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 by Liam Timmons & Keelin Wolfe

Analyzing Election Violence in South Asia

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In this May 11, 2017 photo, supporters of Nepali Congress party march during an election campaign event in Bhaktapur, Nepal. (AP Photo/Niranjan Shrestha)

 

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal all held national elections between late 2017 and mid-2018. All three experience significant election security concerns due to political violence that targets campaign events, infrastructure, and political leaders themselves. While this violence focused on election disruption, the scope, targets, and attack methods varied from country to country.

Leading up to the election, the three regions were targeted differently. In Pakistan, terroristic violence targeted campaign events and candidates. These politically influenced attacks included a suicide bombing on July 13th in Mastung resulting in 149 people dead including Balochistan Awami Party leader and political candidate Siraj Raisani.

The attack, later claimed by ISIS, was the third deadliest in Pakistan’s history. Raisani was not the only candidate killed. Other murdered candidates included Haroon Bilour and Ikramullah Gandapur. Candidates Arkham Durrani and Dawood Khan Achakzai survived pre-election attempts on their lives. All of the attacks were organized and executed by skilled, experienced strategists.

Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections have been delayed since 2016, with voting set to take place on October 20th, 2018. Attacks in Afghanistan targeted electoral institutions, including the bombing of voter registration centers and the assassination of election officials. An attack claimed by ISKP killed 57 outside a Kabul voter registration center.

Like the Pakistan attacks, these, perpetrated by the Taliban and a few by ISIS, were well orchestrated and highly effective. Between April 1st and June 13th, more than 100 Afghans were killed in election violence. Afghanistan was also plagued by non-electoral violence, perhaps prompted by election-related instability, during this period.

This includes a June 20th attack wherein Taliban militants attacked a military base and killed 30 Afghan soldiers, followed by an attack on July 3rd wherein a car bomb, targeting a foreign military convoy, detonated. Another example is a July 7th attack which saw a police convoy ambushed by Taliban fighters in the Ghazni province, leaving four officers dead and six wounded.

For planned attacks such as these that are heavily reliant on timing, terrorist organizations require intelligence, location analysis for the strategic placement of IEDs, and experienced members to successfully execute the attacks.

Nepal held legislative elections in stages between May and December 2017, and presidential elections in March 2018. These elections transpired despite contention surrounding federalism and provincial-level voting within the rewrite of the Nepalese constitution.

While the campaign silence period and voting day for the legislative elections’ first phase were largely peaceful, the campaign period itself saw the use of IEDs targeting political leaders and campaign events. There were 72 instances of election violence in these elections and 161 in the three phases of local and provincial elections.

Compared to the attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, pre-election attacks in Nepal appear to lack planning and clear goals. Civilian locations such as a jewelry store, a hydropower project, and a cell tower, were targetted rather than locations or people connected with the opposition. No active Nepalese terrorist group formally claimed responsibility for the attacks.

In Nepal, the presidency is a ceremonial role. Consequently, there is less incentive to carry out election violence before a presidential vote. However, there was a significant uptick in overall political incidents prior to these elections. These included a number of attacks on civilian infrastructure and clashes involving politically-motivated, although not necessarily terrorist, groups.

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal all experienced terrorism that was intended to disrupt elections prior to their national votes. However, the threats faced by these countries diverged in terms of target type and tactics. ISKP and the Taliban carried out attacks on election infrastructure including voter registration centers and election officials, while Nepal suffered attacks against civilian infrastructure and clashes between opposing political parties. 

nepal election - Analyzing Election Violence in South Asia

A Nepalese policeman helps a woman to cast her vote during the legislative elections in Thimi, Bhaktapur, Nepal. (AP Photo/Niranjan Shrestha)

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 by Kristine Olsen

Malaysia Shutters Saudi-funded Anti-Terror Facility

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Saudi Arabia’s King Salman speaks with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak during a Memorandum of Understanding signing ceremony in Putrajaya, Malaysia on Monday. (Reuters)

Following the Malaysian general election in May of 2018, the newly elected government decided to permanently shut down the anti-terrorism center which had been set up by former Prime Minister Najib Razak. The center, known as King Solomon Center for International Peace (KSCIP), was financed and backed by Saudi Arabia. The new government called into question the validity of a Saudi-funded de-radicalization center.

Officially, the center was closed for safety issues. The new government expressed concern that its operations would generate unwanted attention from the Islamic State. The stated purpose of the center upon creation was to, “…combat terrorist threats and the spread of propaganda and ideologies bandied about by the extremists and the terrorists.”

Some suggest closing the center will offend the Saudi government and disrupt diplomatic, economic, and political ties between Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Others believe it is a good break which comes at a good, natural time of change. So doing, those say, allows the new government to distance itself from the old government, and perhaps Saudi Arabia.

During the Obama administration, Saudi Arabia was a close, US counter-terrorism partner, yet there is also speculation that Saudis use government funds, filtered through NGOs, to contribute to radicalization and violent extremism. The previous Malaysian administration was known to be corrupt. The former Prime Minister was arrested on corruption charges twice, and one of the instances involved the Saudi royal family. The new regime’s move to distance itself from the old regime’s policies and practices is not altogether unwise.

Theoretically, it seems self-evident that an anti-terrorism facility should serve as an asset to the country and help bring about a more peaceful, stable environment. But corruption overshadows that message and the good work KSCIP promised to do. The War on Terror and Islamic extremism have featured squarely in Malaysian current events. The government has introduced several anti-terrorism bills.

If centers like the KSCIP operated beyond the reach of foreign influence, educating young people, and focusing on peaceful, global change, then that would be a palliative to countries actively combatting terror. Meanwhile, upon closing, the center’s responsibilities were absorbed by the Defense Ministry.

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 by Liam Timmons

Comparing Targeted Killings Across Four Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups carry out targeted killings for a number of reasons: as a method of internal policing, in response to political repression, or domestic violence, and to exacerbate political or territorial fragmentation. The rate of political assassinations, whether perpetrated by terrorist groups or by regimes themselves, has risen since the early 1970s. Targeted killings are yet another tool in the terrorist’s toolbox, to be deployed against varied targets in the service of any number of motivations.

The Rise to Peace Active Intelligence Database identifies 269 targeted terror attacks worldwide between June 7, 2017, and July 24, 2018. Of these, 180 were claimed by or associated with at least one group, while 89 had unknown perpetrators. The attacks range from individual assassinations to election violence causing dozens of casualties, such as attacks on rallies in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. The most frequent perpetrator was Al-Shabaab with 48 targeted attacks, followed by Naxal groups with 35, and the Islamic State and New People’s Army with 21 each. Combined, these four groups are associated with nearly 70% of attributed targeted killings in the Active Intelligence Database.

 

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab was responsible for 48 targeted attacks, often using firearms and carrying out the attack in teams of two. In May 2018, Al-Shabaab released a video depicting an assassination team known as the Muhammad bin Maslamah Battalion, which operates within Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region. The video shows the battalion’s camp and training activities, as well as the group conducting drive-by shootings and assassinating targets in urban areas. Al-Shabaab focuses its assassination efforts on military officers, militia members, and government officials. These efforts have long been an important part of Al-Shabaab’s strategy. Targeted killings allow Al-Shabaab to disrupt Somali military and political operations and prevent the government from setting up a stable environment in regions seized from the terrorist group. In addition to firearm assassinations carried out by small teams, Al-Shabaab uses targeted suicide attacks to impact the Somali state. Unlike other groups such as the Naxals, Al-Shabaab attempts to avoid targeting civilians in their assassinations, which suggests an emphasis placed on strategic importance in their target selection. Examples of significant targeted killings perpetrated by Al-Shabaab include the August 2017 killing of Mohamed Ali Elmi, then-governor of the Galgadud region, and the shooting of a senior Somali general and his bodyguard in September 2017.

 

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Image Courtesy: NaxalRevolution

Naxals

Naxal groups were responsible for 35 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Typical Naxal targeted killings involve a group of attackers storming a village, seizing their target, and killing them with knives or axes. The perpetrators often leave behind pamphlets advocating their cause and justifying the killing. These attacks are often carried out as a means of internal control, as many targets are killed upon suspicion of being police informants. Naxal attacks on civilians are often carried out in times of economic distress when civilians are more likely to turn to government collaboration. The Indian government offers rewards for information leading to the death or arrest of Naxals and state governments have encouraged civilians to join militant groups that work in tandem with security forces. When civilians are incentivized to become informants or otherwise cooperate with government and security officials, Naxal groups step up targeted killings in order to maintain their regional control. The frequency and brutality of Naxal targeting killings suggest a high level of concern with preventing civilians from turning informant. In addition to attacks on civilians, Naxal groups have plotted the assassination of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and were responsible for a 2003 attempt on the life of Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.

 

ISIS and ISKP

The Islamic State (including ISIS and ISKP, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan branch) was responsible for 21 targeted attacks. Most often, these attacks were carried out against political leaders and most frequently used either suicide bombs or firearms. Due to the use of suicide bombs, the Islamic State’s targeted attacks often cause collateral damage, with roughly a third of said attacks resulting in more than five casualties. Additionally, with increased targeted killings of police and security personnel, the Islamic State has marked a return to the Soldiers’ Harvest strategy it employed in 2013. The collapse of security following assassinations allows ISIS to maintain hyperlocal control, even after it has lost territory and fighters, as has been the case in recent years. With fewer fighters able to carry out large-scale attacks, targeted killings serve as a force-multiplier with outsized strategic impact, given the resources dedicated to such attacks. The Islamic State also has a history of carrying out assassination campaigns against rival militant groups. ISIS operative Abu al-Baraa al-Saheli was detained and executed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham after a number of targeted killings impacted the militant group. ISIS continues to carry out these attacks against its rivals in Syria.

 

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Members of the Maoist New People’s Army. | Photo: Reuters

New People’s Army

The New People’s Army was responsible for 21 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Most were individualized attacks, with 15 causing only one casualty each, and all but one carried out with a firearm. The attacks targeted mostly low-level politicians such as village chiefs, policemen, and members of the CAFGU, an auxiliary unit within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. NPA assassination teams, known as Sparrow units, have been active in urban areas since the 1980s. In 1984, the Washington Post reported 80 policemen were murdered by the NPA. In a typical attack, Sparrow unit members “…emerged from a crowd, fired a single bullet into the policeman’s head, grabbed his pistol and merged back into the crowd.” This was an effective tactic, with police and business leaders living in fear of the NPA, but with everyday citizens viewing the rebels as their protectors. Sparrow unit tactics changed in 2012; assassins were deployed in localities to carry out assassinations instead of operating from urban safehouses. In March, President Rodrigo Duterte claimed that the Sparrow units had made a come-back, and he proposed a central marketplace for soldiers to protect against attacks.

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 by Ahmad Mohibi

US-Taliban Peace Talks: An Opportunity For Peace?

The United States is planning to lead direct talks with the Taliban in an effort to end the 17 years of war in Afghanistan.

The United States plans to lead peace talks with the Taliban in an effort to end 17 years of war in Afghanistan. The New York Times reported in recent weeks U.S. delegates have visited Kabul and Pakistan to discuss the aforementioned US-Taliban talks.

Last week, Secretary Pompeo promised to support the Afghan government in peace negotiations. Pompeo reiterated the strategy announced last year by President Donald Trump which focuses on additional U.S. troops in the country as a tool to pressure the Taliban to negotiate with Afghan leadership. “The strategy sends a clear message to the Taliban that they cannot wait us out,” Pompeo said.

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The Taliban and Afghan security forces greet each other during the cease-fire in Kabul. Photo by Ahmad Mohibi, June 16, 2018

Tuesday, U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen John. Nicholson said the U.S. is not replacing the Afghan government in the peace talks. “The United States is not a substitute for the Afghan people or the Afghan government,” Nicholson said.

But during his trip to Kandahar, he said, “Our Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has said that we, the United States, are ready to talk to the Taliban and discuss the role of international forces.  We hope this will help move the peace process forward.”

The State Department added that “any negotiations over the political future of Afghanistan will be between the Taliban and the Afghan government.”

The Taliban cheered the prospect of direct U.S. talks. They do not want to negotiate with Afghan leadership, which see as illegitimate and incapable of offering them valuable concessions. Sohail Shahin, spokesman from the Taliban’s Qatar office, told Aljazeera, “This is what we wanted, and what were waiting for – to sit with the U.S. directly and discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops.”

Political leaders and Afghans believe peace is possible if Afghans lead the way. Only the Afghans can win this war. Neither U.S. troops nor U.S.-Taliban peace talks will pacify Afghanistan.

In fact, U.S. involvement may be exacerbating fundamental tensions. Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai stated recently in an interview with Ahmad Mohibi, “The Taliban want to negotiate with the U.S. because the Afghan National Unity Government is weak. The Taliban sees themselves as stronger than the Afghan government. They believe the U.S. is the power-holder in this dynamic.” Karzai advocates an Afghan peace process led and implemented by Afghans. “Peace is possible in Afghanistan if it’s a pure process in which Afghans are involved in every aspect of talks,” Karzai said

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Taliban supporter biking around the city of Kabul during the ceasefire between the Afghan government and the Taliban. June 17, 2018 Photo by Ahmad Mohibi

Attempts at Afghan peace talks date back to 2006 – a year of deadly terrorist attacks and suicide bombings that saw in excess of 4,000 people dead, including 170 foreigners. This was a dramatic uptick in suicide bombings and it came in the wake of the War on Terror, which began in 2001. But that same year, 2006, at a Shia religious gathering, Hamid Karzai invited the Taliban to participate in peace talks. Karzai said, “While we are fighting for our honor, we still open the door for talks and negotiations with an enemy who is shedding our blood and bent our annihilation.”

Since then, Afghan and American governments, the international community, NATO, and Afghanistan’s neighbors have supported peace talks. Yet, despite the deployment of 15,000 U.S. troops and 17 years of U.S. and international support, the Taliban has gained territory, suicide bombings surge, and more terror groups are coalescing. And the Taliban are unwilling to negotiate with the Afghan government.

However, that the role of the United States in the peace process remains necessary to ensure other state actors, such as Pakistan, which continues to provide material support to the Taliban, push them to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table. Together peace can be achieved, but only through a recognition of the Afghan lead in these efforts.

There is still a chance for peace. Afghans are hardworking people with the courage to build their homeland.  Americans are thoughtful and passionate people that are willing to help Afghans win the peace. 

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is founder and president of Rise to Peace and a national security expert. Ahmad Mohibi is a published writer as well as a George Washington University and George Mason University Alumni. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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 by Rise to Peace

Ahmad Mohibi discusses US’ direct talks with the Taliban on Tolonews

After the New York Times reported that the White House ordered diplomats to hold direct talks with the Taliban, Rise to Peace founder Ahmad Mohibi told Tolonews, “The United States will not negotiate with the Taliban directly. The U.S. is facilitating the peace process, and U.S. talks with the Taliban will expedite the process.” Mr. Mohibi added, “Negotiations must occur between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Because it’s a war among Afghans, they are responsible for fixing it. Peace is critical and achievable, but it must come from the indigenous people.”
[embedyt] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNIX27BVO8g[/embedyt]

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is founder and president of Rise to Peace and a national security expert. Mr. Mohibi is a published writer and a George Washington University and George Mason University alumnus. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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 by Liam Timmons

Taliban Innovation, Global Threat: Combined Suicide and Firearm Attacks

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Taliban attacks in Afghanistan represent a decade-long evolution of terror tactics, drawing influence from a variety of operating groups and countries, including Afghan mujahedeen fighters, Al-Qaeda, and Iraqi insurgents. Suicide attacks in Afghanistan are a relatively recent development. Afghan mujahideen fighters did not use suicide tactics in their campaign against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, nor did the Taliban use them for the first four years of the War in Afghanistan. Only 30 suicide attacks were executed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005, a figure which can be explained by the ethnic makeup of the Taliban at that time. Both the Taliban and the mujahideen were largely ethnic Pashtuns who scorned suicide.

However, a fall 2005 meeting between Afghan Taliban and Iraqi insurgent leaders dramatically changed Afghanistan’s terror landscape. Iraqi insurgents introduced IED and suicide bomb technology to the Taliban, causing an immediate uptick in these types of attacks in Afghanistan. 139 suicide attacks were committed in 2006, and 160 in 2007. Further, a Taliban tactic used to devastating effect involves sending suicide bombers to breach security perimeters, followed by gunmen to carry out direct assaults on a target. The June 2008 attack on Sarpoza Prison near Kandahar City is an early example of this combined attack tactic. The prison breach was initiated with a detonation at the back wall of the prison, and an RPG-triggered truck bomb explosion at the front gate. Gunmen then stormed the prison, killing half of the 30 guards and freeing 1,000 Taliban prisoners. The efficacy of this tactic lies in its rapidity and its shock-value. Police stationed nearby were unable to repel hostile gunfire, and a Canadian quick-reaction force would not arrive until two hours after the violence ceased. Two months later, an attack on Camp Salerno in Khost leveraged the same tactic but was foiled when three bombers were shot and three others detonated before reaching their target. Around this time, the Taliban carried out similar attacks on foot patrols in Helmand province, detonating IEDs or suicide bombs and then launching ambushes with RPGs and small arms.

The implementation of combined attacks can be seen as a response to the failure of Taliban traditional suicide bombings. While Iraqi insurgent groups such as Ansar al-Sunnah and Al-Qaeda attack soft targets like markets, the Taliban focuses its attacks on military and police installations. For, it was these entities who were responsible for drastically reducing suicide bombing casualties before the introduction of combined attacks. In the first 22 bombings in 2007, only three caused fatalities. This trend continued into 2010, when the suicide bombing death toll was halved from where it stood in 2007 in part because of better training of security forces as well as  NATO-led raids on bomb-making sites. Since late 2017, the Taliban has utilized Humvees and other military vehicles (often purchased by the US military for, and captured from Afghan security forces) as mobile IEDs. An October 2017 attack in Kandahar involving an opening car bomb, a firefight, and a second blast killed nearly three-quarters of an Afghan Army unit and allowed the Taliban to seize seven vehicles for use in future attacks. Rise to Peace’s Sara Huzar published an excellent analysis of this trend, which has the dual effect of being lethal and self-sustaining.

Combined attacks are now ubiquitous among terrorist groups around the globe. Rise to Peace’s Active Intelligence Database has identified more than 40 attacks since June 2017 that involve both suicide bombers and gunmen. The Taliban and Islamic State (ISIS and ISKP) are the most frequent practitioners of this method with 21 and 10 attacks respectively, but Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and others have also carried out combined attacks. Attacks combining the use of suicide bombs and firearms by these four groups caused a median of 27 total casualties, compared to 12 for attacks using only suicide bombs and 4 using only firearms. The mean casualties per attack was also highest for combined attacks at 40, compared to 23 for bomb-only attacks and 16 for firearm-only attacks. Each group’s reliance on combined attacks reflects the close relationship between suicide bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the Taliban and ISIS/ISKP carry out combined attacks at a much higher rate than the mean for the four groups examined, at 15 and 10 percent respectively compared to around 2 percent each for Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram.

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The Rise to Peace dataset demonstrates that suicide attacks have higher casualty rates compared to non-suicide attacks. However, suicide attacks inherently involve the death of perpetrators and thus have a higher operational cost to terrorist groups. Combined attacks, therefore, represent a tactical option for terrorist groups seeking a high lethality-to-operational-cost ratio by increasing the lethality of non-suicide attacks while mitigating the operational cost of multiple suicide attacks. This helps the Taliban perpetrate effective attacks despite suboptimal target selection (assuming maximum casualties inflicted is a terrorist group’s optimal outcome). As mentioned previously, the Taliban primarily executes suicide attacks against “hard” targets such as the recent attack on Kabul’s Interior Ministry and the 2008 attack on Camp Salerno. However, analysis by Northeastern Political Science PhD and U.S. Navy Reserve officer Joseph Mroszczyk finds that the perpetrator-to-total death rate is virtually identical for suicide and non-suicide attacks against police or military targets. Since the Taliban is committed to these targets, combined attack tactics dramatically increase the group’s impact.

Taliban suicide attack tactics constitute a synthesis of experience, shared knowledge, and practical necessity. Since the introduction of suicide attacks in Afghanistan in 2005, the Taliban’s repertoire has evolved to include combined attacks because of target selection and the increased lethality of these methods. Rise to Peace’s data bears out this conclusion. It also highlights the spread of combined attack tactics to groups such as the Islamic State, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram who have all used them to deadly effect.

AID Methodology

Filter where [weapon] [has all of] [suicide bomb AND firearm], Group by [group] to find combined attacks by any group

Filter where [group] [has any of] [*insert group name here], Group by [weapon] to compare attack methodologies within each group (this can be used for bomb only and combined attacks]

Data involving firearms only ignores targeted attacks because of their unique nature (bomb only and combined attacks include targeted attacks since they impact bystanders as well)

To find this data: Filter where [group] [has any of] [*insert group name here] and [weapon] [has any of] [firearm] and [weapon] [has none of] [suicide bomb] and [tags] [has none of] [targeted]

ISIS data combines ISIS and ISKP

One attack involved both the Taliban and ISKP so totals will be slightly off because of single-counting this attack

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 by Tim O'Shea

Central Asian Export of ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism: Case Studies, Comparisons and Lessons

Introduction
Several high-profile terrorist attacks in Western Europe and North America in recent years have been committed by migrants from Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, much of the popular discourse on foreign terror threats doesn’t include analysis of this trend. Most famously, President Donald Trump’s proposed travel ban on countries allegedly prone to radicalization mentioned nothing of Central Asia. This report reviews relevant case studies of Central Asian ‘lone wolf’ terrorism abroad in order to find commonalities and lessons from these attacks. The report also analyzes contextualized casualty comparisons of Central Asian attacks in the context of post-9/11 international terrorism. This report concludes by noting both the mixed cyber and personal nature of recruitment and training among the case studies, as well as the presence of significant intelligence failures.

Background
Since 1991, the Uzbek government has used brutal repression of a peaceful religious movement as a tool to stop the radicalization of the country’s Muslims. The Karimov regime imprisoned thousands accused of religious activity, banned imported Islamic literature, and controls the prayers and discussions in Uzbek mosques. It appeared to have worked: the country has seen little terrorist activity on its own soil since the 2000s.

However, radicalized Uzbeks and other Central Asians have since engaged in multiple instances of terrorism abroad. While this is likely due to the same radicalization and recruitment measures common to other demographics, the dual challenge for Central Asian migrants of integrating into foreign lands while being actively alienated by their own government has likely increased their susceptibility to radicalization. Moreover, some theorize that the Uzbek government’s control of domestic, Islamic voices shifted the country’s Muslims towards other, more politicized voices, including internet content which is often radical and serves extremists. Notoriously, this has occurred in Russia where tight Central Asian communities, combined with active extremist recruitment, have radicalized many guest workers. Indeed, up to 90% of ISIS foreign fighters from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were radicalized or recruited while living as guest workers in Russia.

There has also been a push by terrorists to especially radicalize Central Asian migrants. ISIS tailored whole sets of online recruiting and social media content toward Uzbeks, including a specialized spokesman tasked with focusing his propaganda on Central Asians.

Case Studies
Boston Marathon Bomb Attack (April 15, 2013)
Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were born in Kyrgyzstan. In the 1990s they lived in Chechnya for a short time before returning to Kyrgyzstan due to political violence in the region. They moved to Dagestan in 2001 before gaining refugee status in the United States and immigrating. In 2011, the Russian government passed intelligence to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in which they warned of the Tsarnaevs’ possible radicalization, and that the Tsarnaev’s mother had been added to Russia’s terrorism database. These concerns focused on a planned trip the Tsarnaevs were taking to meet with known extremists in the Caucasus. The trip occurred in 2012 when Tamerlan travelled to Dagestan and Chechnya to allegedly pick up a new Russian passport, which he never actually received. Surveilling Tamerlan and his trip, Russia even reported that he interacted with mosques known for hosting extremists. After his return, Tamerlan and brother Dzhokhar used online bomb-making instructions from the Al-Qaeda magazine Inspire to construct two improvised explosive devices. They placed the two bombs near the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon, detonating them 10 seconds apart. The two bombs killed three people and wounded 264.

Istanbul Nightclub Attack (January 1, 2017)
Abdulkadir Masharipov is believed to have entered Afghanistan in 2011 after leaving Uzbekistan. During the ensuing five year period authorities believe he may have received militant training in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Syria. In January 2016, after moving through Iran, Masharipov settled at an ISIS safehouse in Konya, Turkey. His initial orders from ISIS suggested a New Year’s Eve attack on Taksim Square, but after surveilling the area his target was switched to a nightclub. Demonstrating a high level of military training, Masharipov entered the Reina nightclub in Istanbul just after midnight on January 1st and launched a two-hour assault with an automatic rifle, killing 39 and injuring 70.

St. Petersburg Metro Bombing (April 3, 2017)
Akbarjon Jalilov was a 22-year-old ethnic Uzbek who grew up in Kyrgyzstan. Interviews indicated that he became more religious during 2014, but neither family members nor his social media activities demonstrated a link to extremist groups. In 2015, he traveled to Turkey where he may have crossed the border into Syria. On April 3rd, 2017, Jalilov entered a St. Petersburg Metro station and detonated a suicide bomb, killing 14 commuters and injuring 60. Jalilov’s attack was claimed by the Imam Shamil Battalion, a small Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group operating in Syria.

Stockholm Truck Attack (April 7, 2017)
Rakhmat Akilov grew up in Uzbekistan but spent the four years between 2009 and 2013 as a legal, guest-worker in a Moscow cement factory. After losing that job in 2014 he moved from Uzbekistan to Sweden in search of work. The Uzbek government reported that in 2015 Akilov travelled to Turkey and attempted to cross the border into Syria, but was detained and sent home. On April 7, 2017, Akilov drove a truck into a department store in Stockholm, killing four people and injuring 15. After his attack, the Uzbek government revealed it had passed intelligence to Sweden regarding Akilov’s attempts to radicalize and recruit Uzbeks to join ISIS in Syria. He was on the Uzbek government’s suspected terrorist most wanted list . Swedish authorities admitted they had received intelligence in 2016 regarding Akilov’s possible radicalization, but that they had not confirmed its validity. Indeed, his social media accounts demonstrated several links to known extremists.

New York City Truck Attack (October 31, 2017)
Sayfullo Saipov moved from Uzbekistan to the United States in 2010, residing in an immigrant community in Ohio before moving to Patterson, New Jersey. There were few suspicions that he was radicalized before coming to the United States. His name had been on an FBI probe of a friend, but Saipov was not suspected of radicalization. Based on post-facto interviews and searches of his electronics, authorities discovered that he’d been viewing ISIS propaganda online for some time, and that he had used ISIS instructions from the internet to plan the attack. Saipov admitted that he spent a year planning the attack, and that he rented a truck to perform a test run earlier that month. On October 31, Saipov drove a truck onto a Manhattan sidewalk, killing eight people and wounding 12 – the deadliest terrorist attack in New York City since 9/11.

Contextualized Casualty Comparisons
This report includes visualization of the data on casualties produced by Central Asian terrorism. Due to because differences across time, location, and weapons, however, visualizing each attack across the entirety of post-9/11 terrorism data would be unlikely to yield any insights into the unique characteristics of Central Asian attacks. Thus, this report creates contextualized casualty comparisons for each attack. These comparisons visually compare attacks to other attacks that have similar weapons, locations, and timeframes in order to provide the most accurate demonstration of an attacker’s lethality versus others who performed similar actions. All data on attacks not discussed in the case study section of this report are pulled from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) run by the Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START). Each figure is labelled with the constraints set on attacks included in the contextualized casualty comparison. All attacks use the following search constraints: the “When” setting is set to “‘2002’ to ‘2016”, and the “Terrorism Criteria” is set to include ambiguous and unsuccessful attacks, while none of the Criteria restraints are used. All graphs display the number of killed victims along the X-axis and the number of injured victims along the Y-axis.

Boston Marathon Bomb Attack (April 15, 2013)

2018 04 31 Tim Boston Marathon - Central Asian Export of ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism: Case Studies, Comparisons and Lessons

Attacks in this category had a mean of 3.739 killed and 13.124 injured. At 3 killed and 264 injured, the Boston attack placed just above the 50th percentile for killed and at the 100th percentile for injured.

Istanbul Nightclub Attack (January 1, 2017)

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The attacks in this category had a mean of 2.614 killed and 4.557 injured. At 39 killed and 70 injured, the Istanbul attack fell above the 97.5th percentile for killed and 99th percentile for injured.

St. Petersburg Metro Bombing (April 3, 2017)

2018 05 31 Tim St. Petersburg - Central Asian Export of ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism: Case Studies, Comparisons and Lessons

Attacks in this category had a mean of 19.615 killed and 113.923 injured. However, this was skewed by the presence of a major outlier. At 14 killed and 60 injured, the St. Petersburg attack placed just above the 50th percentile for killed and just above the 50th percentile for injured. Once the outlier was removed, the mean killed became 16.583 and the mean injured became 58.083, placing the St. Petersburg attack a bit above the 50th percentile in killed and injured.

Stockholm Truck Attack (April 7, 2017)

2018 05 31 Tim Stockholm 1 - Central Asian Export of ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism: Case Studies, Comparisons and Lessons

The attacks in this category had a mean of 14 killed and 68.25 injured. However, this was heavily skewed by a major outlier. At 4 killed and 15 injured, the Stockholm attack fell just above the 50th percentile for killed and 50th percentile for injured. However, once the major data outlier was removed, the category had a mean killed of 3.571 killed and 16.143 injured, with the Stockholm attack still hovering around the 50th percentile for killed and injured.

New York City Truck Attack (October 31, 2017)

2018 05 31 Tim NYC Truck 1 - Central Asian Export of ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism: Case Studies, Comparisons and Lessons

The attacks in this category had a mean of 14 killed and 68.25 injured. However, this was heavily skewed by a major outlier. At 8 killed and 12 injured, the New York City attack fell just above the 50th percentile for killed and 50th percentile for injured. However, once the major data outlier was removed, the category had a mean killed of 3.571 killed and 16.143 injured, with the New York City attack still hovering around the 50th percentile for killed and 50th percentile for injured.

Conclusions
Two principle commonalities emerge from the analysis of the case studies above. First, the mix of cyber and personal recruitment and training reflects the hybrid nature of threats from non-state actors in the 21st century. While Abdulkadir Masharipov received intensive military training and was linked in to a terrorist chain of command, others never interacted with foreign militants directly and only used public information and propaganda to radicalize and plan their attacks. The use of vehicular attacks similarly exemplifies the reach of cyber-radicalization. Vehicle attacks require little expertise and are easy to coordinate from a distance, making them a central piece of ISIS’s inducement for ‘lone wolf’ attacks abroad. This problem speaks to the need for a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that focuses on a broader range of possible attacks rather than monolithic expectations and ‘silver bullet’ solutions.
The second principle commonality was the repeated occurence of intelligence failures. The lack of intelligence-sharing or follow-through allowed both the Tsarnaev brothers and Rakhmat Akilov to perpetrate attacks even though they’d been marked ahead of time as possible militants. Whether this was due to resource constraints, inter-governmental trust issues, inter-agency cooperation problems, or an inability to detect these threats should be the subject of further study.

The univariate analysis of the contextualized casualty comparisons for Central Asian attacks indicates that while some attacks were abnormally lethal for their methodology, region, and timeframe, many of them fit within the scope of expected casualties for their attack types. This seems to show that Central Asian terrorists are not more lethal or injurious than similar attackers.

There are several caveats to the lessons derived here. First, the case study’s sample size being so limited inherently limited our ability to draw definitive conclusions on trends among Central Asian terrorists. Second, other forms of exported terror are underrepresented in this analysis. Most notably, there’s been a substantive movement of hundreds of radicalized Central Asian fighters into conflict zones in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight for Islamic non-state actors. While this analysis purposely focused on ‘lone wolf’ attacks, this still means the analysis is about a mere subset of the foreign terror threat, rather than it’s totality.
More research and analysis must be done if the Central Asian ‘lone wolf’ is to be evaluated as a categorizable form of attack. The diversity of radicalization forms, histories, and weapons make them a difficult cohort to understand as a unified entity. However, assessment of immigration policy and immigrant experiences may shift the integration of these future militants into host societies and alter their propensity to fight against the states they enter.

Sources
[1] Laruelle, Marlene.  “The Paradox of Uzbek Terror”.  Foreign Affairs.  Nov 1, 2017.

[2] ibid

[3] Ward, Alex.  “The New York attacker was from Uzbekistan. Here’s why that matters.”  Vox.  Nov 1, 2017.

[4] Pannier, Bruce.  “Why are Uzbeks So Often Linked to Terrorist Attacks?”.  RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty.  Nov 1, 2017.

[5] ibid

[6] Ward, Alex.  “The New York attacker was from Uzbekistan. Here’s why that matters.”  Vox.  Nov 1, 2017.

[7] ibid

[8] Radia, Kirit.  “Boston Marathon Bombing Suspects’ Twisted Family History”.  ABC News.  April 22, 2013.  

[9] ibid

[10] “Boston Marathon Bombing Timeline of key events”.  Chicago Tribune.  April 8, 2015.

[11] Schmitt, Eric, Michael Schmidt, and Ellen Barry.  “Bombing Inquiry Turns to Motive and Russia Trip”.  New York Times.  April 20, 2013.

[12] “Boston Marathon Bombing Timeline of key events”.  Chicago Tribune.  April 8, 2015.

[13] ibid

[14] Williams, Pete and Tom Winter.  “Court Documents Reveal Boston Bomber’s Statements to FBI”.  NBC News.  February 23, 2016.  

[15] ibid

[16] “GTD ID: 201304150002”.  START Global Terrorism Database.  

[17] “GTD ID: 201304150001”.  START Global Terrorism Database.  

[18] “Istanbul Reina attacker ‘switched target’ after Raqqa order”.  Hurriyet Daily News.  January 18, 2017.  

[19] Arslan, Rengin.  “Abdulkadir Masharipov: who is Istanbul gun attack suspect?”.  BBC.  January 17, 2017.  

[20] Istanbul Reina attacker ‘switched target’ after Raqqa order”.  Hurriyet Daily News.  January 18, 2017.  

[21] ibid

[22] ibid

[23] “Istanbul: Victims of Reina Nightclub Attack identified”.  Al Jazeera.  January 2, 2017.  

[24] Mirovalev, Mansur.  “Russia bombing triggers crackdown on Central Asians”.  Al Jazeera.  May 15, 2017.  

[25] Nikolskaya, Polina and Hulkar Isamova.  “Suspect in Russia metro bombing traveled to Turkey, say co-workers”.  Reuters.  April 8, 2017.

[26] ibid

[27] Nechepurenko, Ivan and Nail MacFarquhar.  “St. Petersburg Bomber Said to Be Ban From Kyrgyzstan; Death Toll Rises”.  New York Times.  April 4, 2017.  

[28] Mirovalev, Mansur.  “Russia bombing triggers crackdown on Central Asians”.  Al Jazeera.  May 15, 2017.  

[29] “Akilovs bror i Uzbekistan: ‘Är det sant att han erkänt?'”.  AftonBladet.  April 26, 2017.  

[30] “Stockholm attack: who is suspect Rakhmat Akilov?”.  BBC.  April 10, 2017.  

[31] “Uzbekistan says told West that Stockholm attack suspect was IS recruit”.  Reuters.  April 14, 2017.  

[32] Habib, Heba, and Griff Witte.  “‘Sweden has been attacked’: Truck crashes into Stockholm store, killing 4”.  Washington Post.  April 8, 2017.

[33] “Uzbekistan says told West that Stockholm attack suspect was IS recruit”.  Reuters.  April 14, 2017.  

[34] ibid

[35] ibid

[36] “Stockholm attack: who is suspect Rakhmat Akilov?”.  BBC.  April 10, 2017.

[37] Rosenberg, Eli, Devlin Barrett, and Sari Horwitz.  “SayfulloSaipov’s behavior behind the wheel of an empty truck raised suspicion before attack”.  Washington Post.  1 Nov, 2017.

[38] Ward, Alex.  “The New York attacker was from Uzbekistan. Here’s why that matters.”  Vox.  Nov 1, 2017.

[39] Rosenberg, Eli, Devlin Barrett, and Sari Horwitz.  “SayfulloSaipov’s behavior behind the wheel of an empty truck raised suspicion before attack”.  Washington Post.  1 Nov, 2017.

[40] “Who Is Sayfullo Saipov, New York City terror attack suspect?”.  Cox Media Group.  Nov 2, 2017.

[41] Rosenberg, Eli, Devlin Barrett, and Sari Horwitz.  “SayfulloSaipov’s behavior behind the wheel of an empty truck raised suspicion before attack”.  Washington Post.  1 Nov, 2017.

[42] ibid

[43] Region: ”Eastern Europe”, “Western Europe”, “North America”

  Weapon Type: “Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite”

  Attack Type: “Non-suicide attack”

  Target Type: “Private Citizens & Property”

[44] Region: Amassed data from one search that utilized ”Eastern Europe”, “Western Europe”, “North America” and one that used Country: Turkey

   Attack Type: “Armed Assault”, “Non-suicide attack”

  Weapon Type: “Firearms”

  Target Type: “Private Citizens & Property”

[45] Region: ”Eastern Europe”, “Western Europe”, “North America”

   Attack Type: “Suicide attack”

  Weapon Type: “Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite”

  Target Type: “Transportation”

[46] Region: ”Eastern Europe”, “Western Europe”, “North America”

   Attack Type: “Non-suicide attack”

  Weapon Type: “Vehicle”

  Target Type: “Private Citizens & Property”

[47] Region: ”Eastern Europe”, “Western Europe”, “North America”

   Attack Type: “Non-suicide attack”

  Weapon Type: “Vehicle”

  Target Type: “Private Citizens & Property”

[48] Ioffe, Julia.  “Why Does Uzbekistan Export So Many Terrorists?”.  The Atlantic.  Nov 1, 2017.

[49] ibid

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 by Rise to Peace

Will the Kim-Trump Summit be a Step Towards Peace?

2018 05 20 Gabe Blog Edit 1 300x168 - Will the Kim-Trump Summit be a Step Towards Peace?

Photo Credit: CNN

On May 10th, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong applauded the announcement of a summit set to for June 12th in Singapore between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald J. Trump, calling it a “significant step on the path to peace” (Straits Times). The announcement came after months of tension over North Korea’s steps toward acquiring the resources to develop and deliver nuclear weapons. The two leaders exchanged angry statements over Pyongyang’s testing of nuclear weapons, long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. But US President Donald Trump announced the date and location for the meeting on Twitter saying, “The highly anticipated meeting between Kim Jong Un and myself will take place in Singapore on June 12th. We will both try to make it a very special moment for World Peace!” The announcement has the potential to lead to progress on questions of peace on the Korean peninsula and the elimination of  nuclear threats to global stability.

Given that the Korean War ended in the 1950s with a truce and not an official peace treaty, the war between North and South Korea has technically never come to an end. Following a summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un in Panmunjom, the village in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, it was announced that the two leaders had agreed to take steps toward the development and implementation of a permanent peace treaty that would supersede the 65-year-old armistice. Following this summit, preparations for the Trump-Kim meeting began to gain  momentum. South Korean officials expressed their optimism in the wake of the summit saying, “We welcome the North Korea-US summit to be held in Singapore on June 12. We hope the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as permanent peace on the peninsula, will successfully come about through this summit,” (Reuters). Dialogue between the two Koreas has played an important role in conjuring  the political will in Washington and Pyongyang to engage in dialogue. South Korea will continue to play a crucial role in talks aimed at reducing tension on, and the denuclearization of, the Korean peninsula.

Kim Jong Un, the country’s supreme ruler announced his willingness to take steps toward the advancement of global peace during his New Year’s Day address to the North Korean people. He expressed his willingness to engage in talks with South Korea and potentially other representatives from around the world in exchange for an international commitment to not engage in steps to overthrow the North Korean regime. The process gained further traction when high profile South Korean officials and Kim’s sister engaged in dialogue in South Korea during the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games. Since then, multiple meetings, both public and private, have occurred  between Chinese and South Korean officials as well as officials from the government of North Korea. The Trump-Kim summit will mark the first time a sitting US president and the leader of North Korea will engage in face- to-face talks. The United States and North Korea have yet to establish diplomatic ties.

According to a statement from the White House, Singapore was selected due to its neutrality and stability, each of which will preserve both leaders’ security. The country is seen as neutral territory, though it has close economic ties with the United States. The trip to Singapore will be the farthest Kim Jong Un has traveled from North Korea since becoming the country’s leader in 2011. Recent reports said that President Trump would have preferred holding the meeting in the demilitarized zone at Panmunjom between North and South Korea. Singapore arose as a host option once Trump gave in to his aides’ concerns about his security. The Singapore summit announcement came after three American detainees returned to the US from North Korea following a second trip by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang to finalize summit plans.

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Mike Pompeo and Kim Jong Un. Photo: The White House/Getty Images

If held, the talks will take place following 20 ballistic missile tests and one nuclear test conducted by North Korea throughout 2017. During the last six months, North Korean officials have made numerous claims that some of the missiles that the country developed were capable of reaching the US mainland. This raised US national security concerns as well as those of US partners and allies in the region. Statements suggest North Korean nuclear advances strengthened US and international resolve to engage with Pyongyang through sanctions and diplomacy and prevent the country from becoming a bonafide threat to international peace and security. The US-North Korean talks, in addition to the potential progress they may enable, are unprecedented. It would be a shame for an opportunity of such potential to go to waste as a result of American or North Korean obstinance. Efforts from the US, China, and South Korea, aided by indispensable international cooperation, have so far proven effective. They will be in the future as well provided  all parties are clear-eyed about their agendas, willing to embrace a spirit of compromise, and determined to cooperate in order to advance mutually compatible interests.

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 by Scott Moshen

Special Report On Child Terrorists and Violent Extremism in Afghanistan

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 by Ahmad Mohibi

The 40-year Afghan War and the Everlasting Hope for Peace

The 40-year Afghan War and the Everlasting Hope for Peace

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Security forces run from the site of a suicide attack after the second bombing in Kabul, Afghanistan, Monday, April 30, 2018. A coordinated double suicide bombing hit central Kabul on Monday morning, (AP Photo/Massoud Hossaini)

Today marks the 40-year anniversary of the Afghan civil war. A country at war for four decades, Afghans continue to have faith that peace is possible.

The people are tenaciously hopeful, but for how long, given the unstable environment and competing for socio-political agendas? Terrorism continues to rise, and the democratic process is under fire. Just last week, more than 60 men, women, and children in Kabul and Baghlan province were killed in the voters’ registration attack. The following chronological framework of the Afghan Civil War may provide some perspective into this complex country turmoil and its psyche.

Day after Saur revolution in Kabul 773 - The 40-year Afghan War and the Everlasting Hope for Peace

Outside the presidential palace gate (Arg) in Kabul, the day after the Saur revolution on 28 April 1978

In 1978, The People’s Democratic Party, a political party in Afghanistan backed by the Soviet Union, attacked the presidential palace. The party killed the first president of Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, and his entire family. Then, the Party took the throne. The People’s Democratic Party would remain in power for 14 years while fighting the U.S.-backed Afghan Mujahideen, a rebel group of freedom fighters that stood against the communist regime.

United States, Afghan Mujahideen, France, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other allies fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In the proxy war between the East and West, the West came out the winner and the Soviets subsequently lost the fight in Afghanistan. In 1989, the last of the Soviet troops pulled out, but the civil war continued as the Afghan Mujahideen set their sights on the last communist president of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah.

image - The 40-year Afghan War and the Everlasting Hope for Peace

Soviet Army soldiers wave their hands as their last detachment crosses a bridge on the border between Afghanistan and Soviet Uzbekistan, Feb. 15, 1989.

In 1992, although the Mujahideen declared victory, a devastating civil war followed. From 1992-1996, Afghanistan experienced one of the most destructive civil wars in its history. Afghans often refer to it as the “Bloody War”. The Afghan Mujahideen did not compromise on a shared power by a unified government. Instead, fought for the throne, and like Syria resulted in a devastated Afghanistan. The most perilous party was the Hezbi Islami, meaning Islamic Party, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, also known as the “Butcher of Kabul”. Hekmatyar’s missiles killed thousands of innocent residents of Kabul. According to the Human Rights Watch, by the year 2000, roughly 1.5 million people died as a direct result of the conflict, and some 2 million people became permanently disabled.

In 1996, as the Mujahideen fought for power, the Taliban (“students” in Arabic) emerged in Pakistan. Backed by the Saudis and Pakistan, the Taliban seized Kabul in 1996. They introduced an extreme version of Islam, banning women from studying and working, and inflicting severe Islamic punishments upon the citizens, such as stoning people to death, public beheadings and amputations.

Taliabn - The 40-year Afghan War and the Everlasting Hope for Peace

Taliban militiamen drive toward the front line near Kabul in November 1997. (Reuters)

Afghans were struggling for deliverance when on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda brought down the World Trade Center in an attack that killed more than 3,000 innocent Americans. That was the year that the United States declared a War on Terror and entered Afghanistan. Since then, the U.S. has remained, combating terrorism to build democracy and help bring more peace to the country. Despite the U.S.’ long tenure in Afghanistan, the same challenges exist.

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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s bombardment of Kabul during the 1990s inflicted some of the worst damage in more than 40 years of war, destroying one-third of the city and killing tens of thousands of civilians.

Afghanistan is not an easy fix. Afghans are ready for a democratic change in order to bring more peace to their homeland, but establishing democracy requires time. The question remains as to whether the government is ready to hold a transparent election because Afghans are so tired of war. In fact, most Afghans are willing to give up almost everything, including many civil liberties, in exchange for a semblance of peace in their homeland. It is hopeful that, despite the failures of the government, Afghans, and particularly the young generation, the generation of war, will be able to make some traction.

Through higher education, new opportunities will present themselves to these young men and women. Armed with a level of understanding and the kind of knowledge aimed at progress over destruction, this generation will be the agents of change.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is founder and president of Rise to Peace, and a national security expert. Ahmad Mohibi is a published writer, as well as a George Washington University and George Mason University Alumni. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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