Pakistan

ISIS Claims Responsibility for the Suicide Bombing in Pakistan

According to security officials, a suicide explosion occurred on March 4th during prayer services at a Shia Muslim Mosque in the northern Pakistani city of Peshawar, killing at least 58 people and injuring almost 200 others. On a side note, while terrorism in Pakistan has decreased in the past few years, the underlying foundations of extremism, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, remain active. Pakistan had 319 terrorism-related incidents in 2020, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, with 169 civilian casualties. This is down from roughly 4,000 such instances in 2013, which resulted in over 2,700 civilian deaths. Will this recent attack serve as a major blow in the next few months in Pakistan?

The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the blast in a statement on Friday, making it one of the group’s largest operations within Pakistan. When police stopped an armed man on a motorcycle near the mosque, he opened fire before forcing his way inside a congested hall and detonating his suicide vest, according to senior police official Haroon Rasheed. As specified by Moazzam Jah Ansari, the chief police commander for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where Peshawar is the capital, the assailant had attached a strong explosive charge to his body, containing 5 kg (12 lbs.) of explosives.

Several of the injured, according to Asim Khan, a spokeswoman for Peshawar’s Lady Reading hospital, were in serious condition. Hundreds of people were hurt by shrapnel, several had their legs amputated, and others were hit by flying debris. Doctors struggled to transport the injured into operating rooms at the hospital’s emergency department, which was chaotic. Hundreds of families gathered outside the emergency room, many of whom were sobbing and shaking their heads, desperate for information on their family members.

Shia Muslims as ISIS Targets

When reviewing the actual circumstances of earlier attacks, it is evident that ISIS, an extreme Sunni militant group, has long targeted Shia Muslims in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and now Pakistan, and has a particular interest in the Hazara ethnic minority, which is primarily Shia. Pakistan is predominantly Sunni, with 76 percent of Pakistanis identifying as Sunni and 10–15 percent of Shia, based on a 2010 estimate.

ISIS issued a statement in 2021 claiming that it would assault Shia in their homes and centers “by any means conceivable,” from “slaughtering their necks to distributing their limbs.” Murder and other inhumane acts inflicting severe pain are alleged crimes against humanity committed by ISIS. According to the group’s public statements, the violent attacks are clearly part of a determined policy.

Until recently, there was no animosity between Sunni and Shi’a religious organizations. The origins of terrorist attacks against Shi’a in Pakistan may be traced back to General Zia-ul-dictatorship Haq’s, which began in 1978 after a military takeover the previous year and lasted until his death in 1988. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, many majority Sunni states, including Pakistan, began to be concerned about the spread of Shi’a Islam. To counter this, Zia bolstered ties with Saudi Arabia and welcomed Wahhabism, a hardline interpretation of Sunni Islam.

In 2011, extreme Sunni militants published an open letter to Quetta’s Shi’a community, which is mostly Hazara, declaring that “all Shi’a are deserving of killing” and that they intend to “create a Pakistan graveyard.” These words were supplemented by a methodical wave of terror directed at Shi’a professionals, officials, and visitors traveling to and from holy places and festivals in Pakistan. Militant groups have continued to target Shi’a professionals to this day, and all of these assaults have indeed been particularly violent in recent times. Militants and terrorist organizations have destroyed social gatherings and thickly urbanized Shi’a neighborhoods with reckless abandon.

A Weak Government is a Weak Defense Force

Vulnerability in the Pakistani government has impacted the lives of the minorities, such as schooling and career opportunities. This insecurity presents itself along gender lines as well, with Hazara women’s mobility being severely limited. As ISIS gains momentum, attacks on minorities will undoubtedly become more cautious in the coming months. To state the obvious, Pakistan has poor governance, allowing extremist organizations to carry out minor to major attacks in regions and cities. Pakistan’s administration lacks transparency and accountability. Political instability and corruption are also present, and the Pakistani government’s ongoing struggles will not be enough to silence ISIS, which will continue to grow in strength.

