https://www.wired.com/story/terror-industrial-complex-isis-munitions-supply-chain/

Weapons for Sale: How the U.S. Indirectly Supplies Terrorists and Organized Crime

While people many are aware that the United States supports partner forces across the Middle East, fewer realize the U.S. sells such partners billions of dollars in weapons. 

Tracing such support is a challenge. For instance, old, Soviet-style weapons are supplied through Eastern Europe intermediaries. So despite what might be good intentions, the organization Conflict Armament Research suggests as much as 90% of ISIL’s weapons are traceable to US sources. How and why this occurs is the focus of a probe on American gun supply. 

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At Iraqi military intelligence headquarters in Baghdad, weapons inspector Damien Spleeters (left) and his coworker, Haider al-Hakim, look through crates of ISIS ammunition. ANDREA DICENZO

It is not just the U.S. but also Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia who employ such tactics.  

Soviet-style weapons are easy to obtain and are familiar to, and highly sought-after by, Syrian fighters. Such weapons are not easily traceable, providing a separation between the U.S. and eventual recipients. One would that the government tightly regulates such arms sales. In fact, supply chains are complex, and procurement is complicated.

In the end, dealers move such weapons with insufficient oversight. Corruption and the use of private contractors further dilute regulatory stringency. And it is not just the U.S. Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia employ such tactics. With dealings of this kind, it is inevitable that at least some weapons end up in hands other than those intended by the seller.

Nowhere has this been clearer than in Syria. There, as well as in spillover affecting its neighbors, the death toll continues to rise. Governments, private contractors, and INGOs must cooperate to ensure the legitimate and accurate movement of arms.

Shady deals and ever-shifting alliances must move the U.S. to reconsider its weapons export policies.

There is mounting evidence that the United States has even indirectly supplied weapons to groups like ISIL. Indirectly, the U.S. is enlarging the very conflicts it seeks to diminish. The U.S. was even recently cited as having supplied weapons used by gangs in Venezuela. Such evidence continues to mount. Yet, there has been little movement by the U.S. to increase the integrity and oversight of its arms sales.

Shady deals and ever-shifting alliances must move the U.S. to reconsider its arms export policies. If the U.S. wants to bring peace to this, or any region, it must improve arms sale transparency and oversight. Otherwise, guns will continue to end up in the hands of organized criminals, drug cartels, and terrorists.

About the Under-Covered Attacks Database

UAD Methodology (Updated 4/3/2018)

The Undercovered Attacks Database is meant, especially, to highlight acts of terrorism that do not receive coverage in the United States. The spreadsheet highlights the data from considerable attacks, which we hold were not given attention by U.S. media. Attacks filed here fit three main criteria:

1 – They fall under the same definitions and classifications of terrorism as described in the Rise To Peace Active Intelligence Database (AID). This database serves as an extension and crystallization of the data available in the AID. Any attack in the UAD is filed in the AID first. All input methodology is the same as well, as described on the AID Methodology page.

2 – They are considerable attacks. For the sake of simplicity, we use a Total Casualties level of 21 to denote a considerable level. The level of 21 was chosen as it represents the 90th percentile of Total Casualties inputs into the Active Intelligence Database as of 8 March 2018.

3 – They are not mentioned in pieces published by any of the top five online news outlets in the United States. We use the index provided by Feedspot to create this list, which is comprised of CNN, The New York Times, The Huffington Post, Fox News, and USA Today.

What Makes a Terrorist Attack Notable: Determinants of U.S. Media Coverage

Introduction

With the sheer saturation of terrorist attacks occurring each week, US news outlets are forced to make decisions regarding what gets published. Characteristics of terrorist attacks such as casualty toll, perpetrator, or weapon type often determine newsworthiness and thus which attacks get covered. While past research has focused on coverage of domestic terrorist attacks within the United States, this paper examines determinants of US major media coverage of terrorist attacks across the globe. Using data collected over the past year, we examine the distribution of characteristics of large-scale terrorist attacks that did and did not garner coverage by major US news outlets.

Background

Media coverage of terrorism strongly influences how the news-consuming public interprets both terrorist attacks and the political and cultural impact that terrorist attacks have on society. Coverage of terrorist events occurring in the United States between October 2001 and January 2010 reveals a media paradigm “in which fear of international terrorism is dominant, particularly as Muslims/Arabs/Islam working together in organized terrorist cells against a ‘Christian America,’ while domestic terrorism is cast as a minor threat that occurs in isolated incidents by troubled individuals” (Powell 2011) [1]. Güven (2018) writes that the media has a powerful ability to shape dialogue surrounding terrorism [2]. This dominant paradigm causes individual terrorists to be linked by government and media to overarching ideologies, which results in “intensified anti-terrorism legislation, snares of rumors, and disinformation in the name of public debate.” Since media coverage of terrorism shapes public sentiment and government policy, understanding the driving factors behind this coverage is vital to the study of the political, cultural, and economic realities of terrorism.

