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 by Kristine Olsen

A Rallying Cry for ISIS Fighters

This week Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi put rumors of his death to rest when he released an audio recording urging the remaining ISIS followers to continue their fight in the name of Islam. The recording reminds followers and the rest of the world that ISIS is neither gone nor completely defeated. Its followers have dwindled since the peak of ISIS’s power and holding of territory the size of Britain in 2014. This week’s message is believed to be a last-ditch effort to rally followers to execute acts of terror and thus provide relevance to ISIS again. The message acknowledges losses over the past year and notes it is a test from God. In the last three years, the group lost 90% of its geographic holdings in Iraq and Syria.

The location and time of the recording are unknown, although Baghdadi mentions Eid al-Adha, which suggests the recording is recent. The message also congratulates those having led attacks in Canada and Europe and calls for followers to overthrow the governments of Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The message is said to have sparked a few isolated incidents, but these could have been coincidental. In the message, al-Baghdadi says, “A bullet or a stab or a bomb would be worth a thousand operations. And don’t forget to drive into crowds in the streets.” The recent increase in vehicular terror acts, suggests the recording is new. There are rumored to be 20,000 to 30,000 ISIS true believers in Syria and Iraq. That the group has shrunk is undeniable, but it is premature to suppose they cannot regroup and trigger real harm.

Baghdadi rarely releases messages – the last one was a year ago – and so some analysts believe he’s desperate to re-create relevance for and re-build his army. He has only appeared in public once, which suggests he feels insecure about his security. The message is unlikely to advance large, orchestrated terror attacks. But it could prompt smaller attacks, and it could catalyze ISIS lone-wolf types. The recording is a reminder to the world that the fight against ISIS is not over.

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https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45277322

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 by Kristine Olsen

Malaysia Shutters Saudi-funded Anti-Terror Facility

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Saudi Arabia’s King Salman speaks with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak during a Memorandum of Understanding signing ceremony in Putrajaya, Malaysia on Monday. (Reuters)

Following the Malaysian general election in May of 2018, the newly elected government decided to permanently shut down the anti-terrorism center which had been set up by former Prime Minister Najib Razak. The center, known as King Solomon Center for International Peace (KSCIP), was financed and backed by Saudi Arabia. The new government called into question the validity of a Saudi-funded de-radicalization center.

Officially, the center was closed for safety issues. The new government expressed concern that its operations would generate unwanted attention from the Islamic State. The stated purpose of the center upon creation was to, “…combat terrorist threats and the spread of propaganda and ideologies bandied about by the extremists and the terrorists.”

Some suggest closing the center will offend the Saudi government and disrupt diplomatic, economic, and political ties between Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Others believe it is a good break which comes at a good, natural time of change. So doing, those say, allows the new government to distance itself from the old government, and perhaps Saudi Arabia.

During the Obama administration, Saudi Arabia was a close, US counter-terrorism partner, yet there is also speculation that Saudis use government funds, filtered through NGOs, to contribute to radicalization and violent extremism. The previous Malaysian administration was known to be corrupt. The former Prime Minister was arrested on corruption charges twice, and one of the instances involved the Saudi royal family. The new regime’s move to distance itself from the old regime’s policies and practices is not altogether unwise.

Theoretically, it seems self-evident that an anti-terrorism facility should serve as an asset to the country and help bring about a more peaceful, stable environment. But corruption overshadows that message and the good work KSCIP promised to do. The War on Terror and Islamic extremism have featured squarely in Malaysian current events. The government has introduced several anti-terrorism bills.

If centers like the KSCIP operated beyond the reach of foreign influence, educating young people, and focusing on peaceful, global change, then that would be a palliative to countries actively combatting terror. Meanwhile, upon closing, the center’s responsibilities were absorbed by the Defense Ministry.

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 by Vincent Lofaso

Imran Khan’s Five-Year Test

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https://aaj.tv/2018/08/imran-khan-elected-22nd-pm-of-pakistan/

Earlier this summer Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Party was elected Pakistan’s new Prime Minister, ending the Pakistan Muslim League’s (PML-N) five-year reign. Imran Kahn’s PTI Party is forming a coalition government, promising to fight corruption and introducing austerity measures to manage government spending given the country’s dire economic crisis. Major challenges await the new government, including boosting the devalued currency and halting militant group financing. Besides security at home and foreign policy issues like Afghanistan and India, the government is expected to seek more than $10 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to balance its budget, as well as from partners like Saudi Arabia and China. The loans come with conditions which will affect the majority of Pakistanis. The economy – including ensuring the affordability of everyday items like milk and sugar – will be the biggest challenge to the incoming prime minister. Young Pakistanis who supported the cricketer have high hopes for Pakistan.

Who is Imran Khan? Now 65, Khan was raised in Lahore by his ethnic Pashtun family and became one of Pakistan’s most famous cricketers. As captain of the national team, he led Pakistan to victory in the 1992 World Cup before retiring and devoting himself to social work. Khan later founded the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Party (PTI) to vouchsafe justice for all Pakistanis. In 2002, he won a National Assembly seat in the general election. He also led protests against election fraud in 2014 and demanded Nawaz Sharif’s government resign. Khan ran on domestic promises to rout corruption, create 10 million jobs, and construct 5 million low-cost homes. On foreign policy, Khan advocates resolving the Kashmir dispute, peace talks with the Taliban, and criticizes U.S adventurism in neighboring Afghanistan.