Developing investigation protocols and the use of corroborating analysis in the formulation of terrorism cases would be extremely beneficial in combating this expanding threat. Improving state and cross coordination on intelligence, police, and counter-terrorism divisions in Pakistan, as well as strengthening capacity on terrorism-related situation plans and promoting greater judicial legitimacy and human rights for minorities, are all crucial. Regardless of the support given by other countries to counter threats in Pakistan, it would be useless if the internal system of their government was compromised.

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

India

Insurgency in India’s Northeastern Frontiers

The far northeastern frontier of India is infamous for insurgent activities which have been functioning for decades. The region is notorious for hoarding numerous insurgent outfits. With 13 active insurgent groups in Manipur alone, and with over 14 factions within the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in Nagaland, violent faceoffs between the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) and insurgents are frequent. Hence, the region has been marred as a sensitive location for India’s national security.

The region serves as a strategic geopolitical location for India and its neighboring countries, such as China, and has continued to serve as a strategic gateway for insurgents to carry out their activities. Accordingly, the IAF had been tackling not only the insurgents, but the Chinese troops as well, the Doklam incident is one of such encounters. In addition, the insurgents have operated between countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, and others, by setting up camps, hideouts and training centers.

Coupled with cross-border insurgencies and China’s geopolitical interest in the region, India’s national security measures were intensified by maximizing military presence and enacting stringent laws throughout the region. However, insurgent activities continue to thrive despite the counteractive measures taken by the Indian government.

Northeast Insurgency and China’s Impact

On November 13th, 2021, Colonel Viplav Tripathi, his wife, their six-year-old son, and four other personnel were murdered by insurgents from the Northeast. Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF) took responsibility for the attack.

The attack was linked to smuggling cases in Mizoram where Colonel Tripathi had been in command and was curtailing the insurgents from carrying out their activities; this was likely the motivating factor leading the insurgents to assassinate Colonel Tripathi.

All the while, China had been accused of backing the insurgent groups since the responsible militants were suspected to have had connections with the Chinese PLA. This is supported by past instances where certain militants were apprehended and admitted to their connections with the Chinese.

China has frequently been accused of training and arming the insurgent groups in the Northeast. This goes as far back as the preformation of the NSCN, when the Naga homeland movement was sustained and led by the Naga National Council through the Naga Home Guards. The medelling of the Chinese in India’s internal affairs has been an age-old concern for India ever since the Sino-Indian war took place in 1962.

Recently, reports have indicated that China still has close ties with the NSCN and other regional groups by providing arms and ammunitions. This continues amid the ongoing peace talks between the insurgents, namely the NSCN-IM, which is one of the most prominent groups amongst the insurgents in the region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

India’s northeastern frontiers are often viewed as a ‘gateway’ to Southeast Asia; however, with the ongoing insurgency and the tense Sino-Indian relations developmental prospects are often curtailed. Hence, it demands India’s persistent effort in paving the path towards bridging not only India, but also the rest of the global south with Southeast Asia. This, however, needs to be done through India’s adherent commitment and consistent effort towards the Naga political dialogue.

This can occur by addressing the political will of the insurgents and by bringing all of the insurgent groups under one unified umbrella. Given, that the Northeast’s insurgency is political in nature, accordingly, it should be addressed in a political manner. By which, the approach should encompass less use of force and stringent laws such as AFSPA and more developmental approaches and peaceful mediation with the insurgents.

If the insurgency can be addressed and a political solution can be met, New Delhi can gain the confidence of the people from the region. This can further secure India of its border tensions with China by actually affirming its territorial integrity through the voice of the people.

 

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

ELN

The Rise of Urban Terrorism in Colombia? ELN Involvement in Citizen Protests

During the last few years, there have been multiple protests in Colombia against the government. Thousands of people have taken to the streets to protest against issues such as tax reforms, government management, and police performance. However, although the ability to protest is a legitimate right, there have also been events that have affected security conditions in the country.  Colombian authorities have indicated that the National Liberation Army (ELN), one of the oldest terrorist groups in the country, is likely participating in the protests.

