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Thai bomb squad officials inspect the site of an explosion in Bangkok Feb. 14, 2012. Three minor blasts rattled the Thai capital Bangkok, leaving a foreigner seriously wounded when a grenade he was suspected of carrying exploded, police said. (NICOLAS ASFOURI / AFP)

The Thai government has employed multiple methods to combat the rising insurgency in Southern Thailand.

One includes a plan proposed by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in March 2005.  This article discusses the long-term solutions embedded in the work of the NRC which were designed to deal with the increase in violence.

Much of the unrest in Southern Thailand has been ascribed to the region’s high density of ethnic and religious minorities. 35% of the population identifies as Muslim and most of these Muslims as Malays. This high concentration of minority individuals creates greater religious and ethnic tension in the region. The tensions are fueled by the spread of extreme Islam in Southeast Asia. As extremist ideology has increased, so too has violence in the region. Since the insurgency’s start in January 2004 more than 6,500 people have lost their lives in southern provinces.

The National Reconciliation Commission, led by Anand Panrayachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand, provided a framework for managing the conflict and curbing the violence in the southern provinces.  

The commission was formed under the command of the King and Prime Minister, and was, “…charged with recommending policies, measures, mechanisms conducive to reconciliation and peace in Thai society. Particularly in the three southern border provinces.” The NRC was tasked with putting an end to daily violence. It is to serve as a catalyst for long-term changes around violence reduction. Finally, it is tasked with building institutions and programs for sustainable peace. The NRC suggested immediate and long-term proposals to combat the ongoing conflict.

In the short-term, the NRC mandated government-initiated peace talks with insurgents and advocates for non-military regional groups to maintain peace. The commission proposed three goals for conflict de-escalation. First, find common ground between the Muslim majority and Buddhist minority in southern Thailand, helping these groups live together peacefully as equals.  Second, create a common understanding of the majority population in Thailand. Third, create a larger, more harmonious and diverse Thai society.

To achieve these goals, the NRC noted the importance of conversation between the Thai government and militant groups.

The NRC noted it, “…believes it is necessary to engage in dialogue, freely exchanging views with people, both at home and abroad, who may subscribe to ideologies different from that of the state.”  In addition to the peace talks, it was suggested that an unarmed peace-keeping unit, known as Shanti Sena, be formed to defuse daily tensions through non-violent means. The mandate of this unit is to, “…prevent existing conflicts from escalating.”

As UN peace-keeping forces have demonstrated, these types of efforts can be effective, but they need sophisticated training and exemplary community relations. The NRC hoped the Shanti Sena would mediate to help re-establish trust between the people and their government. Thus, in the short-term, the NRC advocated for both a political solution and a common security policy.  

The long-term proposals accounted for greater post-conflict reconstruction, including five measures from the structure and seven from cultural and economic perspectives.   

Lastly, the proposal called for a better understanding of the situation in Southern Thailand. It wants to ensure that all parties understand the insurgency was not a simple rebellion against the government. The civil conflict was complex and rooted in historical injustices regarding religious identity, economic inequality, unequal power, and local governmental corruption. Southern Thailand was in a state of civil conflict for a long time.

There were obvious abuses of power in the region. In order to combat this, the NRC suggested, “…a transfer [of] state officials out of the area against whom abuse of authority complaints had been issued, an investigation guided by facts, and transparent legal action taken against such officials when appropriate.”  The NRC also proposed these transferred officers never again be deployed to southern provinces.

The NRC report makes clear that dealing with the crisis would require political will and input from all parties. However, it does not have realistic expectations or frameworks regarding how this might be accomplished.

This may stem from the composition and activity of the NRC. Unlike most conflict resolution boards, this group did not seek testimony beyond the 50 member commission. The commission was comprised of a cross-section of individuals including Muslim leaders and civil society agents both from within and outside the region. However, testimony from individual citizens was not sought. This is in contrast to similar commissions in South Africa and El Salvador. Finally, in other regions, such commissions were effective in post-conflict times, not during conflicts.