What’s significant about Imran Khan’s victory is how his justice banner connected with voters. His pleas on behalf of ordinary Pakistanis struggling for a living paid off, which recalls   Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s slogan Food, Shelter, and Clothing. One wouldn’t be remiss for pointing out that Khan’s team lacks the experience and chops of former Pakistani leaders like Bhutto and Sharif. Khan is a breath of fresh air for Pakistan, as well as a break from tradition, but will he transform sentiment into successful policy outcomes and give Pakistanis what they need?

Seen in a particular vantage point, Khan’s team’s naivete can be seen as net neutral. Pakistan’s experienced leaders like Nawaz Sharif, as often as not, brought the country piles of debt, rendering Pakistan on the brink of bankruptcy. New people and ideas could allow it to start afresh and hopefully, Khan’s team remains dedicated to improving ordinary Pakistanis’ lives, especially in his base at Punjab. There, folks would like nothing more than contribute meaningfully to the country’s development.

The European Union Election Observer Mission found no election day vote-rigging, a real departure in this region. It found a lack of opportunity equality and systematic attempts to undermine the ruling party. Nonetheless, the elections were well organized and result discrepancies were consequences of governmental and election commission flaws rather than malice. Pakistani elections were commended by EU observers as fair, despite pre-election procedure improvements suggested for the next term.

The opposition’s criticism took three forms: first, that PTI had nothing to do with election tampering, let alone rigging. Second, the Pakistani Electoral Commission owns aforementioned administrative flaws. Khan has been transparent about investigating administrative flaws. At the end of the day, he won 116 seats in the National Assembly. The real crucible for Khan will be running a country of 200 million people – it will prove more complicated than captaining a Cricket team of 12, to say nothing of Punjab Province. It is hoped that Khan’s peace-offerings to the opposition will yield a new government which works for the people.

If Khan’s anti-corruption campaign succeeds, billions of dollars outside Pakistan could return. Will the PTI apply those funds directly to the Pakistani people’s needs? Will the nation’s powerful military give Khan the political space he needs to lead without the military meddling in decision-making? Even more, PTI is not a Pakistani ideological monolith. Rather, it is divided between activists who’ve jumped ship from parties like the PML-N and PPP. 

As regards foreign policy, Khan has been critical of the U.S.’s war in Afghanistan, especially its use of drones inside Pakistan’s Waziristan and other tribal areas. Khan is calling for better ties with Washington at a time when the U.S. has suspended Pakistani aid. The post 9/11 skepticism that defines each side’s perception of the other must be cast off for the two to find common cause on regional and global issues. Each wants what might be impossible for the other to deliver: Washington wants Pakistan to stop the arming and funding militants like the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba. And Pakistan wants the U.S. to sit for peace talks with the Taliban. This is to say nothing of Pakistan’s relationship with its neighbors, and U.S. nemeses, China and Iran.

Imran Khan wants to put aside the long-simmering dispute over with India over Kashmir. As a popular figure in India, Khan has visited that country many times as a Cricket player and social worker. If anyone is popularly situated in both countries, it’s Khan. A dialogue between Islamabad and Delhi – among the least economically integrated regions in the world – is desperately needed to benefit both sides.

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 by Kristine Olsen

Youth, Radicalization, and Rehabilitation in Northern Iraq: A Life-Skills Approach

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An ISIS video apparently depicting children in a training camp in 2015. Photograph: Isis

 

The Iraqi government has initiated a series of educational programs in detention centers that focus on the deradicalization of youngsters who were once part of terror groups such as ISIS. In a detention center in Northern Iraq, teenagers who were once ISIL recruits are learning to lead productive, non-violent lives. The detention center houses 75 boys, with the youngest being only 11 years old.

The boys have been accused or convicted of crimes, in some cases, as serious as murder and rape. Rather than having them sit in jails with other criminals and extremists, the center focuses on rehabilitation. The center takes responsibility for providing what it sees as traumatized teens with education and vocational skills, as well as arts exposure in the hopes of transforming a, “…destroyed person, into someone who has a life.”

Despite its honorable intentions, rehabilitation programs like this one are controversial with some. The question asked is whether these youngsters who have lived at least part of their lives dedicated to terror and extremist ideology can change.

Tariq Noori, who works at the Security Council of Kurdistan, believes their chances of a successful outcome are 50/50, a superior stat to the recidivism rate of parolees from Iraq’s prisons. That said, last month an attack on Kurdistan Regional Government headquarters was believed to have been perpetrated, in part, by a young man released from the center.

This is the only center with the capacity to leverage multiple educational efforts to deradicalize the youth. It should be pointed out, if any of these youngsters are released from this center and commit another crime, the government’s next move is to send them to one of the federal prisons run by Bagdad.

Needless to say, there, these young men will find no rehabilitation programs. The communities into which these young men are being released must avail continued support. It will take more than their term in the center to keep such young men motivated for good, and shunning extremism’s allure.

With programs in the communities, perhaps Iraqis can push that 50/50 chance of success to 60/40 or 80/20 in peace’s favor.