The Protests

Colombia had serious episodes of protests and riots throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021. Their objectives and motives were distinct, but they shared in their international recognition for their levels of violence and destruction.

The first major protest during the government of President Iván Duque was the national strike of November 21, also known as 21N. Some of the reasons that led to these protests included economic proposals, such as eliminating the state pension fund Colpensiones and increasing the retirement age. Also, protesters demanded more investment in public education, combating corruption in several universities, effective protection measures for indigenous and social leaders, as many have been assassinated, and the full implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, which was reached in 2016. The protests lasted until the beginning of 2020 and left approximately 769 people injured, more than 100 arrested, and six dead.

The next major series of protests in Colombia were those against the death of Javier Ordoñez in September 2020. The main reason for the protest was the murder of Javier Ordoñez by members of the national police in Bogota. Throughout September, there were clashes between protesters and police and multiple burnings of police stations, known as CAI. The protests resulted in 13 deaths, 72 CAI affected, and 581 injured, 75 of which were the result of firearms.

Finally, the most recent wave of protests occurred in April 2021 and was labeled the National Strike. These protests were primarily against a tax reform promoted by the government. The protests were characterized by their levels of violence and destruction. In fact, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between April 28 and July 31, reports attributed 63 deaths to the protests. To date, the UN has verified 46 deaths, of which 44 were civilians and two were police; 76% of victims died from gunshot wounds.

The Infiltration of the ELN

Colombian authorities have indicated that there is a high possibility that ELN militants infiltrated the protests to destabilize the country, attack members of the security forces, and cause damage to private and public property.

According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, the protests against police brutality in September 2020 were infiltrated by the ELN and other terrorist groups. The then Minister of Defense, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, stated that the acts of violence were systematic and aimed at destroying public property and citizen infrastructure dedicated towards security.

A few days after the Defense Ministry’s statements, the ELN acknowledged its participation in the protests against police brutality. Through a video on social networks, alias “Uriel,” an ELN leader, stated that the group sought to “put an end to the torture and death centers called CAI (Immediate Action Commandos) of the police”; also that the ELN’s urban militancy actively participates in protests and incites the use of homemade explosive devices.

ELN involvement in protests was also registered in the 2021 National Strike. In June 2021, ELN member alias “Fabian” was captured and storage devices were seized. The devices contained instructions from the ELN central command to inspire acts of vandalism, instructions to attack the police, and money transfer orders for individuals to attack security forces.

Eventually, the Colombian Ministry of Defense indicated that the ELN and FARC dissidents continue to act with the intention of financing violent and criminal activities, including vandalism and violence across Cali and Bogota. Also, reports indicate a potential presence of ELN members at the anti-government protests on July 20th, 2021.

Finally, in 2021 the Colombian National Police found evidence that the ELN had given protesters $70 million to organize attacks against the police and execute riots.

Urban Terrorism: A Challenge that Must be Addressed

The evidence that the ELN was involved in the protests in Colombia seems conclusive. Financing, infiltration of riots, incitement to cause destruction, and the distribution of propaganda are just some of the actions carried out by the ELN.

The ELN’s actions are of particular relevance as they demonstrate the existence of a challenge for the country’s authorities: urban terrorism that can be executed in Colombia’s main cities.

This modality of terrorism is particularly dangerous for the security of cities due to its characteristics. Urban terrorism can be carried out by a small number of people, its perpetrators can camouflage themselves among other demonstrators, it causes great damage to security forces for a low cost, and terrorists can use their propaganda to legitimize it because it occurs within citizen protests.

For this reason, it is necessary that Colombia, and other countries in the region with similar situations, strengthen their intelligence, terrorist identification, terrorist financing, and anti-riot capabilities to mitigate the risk posed by the presence of guerrillas and terrorist groups acting within citizen protests. State action must protect the lives of demonstrators, and public and private property, and avoid the deterioration of security conditions across the country.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Russia

What is Russia Really Thinking?

