Blog

This is where we share our experience
Afghanistan
 by Isabella Bjorkman

Youth Are an Important Factor for a Peaceful Afghanistan of the Future

Some say that the intra-Afghan peace talks in Doha, Qatar represent a unique opportunity to change the current state of conflict in Afghanistan. However, even if the parties manage to negotiate a peace agreement, the road to a peaceful society is long and it will require the commitment from the entire population, including youth.

Afghanistan is a country with a very young population. Over 60 percent are under the age of 25 and roughly 46 percent are under the age of 15. Currently, youth feel excluded from the peace process which is problematic since they represent the vast majority of the population, and also because they are an important factor in building peace. Therefore, this piece will focus specifically on the meaningful participation of youth in the peace process; why this is important and what some of the challenges are.

Because of the conflict, young people in Afghanistan face significant challenges relating to health, education, employment and gender equality. With decades of lost educational opportunities and unemployment, a great burden has been put on young people. In particular, young men are often forced to assume the role of breadwinner in order to fulfill their perceived obligations and duties to their family, and they can end up involved in organized crime or other illegal, often violent, activities. Young women face other challenges because of their gender. This includes direct violence and low-level harassment, which is affecting how they can physically move in society as well as their opportunities to participate in, for example, politics.

Youth in Afghanistan have expressed serious distrust in governmental and local leaders because of issues such as corruption as well as the undermining of younger leaders. Moreover, research shows that young people feel excluded from the political discussions around the peace process. At the same time, there are numerous examples of how young people engage in peacebuilding. This includes raising awareness of the peace process among the younger generation and working to engage them as committed stakeholders, the establishment of the mechanism National Youth Consensus for Peace, and presenting a declaration listing expectations of the current peace talks in Doha. A final example is an organization that was founded using art, education and critical thinking to promote social tolerance among communities.

The Youth, Peace and Security Agenda

By introducing youth as agents of change and highlighting the diversity of youth in the field of peace and security, the Youth, Peace and Security agenda was established in 2015. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 recognized for the first time young people’s important and positive role in preventing and resolving conflict, countering violent extremism as well as building peace. Since then, additional resolutions have been adopted (2419 and 2535) and work carried out so far concludes that “including youth in peace processes will result in more inclusive and representative governance structures that will foster more peaceful societies”.

As demonstrated, to ensure the meaningful participation of youth is not only important from an altruistic perspective that all of society should be involved in what is essentially their peace process. Instead, a broad buy-in from society is vital for a peace agreement to be followed by a successful implementation phase and in addition, research shows that countries with a young population suffer an increased risk of conflict. Youth is therefore important also from the perspective of preventing the eruption of new conflict.

Negative Stereotypes Standing in the Way of Meaningful Participation

Just like champions of the Women, Peace and Security agenda are working to break down stereotypes and broaden the understanding of gender and women, those working for the participation of youth are faced with similar challenges. This includes stereotypes and assumptions that youth consists of only young men, that youth are violent and peace spoilers instead of peace activists as well as the perception of young women as being vulnerable and passive. There is a default thinking about youth in Afghanistan that tends to be overwhelmingly negative and as a result, this narrow and homogeneous view of young people as either perpetrators or victims has been and continues to be problematic for their participation.

To conclude, youth form the vast majority of Afghanistan’s population and they are distinctively impacted by the decisions made in the current peace process. Moreover, they are not only significant in building peace, but also responsible of doing so for decades to come. There are many examples, more than mentioned in this short piece, about how young Afghans work to build peace in their societies and how they are not necessarily fitting into any of the existing youth stereotypes.

Understanding and acknowledging the diversity of youth is one of the keys to understanding their potential. As the future leaders of their country, the meaningful participation of youth needs to be enabled by the people currently in power and this should be done for the future of a more peaceful Afghanistan.

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Rise to Peace

What Can Afghanistan Learn from the Colombian Peace Agreement?

Amidst chaos in Kabul and confusion in Doha, Qatar, the future of the Afghan peace process looks gloomy. The recent wave of attacks on civilians and Afghan armed forces is unprecedented. Despite this, the desirable outcome of peace merits a review of similar peace processes and the chance to draw lessons from other countries’ experiences in reaching a peace accord. Among them, the Colombian government’s peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) offers valuable lessons.

