region is notorious for hoarding numerous insurgent outfits. With 13 active insurgent groups in Manipur alone, and with over 14 factions within the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in Nagaland, violent faceoffs between the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) and insurgents are frequent. Hence, the region has been marred as a sensitive location for India’s national security.

The region serves as a strategic geopolitical location for India and its neighboring countries, such as China, and has continued to serve as a strategic gateway for insurgents to carry out their activities. Accordingly, the IAF had been tackling not only the insurgents, but the Chinese troops as well, the Doklam incident is one of such encounters. In addition, the insurgents have operated between countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, and others, by setting up camps, hideouts and training centers.

Coupled with cross-border insurgencies and China’s geopolitical interest in the region, India’s national security measures were intensified by maximizing military presence and enacting stringent laws throughout the region. However, insurgent activities continue to thrive despite the counteractive measures taken by the Indian government.

Northeast Insurgency and China’s Impact

On November 13th, 2021, Colonel Viplav Tripathi, his wife, their six-year-old son, and four other personnel were murdered by insurgents from the Northeast. Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF) took responsibility for the attack.

The attack was linked to smuggling cases in Mizoram where Colonel Tripathi had been in command and was curtailing the insurgents from carrying out their activities; this was likely the motivating factor leading the insurgents to assassinate Colonel Tripathi.

All the while, China had been accused of backing the insurgent groups since the responsible militants were suspected to have had connections with the Chinese PLA. This is supported by past instances where certain militants were apprehended and admitted to their connections with the Chinese.

China has frequently been accused of training and arming the insurgent groups in the Northeast. This goes as far back as the preformation of the NSCN, when the Naga homeland movement was sustained and led by the Naga National Council through the Naga Home Guards. The medelling of the Chinese in India’s internal affairs has been an age-old concern for India ever since the Sino-Indian war took place in 1962.

Recently, reports have indicated that China still has close ties with the NSCN and other regional groups by providing arms and ammunitions. This continues amid the ongoing peace talks between the insurgents, namely the NSCN-IM, which is one of the most prominent groups amongst the insurgents in the region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

India’s northeastern frontiers are often viewed as a ‘gateway’ to Southeast Asia; however, with the ongoing insurgency and the tense Sino-Indian relations developmental prospects are often curtailed. Hence, it demands India’s persistent effort in paving the path towards bridging not only India, but also the rest of the global south with Southeast Asia. This, however, needs to be done through India’s adherent commitment and consistent effort towards the Naga political dialogue.

This can occur by addressing the political will of the insurgents and by bringing all of the insurgent groups under one unified umbrella. Given, that the Northeast’s insurgency is political in nature, accordingly, it should be addressed in a political manner. By which, the approach should encompass less use of force and stringent laws such as AFSPA and more developmental approaches and peaceful mediation with the insurgents.

If the insurgency can be addressed and a political solution can be met, New Delhi can gain the confidence of the people from the region. This can further secure India of its border tensions with China by actually affirming its territorial integrity through the voice of the people.

 

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

ELN

The Rise of Urban Terrorism in Colombia? ELN Involvement in Citizen Protests

During the last few years, there have been multiple protests in Colombia against the government. Thousands of people have taken to the streets to protest against issues such as tax reforms, government management, and police performance. However, although the ability to protest is a legitimate right, there have also been events that have affected security conditions in the country.  Colombian authorities have indicated that the National Liberation Army (ELN), one of the oldest terrorist groups in the country, is likely participating in the protests.

The Protests

Colombia had serious episodes of protests and riots throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021. Their objectives and motives were distinct, but they shared in their international recognition for their levels of violence and destruction.

The first major protest during the government of President Iván Duque was the national strike of November 21, also known as 21N. Some of the reasons that led to these protests included economic proposals, such as eliminating the state pension fund Colpensiones and increasing the retirement age. Also, protesters demanded more investment in public education, combating corruption in several universities, effective protection measures for indigenous and social leaders, as many have been assassinated, and the full implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, which was reached in 2016. The protests lasted until the beginning of 2020 and left approximately 769 people injured, more than 100 arrested, and six dead.

The next major series of protests in Colombia were those against the death of Javier Ordoñez in September 2020. The main reason for the protest was the murder of Javier Ordoñez by members of the national police in Bogota. Throughout September, there were clashes between protesters and police and multiple burnings of police stations, known as CAI. The protests resulted in 13 deaths, 72 CAI affected, and 581 injured, 75 of which were the result of firearms.

Finally, the most recent wave of protests occurred in April 2021 and was labeled the National Strike. These protests were primarily against a tax reform promoted by the government. The protests were characterized by their levels of violence and destruction. In fact, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between April 28 and July 31, reports attributed 63 deaths to the protests. To date, the UN has verified 46 deaths, of which 44 were civilians and two were police; 76% of victims died from gunshot wounds.

The Infiltration of the ELN

Colombian authorities have indicated that there is a high possibility that ELN militants infiltrated the protests to destabilize the country, attack members of the security forces, and cause damage to private and public property.

According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, the protests against police brutality in September 2020 were infiltrated by the ELN and other terrorist groups. The then Minister of Defense, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, stated that the acts of violence were systematic and aimed at destroying public property and citizen infrastructure dedicated towards security.

A few days after the Defense Ministry’s statements, the ELN acknowledged its participation in the protests against police brutality. Through a video on social networks, alias “Uriel,” an ELN leader, stated that the group sought to “put an end to the torture and death centers called CAI (Immediate Action Commandos) of the police”; also that the ELN’s urban militancy actively participates in protests and incites the use of homemade explosive devices.

ELN involvement in protests was also registered in the 2021 National Strike. In June 2021, ELN member alias “Fabian” was captured and storage devices were seized. The devices contained instructions from the ELN central command to inspire acts of vandalism, instructions to attack the police, and money transfer orders for individuals to attack security forces.

Eventually, the Colombian Ministry of Defense indicated that the ELN and FARC dissidents continue to act with the intention of financing violent and criminal activities, including vandalism and violence across Cali and Bogota. Also, reports indicate a potential presence of ELN members at the anti-government protests on July 20th, 2021.

Finally, in 2021 the Colombian National Police found evidence that the ELN had given protesters $70 million to organize attacks against the police and execute riots.

Urban Terrorism: A Challenge that Must be Addressed

The evidence that the ELN was involved in the protests in Colombia seems conclusive. Financing, infiltration of riots, incitement to cause destruction, and the distribution of propaganda are just some of the actions carried out by the ELN.

The ELN’s actions are of particular relevance as they demonstrate the existence of a challenge for the country’s authorities: urban terrorism that can be executed in Colombia’s main cities.

This modality of terrorism is particularly dangerous for the security of cities due to its characteristics. Urban terrorism can be carried out by a small number of people, its perpetrators can camouflage themselves among other demonstrators, it causes great damage to security forces for a low cost, and terrorists can use their propaganda to legitimize it because it occurs within citizen protests.

For this reason, it is necessary that Colombia, and other countries in the region with similar situations, strengthen their intelligence, terrorist identification, terrorist financing, and anti-riot capabilities to mitigate the risk posed by the presence of guerrillas and terrorist groups acting within citizen protests. State action must protect the lives of demonstrators, and public and private property, and avoid the deterioration of security conditions across the country.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Rise to Peace