Since President Putin launched his attack on Ukraine, Russia has faced a considerable Western backlash. Disconnected from the global financial system and targeted by a sweeping range of economic sanctions, Russia has been set on a path to economic meltdown.

Over 400 companies have withdrawn from the country, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project has been canceled, and over ten 10 years worth of economic gains are on course to be wiped out. With the ruble collapsing, GDP plummeting, and prices soaring, the Russian economy is facing pain unseen since the 1990s.

Western nations are also preparing for substantial military build-ups. Belgium, Italy, Poland, Romania, Norway, and Sweden have all pledged to increase defense spending. Germany has announced a major increase in its military budget, a historic shift in the country’s foreign policy that ends decades of reluctance on defense spending and will transform it into the world’s third-largest military spender.

Russia’s invasion has also led to the deployment of additional NATO forces to eastern Europe. The alliance is set to double its battlegroups in the region, which has already seen the arrival of over 20,000 NATO troops.

Russia has condemned the economic measures imposed on the country, which Mr. Putin has referred to as “akin to an act of war” and has expressed strong discontent with the strengthening of NATO’s posture. “The build-up of NATO forces on the ‘eastern flank’ is openly provocative”, said the Russian foreign ministry.

The invasion has only exacerbated many of President Putin’s long-held concerns, and embroiled Russia in a bloody conflict that has seen its military take more casualties than the U.S. endured throughout the entirety of its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, given public sentiment in Ukraine and the lethal aid provided by Western powers, it is likely this conflict will persist. Meanwhile, the Russian economy slides toward crisis and NATO forces mount along its border.

Commentators now frequently decry the invasion as a ‘miscalculation’, an epithet that provides a measure of comfort for Western audiences by assuring them this war would not have unfolded had President Putin understood its full consequences.

But, what if the backlash was foreseen? What if President Putin is motivated by something more than Western commentators understand? Does the West really understand what is driving this invasion?

“The Creation of a Vast, Continent-Spanning Russian-Eurasian State”

For much of its history, Russia’s suspension between Europe and central Asia has induced a sense of identity crisis. Its territory lies mostly in Asia, but its history of art, music, and literature are more closely associated with Europe.

Following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, a group of Russian intellectuals called on the country to transcend its European fixation. Russia, they proposed, should dedicate itself to the creation of a vast, continent-spanning Russian-Eurasian state, independent of Europe’s influence, based on the legacy of Genghis Khan and the deep history of cultural exchange among people of Slavic, Turkic, Mongol, and other Asian origin.

This concept, known as Eurasianism, was suppressed by the Soviet Union. Indeed, according to early Eurasianist thinkers, communism itself was a destructive European import. Nonetheless, Eurasianism survived in the underground and reentered public discourse following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Over time, a new form of Eurasianism permeated Russia’s policy and military elite. A key moment in the ideology’s revival came with the publication of Aleksandr Dugin’s 600-page textbook titled The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia.

Dugin, an eccentric philosopher and sociologist, was once a fringe figure in Russia. However, through the years, his influence has grown significantly. Indeed, Mr. Dugin has been referred to as ‘Putin’s Brain’, ‘Putin’s philosopher’ and even ‘Putin’s Rasputin’. He has served as an advisor to key political and military figures and–on the insistence of Mr. Putin–his textbook forms part of the curriculum for the Academy of General Staff of the Russian military. According to Dr. Jane Burbank, a recently retired professor of Russian history at New York University, “a revitalized theory of Eurasian empire informs Mr. Putin’s every move.”

Aleksandr Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism, and the “Fourth Political Theory”

Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism involves a bizarre fusion of various political and religious ideologies. According to Dugin, fascism, communism, and liberalism represent the leading political theories of recent history. Fascism collapsed with the fall of Nazi Germany. Communism collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union. Now, liberalism is collapsing as the West enters a “nihilistic post-modern stage.”