Prior research has demonstrated that a number of attack characteristics influence media coverage of terrorism. Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) examine terrorist incidents occurring in the United States pre-9/11 and find that a number of characteristics including region, seriousness, target type, and tactics influence New York Times coverage [3]. Attacks taking place in the northeast are covered more often than those taking place in other regions of the country, and attacks causing at least one death are almost fully covered while those without death tolls are covered around half the time. They also find attacks on civilian or airline targets result in more coverage than attacks on government or NGO targets. The same holds for attacks using firearms and hijackings which are covered significantly more often than other types of attacks. Kearns et al. (2017) find that post-9/11, Muslim perpetrators, the arrest of the perpetrator, law enforcement or government targets, and casualty rates all increase media coverage of terror attacks [4]. Media coverage decreases when the perpetrators are unknown or attacks target out-groups such as Muslims or other minorities. However, saturation of coverage also increases the threshold of an attack’s newsworthiness necessary for it to garner attention. Well before 9/11, Weiman and Brosius (1991) note that as terror coverage becomes more frequent and thus normalized, the number of victims for an attack to be covered increases as well [5]. As terrorist attacks become routine, that which was once newsworthy to many media outlets, is no longer worth mentioning.

Media coverage of terrorism resonates beyond the viewers it intends to attract with far-reaching implications. Because terrorist attacks are frequently motivated by the desire to bring attention to the perpetrators’ cause, increased media coverage of terrorist attacks often causes more attacks. This effect holds across multiple forms of media. Jetter (2017a) finds that one article on a terrorist attack results in approximately 1.4 future attacks in the same country over the next week, resulting on average in three additional casualties [6]. Jetter (2017b) also finds that one minute of Al-Qaeda coverage on a major news network results in one attack in the next week, resulting in 4.9 additional casualties on average [7]. However, Asal and Hoffman (2016) find a dampening effect of media coverage on cross-border terror. They find that “the more attention a country gets from international media sources, the less likely terrorist organizations operating within that state are to launch attacks outside their national borders,” and that terrorists active in states that receive little media coverage launch international and cross-border attacks requisite to promulgate their beliefs. Therefore, media coverage of terrorism can impact the frequency, location, and perpetrators of terrorist attacks, with a corresponding impact on lives.

While prior research has focused largely on domestic attacks in the United States, this work is oriented towards global attacks significant in their casualty tolls. Characteristics that impact media coverage of terrorist attacks are analyzed to determine how major US media outlets select which attacks to cover when their viewing audience may be unfamiliar with the context, perpetrators, or country in which the attack took place. These characteristics include casualty level, target type, weapon type, country, and terrorist group. We hypothesize that attacks with characteristics more engaging to the American public are more likely to be covered by American media. Such factors include higher casualty rates, attacks in active U.S. military deployment areas, attacks by groups well-known to Americans, and attacks with more notorious groups. We test our hypothesis by comparing the distribution of attack characteristics across attacks that did and did not receive major U.S. media coverage.

Data methodology

All records were pulled from the Rise To Peace Active Intelligence Database, running from June 7, 2017, to June 7, 2018. Using all attacks would be unrealistic: news saturation of terrorist attacks means only attacks that are notable would be expected to receive news coverage. To mitigate this, we pull all attacks where total casualty count, a sum of killed and injured victims, is greater than or equal to 21. This number is chosen because it represents the 90th percentile and higher of the first 1,000 attacks entered into the Active Intelligence Database, which generates a sensible coverage expectation. Next, we search for articles from U.S. news sources representing the attention of the U.S. media to these attacks. For our purposes, we use sources from the top five most-used U.S. news sites: CNN, Fox News, New York Times, Huffington Post, USA Today. Information on attacks is sought using keyword configuration “[Source] [Month] [Day] [Year] attack.” If those searches did not yield a hit on an article referencing the attack in question, the attack was coded as ‘Undercovered’. If at least one search returned a hit on an article referencing the attack in question, the attack was coded as ‘Covered’. This yields sets of 108 ‘Covered’ attacks and 68 ‘Undercovered’ attacks. Next, we create distributions of the data-sets comparing the prevalence of characteristics within each data-set. We calculate for five characteristics: casualty level, target type, weapon type, country, and terrorist group. The results are visualized below.

Results

For the graphical analysis alone, we do not show characteristics whose representation among the 2 data-sets combined is less than 10. This is done to prevent conclusions on the basis of low data. Three of the five comparisons, therefore, suffered graphical exclusions of data: country, weapon type, and terrorist group. No data is excluded from the analyses of target type, casualty level. Results are shown below.

Target type

Attacks on civilian targets made up a larger portion of the undercovered attacks than the covered attacks, while security and political targets made up larger portions of the covered attacks than undercovered attacks [Figure 1].

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Attacks on civilian targets comprised the largest portion of both data-sets, suggesting that civilian targets suffer from lower levels of notability due to their high frequency. This may explain the more equitable distribution of target types across covered attacks, which tend to distribute more coverage across rarer types of attacks.

Weapon type

Attacks carried out using suicide bombs and firearms were greater represented in the covered attacks data-set than were attacks utilizing IEDs or grenades, which made up a larger portion of the Undercovered attacks [Figure 2].