In more than 50-days of intra-Afghan talks, Afghan negotiators and the Taliban have not agreed on a framework and agenda. Multiple meetings between contact groups from both sides have ended with no substantial results. The Taliban maintains their stance to recognize the Doha Agreement as the only basis for talks however the Afghan delegation accepts the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Nations (UN) approved United States-Afghanistan Joint Declaration.

With violence reaching 28 out of 34 provinces, hopes for a ceasefire remain distant. The Taliban has been accused of using violence to gain leverage in the peace talks. Moreover, they are also accused of maintaining ties with Al-Qaeda. Recently, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, called on the Taliban to live up to their commitments and “break all ties with Al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups.”

Similarities Between Afghanistan and Colombia

Although two very different countries, there are similarities between experiences in Colombia and Afghanistan, especially in regard to peace processes. Both countries have witnessed decades-long insurgency and violence — from the 1970s in Afghanistan and the 1960s in Colombia. Conflict in both countries has been mostly based in rural areas. Drug trafficking has fueled the conflicts and neighbors have supported violence one way or another.

As signs of fatigue and frustration due to the stalemate in Doha begin to emerge, both sides must display strong political will and agree on meeting agendas and discussion frameworks. In order to do so, the following four lessons from the Colombian peace process can be helpful.

1. Maintaining Mutual Trust and Recognition

Despite their commitments to reduce violence, the Taliban have escalated violence — killing 260 civilians in the past 50 days. They have not shown any compromise and have recently demanded further prisoners’ release by the Afghan government. They have not accepted the Afghan-US Joint Declaration as a basis for talks and have publicly stated that they do not recognize the Afghan govenment. All of these undermine trust, leaving little room, if any, for talks to progress.

Humberto De La Calle, the former Colombian government chief negotiator, believes that both parties must acknowledge and recognize each other for peace negotiations to be successful. Similarly, Sandra Ramírez, a senator affiliated with the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) party, states that political will is a critical factor in peace negations. This will not be formed unless parties establish and maintain trust.

On the other hand, Bernard W. Aronson, former U.S. special envoy to the Colombian peace process, believes that the Taliban may lack a strong consensus for peace. Therefore, they should be treated with dignity during the peace process so that they maintain their momentum for peace.

2. Gaining Support of the International Community

During the opening of intra-Afghan talks, about 20 foreign ministers delivered speeches, which is a substantial sign of support for the process. However, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, has stated that “The window to achieve a political solution will not stay open forever.” Therefore, both the Afghan government and the Taliban must not take the international community’s support for granted and agree to choose a ‘guarantor’ or facilitator from the international community.

Dag Nylander, the former Norwegian special envoy to Colombia, who facilitated the peace talks between FARC and the Colombian government, believes that ownership and control of the agreement’s outcome must remain with negotiating sides, and the international community assume facilitating roles.

Recent reports from Doha indicate that both sides have accepted Qatar as the facilitator for the intra-Afghan peace talks; however, this role must not be limited to logistics. The Afghan government and the Taliban must capitalize on Norway’s interest and support for the Afghan peace process. Given Norway’s experience in the Colombian peace agreement and its philosophy on peace and reconciliation, it can play a critical role in reaching a framework, setting the agenda, and beyond.

3. Seeking Internal and Regional Consensus

Pakistan has been repeatedly accused of forming and supporting the Taliban since the 1990s. Iran has also been accused of aiding the Taliban in western Afghanistan. Therefore, the support of neighbors, particularly Pakistan, is essential in the Afghan peace process.

Sergio Jaramillo, the former Colombian high commissioner for peace, states that it is vital to turn the vicious circle of aiding and abating the insurgency into a virtuous circle. As a result, the Afghan government should engage more with neighboring countries and reset its relationship with them.

Recent visits of Abdullah Abdullah, Chairman of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, with representatives from Pakistan, India, and Iran show the importance of the regional consensus on peace. It is expected that he will visit Central Asian countries to earn their support for the Afghan peace process. Equally important is building and maintaining a strong political momentum and consensus internally, which has become more fragile with increased violence by the Taliban.

4. Displaying Power on the Battlefield

The Taliban has dramatically ramped up attacks on Afghan armed forces. In the last 50 days, they have carried out roughly 2000 attacks killing 260 civilians and injuring 602 others. Afghan forces are on the defensive against the Taliban, which can weaken their position on the battlefield. Experts believe “the best opportunity for peace is when your enemy is begging to come to the table, and that generally happens once you have shown your military muscle and might.”

Experts also state that the concept of a “mutually hurting stalemate” in conflict resolution means that both parties realize that military confrontation is not a sustainable solution, and “this is when a conflict is ripe for negotiation.” Therefore, it is crucial for the Afghan armed forces to win on the battleground.

Agreement on peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government may now seem a distant reality. However, taking into account the lessons from other peace agreements in the world, particularly the Colombian peace agreement, can help speed up the process and can lead to a sustainable peace agreement.

–Shabir Eman

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Jamil Ziaey

Afghan Peace Talks: Interests and Uncertainties

It has been more than a month since inter-Afghan negotiations started in Doha, Qatar. Within this period, they have come close to an agreement on procedural rules and this is important as direct negotiation will commence once both parties agree on a framework at the negotiation table.

Right now, two disputed articles are a source of dispute resolution during negotiations and highlight the relevance of the United States-Taliban agreement. The Taliban want Hanafi Fiqh to be the only source for dispute resolutions and insist that the US-Taliban agreement should be treated as the ‘mother deal’.

Progress in negotiations, however slow, is obvious. It may take time but there are hopes among both parties that an agreement can be reached. Yet, reaching an agreement will not be the end of the road. The Taliban have failed to deliver on their promise of reducing violence. Recently, the US military targeted Taliban strongholds in Helmand province stating that their actions have not been consistent with the deal. This is not a large-scale conflict, but it indicates that the Taliban are not honest about their agreement with the US. It would be hard, therefore, to be optimistic about their honesty with the Afghan government if an agreement is reached.

Recently Amrullah Saleh, the first vice president of Afghanistan, reemphasized that the Taliban are a terrorist group based in, and supported by, Pakistan. He foresaid with confidence that the Taliban would melt in the society after a peace agreement and would soon have no public support at all. This may not be 100% accurate, but it signifies an important point about the interests of the negotiating parties. The Taliban understand that they can well secure their interests and goals through war, extremism, terror, and tyranny.

The Afghanistan government, on the other hand, knows that they win through peace, democracy, and ensuring civil and political liberties. Peace for the Taliban would mean giving up on their key means of coming to power (i.e. war) as gaining power through democratic institutions seems very unlikely for them not to say that it is against their religious systems of governance and liberties. This makes reaching an agreement hard if not impossible.

Both parties will need to meet in an intersection where their interests overlap. Perhaps, this could be achieved through a balance in political and military power which is more easily said than done. If forced to a political settlement, the Taliban would definitely propose special structures of governance to ensure they remain in power later on.

The US approach to bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table has probably intensified problems. Now, they have a deal with the US and have had 5000 prisoners released. Yet, they have not reduced violence in spite of their participation in the negotiations with the Afghan government. Apparently, the Taliban are misusing US diplomacy as well as the fact that the Afghan government has failed to bring all political parties under a united umbrella. Currently, the leading political parties such as Jamiat-e-Islami, led by the former foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, Junbush-e-Milli led by Marshal Dostum, and Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, are the government oppositions after the controversial results of the 2020 presidential elections.

An alternative approach would have been regional pressure on the Taliban as well as increasing military attacks on them temporarily in order to force them to negotiate. Such an approach could have signaled to the Taliban that war is not their dominant strategy and their only option would be giving in to a political settlement. Particularly, international pressure on Pakistan to dismantle Taliban headquarters (especially the Quetta Shura) in its land would have been fundamentally effective. However, Pakistan has been a resort to all terrorist groups in Afghanistan and despite the fact that bin Laden was killed in this country, the US and international community have never exerted enough pressure on this country to take effective measures against these groups.

Pakistan could, at the very least, bring its ‘boys’ to negotiations with lower demands if this approach was used. Some analysts believe, though, that the US war against the Taliban is a sheer waste of time and resources. They argue that the US has no interest in Afghanistan anymore as the main goal of eliminating Al-Qaeda has already been achieved. They believe this is not a US war but the continuation of a civil war that started after the coup for the presidency in the 70s and, therefore, should be left to the Afghans themselves to resolve it.

One important aspect of the uncertainties is associated with ethnic and religious complexities in Afghanistan. Some analysts have highlighted the Pashtun ethnic basis of the Taliban movement as they emerged to fight a non-Pashtun government/leadership after the war against the Soviet Union. Some Pashtun elites referred to that transfer of power as the decline of the Pashtuns back then and believed it was more significant than the defeat of communism. That was probably a reason that the Taliban gained public support among the majority of Pashtuns back in 1996 and fought the resistance groups mainly consisting of non-Pashtun ethnicities. Circumstances might have changed but the complexities are still in place.

Another issue would be religious jurisdictions. As noted before, the Taliban insist on using the Sunni-Hanafi sect as the source of solving disputes in the negotiations. One can hardly predict that they accept the Shia sect, in which almost all Hazaras believe when it comes to laws and dispute resolution in the country. Considering all these diversities, some politicians from the former resistance groups (against the Taliban) ask for reforms in the political structure and believe that a decentralized system would have the capacity to include all in the future.

Prospects seem unclear at this point but time will clear uncertainties as the negotiations start. If resulting in peace, the negotiations will be an unprecedented success in the history of Afghanistan.

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
intra-Afghan
 by Rise to Peace

Intra-Afghan Talks Reveal the Long Road Ahead to Peace

“For the first time in 40 years, Afghans will sit together, the government delegation that includes people who are not part of the government as well as four very distinguished women, civil society, political groups will be sitting with an authoritative Taliban delegation to discuss and hopefully come to an agreement on a political roadmap to end the protracted war that Afghanistan has had”.  — Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, in a special briefing.

After delays since March, intra-Afghan peace talks finally began on September 12 in Doha, Qatar. Though the key actors are the Afghan government and the Taliban, several representatives from important states, including the United States, are also taking part. Events in Doha are some of the most anticipated as they serve as a breakthrough in the stagnancy of decades of conflict in Afghanistan.

After over four decades of war, these intra-Afghan talks are a major turning point. However, it seems like the influential states present have limited interests in this negotiation process. The US wants to relieve itself from the 19-years of engagement that have cost them significant resources. Further, Russia is keen to keep track of extremist influences that can spread regionally while China has support from Pakistan in terms of security and networking. These limited interests have made these states content with their roles of being facilitators while they could have exerted more influence to conduct a more effective negotiation process.

The outcome of these talks will determine the future of Afghanistan as they signify hope for possible peace in the country. It is for this reason that there should be a greater focus on facilitating sustainable peace so that Afghan citizens can pursue and secure their basic rights like freedom of expression; equality for women; educational rights; employment and liveable wages.

These are some of the most basic yet important examples. International non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) has urged the Afghan government, Taliban representatives, and other stakeholders to facilitate the peace process through their politico-economic resources and ensure such mechanisms so that Afghan citizens can access their rights.

A peace process can only be effective if it is recognized as valid by the affected people in the concerned region. Lack of grassroots validity not only lessens the effectiveness, but it also jeopardizes the endurance of the agreement. Sooner or later, peace will be threatened and conflict will start again in such a context.

The process of validation allows broader participation and also provides space so that the oppressed and the marginalized groups can be heard. Citizens feel that they are a part of and contribute to the peace process — as well as shaping the future of their country — when their experiences are acknowledged. This proportionately increases their faith in government systems and thus healthy relationships between governance and society can be formed. These relations are also necessary for peace processes as they synthesize harmony.

However, little information has been disseminated to the media and Afghan citizens about the peace talks ongoing in Doha. According to a source, there are also instances of informal meetings happening behind closed doors. This is unfavorable for sustainable peace in general. Information on every step of progress at the negotiations should be shared with the media so that it can reach the citizens in Afghanistan so that they can know how the future of their country is shaping up.

Peace is a process, but it is also a state. The quest to achieve it has still a long way to go, but that does not deny the momentum it has achieved. In order to realize the smoothest road ahead, a transparent policy must be adopted that will facilitate the process of creating trust and the removal of hostilities. This can only lead to mutual understanding between actors once in conflict.

The process of negotiations will then not only be a matter of who wins or loses, but of equal victory for all.

–Nelofer Laskar

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
US soldier in Afghanistan
 by Ahmad Mohibi

What’s Next for the United States in Afghanistan?

On September 12, a day after the 19th anniversary of 9/11, talks between the Taliban and Afghan government began in Doha, Qatar. The historic talks mark the first time that the two parties have engaged in direct conversations with each other in hopes of ending forty years of war in Afghanistan.

It took over a decade for such a diplomatic shift to occur. On February 29, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that committed to the withdrawal of its troops within a 14-month deadline. Given that the US toppled the Taliban in 2001 and helped establish a Western-backed government, the role of the US as a third-party mediator is vital for Afghanistan as they act as a mediator between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

Concerns of Afghan citizens loom in the background in the case that a political deal for a power-sharing form of government is achieved. More than half of the population lives below the poverty line, leaving more Afghan civilians vulnerable to falling victim to extremist recruitment. A long-term strategy is needed for Afghans to counter the numerous terrorist organizations in the country.

Negotiations have come at a big cost for Afghans, but they are still hopeful that peace is possible.

The War on Terror has cost over 100,000 civilian casualties and stunted the growth of Afghanistan’s economy, leaving millions in poverty and uncertain about the future of their state. On daily basis, an estimated 54 Afghan security forces and 19 civilians have lost their lives, even while engaged in talks with the Taliban. Additionally, over $2 trillion USD has been spent fighting, which has resulted in the deaths of 24,000 American soldiers.

It is important to mention that this is not the Taliban’s first time at the negotiation table nor their first attempt at engaging in peace talks with Afghan authorities. In early attempts to talk with the Taliban in 2011, the former president of Afghanistan Burhanuddin Rabbani (head of the Afghan Peace Council) was assassinated by the Taliban. Two years later, the Taliban and the Afghan government tried again to engage in direct peace talks and even so far as agreeing to meet in Qatar. However, the scheduled meeting was canceled when the Afghan government was angered by the Taliban establishing an office in Doha.

After the US-Taliban agreement reached, 5,000 Taliban prisoners convicted of terrorism, kidnapping, and drug-trafficking offenses were released. Most returned to combat on the frontlines after their release. In addition to the total withdrawal of its troops, the United States agreed to reduce the number of soldiers from 13,000 to 8,600 in 135 days.

Takeaways from the Initial Round of Talks

The Taliban are after power, not any higher purpose. This became clear as they continued to target and attack their fellow Afghan citizens even after they signed an agreement with the US. However, the US military expressed their satisfaction that Taliban attacks in Afghanistan decreased by eighty percent following the agreement made in February. Furthermore, the Taliban’s appointment of Abdul Haqqani as their chief envoy, an influential imam and proponent of the fundamentalist movement, perhaps shows the importance of these discussions to Taliban leadership.

Alternatively, if the Taliban agrees to a ceasefire or any other formal compromises, the structure of the group has already been altered drastically over the past two decades. The argument that the Taliban has become too ‘decentralized’ is invalid as a more accurate way to describe the movement’s modus operandi is that it has broken up into splinter factions that have spread throughout the country. In fact, last year the US conducted the most airstrikes in Afghanistan since 2010 and still the Taliban hold more territory than they did shortly after 9/11. It is uncertain whether the splinter factors or their non-state actor allies will abide by any deal reached in Doha.

Although Taliban attacks have ebbed drastically following the settlement made last spring, the four-month phase of American troop reduction has already been moving ahead of schedule. This has left a power vacuum that has been detrimental for the Afghan National Police Force and the National Security Forces as they are ill-equipped to spearhead counterterrorism operations and manage border security responsibilities to stop fighters crossing over from Pakistan. Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that deal between the US and the Taliban did not mandate that the insurgent group respect the human rights of Afghan citizens nor did they loosen regulations regarding their treatment of women.

Policy Recommendations for the United States

 Recommended policies going forward are rooted in basic realities learned from previous US foreign policy blunders made in Afghanistan as well as the wider Middle East. They include:

  1. The United States should act as a third-party negotiator to advance Afghan peace settlements. In January, the Brookings Institute published the conclusions of a survey that concluded 72% of the 1,260 people polled favored maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan rather than withdrawing or reducing the number of troops. Despite past American sentiments of not wanting to be involved in intra-state conflicts abroad, the survey shows not only how much ordinary Americans care about the safety of Afghan civilians, but that they recognize the importance of US CVE initiatives in Afghanistan.
  2. Pressure the state-sponsors of terrorism and the regional actors to support the Afghan peace process. Lashkar-e-Taibi and Jaish Muhammed, two of the strongest Islamist groups based in Pakistan, are aligned with the Taliban. Both groups combined have over a thousand members operating with the Taliban in Afghanistan. They also both share a close relationship with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency. It is essential that both state and non-state actors facilitating the Taliban’s improved combat capabilities as well as their sources of financial income be obstructed.
  3. Keep a small presence of forces (as low as 4,000) to monitor post-peace developments while focusing on the East. The presence of the US military should be limited to approximately 4,000 troops to aid Afghanistan post peace settlement. Troop strength can be increased at military bases in North Africa or European countries close to the Mediterranean for logistical ease of military operations in Afghanistan, but this still abandons Afghan military and law enforcement institutions.
  4. Deliver and monitor aid in areas of sustainable development and government reformation post-peace settlement as Afghanistan will continue to rely on foreign aid with proper allocation and evaluations of resources.
  5. Supporting reintegration and de-radicalization programs for the Taliban ex-combatants. Already radicalized individuals possess the capabilities needed to learn a new worldview; this is evident in the several cases of former members of extremist groups successfully de-radicalized across the globe. While this worldview juxtaposes with the Taliban’s stance on Western liberalism, the process of deradicalization can potentially occur in established state-sponsored negotiations and peacefully discussing ideological differences.
  6. Promotion of citizens’ self-agency, improvement of conflict resolution skills, or fostering cooperation within a society does not replace nor nullify the importance of strengthening/bolstering government institutions to achieve good governance. These courses of action should be implemented simultaneously. The US State Department should strengthen its visibility in Afghanistan by increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers. Additionally, the US government should also increase funding to grassroots organizations and international aid agencies.

A long-term strategy balanced with short-term objectives is needed for Afghanistan to be able to counter the numerous terrorist organizations in the country. The significance of this theme is recognized as it is interwoven into our policy analysis and recommendations. Moreover, assisting Afghanistan in achieving political stability and economic prosperity is paramount to both Americans and Afghans.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace

Ariel Merin is a Research Intern at Rise to Peace

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
The Afghan Future Looks Promising After Decisions at the Loya Jirga
 by Ahmad Mohibi

With Final Prisoner Release, Afghanistan Takes a Giant Step Toward Peace

Originally published at The Diplomat

At long last, the Afghan government and the Taliban are ready to start their long-delayed peace talks.

The Afghan Loya Jirga (grand assembly) approved the release of 400 Taliban prisoners on Sunday, and President Ashraf Ghani endorsed the decision. This hopefully paves the way for the intra-Afghan talks between Afghan delegates and the Taliban insurgency, aimed at ending the 19 years of war.

“I look forward to the intra-Afghan dialogues,” said Khalid Noor, the youngest member of the Afghan negotiating team. He added, “I believe it’s going to start in the next few days.”

On Monday, the Taliban and the Afghan government agreed on August 16 as the start date for the intra-Afghan dialogues. The 21 members of the Afghan negotiation team headed by Massoum Stanikzai (former chief of the National Directorate of Security) is likely to depart Afghanistan for Doha, Qatar once the prisoners are released — as early as tomorrow.

The 400 prisoners were the last of a group of 5,000 whose release was promised in the U.S.-Taliban peace deal, signed on February 29. The Afghan government was hesitant to release these last prisoners for various reasons, from a lack of presidential constitutional authority to a desire to hold the prisoners responsible for their actions as well as a need for leverage for the Afghan government after the U.S.-Taliban deal.

Read the full article on the website of The Diplomat

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace

in Afghanistan / Ahmad Mohibi / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Rise to Peace