Therefore, Dugin proposes a “Fourth Political Theory,” an alternative political model that challenges the “progress” of world history. According to Dugin, human beings’ self-awareness is rooted in the world. Because this root differs across cultures, a multipolar world order is required for humans to feel a sense of identity.

Thus, the mission of Russia, as a nation of unique culture and destiny, is to create a Eurasian power center that can challenge the unipolarity of U.S. global influence and restore the root of human self-awareness across Eurasia.

The Fourth Political Theory combines what Dugin identifies as the strongest elements of communism, fascism, ecologism, and traditionalism. In sum, his political model represents a totalitarian synthesis of unlimited state power, ‘blood and soil’ nationalism, and traditional religious hierarchy.

Indeed, according to James Heiser, author of The American Empire Should be Destroyed’: Alexander Dugin and the Perils of Immanentized Eschatology, Dugin considers the true meaning of Russia to be “marked by [a] ‘dialectical triad’ which combines ‘Third Rome–Third Reich–Third International’”. Among the aims of this messianic, imperial project is the destruction of Western liberalism and a fundamental reordering of the global political landscape.

“One of the Poles in the Modern World”

Whilst the full extent of Eurasianist ideology on Mr. Putin is far from clear, “he’s always had an intellectual affiliation with Eurasianist thinkers” says Hannah Thoburn, a Eurasia analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative.

Indeed, Russia has been attempting to assert itself as a new geopolitical force for some time. It has been argued, for example, that the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union (E.A.E.U.) in 2015, a regional trade pact involving a constellation of post-Soviet states, is part of a broader effort to disrupt the U.S.-led world order.

“We suggest a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world,” wrote Mr. Putin in 2011. Unsurprisingly, the E.A.E.U. was not well received by the United States. “Let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it,” said then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012.

Whilst President Putin discussed the formation of the E.A.E.U. in mostly economic terms, his comments have alluded to a set of deeper ideological motives closely aligned with Eurasianist thought. For example, in 2013, he described the union as a “project to preserve the identity of the people who inhabit the historic Eurasian space…Eurasian integration is a chance for the post-Soviet space to become an independent center for global development–not a peripherality to Europe or Asia”.

“Ukraine is the Big One”

Ukraine has always played a key role in Eurasianist ideology. In 1927, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, one of the ideology’s founding figures, argued that Belarus and Ukraine should unite with Russia around their shared orthodox faith. More recently, in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dugin wrote that total dominion over the north coast of the Black Sea was an “absolute imperative” of Russian geopolitics and that Ukrainian independence represented “a huge danger to all of Eurasia.” According to Dugin, Ukraine had to become “a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state.”

Currents of Eurasianist ethnonationalism appear central to the propaganda campaign surrounding Russia’s invasion. In a 5,000 word article published in 2021, entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukranianians”, Mr. Putin reasserted his claim that Russians and Ukranians are “one people.”

For Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is part of a broader effort to reassert the unity of a divided Russian people. Indeed, according to Ivan Vejvoda, a senior fellow at the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna, “Putin wants to consolidate the civilizational border of Russia, as he calls it, and he is doing that by invading a sovereign European country.”

“Ukraine is the big one” says Alexander Cooley, a political science professor at Barnard College. The success of the Eurasian Union “hinges on Ukraine’s participation and cooperation.”

Perhaps the clearest display of the deeper ideological underpinnings of Putin’s war effort comes from a news article accidentally published by multiple state-run Russian media outlets just three days into the invasion. Commentators have explained that the article’s publication at exactly 08:00 suggests it was a pre-written piece intended to celebrate a swift Russian victory. However, Ukraine did not fall within the first days of the invasion, and the article was deleted.