To counter violent extremism governments, institutions, and the populace should counter-narratives and help victims find peace and societal acceptance. Educational rehabilitation programs like the Iraqi Rehabilitation Center are critical to deradicalizing youth and ensuring these young men avoid extremist thought – in sum, to be productive members of society.

The rehabilitation center’s providers are optimistic. They hope the program is transformational, allowing boy soldiers to just be boys. In one interview, a young boy talks about leaving the violent part of his life behind and wanting to be a football player. We cannot give up on these boys, or we risk losing another generation to extremism.

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 by Liam Timmons

Comparing Targeted Killings Across Four Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups carry out targeted killings for a number of reasons: as a method of internal policing, in response to political repression, or domestic violence, and to exacerbate political or territorial fragmentation. The rate of political assassinations, whether perpetrated by terrorist groups or by regimes themselves, has risen since the early 1970s. Targeted killings are yet another tool in the terrorist’s toolbox, to be deployed against varied targets in the service of any number of motivations.

The Rise to Peace Active Intelligence Database identifies 269 targeted terror attacks worldwide between June 7, 2017, and July 24, 2018. Of these, 180 were claimed by or associated with at least one group, while 89 had unknown perpetrators. The attacks range from individual assassinations to election violence causing dozens of casualties, such as attacks on rallies in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. The most frequent perpetrator was Al-Shabaab with 48 targeted attacks, followed by Naxal groups with 35, and the Islamic State and New People’s Army with 21 each. Combined, these four groups are associated with nearly 70% of attributed targeted killings in the Active Intelligence Database.

 

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab was responsible for 48 targeted attacks, often using firearms and carrying out the attack in teams of two. In May 2018, Al-Shabaab released a video depicting an assassination team known as the Muhammad bin Maslamah Battalion, which operates within Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region. The video shows the battalion’s camp and training activities, as well as the group conducting drive-by shootings and assassinating targets in urban areas. Al-Shabaab focuses its assassination efforts on military officers, militia members, and government officials. These efforts have long been an important part of Al-Shabaab’s strategy. Targeted killings allow Al-Shabaab to disrupt Somali military and political operations and prevent the government from setting up a stable environment in regions seized from the terrorist group. In addition to firearm assassinations carried out by small teams, Al-Shabaab uses targeted suicide attacks to impact the Somali state. Unlike other groups such as the Naxals, Al-Shabaab attempts to avoid targeting civilians in their assassinations, which suggests an emphasis placed on strategic importance in their target selection. Examples of significant targeted killings perpetrated by Al-Shabaab include the August 2017 killing of Mohamed Ali Elmi, then-governor of the Galgadud region, and the shooting of a senior Somali general and his bodyguard in September 2017.

 

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Image Courtesy: NaxalRevolution

Naxals

Naxal groups were responsible for 35 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Typical Naxal targeted killings involve a group of attackers storming a village, seizing their target, and killing them with knives or axes. The perpetrators often leave behind pamphlets advocating their cause and justifying the killing. These attacks are often carried out as a means of internal control, as many targets are killed upon suspicion of being police informants. Naxal attacks on civilians are often carried out in times of economic distress when civilians are more likely to turn to government collaboration. The Indian government offers rewards for information leading to the death or arrest of Naxals and state governments have encouraged civilians to join militant groups that work in tandem with security forces. When civilians are incentivized to become informants or otherwise cooperate with government and security officials, Naxal groups step up targeted killings in order to maintain their regional control. The frequency and brutality of Naxal targeting killings suggest a high level of concern with preventing civilians from turning informant. In addition to attacks on civilians, Naxal groups have plotted the assassination of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and were responsible for a 2003 attempt on the life of Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.

 

ISIS and ISKP

The Islamic State (including ISIS and ISKP, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan branch) was responsible for 21 targeted attacks. Most often, these attacks were carried out against political leaders and most frequently used either suicide bombs or firearms. Due to the use of suicide bombs, the Islamic State’s targeted attacks often cause collateral damage, with roughly a third of said attacks resulting in more than five casualties. Additionally, with increased targeted killings of police and security personnel, the Islamic State has marked a return to the Soldiers’ Harvest strategy it employed in 2013. The collapse of security following assassinations allows ISIS to maintain hyperlocal control, even after it has lost territory and fighters, as has been the case in recent years. With fewer fighters able to carry out large-scale attacks, targeted killings serve as a force-multiplier with outsized strategic impact, given the resources dedicated to such attacks. The Islamic State also has a history of carrying out assassination campaigns against rival militant groups. ISIS operative Abu al-Baraa al-Saheli was detained and executed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham after a number of targeted killings impacted the militant group. ISIS continues to carry out these attacks against its rivals in Syria.

 

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Members of the Maoist New People’s Army. | Photo: Reuters

New People’s Army

The New People’s Army was responsible for 21 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Most were individualized attacks, with 15 causing only one casualty each, and all but one carried out with a firearm. The attacks targeted mostly low-level politicians such as village chiefs, policemen, and members of the CAFGU, an auxiliary unit within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. NPA assassination teams, known as Sparrow units, have been active in urban areas since the 1980s. In 1984, the Washington Post reported 80 policemen were murdered by the NPA. In a typical attack, Sparrow unit members “…emerged from a crowd, fired a single bullet into the policeman’s head, grabbed his pistol and merged back into the crowd.” This was an effective tactic, with police and business leaders living in fear of the NPA, but with everyday citizens viewing the rebels as their protectors. Sparrow unit tactics changed in 2012; assassins were deployed in localities to carry out assassinations instead of operating from urban safehouses. In March, President Rodrigo Duterte claimed that the Sparrow units had made a come-back, and he proposed a central marketplace for soldiers to protect against attacks.

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 by Ben Maalouf

Hezbollah: Exporting the Political Paramilitary Organization Model

Thursday evening, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah phoned six fighters in his paramilitary political party recalling them to Lebanon following months of support in Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s defense against Syrian rebel fighters. “You accomplished the greatest [accomplishment] of steadfastness, triumph, and fortitude in the history of Hezbollah,” said the incumbent who has held leadership over Hezbollah, a terrorist group according to the United States among others, since 1992.

The praised fighters were assisting in the defense of two Shia-majority towns from rebel siege in Northern Syria. On Tuesday, a deal was struck between Syrian government backers, Russia, and rebel backers, Turkey, wherein several thousand civilians are to be evacuated, thus ending the siege and allowing the Hezbollah fighters to return home.

In the last five years, this is not an unfamiliar story. This update regarding Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War is part of a spiking-trend involving the organization and its growing influence. This is the case politically in Lebanon as well as worldwide.

Hezbollah is the quintessential political paramilitary organization success story: highly trained, heavily armed, and politically and economically influential. Their influence and highly efficient communication present an even more dangerous situation.

Foreign extremists traveling to train in Lebanon, and vice-versa, hinder the fight to end extremism and strengthens such groups. But how does Lebanon secure an end to such training without drawing the ire of Hezbollah and its patron, Iran?

Beyond Syria, eight Hezbollah fighters were killed less than a month ago by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The fighters were providing military support to the Iran-aligned Houthi (Ansar Allah) group. Hezbollah denied the deaths, but are yet to rule out their involvement in the Yemeni proxy war. Saudi-backed Yemeni government officials have accused Iran, for years, of backing the Houthis in an effort to transform them into a carbon copy of Hezbollah.

Such reports coupled with ones highlighting Hezbollah’s training of Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria to legitimize the idea that Hezbollah has established itself as the manifestation of what terrorist-backers want such groups to become.

Furthermore, the continued development of these organizations’ communication methods reinforces one’s sense that the best way to cripple Hezbollah’s training and scope is to break its communication apparatus. Easier said than done, especially in Lebanon. The Lebanese military can barely secure its frontier. And due to Hezbollah’s Parliamentary presence, any military intervention against it would instantly unravel the country.

Ethical hacking methods exist, and while their implementation is difficult, and therefore improbable, a reduction in the flood of foreign financial support, and increased border security technologies could go away toward limiting extremist trainees’ movement to and from Lebanon. These considerations also come with consequences, so the question lingers, can Lebanon solve its problems without creating new ones?

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Hezbollah training ME Shiites to fight in Syria

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 by Vincent Lofaso

Hudaydah’s Resistance: An Inflection Point for the War in Yemen?

The Arab coalition’s operation against the Houthis in Yemen has been heavily bombarding Hudaydah for days. Hudaydah is a Yemeni port city on the Red Sea that is of great strategic significance. Through it, the Houthis have established a support line to give supplies to their base in the capital Sana’a.

A week ago, the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began a major offensive to assist the internationally recognized Yemeni Government to retake control of the city. On Monday, the coalition stated that it had killed 600 Houthi fighters and destroyed more than 200 targets since the operation began.

The UAE, the biggest contributor to the coalition after  Saudi Arabia, estimates that there are 3,000 Houthi fighters in Hudaydah and that the battle is over the airport where coalition forces have said they were based on the western side while the Houthis are in the north. On Tuesday, the Yemeni Army claimed they had taken full control of the airport, thus cutting the Houthis main supply-line, a major advance in its attempt to retake full control of Hudaydah. Outcomes, however, remain to be seen.

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Around 27 million people have been caught in the middle of Yemen’s war. AFP/Reuters

The latest offensive has alarmed the United Nations because Hudaydah accounts for 80% of Yemen’s humanitarian supplies and serves as a lifeline for relief from an impending famine. The United Nations has warned that the famine crisis in Yemen could be one of the worst the world has ever seen, threatening more than eight million Yemenis. Earlier this month, The Red Cross evacuated workers from Hudaydah amid rising security concerns.

Meanwhile, UN officials held administrative talks with the Houthis over the city’s port to maintain the flow of assistance. When the war in Yemen broke out in 2015, the Houthis managed to exile the internationally recognized government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to Riyadh. However, last week, Hadi and many members of his government returned to Aden, with permission from the coalition, for the first time in a year. Hadi’s return signals optimism on the ground but it does not guarantee an end to the conflict and the humanitarian crisis continues.

Hudaydah is home to 400,000 people. The coalition’s conundrum in Hudaydah is that civilians have no place to go. Gas prices have increased, there has been no genuine effort to protect civilians in harm’s way, food is scarce and getting medicine to Yemenis in the populous areas of Northern Yemen is near impossible, spelling all but worst-case scenarios for locals. The rub with the Arab coalition offensive from a military perspective is that for there to be a winner and loser the coalition might wage an operation that could take two more months causing untold devastation to an already devastated country.

Such humanitarian conditions would inevitably undermine peace. This state of affairs suggests point to realities: ongoing negotiations have failed, and there is either a military solution or no solution at all. No one, not the Arab coalition, the Houthis, nor the Yemeni Government are backing down. Each is choosing self-interest over consideration for civilians and that is most devastating of all.

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At least seven Yemeni civilians were killed, including a child, and more than sixty injured when the US-backed Saudi-led aggression coalition launched over 46 airstrikes on several provinces of Yemen during the past 24 hours, officials and medics told Yemen News Agency on Monday.

That there is no military solution in Yemen in a foregone conclusion, but a political solution must be pursued. For that,  all parties to the conflict must be willing to negotiate. There have been negotiations between the EU Four (France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy) with Iran, which have seen baby steps toward a political solution. Europe has shown goodwill toward Iran with its willingness to have peace talks, but there is persistent doubt in the Arab Coalition about moving toward serious peace negotiations and political procedures to end the crisis.

27,000 people have been killed in Yemen since the start of the war in 2015 and predictably the war is destroying the country. 17,000 airstrikes have been executed by the Arab coalition, backed by the United States and European powers, with a third of them hitting non-military targets. Extreme food, water, and medical supply shortages exemplify Saudi Arabia’s blockade on imports.

Half of Yemen’s medical facilities have been destroyed, 8,000,000 people are on the brink of starvation, 2,000,000 children face malnutrition, and a Cholera outbreak has plagued the country. Yemen remains the world’s worst man-made humanitarian crisis according to the United Nations. Schools, hospitals, roads, and markets have also suffered from bombing campaigns during three years of war. Monitoring groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International get no rest.

The Hudaydah situation is built on an already dire humanitarian crisis with two dimensions: civilians in the city face the threat of constant artillery fire and aerial bombardment. Additionally, the disruption of supplies moving through the port is consummate. Even in mass ‘Houthi-free’ sections of Yemen, there remains a lack of stability, a failure on the government’s part to manage the situation, and the mismanagement of war zone finances.

How to back away when both sides seek total victory with the Arab coalition having invested a ton to look like victors? Perhaps the most realistic scenario would be for the United Nations to propose a settlement wherein Houthis would surrender the port to the Arab coalition and the Yemeni Government could make room for negotiations and a political solution in exchange for peace.

Of all the Middle East conflicts, Yemen is one where things could be manageable were their political will on both sides sufficient to meet at a negotiating table. The fighting must stop, military force mustn’t advance political agendas, The UN must issue a ceasefire and humanitarian assistance like food, shelter, and medicine must reach displaced Yemenis. Regional dialogue on Yemen must advance a power-sharing system.

Thereafter the UN must oversee a free election and Yemenis must adopt a constitution that makes room for a new president and political system. The United States could use its leverage to end the crisis. And indeed congressional voices are calling even now for the U.S to stop the disaster in Yemen and take steps to aid the humanitarian situation. Absolute victory is beyond everyone’s grasp in Yemen, but the cost in human lives even to a prospective victor is too great. It is time for Yemen to be a cohesive country again.

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 by Gabriel Piccillo

Countering Youth Extremism in Iraq: A Generational Challenge

Of the many countries around the world affected by terrorism in recent years, few have suffered to the degree that Iraq has. The brutal terrorist group known by various names including ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh has drastically damaged the country’s economy and infrastructure. More than anything else, it has brought a great deal of bloodshed and suffering to the country’s people. Through international cooperation and resolve Iraq has made great strides in disrupting, weakening, and dismantling ISIS by targeting its leadership, financial resources, and sources of propaganda. The battle to prevent the group from re-emerging, however, is far from over. Fortunately, the international community finds itself at a place in time wherein preventing groups like ISIS from flourishing is possible.

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Qayyarah, Iraq © Cosimoattanasio – Redline

The Federal Government of Iraq announced months ago that the terrorist group had been defeated. This may be true. But eradicating and preventing Daesh and groups like it from reemerging presents the greatest obstacle to sustained peace and stability. In order to address this issue, it is crucial that local governing authorities within the country, aided by logistical support from the international community, take steps to de-radicalize and reintegrate the children who’ve been taken as intellectual hostages by terrorist ideology. Without so doing, the terrorist narrative will be passed onto future generations.

According to Peter W. Singer from Brookings, despite, “…global consensus against sending children into battle…there are 300,000 children under 18 (boys and girls) serving as combatants in almost 75 percent of the world’s conflicts; in 80 percent of these, there are child fighters under 15, and in 18 percent, fighters less than 12 years old.” Many children have fought alongside terrorist groups carrying out executions, acting as suicide bombers, and contributing – to an increasingly large degree – to the development and proliferation of extremist propaganda. Terrorist groups see children as invaluable in passing their ideology onto future generations. Children are vulnerable to manipulation and are seen as effective vehicles for carrying out surprise attacks against terror organization’s enemies.

In the face of poverty and despair, children with little access to education often see joining terrorist groups as a source of income, pride, and adventure. They join terrorist groups because they provide them with a feeling of purpose and belonging. Addressing the issues that enable children and their families to see terrorist groups as feasible paths to a decent quality of life is crucial to preventing such groups from being able to successfully recruit children.

A variety of steps should be taken by international organizations, nonprofits, civil society, and local governments to tackle at its ideological roots the challenge of modern-day terror in Iraq. In order to address child terrorism, it is crucial that steps are taken to identify and weaken the structures and mechanisms through which terrorist groups recruit and mobilize youths. Religious leaders have a significant role to play here. It is critical that religious leaders who children see as role models and sources of guidance are encouraged to explicitly denounce false and perverted interpretations of Islam espoused and promulgated by groups like ISIS. In so doing, it’s possible that fewer children will be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Further, it increases the possibility of youths themselves speaking out against terrorist ideology. This, in turn, would prevent children from subscribing to the terrorist ideology for that sense of camaraderie and belonging.

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Rudaw – An ISIS propaganda photo shows a prayer session for child soldiers

Steps should also be taken to strengthen the fragile education system in parts of rural Iraq to make it harder for terrorist groups to indoctrinate children with their views. Developing Iraq’s education system through international cooperation and ensuring that educators are teaching peaceful Islamic values is vital to preventing terrorist groups from preaching violence and hate to children. Schooling must be made affordable and accessible as well. Throughout ISIS’s rise and brief reign, impoverished families were forced to send their children to schools that taught extremist interpretations of Islam. Ensuring Iraq’s future generations are provided with quality alternatives to schools of this nature is an important step toward inoculating them against extremism’s allure.

Adopting measures to heighten the accountability of everyone – from religious and terrorist leaders to family members – for terrorist activity perpetrated by recruited youth, is also paramount to discourage the proliferation of terrorist groups’ extremist ideologies. Demonstrating that Iraq’s judicial system is capable of identifying and bringing to justice those who contribute to the radicalization of children will discourage adults from engaging in the practice thereof.

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Michael Kamber/The New York Times

Defeating terrorism in Iraq will be a generational challenge. Reducing the pool of desperate, vulnerable children available for terrorist recruitment can only be achieved through improved living standards and access to education. According to Brookings’ Singer, “…underlying problems of hopelessness often lead children (and even their parents) to believe they have no better future than joining terrorism and its likely outcome of an early death.” Fadl Abu Hein, a psychology lecturer from Gaza, notes, “Martyrdom has become an ambition for our children. If they had a proper education in a normal environment, they wouldn’t have sought value in death.”

Defeating terrorism in Iraq and preventing it from reemerging is possible. Addressing the socioeconomic factors that render children vulnerable to extremist recruitment is indispensable to a comprehensive long-term counterterrorism strategy. The international community must help guide Iraq in its efforts to provide its younger generation with a better education, an improved economic environment, and finally, hope. As long as Iraqi youths lack such opportunities they will seek meaning and welfare anywhere it can be found. As long as terror organizations can provide such things, they will be able to recruit from a pool of Iraq’s most vulnerable.

References

Singer, Peter W. “The New Children of Terror.” Brookings, Brookings, 28 July 2016, www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-children-of-terror/.

“Saving the ‘Cubs of the Caliphate.’” Fair Observer, Fair Observer, 5 June 2018, www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/iraqi-youth-countering-violent-extremism-isis-middle-east-latest-news-65241/.

“Iraq Research: Sense of Injustice Is Key to Violent Extremism.” United States Institute of Peace, 28 Dec. 2016, www.usip.org/publications/2016/01/iraq-research-sense-injustice-key-violent-extremism.

Press Release – June 5, 2018, et al. “Iraq: Extremism & Counter-Extremism.” Counter Extremism Project, 9 May 2018, www.counterextremism.com/countries/iraq.

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 by Liam Timmons

Taliban Innovation, Global Threat: Combined Suicide and Firearm Attacks

2018 06 23 Liam Pic 1 300x169 - Taliban Innovation, Global Threat: Combined Suicide and Firearm Attacks

Taliban attacks in Afghanistan represent a decade-long evolution of terror tactics, drawing influence from a variety of operating groups and countries, including Afghan mujahedeen fighters, Al-Qaeda, and Iraqi insurgents. Suicide attacks in Afghanistan are a relatively recent development. Afghan mujahideen fighters did not use suicide tactics in their campaign against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, nor did the Taliban use them for the first four years of the War in Afghanistan. Only 30 suicide attacks were executed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005, a figure which can be explained by the ethnic makeup of the Taliban at that time. Both the Taliban and the mujahideen were largely ethnic Pashtuns who scorned suicide.

However, a fall 2005 meeting between Afghan Taliban and Iraqi insurgent leaders dramatically changed Afghanistan’s terror landscape. Iraqi insurgents introduced IED and suicide bomb technology to the Taliban, causing an immediate uptick in these types of attacks in Afghanistan. 139 suicide attacks were committed in 2006, and 160 in 2007. Further, a Taliban tactic used to devastating effect involves sending suicide bombers to breach security perimeters, followed by gunmen to carry out direct assaults on a target. The June 2008 attack on Sarpoza Prison near Kandahar City is an early example of this combined attack tactic. The prison breach was initiated with a detonation at the back wall of the prison, and an RPG-triggered truck bomb explosion at the front gate. Gunmen then stormed the prison, killing half of the 30 guards and freeing 1,000 Taliban prisoners. The efficacy of this tactic lies in its rapidity and its shock-value. Police stationed nearby were unable to repel hostile gunfire, and a Canadian quick-reaction force would not arrive until two hours after the violence ceased. Two months later, an attack on Camp Salerno in Khost leveraged the same tactic but was foiled when three bombers were shot and three others detonated before reaching their target. Around this time, the Taliban carried out similar attacks on foot patrols in Helmand province, detonating IEDs or suicide bombs and then launching ambushes with RPGs and small arms.

The implementation of combined attacks can be seen as a response to the failure of Taliban traditional suicide bombings. While Iraqi insurgent groups such as Ansar al-Sunnah and Al-Qaeda attack soft targets like markets, the Taliban focuses its attacks on military and police installations. For, it was these entities who were responsible for drastically reducing suicide bombing casualties before the introduction of combined attacks. In the first 22 bombings in 2007, only three caused fatalities. This trend continued into 2010, when the suicide bombing death toll was halved from where it stood in 2007 in part because of better training of security forces as well as  NATO-led raids on bomb-making sites. Since late 2017, the Taliban has utilized Humvees and other military vehicles (often purchased by the US military for, and captured from Afghan security forces) as mobile IEDs. An October 2017 attack in Kandahar involving an opening car bomb, a firefight, and a second blast killed nearly three-quarters of an Afghan Army unit and allowed the Taliban to seize seven vehicles for use in future attacks. Rise to Peace’s Sara Huzar published an excellent analysis of this trend, which has the dual effect of being lethal and self-sustaining.

Combined attacks are now ubiquitous among terrorist groups around the globe. Rise to Peace’s Active Intelligence Database has identified more than 40 attacks since June 2017 that involve both suicide bombers and gunmen. The Taliban and Islamic State (ISIS and ISKP) are the most frequent practitioners of this method with 21 and 10 attacks respectively, but Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and others have also carried out combined attacks. Attacks combining the use of suicide bombs and firearms by these four groups caused a median of 27 total casualties, compared to 12 for attacks using only suicide bombs and 4 using only firearms. The mean casualties per attack was also highest for combined attacks at 40, compared to 23 for bomb-only attacks and 16 for firearm-only attacks. Each group’s reliance on combined attacks reflects the close relationship between suicide bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the Taliban and ISIS/ISKP carry out combined attacks at a much higher rate than the mean for the four groups examined, at 15 and 10 percent respectively compared to around 2 percent each for Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram.

2018 06 23 Liam Pic 2 300x200 - Taliban Innovation, Global Threat: Combined Suicide and Firearm Attacks

The Rise to Peace dataset demonstrates that suicide attacks have higher casualty rates compared to non-suicide attacks. However, suicide attacks inherently involve the death of perpetrators and thus have a higher operational cost to terrorist groups. Combined attacks, therefore, represent a tactical option for terrorist groups seeking a high lethality-to-operational-cost ratio by increasing the lethality of non-suicide attacks while mitigating the operational cost of multiple suicide attacks. This helps the Taliban perpetrate effective attacks despite suboptimal target selection (assuming maximum casualties inflicted is a terrorist group’s optimal outcome). As mentioned previously, the Taliban primarily executes suicide attacks against “hard” targets such as the recent attack on Kabul’s Interior Ministry and the 2008 attack on Camp Salerno. However, analysis by Northeastern Political Science PhD and U.S. Navy Reserve officer Joseph Mroszczyk finds that the perpetrator-to-total death rate is virtually identical for suicide and non-suicide attacks against police or military targets. Since the Taliban is committed to these targets, combined attack tactics dramatically increase the group’s impact.

Taliban suicide attack tactics constitute a synthesis of experience, shared knowledge, and practical necessity. Since the introduction of suicide attacks in Afghanistan in 2005, the Taliban’s repertoire has evolved to include combined attacks because of target selection and the increased lethality of these methods. Rise to Peace’s data bears out this conclusion. It also highlights the spread of combined attack tactics to groups such as the Islamic State, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram who have all used them to deadly effect.

AID Methodology

Filter where [weapon] [has all of] [suicide bomb AND firearm], Group by [group] to find combined attacks by any group

Filter where [group] [has any of] [*insert group name here], Group by [weapon] to compare attack methodologies within each group (this can be used for bomb only and combined attacks]

Data involving firearms only ignores targeted attacks because of their unique nature (bomb only and combined attacks include targeted attacks since they impact bystanders as well)

To find this data: Filter where [group] [has any of] [*insert group name here] and [weapon] [has any of] [firearm] and [weapon] [has none of] [suicide bomb] and [tags] [has none of] [targeted]

ISIS data combines ISIS and ISKP

One attack involved both the Taliban and ISKP so totals will be slightly off because of single-counting this attack

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 by Rise to Peace

After the Violence in Gaza; Is There a Way Forward?

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Mahmud Hams/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Recent violence along the border between Gaza and Israel has sparked significant international concern and condemnation. Sixty protesters of varying ages were confirmed dead as a result of violence on May 14th in Gaza, a self-governing Palestinian territory sandwiched between Israel, Egypt and the East Mediterranean Sea. In a statement on May 23rd, Nickolay Mladenov, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, told the United Nations Security Council that, “…the number [of dead and injured Palestinians] continues to climb.” UN figures claim that Israel Defence Forces killed more than 76 Palestinian protesters in  May 2018. 3,000 more were left injured. The largest protests took place on the day the United States moved its embassy from Tel Aviv, Israel to Jerusalem. It also happened to be the eve of Nakba Day, when  Palestinians remember their expulsion from specific Palestinian territories during the 1947-1949 war. The protests resulted in the most bloodshed since the 2014 Gaza war.

Protesters demonstrated for a variety of reasons but are unlikely to achieve any of their objectives. The massive demonstrations were aimed at the decision to move the United States embassy to Jerusalem, a city which Israelis and Palestinians have disputed for decades. The protesters sought to display the Palestinian desire to return to homes in Israel from which they have been prevented from returning for 70 years. Their demonstrations also called for an end to Gaza’s siege and economic isolation. The territory currently experiences high levels of poverty and is faced with the additional economic challenges of significant import, export, and travel restrictions.

According to Nathan Thrall from the International Crisis Group, “Israel, Egypt and the U.S. share an interest in containing the protests, and it is possible that they will now act with greater urgency to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.” Israel could face a variety of long-term consequences if it responds improperly or inadequately to the protests. According to Thrall, it could result in the fraying of bipartisan support in the U.S., alienation from parts of the American Jewish community, growing calls for boycotts and sanctions, the announcement by the UN Office of Human Rights that it expects to publish a database of businesses that are linked to Israeli settlements or enable and support their establishment, expansion, and maintenance and the warning in April from the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that, “Violence against civilians, in a situation such as the one prevailing in Gaza, could constitute crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC, as could the use of a civilian presence for the purpose of shielding military activities.”

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AP Photo/Nasser Ishtayeh

It is possible that given international responses to the violence in Gaza, the three countries will work in close coordination to expand their efforts to address the conflict and the issues that allowed it to flourish. According to reports from Arab media, Egypt offered to make concessions to Hamas in exchange for their agreement to dampen protests. According to Thrall, these included, “…expanding the area in which Gaza fishermen are permitted, opening Egypt’s crossing with Gaza on a regular basis, increasing imports of fuel and goods through the Kerem Shalom crossing with Israel, and allowing greater numbers of medical patients to be treated in Israel and the West Bank.” The progress these steps represent is substantial. Actors involved in the conflict should adopt similar measures aimed at improving conditions in  Gaza as well.

According to UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nickolay Mladenov the international community should take the following steps: prioritize the  identification, facilitation, support, and acceleration of crucial infrastructure projects. Second, the UN and other international bodies should work alongside the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt to alleviate economic burdens on Gaza. Third, all parties should be ordered to abide by the terms of the 2014 ceasefire. The envoy said such steps would facilitate, “…the unification of Gaza and the West Bank under a single, democratic and legitimate Palestinian authority in line with the Quartet Principles, and an end to the occupation and resolution of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict (UN News).”

Actors engaged in the conflict directly and the international community alike should take steps to de-escalate tension, prevent further loss of life, and make real moves toward a political settlement. Gazans should be permitted to protest peacefully without being threatened by Israeli forces. Israel must stop using excessive or lethal force against unarmed protesters. Such actions provoke  severe upticks in hostility amongst Palestinian protesters who may, in turn steel themselves for more aggressive activity. Israeli military officials should be permitted to protect their border from hostiles posing existential threats to them and Israeli civilians. According to sources from the Israeli army, Palestinians threatened border officials during the protests by hurling firebombs, planting explosives, and flying flaming kites. Protest organizers must prohibit such activity. They must ensure that demonstrations remain peaceful. Failure to do so will yield further loss of life, more injuries, and delays on the way toward peace.

Palestinian leadership and Israel should agree on a comprehensive ceasefire including a  dialogue about peaceful governance and the free flow of goods and services between Gaza and Israel. Further, Hamas and Israel should take steps to exchange detainees captured during  the last few decades of hostilities. Such confidence-building measures have the potential to be productive and lead to increased cooperation in the future. The European Union should support the government of Gaza as long as it respects the ceasefire with Israel and refrains from supporting groups, individuals, or entities that threaten Israel.

Israel and other international actors should also take steps to address the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza. Improved living standards there would do much to eliminate despair and hostility toward Israel, two conditions upon which violent extremist groups feed. International actors with economic influence over Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) should strongly urge the three to relax their economic pressure on Gaza. International organizations who have supported the PA in the past could improve the situation in Gaza by investing in infrastructure projects with prospects for long-term benefits for Gazans. A greater part of the budget should be apportioned to essential goods and services like sanitation, health facilities, trash disposal, and clean drinking water. Israel could stop providing the PA with tax revenues and instead use its money to fund projects such as these directly. Developing an environment in which jobs abound is crucial.

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(AP Photo/Adel Hana)

The UN Special Coordinator said the Middle East Quartet (the UN, European Union, United States, and Russia) continues to play a vital role in monitoring and mediating the conflict. As stated in a UN News report, the quartet remains, “…a key forum for resolving the conflict, including within the broader regional context (UN News).” Special Coordinator Mladenov concluded his remarks to the UN Security Council on May 23rd by saying “We must continue to work together to achieve a peaceful future for all the people of this troubled land.” The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has persisted for decades. Unless steps are taken to improve relations between local Palestinian governments and Israel, it will endure. Recent flare-ups may have reminded the international community of the importance of cooperation to address the conflict’s serious challenges. With time and steadfast resolve, the international community will make progress. The first steps to peace, however, must come from within Palestine and Israel.

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