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Exclusions from the analysis of weapon type: Misc, Unknown, Mortar, Rocket

High-casualty attacks using firearms tend to be rare, large-scale assaults on targets such as security installations or entire towns, increasing newsworthiness. Suicide bomb attacks tend to inflict larger casualty rates than other explosive-based attacks such as grenades or IEDs, and their occupation of the American psyche post-9/11 is a driving force behind greater coverage. Grenade and IED attacks, while similar in execution, tend not to capture the attention of the American public in the same way as the stereotypical Muslim suicide bomber.

Terrorist group

Attacks by Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the Taliban made up a larger portion of covered attacks than undercovered attacks, while attacks by Boko Haram, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and attacks by unknown actors were greater represented in undercovered attacks than covered attacks [Figure 3].

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Exclusions from the analysis of terrorist group: Abu Sayyaf, AQIM, Bacham Militia, FARC, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, [HPG,PKK], [ISIS,Jamaat ur Ahrar], Lashkar-e-Taiba, PYD, [Taliban,ISKP], TTP

The high rate of coverage of Taliban and ISKP attacks are consistent with the expectation that attacks on active U.S. military deployment areas would receive more coverage by virtue of of American attention to the area. U.S. drone strikes and special operations deployments to Somalia, as well as past U.N. commitments to the area, are similarly likely to drive attention towards Al-Shabaab’s actions in Somalia. Meanwhile, lack of U.S. engagement in Nigeria has likely reduced American attention towards Boko Haram. The finding regarding ISIS is contrary to expectations: considering high historical U.S. attention toward Iraq, as well as media sensationalization of brutal ISIS tactics and success, one would expect them to receive higher coverage levels. Finally, attacks committed by unknown actors are difficult to interpret given these attacks heavy distributions across regions.

Casualty Rate

As casualty tolls increase, attacks are greater represented in covered attacks than undercovered attacks. Only attacks causing 21-40 casualties comprise a greater portion of undercovered attacks than covered attacks [Figure 4].

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This result is consistent with the expectations set on coverage contingent on the notability of attacks. The redistribution of media coverage from low to high-casualty attacks demonstrates a higher premium for media coverage placed on high-casualty attacks.

Country

Finally, attacks in Afghanistan and Somalia make up a significantly greater portion of covered attacks than undercovered attacks, while those taking place in Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria are greater represented in undercovered attacks [Figure 5].

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Exclusions from the analysis of country: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, England, India, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Mali, Niger, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, USA, Yemen

Countries with higher representation in the covered attacks data-set tend to be those with significant US military involvement and public attention in recent years. US military presence in Afghanistan and its drone and air strikes in Somalia, coupled with troop deployment drives attack coverage in those countries. Reduced military involvement in Nigeria and Pakistan means attacks in those countries garner less coverage. However, the results in Iraq and Syria run contrary to the expectation that attacks in countries with larger US involvement tend to see increased media coverage. Attacks in Iraq and Syria were significantly greater represented in the undercovered attacks dataset.

Conclusion

The results provide some support for our hypothesized proxies for notability of terrorist attacks. Attacks with higher casualty levels, suicide bombers, political or security targets, and in some areas that have active U.S. military deployment (Afghanistan and Somalia) made up higher portions of the covered attacks data than the uncovered attacks data, suggesting they receive disproportionate attention in the U.S. media. Meanwhile, attacks using commonplace tactics like grenades and IEDs, in areas without significant U.S. military presence (Nigeria and Pakistan) and attacks against civilian targets were more represented in the undercovered data.  

The notable outliers are intertwined: attacks in Iraq and Syria, as well as attacks committed by ISIS, were more represented in the undercovered data than in the covered data, suggesting they received disproportionately low coverage. This contradicts our expectations for notability given that ISIS has not only launched attacks on the United States in the past, but the U.S. has active military deployments in the region. We suggest two possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, the massive volume of attacks by ISIS has introduced a saturation level to media markets dampening coverage of ISIS in favor of other groups. The pure volume of violence, even at high levels, removes the notability from the attacks and reduces coverage of the attacks. However, this explanation is likely inconsistent with the finding that attacks in Afghanistan, and even with the ISIS cell in Afghanistan, ISKP, are greater represented in the covered than the undercovered data. The U.S. also has active U.S. military deployments there, but saturation does not appear to have dampened the proportion of coverage. The second possible explanation is the distinction in the data between territorial warfare and terrorism. The Rise To Peace Active Intelligence Database distinguishes between acts of terrorism and attempts at territorial control, only including the former. However, ISIS engages in both forms of warfare, and it, therefore, may receive higher proportions of coverage for territorial warfare and therefore still receive high media attention. This apparent discrepancy, and its implications for U.S. media coverage of foreign violence in Iraq and Syria is deserving of further research.

Endnotes

[1] Powell, Kimberly A. “Framing Islam: An Analysis of US Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11.” Communication Studies 62, no. 1 (2011): 90-112.

[2] Güven, Fikret. “Mass Media’s Role in Conflicts: An Analysis of the Western Media’s Portrayal of Terrorism since September 11.” International Journal of Social Science 66, Spring II (2018): 183-196.

[3] Chermak, Steven M., and Jeffrey Gruenewald. “The Media’s Coverage of Domestic Terrorism.” Justice Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2006): 428-461.

[4] Kearns, Erin, Allison Betus, and Anthony Lemieux. “Why do Some Terrorist Attacks Receive More Media Attention Than Others?.” (2018).

[5] Weimann, Gabriel, and Hans-Bernd Brosius. “The Newsworthiness of International Terrorism.” Communication Research 18, no. 3 (1991): 333-354.

[6] Jetter, Michael. “The Effect of Media Attention on Terrorism.” Journal of Public Economics 153 (2017): 32-48.

[7] Jetter, Michael. “Terrorism and the Media: The Effect of US Television Coverage on Al-Qaeda Attacks.” (2017).

[8] Asal, Victor, and Aaron M. Hoffman. “Media effects: Do Terrorist Organizations Launch Foreign Attacks in Response to Levels of Press Freedom or Press Attention?.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 33, no. 4 (2016): 381-399.

Will the Kim-Trump Summit be a Step Towards Peace?

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Photo Credit: CNN

On May 10th, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong applauded the announcement of a summit set to for June 12th in Singapore between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald J. Trump, calling it a “significant step on the path to peace” (Straits Times). The announcement came after months of tension over North Korea’s steps toward acquiring the resources to develop and deliver nuclear weapons. The two leaders exchanged angry statements over Pyongyang’s testing of nuclear weapons, long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. But US President Donald Trump announced the date and location for the meeting on Twitter saying, “The highly anticipated meeting between Kim Jong Un and myself will take place in Singapore on June 12th. We will both try to make it a very special moment for World Peace!” The announcement has the potential to lead to progress on questions of peace on the Korean peninsula and the elimination of  nuclear threats to global stability.

Given that the Korean War ended in the 1950s with a truce and not an official peace treaty, the war between North and South Korea has technically never come to an end. Following a summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un in Panmunjom, the village in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, it was announced that the two leaders had agreed to take steps toward the development and implementation of a permanent peace treaty that would supersede the 65-year-old armistice. Following this summit, preparations for the Trump-Kim meeting began to gain  momentum. South Korean officials expressed their optimism in the wake of the summit saying, “We welcome the North Korea-US summit to be held in Singapore on June 12. We hope the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as permanent peace on the peninsula, will successfully come about through this summit,” (Reuters). Dialogue between the two Koreas has played an important role in conjuring  the political will in Washington and Pyongyang to engage in dialogue. South Korea will continue to play a crucial role in talks aimed at reducing tension on, and the denuclearization of, the Korean peninsula.

Kim Jong Un, the country’s supreme ruler announced his willingness to take steps toward the advancement of global peace during his New Year’s Day address to the North Korean people. He expressed his willingness to engage in talks with South Korea and potentially other representatives from around the world in exchange for an international commitment to not engage in steps to overthrow the North Korean regime. The process gained further traction when high profile South Korean officials and Kim’s sister engaged in dialogue in South Korea during the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games. Since then, multiple meetings, both public and private, have occurred  between Chinese and South Korean officials as well as officials from the government of North Korea. The Trump-Kim summit will mark the first time a sitting US president and the leader of North Korea will engage in face- to-face talks. The United States and North Korea have yet to establish diplomatic ties.

According to a statement from the White House, Singapore was selected due to its neutrality and stability, each of which will preserve both leaders’ security. The country is seen as neutral territory, though it has close economic ties with the United States. The trip to Singapore will be the farthest Kim Jong Un has traveled from North Korea since becoming the country’s leader in 2011. Recent reports said that President Trump would have preferred holding the meeting in the demilitarized zone at Panmunjom between North and South Korea. Singapore arose as a host option once Trump gave in to his aides’ concerns about his security. The Singapore summit announcement came after three American detainees returned to the US from North Korea following a second trip by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang to finalize summit plans.

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Mike Pompeo and Kim Jong Un. Photo: The White House/Getty Images

If held, the talks will take place following 20 ballistic missile tests and one nuclear test conducted by North Korea throughout 2017. During the last six months, North Korean officials have made numerous claims that some of the missiles that the country developed were capable of reaching the US mainland. This raised US national security concerns as well as those of US partners and allies in the region. Statements suggest North Korean nuclear advances strengthened US and international resolve to engage with Pyongyang through sanctions and diplomacy and prevent the country from becoming a bonafide threat to international peace and security. The US-North Korean talks, in addition to the potential progress they may enable, are unprecedented. It would be a shame for an opportunity of such potential to go to waste as a result of American or North Korean obstinance. Efforts from the US, China, and South Korea, aided by indispensable international cooperation, have so far proven effective. They will be in the future as well provided  all parties are clear-eyed about their agendas, willing to embrace a spirit of compromise, and determined to cooperate in order to advance mutually compatible interests.

How Exactly Are Acts of Violence Defined?

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© LA Times-FBI Agents in Austin, Texas worked from one blast to another to capture serial bombing suspect Mark Anthony Conditt

Last week our attention turned to Austin, Texas as it suffered a series of bombings. Authorities have been hesitant to define bomber Mark Anthony Conditt or his deeds. You can bet questions regarding his intent are foremost among those investigators are trying to answer. Was this terrorism? Hate-crimes? Or was Conditt just a, “…very challenged young man,” as Austin police-chief Brian Manley said? [1]

Many would see bombings like his as acts of terror and they would identify Conditt as a terrorist. Law enforcement has been reluctant to use these words. Let’s make this simple as can be: Merriam-Webster defines terrorism as, “…the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.” [2] A terrorist, unsurprisingly, is, “…an advocate or practitioner of terrorism as a means of coercion.” These definitions are tautologies, but they are as straight-forward as they come. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism with a bit more nuance, “…the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” [2]

My Rise-to-Peace colleague, John Sims, aptly pointed out in the wake of the Parkland shooting that the FBI sees terrorism, first, in one of two categories: domestic or international. Next, what’s noteworthy is that terrorism, “…is not a standalone criminal charge,” but one used to determine how government resources and personnel will be allocated. [2]

Key political staff, such as White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, have avoided calling Conditt a terrorist. Secretary Sanders tweeted there was, “…no apparent nexus to terrorism at this time.” [3] Greg Abbott, the governor of Texas (R), similarly refrained from referring to Conditt as a terrorist and said, “The definition of a terrorist is tied to the mindset of the person who committed the crime.” [3]

Are the definitions themselves, or the bureaucratic actions such words trigger, the reasons we haven’t deemed Conditt a terrorist? Were the events done as a means of coercion and in furtherance of political or social objectives? The investigation remains in its infancy so it’s too soon to tell whether Conditt was or was not politically motivated. Authorities were quite transparent about locating a 25-minute video on Conditt’s cell-phone of Conditt himself explaining how he made his bombs. Was there more to the video? Austin police-chief, Manley said, “We are never going to be able to put a rationale behind these acts.” [4] At this early stage, why does he seem so sure?

2018 03 25 Austin Ludolph Image 2 300x199 - How Exactly Are Acts of Violence Defined?© Getty Images- Serial-bomber Mark Anthony Conditt, 23, left two dead and four injured after a series of attacks in Austin, Texas

There will be those who see Conditt as a terrorist until they are shown otherwise. My Rise-to-Peace colleague, Maya Norman, pointed out, semantics matter: How we define politically-charged terms and why matters. As permutations of violence in our midst seemingly undergo a weekly mitosis, we must be fair about how we’re defining each act and why.

Sources

  1. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/us/terrorism-definition-trnd/index.html
  2. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorist
  3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/03/22/austin-bomber-challenged-young-man-or-terrorist/?utm_term=.8d2a8f412f53
  4. https://nypost.com/2018/03/21/austin-bombing-suspect-left-25-minute-video-confession-cops/

Legal Difficulties May Loom: Arms Sales Between The West and its Gulf Allies

According to John Irish and Emmanuel Jarry at Reuters, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E., “…are leading a coalition fighting the Iran-aligned Houthi group that controls most of northern Yemen and the capital Sanaa.” According to human rights groups’ legal counsel, “France faces heightened legal risks for supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. despite warnings such arms could be used in the war in Yemen,” (Irish). France’s arms sales to its two Gulf allies have been criticized for being used by the pair to take civilian lives, interfere with peace prospects and generally fuel the conflict in Yemen. France’s weapon sales to the two Gulf states could bring legal headaches in the months to come.

The conflict in Yemen between the Houthis and the international Saudi-led coalition has killed 10,000 people as of March 19th, 2018. Three million others are displaced. The conflict has shown few signs of de-escalation. More death, destruction, and displacement are expected unless the international community, the militias, and the countries engaged in the conflict agree to a ceasefire and peace-seeking dialogue. Unlikely. Each actor is committed to emerging victorious. Clearly, for the war to end, someone will have to lose or unlikely but significant concessions will be necessary from all.

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https://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Images/2017/6/22/6c2a986ceadd4321b5d7d274954426de_6.png

Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. see France as one of their most reliable sources for arms in the world. Each state purchases tanks, armored vehicles, munitions, and artillery. The U.A.E. alone purchases fighter-jets from France. The United States and France have continued selling arms to the Saudi-led coalition, while other participants have reduced their weapon sales fearing their use in the conflict. France and the United States agree that Iran and its proxy rebels are threats to stability and peace in Yemen. Therefore, it is unlikely they will roll back their coalition arms sales.

According to Amnesty International, “France’s arms transfers are contrary to its international commitments. The French government has authorized exports of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. in circumstances where these weapons can be used in the conflict in Yemen and could be used to carry out war crimes,” (Irish).

France would be wise to avoid seeming out of step with its stated commitment to human rights. It should adopt measures to more closely monitor the weapons it exports. Thusly, it can avoid selling to parties who use weapons on civilians as a matter of course. In turn, France’s beneficiaries in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh should be allowed to purchase on the condition that they candidly report how the weapons are being used to U.N.S.C.A.R. (the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation).

France’s foreign ministry described government’s processes as, “…robust and transparent,” in response to questions about France’s licensing system for exports. To be clear, France does have a proven track record of supporting and cooperating in efforts to strengthen peace and security in Africa for years. This will most likely continue to be the case. In light thereof, a priority should be made of ensuring its weapons are not used in the service of violating international law.

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Privately, French officials have divulged that France has already told weapon suppliers to exempt themselves from pursuing new Saudi and U.A.E export licenses. This is, at a minimum, a symbolic attempt to reduce its weapons transfers to Gulf states. “I don’t think you’ll see a clear pushback from us,” one French diplomat told Reuters, “What’s more likely is an informal message to companies to not bother asking for licenses. It will be a de-facto restriction but without saying it publicly, so as not to annoy the Saudis,” (Jarry).

The probability that the Saudi-led coalition will use French weapons in operations that could take the lives of innocent Yemeni civilians is high. France should make clear to its Gulf allies that such eventualities are intolerable. As stated, it has taken steps but it must be explicit about protocol so missteps aren’t made during the anarchy and, so-called, fog of war.

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The Yemen war has already cost too many lives. France and the United States have stated their commitment to returning Yemen to its people. The two western powers should commit themselves to pursuing a roadmap to reconstruction. They mustn’t leave the African nation in the tragic tatters that it finds itself in today.

Works Cited

Irish, John, and Emmanuel Jarry. “France Faces Legal Risks over Saudi, UAE Arms Sales: Lawyers.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 19 Mar. 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-france/france-faces-legal-risks-over-saudi-uae-arms-sales-lawyers-idUSKBN1GV2ME.

“UNSCAR: UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation – UNODA.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/disarmament/unscar/.

Aohruk. “UK Complicit in War Crimes through Arms Export to Saudi Arabia and UAE.” Arab Organisation for Human Rights in UK, aohr.org.uk/index.php/en/all-releases/item/7204-uk-complicit-in-war-crimes-through-arms-export-to-saudi-arabia-and-uae.html.

 

Terrorism or Just Terror: When Horror Springs From Within

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© Lisa Marie Pane/AP, The Atlantic

Alyssa Alhadeff. Scott Beigel. Martin Duque Anguiano. Nicholas Dworet. Aaron Feis. Jamie Guttenberg. Chris Hixon. Luke Hoyer. Cara Loughran. Gina Montalto. Joaquin Oliver. Alaina Petty.  Meadow Pollack. Helena Ramsay. Alex Schachter. Carmen Schentrup. Peter Wang.

These are the names of the Parkland victims. They were students, teachers, and coaches. They had dreams, hopes, and ambitions. They were all lost too soon and they must all be remembered.

The Parkland victims are the latest in an all-too familiar-cycle of events in the United States.  There have been twenty-five major school shootings since the Columbine massacre in 1999.  American children harbor ever-present fears of school shootings, parents anxiously await calls from loved ones, and the United States remains paralyzed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3xoVCJOoB8

But is it terrorism? The Federal Bureau of Investigation distinguishes two major forms of terrorism: international and domestic. International terrorism is that which is committed by an individual or group, inspired by or associated with a designated foreign terrorist organization or state. Alternatively, domestic terrorism is that which is perpetrated by an individual or group inspired by or associated with domestic political, religious, social, racial, or environmental ideas. Pared down, terrorism is a tactic. It is employed in the pursuit of a political goal to generate fear and intimidation in a specific population.

School shootings bear many of terrorism’s hallmarks.  Certainly, they are designed to stoke fear and intimidation.  Their target populations are schools and the individuals who attend them: children, teachers, and administrators.  However, school shooters are not typically motivated by political goals. They are not ordinarily tied to underlying terrorist causes like religious, racial, or social issues. Consequently, most school shootings are not considered terrorism.

We’ve learned that dozens of people in the Parkland shooter’s orbit, prior to the attack, reported him to authorities as a troubled person. Shortly after the shooting, rumors surfaced that the shooter had ties to a white supremacist group.  However, as of this writing, the Parkland shooter’s motivations remain unclear.

What would make a school shooting terrorism and not just terrifying? If we learn that the Parkland shooter entered the school to kill students in the name of a white supremacist idea, then Parkland could rightfully be called terrorism.  If he was motivated by religious or social grievances, Parkland could be described as terrorism. However, absent such verifiable motivations, labeling the attack and others like it domestic terrorism is far from a slam-dunk.  This remains true, despite a consensus that the attack was a consummately terrifying act perpetrated against the Parkland students and administrators as well as the psyches of students, teachers, and parents across our country.

Fear is ever-present, we are warned that violent, religious zealots can strike anywhere, anytime. We’re no longer safe on our streets; vehicles can be used as weapons of war.  Churches and synagogues are no longer sacrosanct oases from our daily lives, let alone violence if gunmen are bent on bringing terror through the doors.  Places we used to associate with leisure – movie theaters, outdoor concerts, schools – have lost the veneer of security. We are told if we see something, say something – anything suspicious must be pointed out.

More must be done to prevent school shootings.  Regardless of what we call the events or the motivations of perpetrators, more must be done.  We must see improvements in school safety, improved mental health awareness and access, and additional, achievable gun safety measures.  America’s children are being conditioned to expect school shootings. Drills, meant to teach students how to remain safe if the unconscionable occurs, are a new focus of the classroom experience. But the drills themselves instill the student body with fear and trepidation.

Apparently, if the United States cannot see an act of violence through the lens of international terror, then little gets done.  9/11 made the United States rethink airport security. Anthrax letters sent to Congress inspired the implementation of thorough mail-screening measures. Laptops were briefly banned [JS2] on U.S. airlines after it was discovered that they could be weaponized by terrorists. Yet, school shootings persist without sensible changes.

The generation advancing through our school system now has been initiated in blood and war. The post 9/11 generation was born into a world of ubiquitous terror, it is their normal. War, violence, both occur daily. Our youth are bombarded with reports of tragic events at home and abroad. The bad actors are known by all. It cannot be lost on these children that their lives are radically different from those of their parents, the latter of whom did not experience similar fears of school shootings on a day-to-day basis.

In closing, and at the risk of seeming contradictory, school shootings are less prevalent than appears to be the case and they do not inflate the level of daily gun violence in the United States. The difference is that each horrible act is inflicted en masse on an innocent, vital segment of our population. The children in school now will be our workers and leaders tomorrow.  We cannot allow these horrors to continually be inflicted on them without expecting a traumatized population to emerge.

 

Terrorism in Africa: Will Tillerson Tip the Scale?

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson traveled to meet with leaders of five African nations this week. He is there to strengthen U.S.-African ties and discuss security and counterterrorism. The countries he will be visiting include Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Certainly, his trip will also see him mending fences with leaders in the wake of President Trump’s “sh*thole countries” comment. That notwithstanding, Secretary Tillerson is in Africa to check in on counterterrorism efforts.

2018 03 11 Austin Image 1 300x167 - Terrorism in Africa: Will Tillerson Tip the Scale?

© Jeremiah Wakaya Secretary Tillerson’s plane touches down at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. He is received by Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Monica Juma and U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Robert Godec.

Secretary Tillerson will be, “…visiting nations engaged in battling Islamist terrorism, including Djibouti, home to Camp Lemonnier, America’s largest and most vital African military base,” [1]. Countries most steeped in conflict with prominent terrorist groups al-Shabaab and Boko Haram will command the bulk of the secretary’s time. Tillerson spoke at George Mason University hours before leaving for Africa. He provided the rationale for choosing the five countries, explaining that the United States has key prospects, troops, interests, and allies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Doubtless, he will be visiting Ethiopia which,“…is a close U.S. ally in its counterterrorism operations in East Africa, notably against al-Shabab,” [1].

2018 03 11 Austin Image 2 300x224 - Terrorism in Africa: Will Tillerson Tip the Scale?

© Austin Ludolph Before his departure for Africa, Secretary Tillerson discusses security, economic welfare, and counterterrorism with George Mason University’s President, Ángel Cabrera 

Tillerson gives an impression of equanimity, praising, “…the role the African Union and G5 Sahel Group have taken on the security and counterterrorism front.” Tillerson pledged, “…$60 million from the U.S. to the G5 security force,” this year. [2] Trump’s feelings may differ. His, “…latest budget proposal in February slashed spending for Africa by 37%, down $3.1 billion from current levels,” [3]. Time will tell how the trip affects counterterrorism and security measures in Africa. As you read these words, imagine Mr. Tillerson trying to repair this:

http://abcn.ws/2G5Yh71

Sources:

1. https://www.dailyrepublic.com/wires/tillerson-arrives-in-africa-with-a-narrow-mission-counterterrorism/
2. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/politics/tillerson-africa-challenges/index.html
3.http://abcnews.go.com/International/tillerson-cleaning-trumps-derogatory-comments-day-africa-trip/story?id=53609344

Can Deradicalization Reduce Violent Extremism? This Expert Thinks So

2018 02 25 Josephine Neulen Image 1 300x228 - Can Deradicalization Reduce Violent Extremism? This Expert Thinks So

When seeking counter-terrorism explanations and solutions, the focus is generally on why radicalization occurs. What happens after radicalization–deradicalization–is much more complicated. Deradicalisation programs are becoming increasingly important in countries that aim to avoid further violence and rehabilitate those who have been radicalized.

Deradicalization programs vary but can include counseling, theological education, and attempts to deemphasize violence in the radicalized person’s value system. There is much criticism of the programs’ effectiveness, however, since there is little evidence at this point to confirm whether or not these programs work.

The writings of Daniel Koehler, Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, and contributor to George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security are vital to understanding this new path. Despite much of the criticism leveled at deradicalization programs,

Koehler argues that arresting or killing people is not the answer to violent extremism since it leaves its appeal untouched or even strengthened[1]. Koehler argues that deradicalization is not the same as disengagement. Disengagement is a mere behavioral change ensuring that a person no longer commits illegal activities, but it does not imply a change in ideology[2].

It is important to understand what motivates a person to engage in violent extremism in the first place. A  broad survey of the literature regarding radicalization suggests that possible driving forces include lack of professional prospects, education, community support, or simply a person’s attempt to find meaning and honor in his (sic) life. Diverse schools of thought including sociological, empirical and psychological theories are converging to grapple with this problem.[3]

Koehler suggests a broad set of tools could be used to address an individual’s concerns, from vocational training to religious or psychological counseling, and even creative art therapy[4].

It is important, however, to tailor the deradicalization techniques to each individual. The ideology and identity that is ingrained during the radicalization process are deeply personal and difficult for a person to simply forget. This lack of efficiency is one of many legitimate concerns about deradicalization programs. Despite those concerns, more research and development could demonstrate that investing in these programs could significantly alter the way extremist groups operate, and perhaps, diminish their success.


[1] Price, Michael. (2017, May 26). Can terrorists be deradicalized? Science Magazine. 
[2] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 
[3] Koehler, D. (2014). The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet. Journal for Deradicalization, 0(1), 116–134.
[4] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 


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U.S. International Terrorism Strategy in 2018: New Battleplan or More of the Same?

Picture1 - U.S. International Terrorism Strategy in 2018: New Battleplan or More of the Same?

© Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

U.S. International Terrorism Strategy in 2018: New Battleplan or More of the Same?

On January 30, 2018, President Donald Trump presented his State of the Union speech before Congress and the nation.  Since 9/11, presidents’ State of the Union speeches have consistently highlighted the impact of terrorism and the United States’ strategy in combating its global presence. Yet, President Trump’s speech mentioned terrorism a handful of times and often in the context of immigration concerns. Although the United States is not the only power fighting against terrorism and extreme ideologies, as a vital actor, it remains important to understand the United States’ objectives and planned actions moving into 2018.

Through 2016 and 2017, the world has watched the gradual, ongoing pushback of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq. The US-led coalition has consistently brought the attack against ISIS terrorists. Kurdish forces and Arab allies reclaimed Mosul and later Raqqa.  Today, the so-called Islamic State retains only a small fraction of the territory it once claimed.

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Map of ISIS Territorial Control[1]

The fight is not over though.  ISIS maintains a foothold and their hateful ideology continues to spread online.  Unfortunately, the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy failed to outline a comprehensive strategy regarding how the factors underlying the conflict will be addressed, the same problem as the past administration. On January 18, 2018, Secretary of State Tillerson outlined five goals for U.S. national security interests in Syria:

  1. Defeat of ISIS, al Qaeda, and terrorist threats to the U.S.;
  2. Resolution of the Syrian conflict through the U.N. political process that assures President Assad’s removal
  3. Diminish Iranian influence;
  4. Safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced peoples; and
  5. Syria remains free of weapons of mass destruction.[2]

While these goals are laudable, they fail to articulate the U.S. strategy in Syria and the deployment of U.S. counterterrorism forces.  Tillerson affirmed that, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. will maintain a military presence in Syria.[3] Just like in Iraq, inadequate management of this victory can lead to the rise of a similar or greater terrorist threat in the region in years to come. The U.S. must remain leery of declaring victory without the assurances of responsible governance and plans to address deep cultural and religious tensions.  As Secretary of Defense Mattis indicated, the U.S. must be mindful what ISIS can morph into following their territorial defeat.[4]

For Afghanistan, the Trump Administration’s goals are more simplistic.  In 2017, President Trump increased the troop levels from 8,500 to 14,000.[5] General Votel, U.S. Central Command, indicated that an increase in American trainers would be vital to expand the fight against insurgents and the Taliban.[6] Under the Trump Administration, the U.S. military was given greater latitude to strike targets and operate within these conflict zones.

Partnerships with Afghanistan and its neighbor, Pakistan, will help in tempering the conflict. A strong U.S. security presence, with a freer reign of tactics, may push back the Taliban and insurgency parties, but only the regional actors may be able to completely resolve the conflict.  President Trump’s determination to withhold aid from Pakistan will not aid that objective or regional stability. U.S. troops may be able to reduce the Taliban and extremist fighters, but terrorism will not end in the area if Afghanistan and Pakistan are not players. One thing is certain, the Trump Administration is focused on the elimination of the Taliban and terrorist fighters in Afghanistan.

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Map of South Asia and Conflict Parties, and U.S. Troops in Afghanistan[7]

In conjunction with President Trump’s rhetoric, U.S. actions in the Middle East and South Asia are moving toward greater militarism.  The U.S. military has been able to reduce terrorist organizations’ strength.  This may lead to some positive outcomes, but it rarely has led to complete success against terrorism. Iraqi and Afghans history shows that the military cannot be the sole solution.  President Trump’s State of the Union did not address any methods or plans to counter violent extremist ideology (a root of many of these conflicts) in the region.  A comprehensive terrorist strategy – military and diplomatic – is necessary.

Sources:

————————————————————————————————————–

[1] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034

[2] https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/30/donald-trump-syria-strategy-216551

[3] https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/30/donald-trump-syria-strategy-216551

[4] http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/370295-the-isis-defeat-myth-no-one-talks-about-isis-sympathizers-and-us

[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/up-to-1000-more-us-troops-could-be-headed-to-afghanistan-this-spring/2018/01/21/153930b6-fd1b-11e7-a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html?utm_term=.83275c5c3741

[6] http://time.com/5085376/afghanistan-us-military-strategy/

[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-11/trump-is-playing-a-dangerous-game-with-pakistan

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