The article claims that Ukraine was a problem for Russia “for two key reasons…the issue of national security, that is, the creation of anti-Russia from Ukraine and an outpost for the West to put pressure on us, is only the second most important among them. The first would always be the complex of a divided people, the complex of national humiliation – when the Russian house first lost part of its foundation (Kiev), and then was forced to come to terms with the existence of two states, not one, but two peoples.”

The article concludes, envisaging the collapse of the Kiev government, “Ukraine has returned to Russia…it will be reorganized, re-established and returned to its natural state as part of the Russian world.”

Conclusions

Across the West, Putin’s invasion has been met with disbelief. The Russian army has already sustained thousands of casualties. The economy is collapsing and NATO forces mount on its border. For many, Russia’s actions seem incomprehensible, even absurd. The commentariat reassure Western audiences that the attack was a ‘miscalculation’, an error of judgment that failed to account for Western sanctions or Ukrainian resolve.

But, there is another possibility. What if Putin expected this response? What if, despite knowing its full cost, he considered his invasion justified? What if his attack on Ukraine is motivated by a deeper ideological desire to reshape the world order and establish Russia as a new global power center, regardless of the cost?

Since the invasion, there have been many calls, including from Kiev, for Western military intervention. The unfolding humanitarian crisis is a catastrophe for Europe, but the threat of a major military confrontation between nuclear powers provides powerful cause for restraint.

Nonetheless, NATO must be prepared to hold its ground and cannot ignore the threat of an ideologically-driven, imperial project wreaking havoc on its border. Indeed, as Mr. Dugin has said, “the Russian Renaissance can only stop by Kiev.”

Restoring Ukrainian sovereignty and challenging Russia’s expansionist agenda will require engagement and negotiation on the military, political, economic, and, perhaps most importantly, ideological level. In order to end the war, the West must understand what is really driving this invasion. Indeed, its aims may be far more ambitious than many realize.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Plan Colombia

Strategies to Combat Narco-Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Plan Colombia

During the 1990s, the U.S. and Colombian governments entered into a security and counternarcotics assistance agreement, known as Plan Colombia.

The strategy has been criticized both in favor and against due to its multiple impacts on security conditions in Colombia. For this reason, it is worthwhile to analyze its development and results in order to show how the strategies against drug terrorism have been implemented and what their effects have been.

What is the Plan Colombia?

At the end of the 20th century, the security situation in Colombia was extremely complex. The presence of drug traffickers, communist guerrillas, and the enormous extensions of coca hectares made it difficult for the Colombian State to guarantee territorial control and security throughout the country.

That is why in 1999, Colombian President Andres Pastrana and his U.S. counterpart, Bill Clinton, entered into a bilateral agreement called Plan Colombia. According to the Colombian National Planning Department, the Plan was an integral strategy of bilateral cooperation. The general objective is to combat illicit drugs and organized crime, in order to contribute to economic reactivation and the achievement of peace in Colombia, while strengthening control over the supply of illicit drugs on U.S. streets.

Plan Colombia had a 15-year duration and its initial budget was $7.5 billion, of which $1.6 billion was contributed by the United States. Between 2001 and 2016, the United States has reportedly provided an average of $404 million per year, prior to 2001 it was $262 million per year on average, to Plan Colombia.

However, in 2016, following a meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the transformation of the program and its nature was announced. Former President Obama stated that the new chapter of the U.S.-Colombia partnership would be called “Paz Colombia”, whose economic aid would be more than $450 million during 2017, in order to support human rights and victims’ rights in the framework of the Colombian peace process.

Plan Colombia’s Achievements

The implementation of Plan Colombia had considerable achievements and successes, which explain its continuity for 15 years. Some of its positive results include an improvement in special operations, intelligence, professionalism of the Armed Forces, respect for human rights, strengthening of the means to fight drug trafficking, and state presence with social investment in remote regions. Likewise, in terms of coca hectares, in 1999 there were about 200,000 hectares of coca cultivated, while in 2016 there were only 60,000 hectares.