Haoyu Huang

www.risetopeace.org/about/mee-our-team/

WANA, PAKISTAN, Photo by John Moore/Getty Images

In recent months, Waziristan has been awash in terror attacks since the Pakistani military began new operations in the region. Ostensibly, the offensive is meant to root out TPP fighters, but physical action typically only treats the symptoms of the disease and not the cause. Without getting to the root of the problem, violent terrorism of this sort will generate here again and again.

Examine, for instance, an incident on April 27, 2018, in which a wedding in Waziristan was attacked and four people were killed, with dozens more injured. Reports are unclear who was responsible, the perpetrators identified simply as militants. Another source asserts that the TPP claimed responsibility for previous attacks, but not this one specifically. Disturbing a sacred, social rite like a wedding is significant on an anthropological level. There are many factors that allowed this to happen. They all signify that terrorist activity has become normalized, even occurring around such community activities.

Terrorist organizations tap into local sentiments to recruit on individual and community levels

Any viable solution to counter terrorism must treat it long-term, and it must learn to do so by studying how terrorism became so virulent in the first place. This is not an isolated phenomenon, working independently of other systems in place. It is part of the place and people in such a way that groups like TPP can use local systems of thought to get their way. This is evident in how terrorists recruit individuals as well as sway policies and politicians to their agenda. There is a deeper phenomenon at play, and the only way to counter it is to study it and determine what makes it work.

Obviously, religion ties in deeply with TPP and similar organizations’ activities. Experts have documented how organizations use Islam to recruit fighters and operatives and, more importantly, maintain their dedication. Terrorist organizations are canny this way because they tap into local sentiments to recruit on an individual and community level. There is a heady mix of patriotism, freedom-fighting, rebellion against Western influence and authority, anger, and religious cause. They use all of these things not to convince people that what they are doing is right, but rather to make them fear it would be wrong not to support them. This is a huge part of why these groups keep growing. Beyond the regular scare tactics (i.e. forcing people to do their bidding under threat of injury or worse), using culture and religion to legitimize themselves means that their idea will never die.

Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective: it takes little to do, but it has long-term effects on how they are treated and thought of

Terrorists take advantage of cultural and religious tensions to further their agenda and legitimize violence. Therefore, a way to counter them is to delegitimize their cultural and religious agency. In terms of policy, Pakistan’s government and media can do this easily. Change the discussion. Any engagement with or treatment of terrorists should identify them as violent criminals, not “Islamic extremists” or “insurgents.” These terms provide legitimacy in the most dangerous of ways. Destroy their legitimacy to combat them. Cut all their links with any local dynamic.

This solution is straight-forward and possibly effective. Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective. It takes little to do, and it has long-term effects on how terrorists are treated and thought of in public and private. Terrorism is a threat to millions of lives. Not the least in vulnerable rural communities. As such, Pakistan must use every weapon it has, including its words.

From there, such policies can extend to even more conspicuous efforts. Ones such as delegitimizing terrorist ideas in schools, in mosques, religious classes, in public and online forums. Leverage local systems of thought and action to do this, the same way that terrorists spread their ideas. Use these means not to normalize violence, but to normalize peace.

Unzila Qureshi

www.risetopeace.org/about-us/mee-our-team/

One of the regions people don’t usually think of related to extremism is Southeast Asia.  Yet, extremism is prevalent there, and like many other types of extremism, it is rooted in religious and ethnic challenges.  In this series of articles, I will provide an overview of extremism in Southeast Asia, starting with Thailand.

When people talk about Thailand, they often think about peaceful beaches, Buddhism, and even rice fields. Although these images are real,  Thailand is a religious and ethnically diverse country, which has led to some security challenges, particularly in Southern Thailand.

By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded and vying for power

According to the US State Department, 10% of the Thai population is Muslim, with most of the Thai Muslims living in Southern Thailand.  Starting in the 1990s, the 3 provinces in southern Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, experienced violent ethnic and religious insurgency, with tensions escalating in recent years.  These 3 provinces are predominately Malay Muslims residents, who share a different religious culture than the rest of Thailand. Beyond religion, the Pattani province was originally an independent Sultanate, conquered by Thailand in the 1700s, creating long-standing political tension.  

The historical, religious, and ethnic tensions between Malays and Thai were further heightened as Southern Thailand was left behind in economic development creating yet another division. Separatist groups from all three provinces share one goal —an Islamic Malay state centered in Patani.  

The 1960s saw the founding of the Malay separatist movement in Thailand, with the National Revolution Front and the Patani United Liberation Organization.  These early organizations were peaceful groups that sought Patani independence. However, as the situation on the ground remained difficult for the people in Southern Thailand, the organizations became more extreme. By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded. In no time flat, they were competing for power. Although these organizations were new and relatively weak compared to the earlier organizations, they chose to launch terrorist attacks to quickly build their profile and relative power.  

In the beginning, the attacks were all targeted toward Thai government officials, police, teachers, and other establishment individuals.  However, starting in 2004, the violence escalated, with a January armory raid in which 364 weapons were stolen.  Many of the weapons were M16 rifles. Later that year, separatist groups attacked 11 military and police facilities in southern Thailand to steal additional weapons.  During this time, the extremist organizations also attacked the Buddhist population in the Southern provinces, killing two elder monks in Yala. Additionally, from June 27 to July 5, 2004, five bomb attacks destroyed Buddhist-owned rubber plantations in Yala.  These extremist groups were purposefully driving tensions and divisions between Malays and Thais in the region.

Starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties

The violence continues today. According to ACLED, there were already 72 incidents in 2018.  In September this year, attackers hit an army patrol in Pattani, killing two soldiers and wounding  four others.  While earlier in the year in Yala, separatists launched a bomb attack on a market, killing 3 and injuring 24. These endless attacks lead to high casualties and continued distrust across religious and ethnic lines.  According to the Bangkok Post, from 2004 to 2015, extremist insurgency groups killed more than 6,500 people, with Muslims the majority of those killed.

There are three trends that suggest rising conflict in the region. First, the number and intensity of violent attacks are increasing. The extremist groups have become more experienced with attack tactics, and thus more deadly. Under the attacks in the 1990s, the separatists were limited in scope.  However, as noted, starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties. The groups became more sophisticated and knew where the weak points of the government were and where they could most easily obtain weapons. The attacks on military facilities in 2004 is direct proof.  

The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom

Second, the groups were becoming more connected with other outside extremist organizations in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah. These groups provided training, tactical, and financial support. Officials believe Jemaah Islamiyah is behind some of the attacks. Additionally, the groups have become more extreme in ideology. The separatist groups initially did not target other religions, but have moved beyond that mandate and have since 2004 targeted Buddhist temples, and even monks.  

In response to the increasing violence, the Thai government has offered some solutions. In 2006, the National Reconciliation Commission, led by Anand Panyarachun, proposed a solution to the Southern insurgency.  The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom. However, the Thai government rejected it. Prem Tinsulanonda, council member and former minister, said, “We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai… We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language.”  

Currently, the 4th Army of Thailand is in the region and in charge of security, with more than 25,000 troops under their command. Outside of military presence, the Thai government has also tried to create a more inclusive policy to reduce violence. For example, the Thai government explained that the white in the national flag is not simply a representation of Buddhism, but a representation of all religions. Also, broadcast TV shows images of Malay people.  More officially, peace talks between separatists and the Thai government began in 2013. Supporting these talks and the peace process, the Thai government also promoted a community-based program to reduce violence, which focused on the power of neighborhoods to report violent actions. The program has allowed for faster response to such violence.

The separatist’s goal remains the formation of a sovereign Southern Thailand. The Thai government has welcomed talks under the structure of the current Thai constitution. Thus, an independent Southern Thailand is still far away.

Haoyu Huang

www.risetopeace.org/about/mee-our-team/