Insurgency

Ending Insurgency in Nigeria

October 1, 1960 was a significant moment in the history of Nigeria; finally, this nation would become an independent, self-governing entity. Accepted with a remarkable mix of hope and doubts, Nigeria set off on a journey that thus far has been characterized by many pleasant and unpleasant events.

Regrettably, the unpleasant events continue to reoccur on this journey, becoming a definitive part of Nigeria’s identity.  One such event was the over-a-decade-long insurgency in the northeast. From 2009 until today, the expenses of the Nigerian government on defence are well more than six trillion Naira. Despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, the country continues to face diverse threats from various groups, spiraling its development in a downward plunge.

Take Them Out?

“Those who are behind this insurgency will be taken out. They are being taken out one after the other, and it will get to a point that the last of them will be taken out, and then we’ll get to the end of it. It can be done within 17 months, that remains for this institution,” declared Femi Adesina, Media Adviser to the President of Nigeria.

The recent statement by Femi Adesina in response to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria is quite revealing. Interestingly, his view on taking the insurgents out to end the menace is not foreign to the government and has hitherto fueled its defence efforts.

Nothing short of an illusion is the premise that eliminating the insurgent group members is the solution to ending the bane of insurgency in the country. The current strength of the insurgency in Nigeria emanates from the same error of the government to eliminate members of the group in 2009. The lessons from the outcome of the government’s devastating error are still not learned, hence the repetition of the same failed strategy.

A Complex Situation

Considering the nature of the insurgency in Nigeria, it is not solely a matter of eliminating those behind it. Its sustainability thus far is mainly a function of the platform and the existing gaps in society it thrives on; so long as that platform exists, it is only a matter of time before another wave of insurgency awakens. Besides, the conflict in Nigeria is far too complex for the current proposed strategy.

The multifaceted nature of the insurgency poses a dire challenge to counterterrorism efforts. For instance, the famous terrorist group, Boko Haram, is highly defragmented with numerous cells, operating independently from various bases across Nigeria and other neighbouring countries in the West African region.

The continuity and the progression of Boko Haram’s operations and activities are clear indicators of the complexity of the problem. With the support and funding from other international terrorist groups, the activities of terrorist groups, like Boko Haram, in Nigeria continue to grow. Attempting to end insurgency in Nigeria without considering this essential aspect is more or less illogical.

The Way Out

The only way out of the problem Nigeria faces lies in a simple statement ascribed to the Chinese general Sun Tzu, “know thy enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.”

Until Nigeria understands itself first and then its enemy, its efforts in achieving any progress in security and development will only meet setbacks. The weak structures and system failures are areas that the government must urgently monitor. The diversity of Nigeria, which underlies many of Nigeria’s conflicts, is a potential strength for its unity if rightly harnessed.

The insurgency in Nigeria feeds off the weaknesses and gaps present in the country. Identifying these gaps and sealing them off is key to ending the insurgency. The government must be wary in developing strategies to avoid conflict with other efforts. A take-them-out approach raises many questions on the purpose of governance and directly opposes the de-radicalization efforts that the government accords a high success rate.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Repatriation

The Repatriation of European Women and Children

In 2019 there was a major incident of the capture of women and children possibly linked to ISIS. Approximately 1,000 women and children from Europe were imprisoned in camps in northeastern Syria, occurring after the crisis with ISIS.

Major Obstacles for the Repatriation of Children in EU

Diplomatic roadblocks created challenges for Europe to repatriate children. There were countless European and global efforts to resolve the problem of repatriations. However, continued refusals to repatriate children stemmed from legal excuses.

Unfortunately, the inability for the children to identify themselves as European citizens was another crucial obstacle they faced.  It was infeasible to prove their identification, especially under the barbaric and inhumane conditions in the detention camps. This resulted in an urgent call for help for the children to the European states in order to provide a practical solution to the nonexistent legal and identification documents so that they could return home.

European Security Endangered by ISIS

Former members of ISIS and their families detained in camps and prisons in northeastern Syria mean “a ticking bomb” for European security, the EU’s new counter-terrorism chief reported recently. Ilkka Salmi, the new counter-terrorism coordinator, provided for the first time at the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defense a detailed speech related to the most concerning threats in Europe. Salmi pointed out that in order to improve the humanitarian situation, the EU must support Syrian and Iraqi refugee camp residents to reintegrate into local communities.

Also, Salami emphasized that the consequences of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan led to the conclusion that the EU had to prevent the infiltration of terrorists “through the development of a common procedure for systematic and timely security checks of biographical data, for instance, against all the relevant EU and internal databases.” Salmi also warned that they “might have a not insignificant number of Afghans” evacuated by the U.S. and now waiting in Kosovo, who could pose security concerns for the EU.

According to sources and recent events, jihadist terrorism constitutes the greatest threat to Europe. The Islamic State looks for Europeans to join them in developing future attacks. Overall, more attacks were reported in 2020 than in 2019. Ten attacks occurred in 2020, resulting in 12 deaths and traumatizing nearly 47 people. In addition, lone-actor-jihadist terrorists, often linked with larger terrorist groups, have organized several attacks over the last seven years.

The Repatriation of Children and Women in 2021

On October 28, 2021, the United Kingdom repatriated three British children from detention camps in northeast Syria, according to Rights & Security International (RSI). Although the repatriation of the children was highly important, RSI demanded to have a more organized plan for the return of all the British children, their parents, and their caregivers.

Sweden is one of the highest-ranked countries in Europe for individuals participating in ISIS. The beginning of the repatriation process resulted in confusion and panic as several Swedish relatives searched to bring their relatives home. The Kurdish government organized a solution by bringing everyone back to their roots. However, it was a temporary relief and has not been repeated since.

Throughout 2021, Belgium and Finland repatriated children via organized methods. Since then, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kosovo have also completed a safe return for women and children previously held in the Syrian camps.

Germany has returned eight women and 23 children from a camp in northern Syria who participated in the Islamic State.  According to German officials, they were brought back in a joint operation with Denmark, in which three women and 14 children were returned.

Most of the European members of the Islamic State were usually held in Kurdish camps in northern Syria. In March 2019, most of the European Islamic State members were exiled in Kurdish camps since the fall of ISIS. Overall, the German Foreign Ministry announced in October that women and children had arrived at Frankfurt Airport from the Roy Prison Camp in northeastern Syria.

After approximately two years of indifference to the circumstances in the repatriation of children and women in Syria, the time has come for the European states to take drastic measures in order to process their repatriation.

 

Katerina Rebecca Paraskeva, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Capitol

One Year After January 6: Who Attacked the Capitol?

Just over one year ago, Americans across the nation watched in stunned disbelief as one of the most powerful and sacred symbols of their democracy was attacked by a seething mob of their fellow country men and women. Through their televisions, laptops, and mobile devices they witnessed the furious crowd tear through barricades and police lines, smashing windows, breaking doors, and invading the Senate floor. They watched as armed guards drew their weapons to defend the House Chamber, as rioters erected gallows at the front of the building, and the incensed mob chanted for the execution of elected officials.

For many Americans, the Capitol riot represented the violent intrusion of domestic extremism into mainstream politics. After the September 11 attacks, the United States’ political leaders and national security establishment swore to defend the country from violent extremists who would do it harm. They launched a two-decades-long campaign to combat global jihadist terrorism, pouring trillions of dollars into defense spending, engaging in counter-terrorism missions across 80 countries, and authorizing the creation of an entirely new agency dedicated to homeland security.

Given this extraordinary focus on combating global jihadist terrorism, it is perhaps unsurprising that the rapid expansion of domestic right-wing extremism was missed. Today, intelligence reports warn that the most lethal threat to American security comes from the country’s own citizens. This threat now outstrips that posed from U.S.-based jihadists; a recent report by the New America thinktank in Washington D.C. concluded that in the two decades since September 11, far-right extremists have killed more people on American soil than domestic Islamist extremists.

Who Stormed the Capitol?

January 6 represented the eruption of this domestic security threat onto the mainstage of American culture and political life. As Americans tried to make sense of how 2,500 of their fellow citizens could storm the Capitol, people quickly jumped to conclusions as to who organized the attack. The various flags, banners, and symbols displayed throughout the crowd led many to the assumption that the riot was largely orchestrated by far-right extremist groups.

However, whilst these groups were certainly present throughout the attack, and likely played a pivotal role in its incitement, analyses have revealed that the vast majority of those involved in the storming were normal, everyday Trump supporters. This reality suggests a different and possibly much more menacing threat than that posed by far-right groups alone; indeed far-right extremists fall into categories familiar to law enforcement, who have established frameworks for addressing the threat they pose. The riotous storming of the Capitol represents the emergence of a new violent mass movement wherein average Trump supporters, with no obvious ties to the far-right, unite with extremists to forcibly enact their political goals.

Research conducted by the Chicago Project on Security and Threats concluded that the overwhelming motivation for the Capitol attack was President Trump’s injunction to his supporters that they prevent Congress from certifying Joe Biden as the winner of the presidential election. The attack, according to the authors of the research, was “not merely an exercise in vandalism or trespassing amid a disorderly protest that had spiraled out of control”, it was “unmistakably an act of political violence.”

Moreover, whilst right-wing extremists belonging to militia-like groups received substantial mainstream news coverage, 89% of those arrested in relation to the attack had no affiliation with any known militant organization. Indeed, the demographic profile of the Capitol rioters significantly diverges from the typical right-wing extremist. Whereas 26% of far-right extremists arrested between 2015 and 2020 belonged to a white-nationalist gang, this was true for just 1% of those arrested in relation to January 6. Those who marched on the Capitol were significantly older and wealthier than the typical far-right actor, 40% were business owners or held white-collar jobs. They worked as CEOs, accountants, doctors, lawyers, and IT specialists, indeed less than 1 in 10 were unemployed.

Mainstreaming Right-Wing Extremism

According to Cythia Miller-Idriss, the director of the Polarization and Extremist Research and Innovation Lab at the American University, the Capitol riot represents the mainstreaming of right-wing extremism. “The majority of the rioters were hitherto ordinary Americans who had only recently embraced radical ideas. Their pathways to political violence did not involve a clearly defined ideology or an affiliation with particular groups but instead were shaped by a propaganda campaign that engulfed the full spectrum of right-wing politics.”

This kind of extremism is challenging for security experts and counter-terrorism officials. Violent mass movements are often unorganized and difficult to categorize, indeed the coalition of extremists on display during the Capitol attack included an array of strange bedfellows. According to Miller-Idress, the January 6 mob included not just traditional far-right extremists, pro-Trump activists, and QAnon conspiracy theorists, but also “‘wellness’ advocates opposed to vaccines, libertarians opposed to mask mandates, gun-rights proponents protesting perceiving threats to the Second Amendment, and ‘accelerationists’ seeking the violent collapse of political, economic, and social systems.”

Adapting to the Threat

In the United States, domestic extremist groups were once motivated by relatively coherent ideological beliefs. Security, intelligence, and law enforcement officials developed strategies, frameworks, and fields of expertise to counter these groups. However, these specialized approaches do not apply to the kind of violent mass movement embodied at the Capitol riot.

“Tactics such as monitoring, surveillance, and infiltration are harder to apply in an environment that is more spontaneous, fragmented, and characterized by rapid evolution and surprising coalitions” says Miller-Idress. “Simply put, the tools that authorities use to combat extremists become less useful when the line between the fringe and the center starts to blur. The federal government urgently needs to adapt to this new reality. Extremism has gone mainstream; so must the interventions needed to address it.”

Counter-extremism efforts designed to tackle threats from the fringe are no longer viable. The threat now comes from the mainstream and counter-terrorism strategies must be adapted accordingly. The U.S. needs to stop conceptualizing the risk of political violence as belonging exclusively to the domain of national security. It must adopt a broadscale response focused on addressing the various grievances and vulnerabilities that fuel extremist ideology. The U.S. has the ability to prevent this extremism, to rebuild public trust, and to restore a sense of civic unity. But to do so, it must first accept its new reality.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Domestic

Domestic Terrorism in 2022: Key Risks and Trends

As 2022 commences, the domestic security landscape continues to evolve and mutate. The COVID-19 pandemic, and our efforts to contain it, have upended many people’s way of life, causing enormous disruptions and forcing substantial economic and psychological hardship upon communities.

The pandemic has also led to a significant increase in the amount of time individuals spend online, socializing with others and attempting to make sense of their changing world, further deepening humans’ technological dependence. Meanwhile, climate change continues to present an enormous global challenge, with the much anticipated COP26 meeting being widely hailed a disappointment.

As our world continues to change, so does the domestic security threat. As society attempts to make sense of the COVID-19 pandemic, and communities suffer the economic fallout of its impact, vulnerable individuals and fragile communities will become increasingly susceptible to extremist ideology.

As distrust in governments and institutions continues to grow, and global challenges remain unmet, individuals will increasingly use online platforms to find like-minded individuals, developing networks to provide a sense of community, security, and identity. This deepening tribalism has the potential of fragmenting society into a patchwork of hostile, ideological communities.

The Global Jihadist Movement

Although it now receives less attention amongst the global community than it did during the peak periods of the Global War on Terrorism, or indeed, during the more recent years of ISIS’ prominence, the global jihadist movement continues to represent a substantial domestic threat, remaining one of the most lethal terrorist risks.

Despite the apparent demotion of the Islamist terror threat to a second-tier priority amid the United States’ shift in focus to great power competition and pandemic response, the threat of jihadi terrorism remains active. Whilst recent years have seen several of the most notable international jihadi terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda and ISIS, weakened by the counter-terrorism efforts of western forces, many of their overseas offshoots and affiliates remain mobile.

Despite its abhorrence to many Muslims around the world, extremist Islamist ideology continues to resonate with radicalized individuals throughout the west. The Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan represents a major propaganda victory for the global jihadi movement.

Moreover, the Taliban’s severe approach to counterinsurgency warfare has inflamed the country’s security crisis, exacerbating the risk of civil war. This potential conflict may find itself joining the array of other armed campaigns waged by Islamists throughout Africa, further expanding the potential of overseas battlefields to become magnets for foreign fighters from the West.

This internationalization of the jihadist terrorist effort is a major security threat, motivating domestic extremists to take violent action against their own societies and providing combat-training for western recruits, many of whom will evade capture in returning to their home countries.

Right-Wing Extremism

After the September 11 attacks, the United States’ national security community maintained a two-decades-long focus on combating international jihadist terrorism. Estimates as to the cost of this global endeavor reach as high as $8 trillion, and by the end of 2019, the United States was engaged in counter-terrorism missions across 80 countries. Given this extraordinary focus on combatting the global Islamist terror threat, it is perhaps unsurprising that combatting the rapid expansion of domestic, far-right extremism remained somewhat peripheral.

White supremacists, neo-Nazis, and other right-wing extremist actors, groups, and ideologies now present a clear domestic threat. Racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and white supremacy are increasingly motivating attacks throughout the West. Indeed, the Global Terrorism Index has reported a 320% increase in far-right terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2018, many of which were concentrated throughout Western Europe, North America, and Oceania, in cities such as Pittsburgh, El Paso, Oslo, and Christchurch.

The armed insurrection at the Capitol on 6 January 2021 demonstrated the extent of the right-wing extremism threat within the United States. The attack involved over 100 injuries and caused $30 million in damages. It also provided a showcase of the various groups, beliefs, and ideologies that permeate the broader right-wing extremist milieu within the United States.

Among these was the QAnon movement, an online meme that has evolved into one of the most influential conspiracy theories in the United States. The iconography of the movement was on display throughout the Capitol attack, on signs, banners, and clothing. Indeed, QAnon is becoming increasingly pervasive throughout the broader conservative movement, with over half of Republicans saying that at least “some parts” of the QAnon worldview are accurate.

In 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation drew attention to the radical adherents of QAnon as a domestic terrorism threat. Certainly, their core belief in a powerful and secretive global cabal of nefarious, Satan-worshiping elites certainly has the potential to incite other violent actions.

Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has injected an array of novel and outlandish conspiracy theories into the extremist milieu of the far-right. These theories often form part of elaborate mis- and disinformation campaigns involving government corruption, social control, and even depopulation. These beliefs can serve as powerful catalysts for radicalization and violent extremist action.

Anti-Technology Radicalism, Eco-Fascism, and the War on Civilization

Several of these pandemic-led conspiracy narratives involve an obsession with recently introduced technologies, including mobile passports, mRNA vaccines, human microchip implants, and 5G telecommunication systems. As of now, opposition to these technologies is largely organized in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the various conspiracy theories surrounding it.

However, security experts have warned that these beliefs, and the actions they have incited, including the destruction of vaccine vials and 5G communication towers, have the potential of morphing into a broader, unified movement against technology; this form of extremism has been referred to as anti-technology radicalism.

Indeed, as artificial intelligence, robotics, and the other emerging technologies of the fourth industrial revolution further exacerbate existing social and economic grievances, including job insecurity and a deepening wealth gap, it is possible the anti-technology movement will expand into a fully-fledged domestic security threat.

This aversion to technological advances is also connected to a growing form of extreme eco-fascism. As climate change creates new social stresses, and individuals become increasingly frustrated by government inaction, right-wing extremists are adapting environmental concerns to fit their narratives and worldview. This is achieved by adopting environmental language for nativist, nationalist, and racist ends, emphasizing notions of “blood and soil”: the idea that particular ethnocultural groups share a symbiotic connection with their homeland.

Through the lens of these right-wing extremists, the answer to the environmental crisis is the strengthening of borders, the increased marginalization of racial minorities, and an obsessive focus on ethnocultural identity.

Both the El Paso and Christchurch terrorists alluded to eco-fascist ideology in their manifestos, and indeed both anti-technology radicalism and eco-fascism feed into a broader neo-Luddite movement encompassing an array of other concerns, including urbanization, consumerism, and industrialization. This anti-technology, neo-Luddite movement will continue to recruit followers as the climate crisis expands and emergent technologies arise. Indeed, as researchers have noted, it may well already be set on an escalatory path toward a war against techno-industrial civilization itself.

Left-Wing Extremism

Whilst jihadists and right-wing extremists most likely remain the strongest and most lethal domestic security threat, the uncertainty and disruption engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic, economic instability, climate change, and emergent technologies may activate largely dormant forms of political violence, including left-wing extremism.

As economic insecurity and social disruption is increasingly forced upon individuals and communities, they will be vulnerable to left-wing narratives that emphasize violent action as a means to redress wealth inequality, government incompetence, and corporate malfeasance.

Currently, left-wing extremists, including violent anarchists, radical strands of Black nationalism, and antifa, present a significantly weaker threat than jihadists or right-wing extremists. Nonetheless, violent far-left actors have demonstrated their ability to incite civil unrest.

Recent history has demonstrated that far-left actors are willing to use improvised weapons, such as projectiles, commercial fireworks, and petrol bombs to target police, property, and other avatars of perceived social injustice. Indeed, firearms are increasingly appearing at left-wing protests, and recent arson and car ramming attacks could suggest left-wing extremists are growing more willing to deploy violence in service of their ideological agenda.

Reciprocal Radicalization and Fringe Fluidity

Whilst the increase in the threat of far-left violence is driven, in large part, by individuals’ growing sense of social and economic grievance, and its capture by extremist actors, the expansion of the left-wing extremist threat may also be connected to the recent upsurge in far-right violence. This process, wherein extremist groups fuel one another’s rhetoric and behavior, is known amongst researchers as reciprocal radicalization.

This process, also known as co-radicalization, cumulative extremism, and interactive escalation, describes a situation wherein extremists groups mutually reinforce the radicalization of their opponent groups, producing a self-feeding cycle of hatred, intolerance, and resentment.

Whilst the process was first described by researchers investigating the relationship between militant Islamists and anti-Islamists, this phenomenon of reciprocal radicalization also feeds the increasing hostilities seen in confrontations between far-left and far-right actors.

However, security experts warn that the prevalence of these simple ideological dichotomies in describing the extremist landscape, such as those drawn in descriptions of the relationship between militant Islamists and anti-Islamists, or left-wing and right-wing extremists, is deeply limiting.

Increasingly, lone actors and small groups of domestic extremists, these being the most likely perpetrators of violent attacks within the United States, are motivated by diverse ideological amalgamations of extremist beliefs. These extremists are motivated by so-called “salad bar” ideologies that draw from numerous, and sometimes even contradictory, ideological foundations.

The adoption of pro-environmental rhetoric amongst right-wing extremists is a classic example of this absence of ideological rigidity, a phenomenon that has been labeled by researchers as fringe fluidity and ideological convergence. Here, the lines between left-wing ideology, of which pro-environmental beliefs have long been associated, and right-wing ideology merge together.

Indeed, a number of prominent terrorist and extremist actors have demonstrated this ideological fluidity, such as: Andrew Anglin, the founder of The Daily Stormer, one of the most popular neo-Nazi websites, was once a devoted vegan and self-described anti-racist who advocated a range of left-wing causes; Nicholas Young, a fanatic supporter of militant Islamism sentenced to fifteen years in prison for aiding ISIS, was also a devoted neo-Nazi; and Adam Gadahn, the American al-Qaeda spokesman who was once one of the most wanted terrorists in the world, experimented with Evangelical Christianity before converting to radical Islam.

This fringe fluidity, powerfully exemplified by the far-right’s growing fetishization of militant Islam, represents a significant challenge to security experts’ traditional understanding of extremist ideology. Its growing prominence amongst violent extremist actors is a concerning trend. Iindeed their attempts to reconcile disparate, and even oppositional, elements of different ideologies, including those drawn from jihadism, neo-Nazism, anti-technology radicalism, eco-fascism, and left-wing extremism, demands a deep overhaul of the long-held assumptions and established analytic frameworks that have dominated security experts’ efforts to combat violent extremism.

Conclusions

As mistrust in government, institutions, and the established social order continues to grow, fueled by the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, the acceleration of the global climate crisis, and the disruption of emerging technologies, individuals and communities become increasingly vulnerable to radicalization.

Indeed, according to the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2040 report, published in March 2021, “large segments of the global population are becoming wary of institutions and governments that they see as unwilling or unable to address their needs. People are gravitating to familiar and like-minded groups for community and security, including ethnic, religious, and cultural identities as well as groupings around interests and causes, such as environmentalism.” This trend, should it continue, will drive violence, extremism, and terrorism within the United States and beyond, as ideological groups increasingly come to see the world in terms of “us versus them.”

The U.S. government should work, in conjunction with the private sector and civil society organizations, to counter these trends. Efforts must be made to address the grievances that fuel extremist recruitment, including the various socioeconomic and psychological stresses that have been amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Currently, the most lethal threat remains that posed by jihadists and right-wing extremists. Nonetheless, security officials must remain cognizant of other domestic security threats, including those presented by eco-fascists, anti-technology radicals, and left-wing extremists. These new potential security threats will likely be empowered by government inaction on climate change and the disruptive impact of emergent technologies.

Moreover, domestic terrorist attacks are increasingly perpetrated by lone individuals or small extremist groups. These actors are often motivated by incoherent amalgamations of ideological belief, challenging security experts’ established understanding of extremist ideology. Efforts must be made to expand and adapt the methods used to counter this growing form of extremism; indeed a major overhaul of long-established counter-terrorism frameworks may be demanded.

As global and domestic circumstances change, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, socioeconomic disruption, climate change, and the impact of new technologies, the threat of domestic extremism will rise. To address this challenge, the United States must work to protect vulnerable individuals and communities, providing support that helps mitigate the allure of extremist ideology. Nonetheless, the U.S. should sustain its commitment to countering jihadism and right-wing extremism, whilst also developing its ability to adapt to new security threats and the emergence of new forms of extremism.

As 2022 commences, the domestic security landscape continues to evolve, driven by the disruption and instability of our changing world. Should the U.S. hope to counter this upheaval, and its exploitation by extremist forces, then it must work to revitalize broken communities, rebuild public trust, and restore a sense of civic unity.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

UAE

Guests in the Gulf: Afghans in the UAE

As part of an ongoing series from Rise to Peace, this article hopes to bring continued attention to the Afghan refugees’ conditions within their new places of residence. As they have made their way far from their homes in Afghanistan, they have braved treks across water, mountains, and militarized borders for a better life.

The states in which Afghans have made this journey cover vast distances, ranging from the mountainous terrain of Iran to the Alps of the French-Italian border. However, this article will delve into the lives of Afghan refugees inside the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Lives in Limbo

With the migration of Afghans across the region, a situation has arisen where nations are scrambling to provide the bureaucratic and humanitarian support to address this influx. Many migrants came with what they could carry and left where they had spent decades of their lives for safety.

Several thousand migrants from Afghanistan have sought refuge within the UAE in order to seek entry into other countries such as the United States. In response, the UAE has housed them within Emirates Humanitarian City as they await further response as to what their future will be.

Per Rise to Peace’s previous report, the conditions within the Emirates Humanitarian City were less than adequate for the safety of the migrants. While the migrants were among the lucky few to escape out of the country when the country fell to the Taliban in August of 2021, they still face a long road ahead towards finding a new home.

One of the largest impediments for Afghan refugees has been the lack of resources to process the necessary paperwork for the next stage in the asylum-seeking process. For some families, the case for being taken to the United States is stronger than others since they have family members who were interpreters for the United States. Those who do not have such a connection to the United States have had a more difficult time getting their cases processed.

For the migrants located within the UAE, the prospect of being forced to return to Afghanistan is one they cannot afford, due to the dire conditions brought on by the Taliban. A critical threat that befalls Afghan migrants facing deportation is a humanitarian disaster that has put millions of Afghans at risk of hunger. Furthermore, Afghan migrants would also face repression by the Taliban, which has prevented journalists from covering protests surrounding the Taliban targeting ex-soldiers who served Ashraf Ghani’s government.

What Policymakers Can Do

When taking in the dire situation the Afghan migrants face, it is clear that action must be taken to alleviate their plight. For those with the strongest case for being processed to the United States, the U.S. government must provide the necessary resources and personnel to help expedite the necessary paperwork needed to obtain asylum. They must also collaborate with the UAE to extend the same protections to the families of Afghan migrants of the UAE who are still in Afghanistan.

For those Afghan refugees without a strong application for entry into the United States, the U.S. must coordinate with the United Kingdom to identify individuals for the newly minted Afghan refugee resettlement scheme, which is set to launch this month.

The Home Office of the United Kingdom announced that they would provide resources to help start the new lives of Afghans within their new home by providing tools such as language education and healthcare. This new scheme presents a model for other nations to follow throughout Europe.

Should the U.K.’s scheme continue to go ignored by the rest of the EU, migrants will be preyed upon by criminal trafficking organizations. This situation played out dangerously before during the last migration crisis the EU encountered. These policies have proved to be disastrous for migrants as several thousand have been lost within the Mediterranean. One nation alone cannot face the logistical challenges presented by Afghan resettlement efforts but must be overcome through a coalition of governments and NGOs.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Nigeria

History Replay: What’s Next for Nigeria?

One Nigeria, a phrase capable of setting off sparks depending on whom you address. Is Nigeria one? Or is this merely wishful thinking? Since its creation and independence, Nigeria has witnessed violence and conflicts; however, none of these threatened its existence as much as the 30-month long civil war from July 6, 1967 until January 15, 1970.

The civil war between the Nigerian-led government of General Yakubu Gowon and the Republic of Biafra, a secessionist state led by Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, is one that left the country more divided than ever before.

Often referred to as a genocide by the sympathizers of Biafra, the civil war saw the death of well over one million children due to starvation and diseases. It is a widely held belief that the casualties from hunger and starvation during the war were far more than those caused by combat.

Almost every ethnic group has its version of the war, blaming different individuals or citing failed strategies as the problem. However, the reality is evident in the unfortunate cruel segregation and oppression of the Igbos, which persists today.

New Agitations

Fifty years after the bloody civil war, new agitations for secession from Nigeria have rekindled, with the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leading the charge. IBOP claims that the desire to secede from Nigeria is due to their treatment as slaves and second-class citizens in Nigeria.

The Nigerian government’s response has been to use violence to attempt to quell the agitations. As expected, the government’s response has only succeeded in spiraling things out of control, committing worse crimes and atrocities in their bid to safeguard the country’s unity.

Like most groups that adopt violent approaches, the recent agitations started peacefully. With the constant maiming and killings of members of the group by the Nigerian security forces, the group’s switch to violent means came as no surprise.

Today, the combat activities in some of the southeast states bear much resemblance to an ongoing war. The Nigerian government’s dogged approach towards quelling the agitations of Biafra in comparison to the extremism of terrorist groups in the northeast and northwest raises questions.

Python Dance II & the Dance of Peace

Operation Python Dance II was a military operation launched in late 2017 in the southeast region of Nigeria. The Nigerian Army publicly stated that this operation aims to curtail the activities of kidnapping, which have plagued the region. Consequently, operation Python Dance II began to take on a different form, looking like an attempt to suppress the agitations of Biafra.

The activities of the Nigerian Army raised fears among the people of the southeast, with several claims of indiscriminate killings of unarmed civilians and pro-Biafrans by the Nigerian Army.

Two years after operation Python Dance II, the Nigerian Army has renamed the operation Dance of Peace. Renaming the operation appears to be the most significant change since the activities of the Army largely remain the same.

Alleged killings of unarmed civilians are still highly reported; arrests and detainments of Biafra agitators are also on a steady rise. With these events, the agitations continue to intensify, with the IPOB group, now designated as a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government, launching both offensive and defensive attacks.

Secession?

Following the unrest in the southeast region, civil groups have called on international actors to intervene in the situation. While the likelihood of secession via dialogue seems slim, the agitators are also unlikely to back down due to the current administration’s opposition.

In the words of Chief Cyprian Okoye, the leader of the IPOB in Australia, “we derive strength in the fact that we are already down, and a man that is down does not need to fear nor fall. You cannot beat a baby and ask him not to cry. If they have beaten us and deny that we are not members of the same country, it is our duty to cry, and I know those who have ears will not let the tears drop from our eyes to be in vain in the end.”

The fear of another civil war is slowly building among Nigerians, with many hoping that these fears never come to pass. Sadly, it seems that history is replaying itself again; grievances are uncapping, the government’s perception of unity is still the same, and the country is in a worse state than it was over 50 years ago. Rather than wait to initiate a disaster or crisis response, a better step is to prevent a disaster and crisis altogether.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

MS13

How to Classify MS13: Gang or Terrorist Group?

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. government accused 14 leaders of the criminal gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) of terrorism. The decision of the American judicial branch resembles the 2015 ruling of El Salvador’s Supreme Court, which also classified the MS13 as a terrorist group.

The decision to categorize MS13 as a terrorist organization opens the debate on how to confront these criminal organizations and what should be the means used for to confront them.

What is the Mara Salvatrucha?

The Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS13, originated in the late 1970s and early 1980s in California, where young people and adolescents from El Salvador formed a gang. In the mid-1980s, more Salvadorans joined the gang, morphing it into a criminal organization, operating in cities such as Los Angeles and rivaling other criminal groups.

However, MS13’s biggest rival is the Latino gang Barrio 18. The war waged between MS13 and Barrio 18 has left hundreds of people dead throughout the region.

Eventually, in the 1990s, hundreds of gang members were deported to Central America. In fact, 31,000 criminals were deported, of whom 12,000 were deported to El Salvador, a country riddled with economic and social difficulties. The deported MS13 gang members took advantage of the country’s situation and recruited hundreds of young people, expanding and increasing their territorial control.

Some of the criminal activities of the MS13 include drug sales, extortion, arms sales, kidnapping, robbery, and commissioned killings. In addition, various investigations have identified links between the MS13 and Mexican drug cartels. Collaboration between these criminal structures translates into alliances facilitating drug and arms trafficking in Central America.

Is MS13 a Terrorist Group?

In 2015, El Salvador’s Supreme Court established that maras are considered terrorist groups, especially the MS13 and the Barrio 18 gang.

The court ruling established that a terrorist is defined as anyone who uses means and methods to generate collective terror, affect personal or material legal assets, and cause potential damage to the democratic system or the security of the state. Thus, the Court indicated that the MS13 meets these conditions and therefore can be considered a terrorist group.

El Salvador’s Supreme Court ruling was intended to generate greater sanctions against MS13 gang members and reduce violence in the country.

However, the court’s decision was criticized for a few shortcomings and ambiguities. Some analysts point out that gangs are not necessarily terrorist groups, but that they do use acts that generate terror. In addition, the ambiguity of the law may cause human rights violations, the penalization of social protests, and the interpretation that arbitrary acts are committed in the name of the fight against terrorism.

Years later, a similar court ruling within the United States was made. On January 14, 2021, 13 of MS13’s leaders were indicted on terrorism charges and imprisoned in El Salvador on behalf of the Eastern District of New York. After that decision, the MS13 is considered as an organization at the same threat level as the Mexican cartels or the Colombian guerrillas.

The MS13 leaders were charged with conspiracy to lend and conceal material support to terrorists, conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism that transcend national borders, conspiracy to finance terrorism, and conspiracy of narco-terrorism in El Salvador, the United States, and Mexico.

Again, the decision was made in order to use more powerful legal instruments against gangs. However, it is also noteworthy that terrorism charges have been brought against members of an organization that has not yet been classified as a terrorist group by the State Department, which can be problematic for the judicial system.

How to Classify and Deal with MS13?

To this day, the question about how MS13 should be classified and how it should be sanctioned is debated. Their classification as terrorists offers valuable legal tools for fighting these gangs. However, various analysts have pointed out the risks that this entails.

Therefore, it is important to reflect on how to combat MS13 in a comprehensive manner. It is necessary to understand the causes of the group’s birth and evolution, such as the socioeconomic context of the members they recruit and the economic, political, and social situation of the countries they operate within. With this knowledge, more effective public policy solutions can be identified to prevent new people from joining MS13, reintegrate previous and current members into society, and improve the living conditions of vulnerable children and teenagers.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Radicalization

Understanding the Drivers of Radicalization in Nigeria

Violent extremism in modern-day Nigeria dates back to pre-colonial days; from the far north to the deep south, historical records show the presence of violent extremism that lingered on to the colonial era and continues to date.

A unique point to bear in mind is the multifaceted nature of violent extremism, especially in Nigeria, where multiple criteria usually form the cause of extremism. Like many other closely linked concepts, defining extremism remains somewhat difficult, mainly owing to the varying perspectives of what may or may not be considered extreme.

Regardless of the existing disagreements in conceptualizing extremism, certain key factors appear to be comparable. Extremism is an ideological phenomenon that vehemently opposes a widely accepted, usually age-long, belief or perception, conceiving the views as wrong and seeking to replace them with a preferred alternative. Violent extremism is the attempt to fulfill extremism by an intended use of violence.

After the conception of an extremist ideology and subsequent goal, furthering that goal involves a process often referred to as radicalization or also known as a violent extremist social trend.

According to a UNHCHR Report, “the notion of ‘radicalization’ is generally used [by some states] to convey the idea of a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations.”

Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Nigeria

While violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, the recent phase of extremism, religious extremism, is not specific to Nigeria. It is, in fact, a global challenge that managed to find a footing in Nigeria and continues to gain ground, threatening security while also hampering development in the country and the entire region.

In Nigeria, the goal of extremist groups is to replace the present democratic system of government, which is viewed as Westernized, and thereby infringing on and directly challenging the tenets of their Islamic faith with a Sharia style of governance. Most proponents of this extremist view have, at one time or another, attempted to impose these views on other Nigerians, radicalizing as many as possible to join in the efforts to achieve their goal.

Boko Haram, which is more or less the face of terrorism in Nigeria, was inspired by such an extremist movement and continues to grow its base throughout the region. The majority of the members of extremist groups come from youth and children, both within and outside northern Nigeria. Researchers, stakeholders, and the government of Nigeria continue to seek to understand the factors that aid radicalization in Nigeria, and as expected, there is much confusion on the possible cause.

Ahmed and Many Others

Some schools believe that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures are drivers of radicalization in Nigeria. However, other schools object to this premise, as members of extremist groups also include wealthy, influential, and educated people. Besides, much of the population of Nigeria fall into these categories, yet they do not directly or indirectly support the extremist ideologies of Boko Haram.

Ahmed, an alias, is an illiterate Muslim youth from a poor background in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram had made attempts to recruit him, which he declined. During one of the many attacks and attempted forced recruitments by Boko Haram, Ahmed watched as his father was gruesomely murdered. Eventually, Ahmed found his way to the country’s capital, Abuja, where he began a new life as a bus driver, staying focused on living a peaceful and crime-free life. Like Ahmed, when many Nigerian youth face challenging conditions they continuously refuse to accept the extremist views forced upon them by extremist groups.

The Principle Driver of Radicalization in Nigeria

Regardless of the disagreements on the drivers of extremism in Nigeria, one key element that continues to resound in schools of thought is the government’s unintended role in fostering extremism. The failure of the government to execute its duties creates several conditions and grievances that enable extremist ideologies to thrive.

The government’s inappropriate response widens existing gaps, giving extremist groups a campaign tool and an added advantage to garner support from susceptible individuals. Beyond these factors is the state’s alleged role in aiding the longevity of extremist groups, like Boko Haram, by political actors, in hopes that they would garner public support.

Conclusion

Poverty, illiteracy, and a lack of religious teachings are not the cause of extremism in Nigeria, as some research claims. A survey by the Pew Research Centre showed that 94% of Nigerian Muslims hold a negative view of Boko Haram. Unfortunately, most assertions on the drivers of extremism are founded upon stereotypes fuelled by actors on and behind the scenes.

Ultimately, the principle driving force of extremism in Nigeria remains the state; and, many other push factors for individuals can be attributed to state failures.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Afghans in Turkey

Restless in Ankara: A Report on Conditions for Afghans

As the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August, many Afghans became fearful of what life under Taliban rule would resemble. This fear prompted a wide array of Afghans from across civil society to try and flee the country before their worst fears would actualize.

Those who could flee traveled to Kabul to evacuate Afghanistan via airlift or went into neighboring states such as Pakistan  While those who were lucky enough to make it out were spared from the Taliban’s reprisal killings, they still face many challenges in the new nations they find themselves in. One of the states which has become a top destination for Afghan refugees is Turkey.

Conditions Faced by Afghans

In 2021, over 40,000 Afghans made the dangerous trek into Turkey from Afghanistan. Afghan refugees within Turkey face a myriad of issues that present a critical threat to their security. One such threat that the refugees have faced on their journey has been their mistreatment by the Turkish police. This comes at a time when Turkey has seen an influx of Syrian migrants in recent years, which has resulted in a rise of anti-immigrant sentiments. Based upon reports by Rise to Peace founder Ahmad Mohibi’s trip to Turkey, only a small amount successfully make the crossing from Iran due to heightened security measures.

Another critical threat Afghans are presented with is the human smugglers who have taken advantage of their dire situation. The operations of these smugglers are often sophisticated in nature, using coded messages on popular messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram. These operations demonstrate cyber capabilities, allowing them to stay ahead of law enforcement agencies of the states receiving Afghan refugees. More importantly, these capabilities allow them to endanger the lives of one of the world’s most vulnerable populations.

Furthermore, while the journey to Turkey is harrowing for many Afghans, it is simply a stopover for seeking asylum within member states of the European Union (EU). For some, the journey takes them by boat, which puts them in danger of becoming victims of drowning from boats capsizing, such as the unfortunate incident in the English Channel. For others, they have made dangerous treks through mountain ranges, such as the Alps, where they run the risk of freezing. Another route Afghans have chosen has been to cross the Bosnia-Croatia border, where they hope to claim asylum within Croatia since it is a member of the EU.

A Path Forward for Europe

Most importantly, it is imperative for the regional bloc to address this humanitarian disaster through policy. This can be achieved by states within the bloc implementing a uniform policy for the absorption of the Afghans claiming asylum. For this to happen, the states that do not care for international humanitarian law must be persuaded with a pragmatic argument presenting the threat to their security, should an uncoordinated response be the norm.

This disregard for humanitarian obligations by some EU nations is best represented by the likes of Hungary, which has refused to accept more migrants to embolden their base. The last instance of a migration crisis which the EU faced was exploited by members of terrorist organizations who posed as refugees. Should a response not be unified, they would be at risk of further exploitation by extremist organizations that capitalize upon a disorganized effort.

The EU has become a beacon for migrants due to its political stability and the opportunity for economic advancement which outpaces the states from which migrants arrived. So long as this is the case, the EU will face more waves of migration in the future. By refusing to address the issue of migration, it will ignore one of its most persistent issues for decades to come. While its adversaries may not recognize this fully, it provides the bloc with an opportunity to shore up one of its most salient challenges to its integrity.

Furthermore, resources should be made available to states which are facing the migrant crisis by other states within the bloc as well as international organizations like the UNHCR. The issue of migration has become a divisive issue among the EU, as other states are seen as taking the lion’s share without any help. This only serves to divide the EU politically and provides an opportunity for nefarious actors to pursue their interests at the expense of EU states.

The bloc must recognize the current geopolitical climate which it finds itself in and understand that it is another arena in which other powers will try to project their influence. Only by effectively managing the current crisis through solidarity will the EU protect its interests as well as its security.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

COVID-19

The Perfect Storm: COVID-19 and Extremism

The COVID-19 pandemic has upended human society across the world. Over the last two years, governments have sought to control the impact of the virus by introducing a range of new laws and policies, including lockdowns, public health mandates, and restrictions on social gatherings. They have also initiated the largest global vaccine rollout in human history, pioneering a new era of mRNA vaccine technology.

Governments, researchers, and security experts have warned that the pandemic, and the various strategies implemented by governments in their efforts to contain it, is fueling extremism.

The pandemic has been a source of profound stress, instability, and disruption for individuals and communities. School closures, precarious employment, housing challenges, and the increasing cost of living have placed a heavy burden on many people.

The physical isolation imposed by lockdowns, social restrictions, and other public health measures has fueled a dramatic rise in mental health issues, and has led to a substantial increase in online engagement, producing “a perfect storm” for extremist radicalization, according to the UK’s Head of Counter Terrorism Policing.

A Gift for Extremists

A new report by the United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), published on 17 December 2021, provides an overview of COVID-19’s impact on global terrorism. The report warns that violent extremists have “sought to exploit pandemic-related sociocultural restrictions that have led people around the world to spend increasing time online, by strengthening their efforts to spread propaganda, recruit, and radicalize via virtual platforms.”

The report also emphasizes that “as new pandemic-related social restrictions result in closures of educational institutions, reduced employment and entertainment opportunities, and curtailed community programs, there are concerns that resilience against violent extremism conducive to terrorism in fragile communities might be reduced, thereby making individuals more vulnerable to radicalization in such settings.”

Michelle Grossman, a researcher at the Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, has described how the pandemic has been weaponized by extremist actors in their efforts to “to attack and undermine democratic systems and institutions, enhance social and political polarization, destabilize truth consensus and accelerate violent civil unrest.”

Frequently, these efforts take the form of dis- and misinformation campaigns designed to promote pandemic-led conspiracy thinking. For these campaigns, “the pandemic was a gift,” according to Grossman, “swiftly weaponised and deployed by those who seek to escalate violent conflict”. The efforts of these extremist actors have “been significantly aided by the ways in which the physical social isolation imposed by public health efforts to mitigate pandemic risks has been offset by increased online social engagement, as people seek to maintain both social connection and access to sense-making information that helps organize their experience of social chaos and upheaval.”

Indeed, according to CTED’s report, “pandemic-related conspiracy theories and mis/dis-information will continue to fuel a situation that is conducive to societal divisions…terrorist groups across ideological spectrums are already seeking to exploit alienation and grievances rising from pandemic-related measures and perceived State excesses by weaponizing those divisions.”

A Catalyst for Radicalization

A recent study, published on 17 December 2021 by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, has found that pandemic-led conspiracy theories and mis/dis-information have become central to the online recruitment efforts of the far right and other extreme right-wing communities.

“COVID-19 has served as a catalyst for radicalization,” said the study’s author, Ciaran O’Connor, an expert in disinformation and online extremism. “It allows conspiracy theorists or extremists to create simple narratives, framing it as us versus them, good versus evil.”

The study analyzed around half a million messages across more than 200 Telegram channels associated with right-wing extremism. Telegram is an online messaging service that has become a popular platform for the far-right due its limited content moderation. The researchers found that around 70% of the channels they monitored discussed COVID-19 between January 2020 and June 2021; and that 90% of the most viewed posts from far-right groups contained misinformation regarding COVID-19 vaccines or the pharmaceutical companies manufacturing them. One Telegram channel saw its subscriber count increase tenfold after it began disseminating COVID-19 conspiracy theories.

Much of the COVID-19 misinformation promoted by far-right groups was underpinned by white supremacist ideologies and other racist belief systems, including anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Indeed, the study found consistent crossover in topic relevancy between white supremacist and conspiracy communities on Telegram when discussing the pandemic and identified two prominent far-right extremists involved in running a COVID-19 conspiracy channel. This channel, which receives around half a million daily views, was found to serve as a COVID-19 pandemic hub for other conspiracy and extremist channels, including at least three white supremacist channels.

“COVID-19 has created fertile ground for recruitment because so many people around the world feel unsettled,” said Cynthia Miller-Idress, director of the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab at the American University. “These racist conspiracy theories give people a sense of control, a sense of power over events that make people feel powerless.”

The study’s findings are particularly concerning given the various incidents and attacks around the world that suggest some extremists are transitioning from online engagement to real-world action. Pandemic-driven social unrest has already been linked to the increased targeting of minority communities, including a surge in Asian-American hate crime and anti-Semitism. It has also provoked violent riots across the world, several of which have involved injury and even death. Misinformation and conspiracy theories have also motivated individuals to destroy vaccine vials, damage communications infrastructure, and to arm anti-vaccine and anti-government propaganda posters with hidden razor blades.

The Long-Term Effects

The concern for many security experts is whether the cessation or moderation of the pandemic will dampen the extremist threat it has fueled, and to what extent extremist groups will retain the support of those they have recruited through their propagation of pandemic-led conspiracy theories.

Moreover, the question should be asked, according to Michelle Grossman, as to whether “the longer-term social, economic and political impacts of the pandemic, which may well outlast the immediate public health crisis, [will] provide fertile ground for continuing political and social polarisation that extremists can channel toward violent action?”

CTED’s report specifically warns against “the proliferation of emergency measures and the curtailing of civil liberties” which “if left unchecked,” the report says, “has the potential to exacerbate existing grievances and may be exploited by terrorist and violent extremists.”

According to Grossman, the extension of government authority and the enforcement of public health measures throughout the pandemic “have been consistently reframed by extremists as instruments of social control, government corruption and state illegitimacy”. Indeed, the CTED report states that governments “need to ensure that pandemic-related social restrictions, including restrictions of human rights through the use of emergency powers, are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, implemented fairly in a non-discriminatory manner and, most importantly, temporally limited.”

Conclusions

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused unparalleled social upheaval, and has subjected individuals, communities, and nations around the world to a host of new challenges and stresses. Governments, the private sector, and civil society organizations must work together to combat the virus, mitigate its consequences, and prevent its exploitation by extremist actors.

The pandemic has exacerbated social inequality and exposed a range of structural problems. These social divides are preyed on by extremist actors, who exploit fragile communities and vulnerable individuals to recruit support for their cause. Efforts must be made to remedy these divides, and to cut off support for extremist narratives rooted in the social and economic grievances fueled by the pandemic.

Efforts should also be made to maintain enlightened online discourse. Eroding trust in governments, media, and institutions fuel conspiracy thinking and empower disinformation campaigns. Restoring this trust is vital in order to combat the spread of extremist narratives online and prevent extremist recruitment strategies based on government mistrust and institutional corruption.

Governments must continue to uphold human rights in their development and implementation of pandemic-mitigation policies and must work to avoid inflaming grievances by suppressing individual liberties. To this end, states must ensure that pandemic-related restrictions and public health measures are strictly required, and that their implementation is fair and, most importantly, temporary.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Rise to Peace