Other positive impacts of the program were the continued strengthening of the country’s military forces as never before in history, advances in social policy, and improvements in security conditions.

In fact, according to the INDEPAZ foundation, Plan Colombia allowed the government to go on the offensive, retake initiatives, neutralize the guerrilla advance and change the correlation of forces in Colombia. Under the shadow of Plan Colombia and the Southern Command, the military and police forces in Colombia were restructured. Mountain brigades and battalions were reorganized. The army was professionalized and sustained tactical operations were defined in previously forbidden territories. The war and national defense budget tripled as a share of GDP and the force level reached the highest level in the history of six decades of counterinsurgency.

Likewise, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Philip Goldberg, pointed out that Plan Colombia was a successful strategy that should now be a beacon to solve the multiple problems still burdening Colombia. This is due to the fact that the Plan had positive effects such as the improvement in the supply and logistics systems, communications, intelligence planning and military and police equipment, resulting in more effective operations against the guerrillas.  Between 1999 and 2014 Colombia went from having 35 military helicopters to more than 200 and the number of professional soldiers increased from 23,000 to 88,000 in the same period of time.

In addition, the FARC guerrilla weakened from 25,000 men in 2002 to about 6,000 in 2013 and went from maintaining a presence in 555 municipalities to only 103 by the end of 2014.

The improvement in security conditions was reflected in the reduction of coca crops, the fact that violent actions by illegal groups decreased 66% between 2002 and 2015, and that attacks on physical infrastructure such as oil pipelines, energy towers, bridges and roads plummeted by 85%.

Finally, the program had a social investment component, as social policy programs such as Familias en Acción, Jóvenes en Acción and Empleo en Acción were created.

Critics of Plan Colombia

Despite its achievements and successes in improving security conditions in Colombia, Plan Colombia has also been criticized.  The Plan’s implementation has had negative consequences, such as that drug trafficking deepened and fragmented during the Plan Colombia, making it more difficult to combat, and there was a marked increase in the number of victims of Colombia’s internal conflict, with more than 800,000 people said to have been victimized in 2008.  In addition, there was an increase in illegal mining, which allows for the financing of illegal groups.

However, the greatest criticism of Plan Colombia has to do with the aspect of respect for human rights during its execution. The Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination (CCEEU) noted that Plan Colombia had serious human rights costs, such as since the beginning of the Plan, more than 6 million people were victimized, more than 4 million people were displaced, more than 4,300 civilians were allegedly killed by government military forces to increase the number of casualties, more than 1,000 trade unionists and 400 human rights defenders were killed, and countless women suffered sexual violence.

Some additional criticisms point out that Plan Colombia gave priority to military assistance over social programs, the lack of resources allocated to programs for the substitution of illicit crops, attention to the vulnerable and displaced population, reform of the judicial system and environmental protection, and that the fight against drugs in Colombia transferred the problem of drug trafficking and increased the levels of violence in several countries of the continent.

Balance of Plan Colombia: A Successful Strategy?

The figures show that Plan Colombia was a decisive factor for the Colombian State to overcome the critical public order situation at the end of the 1990s and to exponentially improve its capacity to confront the guerrillas, reduce coca crops and improve security conditions in a large part of the national territory.

In fact, the results achieved by Plan Colombia allowed the program to evolve and become “Peace Colombia”, since, thanks to the advances in military capabilities resulting from Plan Colombia, the Colombian State weakened the FARC guerrillas so much so that they had to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On the other hand, Plan Colombia also had negative consequences, especially in such sensitive aspects as the violation of human rights. Therefore, it is worth evaluating the achievements, vulnerabilities, lessons learned and failures of such a program in order to implement similar strategies in Colombia’s future or in other countries struggling in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism.

Finally, it must be understood that Plan Colombia is a strategy that was specifically designed to Colombia’s needs. Therefore, the implementation of similar programs in other regions must take into account the particular characteristics of their countries in order to achieve optimal results and impacts.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow