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https://www.voanews.com/a/yemen-s-houthis-want-un-guarantees-for-delegation-as-peace-talks-stall/4562217.html
 by Kristine Olsen

Yemeni Violence Escalates as Peace Talks Crumble

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Yemen Foreign Minister Khaled al-Yamani walks in a hotel lobby in Geneva, Sept. 7, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/yemen-s-houthis-want-un-guarantees-for-delegation-as-peace-talks-stall/4562217.html

UN-sponsored peace talks seemed to provide a ray of hope for Yemen. But within hours of the talks stalling, air-raid alarms blared through the Yemeni city Hodeidah — confirmation that hopes for peace were misplaced. The dead include rebels, government officials, and civilians. The international community must find a way forward for the sake of Yemen’s people.

UN Resolution 2216 called for all parties — Houthi rebels, government representatives, and Saudi-coalition forces — to deconflict and participate in peace talks. The Houthis did not show up for peace talks, however. Unsurprisingly, this angered the Yemeni government. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths hosted talks with Yemen’s internationally recognized government despite the Houthi absence. They discussed prisoner releases, humanitarian aid logistics, and a timeline for re-opening the airport.

After three days of one-sided discussion and stalling, Griffiths confirmed that Houthis would not show.

Yemen Minister Khaled al-Yamani felt the UN failed to sufficiently pressure the Houthis to attend the talks and negotiate in good faith. As the rhetoric in Geneva intensified, the Houthis sent word that they skipped the talks because their transport and medical care access demands were inadequately vouchsafed. After three days of one-sided discussion and stalling, Griffiths confirmed that Houthis would not show. He suggested theirs was a logistical travel issue, not a political stance. Insisting that Ansar Allah (Houthi rebels) wanted to be present and were disappointed not to be, he vowed to reschedule talks at a location and time which has yet to be determined.  He hopes to meet with Houthi leaders next week.

The talks would have been the first in two years of conflict in Yemen and they would have represented a step toward establishing safety and reducing the humanitarian crisis’s magnitude. Iranian-backed Houthis stormed Yemen in 2014, even taking control of the capital in Sanaa, plunging the country into violence. In 2015 Saudi-Arabia and its allies launched a strong military defense of the internationally recognized Yemeni government. In so doing, it escalated the situation and subjected more than 20 million civilians to the throes of a humanitarian crisis.

UNICEF has reported widespread hunger, disease, and violence impacting more than 11 million children. The EU has called Yemen the worst humanitarian crisis of our time. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East. It has no resistance to the devastation the conflict has wrought. The Saudi coalition has bombed schools, hospitals, and infrastructure. As often as not, ammunition supplied to the coalition has come from the US and UK. Of comparable concern is the Houthi strategy of indiscriminately firing into cities and towns, terrorizing civilian populations, The Houthis have also planted hundreds of landmines.

UNHCR and Human Rights Watch have called for independent investigations into the actions of participants from all sides.

The crossfire has killed protected populations including activists, journalists, and aid workers in addition to civilians. Coalition and Houthi forces have stalled and stolen aid at the ports. UNHCR and Human Rights Watch have called for independent investigations into the actions of participants from all sides.

More than anyone, it is the people of Yemen who suffer as the Shia-affiliated Houthi and the Sunni-aligned Saudi coalition slug it out. Limited enforceable legal protections leave women and children especially vulnerable. It is critical that the peace talks move forward. Humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Yemen must resume at once. 

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http://www.humanosphere.org/world-politics/2015/06/sahel-drought-displacement-and-conflict-leave-20-million-food-insecure/
 by Kate Kleinle

Famine and Terror: A Warning from Africa’s Sahel Region

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The village of Siédougou in Burkina Faso, at the forefront of the Sahel’s climate crisis.

They say the way to a person’s heart is through her (sic) stomach. That may be true because when food runs out hearts turn sour. With climate change’s breakneck pace, food supplies across the globe are in peril. If communities lose the ability to feed themselves then famine results, threatening social stability. We have seen how terrorism fights for a foothold in such cases, intent to capitalize on the discontent.

The Sahel region in Africa is an excellent example. The 3,300-mile swath of land in northern Africa is experiencing rapid desertification. This has plunged it into a state of extreme food insecurity. 20 million of the region’s residents – including 5 million malnourished children – face potential starvation due to the increasingly inhospitable climate. As people starve, conflict and tribalism emerge. Regional stability is destroyed and thousands of lives are lost.

As people starve, conflict and tribalism emerge. Terrorists exploit this state of affairs. Organizations like Al Shabab and Al Qaeda spill across borders from Mauritania to Sudan.

In the Sahel, where jobs are scarce and subsistence farming is becoming impossible, young people are unemployed. Starving, and desperate for something to do, terrorism offers purpose and income. Terrorists exploit this state of affairs, recruiting young people with the promise of food and wages for them and their families.

Massive numbers of young recruits have swollen the ranks of Al Shabab, Al Qaeda, and others across the Sahel. The organizations end up spilling across national borders from Mauritania to Sudan. The region has become a figurative tinderbox, ready to explode.

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French troops on patrol during Operation Serval in Mali, 2013.

The Sahel is one example of the link between extreme climate and extremist ideology. As the Earth warms and our climate further destabilizes the correlation will surely become more conspicuous. Desertification is extremely difficult to reverse, inspiring the UN to call it the greatest environmental challenge of our time. One-third of the Earth’s population may be at risk, threatening food and social instability like we’ve seen in the Sahel.

One-third of the Earth’s population may be at risk. If even a fraction of those affected seeks shelter in the ranks of terrorist organizations, the world will face an epidemic.

If even a fraction of those affected seeks shelter from the instability in the ranks of terrorist organizations, then the world will face a legitimate epidemic within as well as beyond the borders of those regions initially affected.

It is too late to reverse climate change. It is unrealistic to advocate for policies extreme enough to reverse desertification (most countries don’t even meet emissions targets). However, we can avoid the extremism associated with climate change through developmental reform. By changing peoples’ reactions to warming climates we can mitigate their turning to terrorist organizations for survival.

Better jobs for the good of the community, microloans, and sustainable farming can help stem harm.

Development is the solution that will stem the tide of extremism. Paul Melly, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, explains how causes of regional conflict in desertification zones like the Sahel can be boiled down to, “…poverty, lack of economic options, and resultant frustration.”

But the international community can help give these people options. Governments, NGOs and the private sector can ensure those who want it can get the education they need. This can lead to better jobs doing work people enjoy for the good of their community rather than tearing it asunder. Surely microloans, sharing means of sustainable farming, and helping develop irrigation systems can help stem harm. These are all alternative solutions to very real problems in rapidly desertifying regions, at least in the short-term.

Hearing locals when they explain how we can help them address the causes of their frustration is a surefire way to show them there are options other than joining terrorist groups. In so doing, the international community has the power to save lives, stop war, and make the world a safer place in the long run.

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 by Liam Timmons

Comparing Targeted Killings Across Four Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups carry out targeted killings for a number of reasons: as a method of internal policing, in response to political repression, or domestic violence, and to exacerbate political or territorial fragmentation. The rate of political assassinations, whether perpetrated by terrorist groups or by regimes themselves, has risen since the early 1970s. Targeted killings are yet another tool in the terrorist’s toolbox, to be deployed against varied targets in the service of any number of motivations.

The Rise to Peace Active Intelligence Database identifies 269 targeted terror attacks worldwide between June 7, 2017, and July 24, 2018. Of these, 180 were claimed by or associated with at least one group, while 89 had unknown perpetrators. The attacks range from individual assassinations to election violence causing dozens of casualties, such as attacks on rallies in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. The most frequent perpetrator was Al-Shabaab with 48 targeted attacks, followed by Naxal groups with 35, and the Islamic State and New People’s Army with 21 each. Combined, these four groups are associated with nearly 70% of attributed targeted killings in the Active Intelligence Database.

 

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab was responsible for 48 targeted attacks, often using firearms and carrying out the attack in teams of two. In May 2018, Al-Shabaab released a video depicting an assassination team known as the Muhammad bin Maslamah Battalion, which operates within Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region. The video shows the battalion’s camp and training activities, as well as the group conducting drive-by shootings and assassinating targets in urban areas. Al-Shabaab focuses its assassination efforts on military officers, militia members, and government officials. These efforts have long been an important part of Al-Shabaab’s strategy. Targeted killings allow Al-Shabaab to disrupt Somali military and political operations and prevent the government from setting up a stable environment in regions seized from the terrorist group. In addition to firearm assassinations carried out by small teams, Al-Shabaab uses targeted suicide attacks to impact the Somali state. Unlike other groups such as the Naxals, Al-Shabaab attempts to avoid targeting civilians in their assassinations, which suggests an emphasis placed on strategic importance in their target selection. Examples of significant targeted killings perpetrated by Al-Shabaab include the August 2017 killing of Mohamed Ali Elmi, then-governor of the Galgadud region, and the shooting of a senior Somali general and his bodyguard in September 2017.

 

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Image Courtesy: NaxalRevolution

Naxals

Naxal groups were responsible for 35 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Typical Naxal targeted killings involve a group of attackers storming a village, seizing their target, and killing them with knives or axes. The perpetrators often leave behind pamphlets advocating their cause and justifying the killing. These attacks are often carried out as a means of internal control, as many targets are killed upon suspicion of being police informants. Naxal attacks on civilians are often carried out in times of economic distress when civilians are more likely to turn to government collaboration. The Indian government offers rewards for information leading to the death or arrest of Naxals and state governments have encouraged civilians to join militant groups that work in tandem with security forces. When civilians are incentivized to become informants or otherwise cooperate with government and security officials, Naxal groups step up targeted killings in order to maintain their regional control. The frequency and brutality of Naxal targeting killings suggest a high level of concern with preventing civilians from turning informant. In addition to attacks on civilians, Naxal groups have plotted the assassination of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and were responsible for a 2003 attempt on the life of Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.

 

ISIS and ISKP

The Islamic State (including ISIS and ISKP, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan branch) was responsible for 21 targeted attacks. Most often, these attacks were carried out against political leaders and most frequently used either suicide bombs or firearms. Due to the use of suicide bombs, the Islamic State’s targeted attacks often cause collateral damage, with roughly a third of said attacks resulting in more than five casualties. Additionally, with increased targeted killings of police and security personnel, the Islamic State has marked a return to the Soldiers’ Harvest strategy it employed in 2013. The collapse of security following assassinations allows ISIS to maintain hyperlocal control, even after it has lost territory and fighters, as has been the case in recent years. With fewer fighters able to carry out large-scale attacks, targeted killings serve as a force-multiplier with outsized strategic impact, given the resources dedicated to such attacks. The Islamic State also has a history of carrying out assassination campaigns against rival militant groups. ISIS operative Abu al-Baraa al-Saheli was detained and executed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham after a number of targeted killings impacted the militant group. ISIS continues to carry out these attacks against its rivals in Syria.

 

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Members of the Maoist New People’s Army. | Photo: Reuters

New People’s Army

The New People’s Army was responsible for 21 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Most were individualized attacks, with 15 causing only one casualty each, and all but one carried out with a firearm. The attacks targeted mostly low-level politicians such as village chiefs, policemen, and members of the CAFGU, an auxiliary unit within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. NPA assassination teams, known as Sparrow units, have been active in urban areas since the 1980s. In 1984, the Washington Post reported 80 policemen were murdered by the NPA. In a typical attack, Sparrow unit members “…emerged from a crowd, fired a single bullet into the policeman’s head, grabbed his pistol and merged back into the crowd.” This was an effective tactic, with police and business leaders living in fear of the NPA, but with everyday citizens viewing the rebels as their protectors. Sparrow unit tactics changed in 2012; assassins were deployed in localities to carry out assassinations instead of operating from urban safehouses. In March, President Rodrigo Duterte claimed that the Sparrow units had made a come-back, and he proposed a central marketplace for soldiers to protect against attacks.

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 by Ben Maalouf

Hezbollah: Exporting the Political Paramilitary Organization Model

Thursday evening, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah phoned six fighters in his paramilitary political party recalling them to Lebanon following months of support in Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s defense against Syrian rebel fighters. “You accomplished the greatest [accomplishment] of steadfastness, triumph, and fortitude in the history of Hezbollah,” said the incumbent who has held leadership over Hezbollah, a terrorist group according to the United States among others, since 1992.

The praised fighters were assisting in the defense of two Shia-majority towns from rebel siege in Northern Syria. On Tuesday, a deal was struck between Syrian government backers, Russia, and rebel backers, Turkey, wherein several thousand civilians are to be evacuated, thus ending the siege and allowing the Hezbollah fighters to return home.

In the last five years, this is not an unfamiliar story. This update regarding Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War is part of a spiking-trend involving the organization and its growing influence. This is the case politically in Lebanon as well as worldwide.

Hezbollah is the quintessential political paramilitary organization success story: highly trained, heavily armed, and politically and economically influential. Their influence and highly efficient communication present an even more dangerous situation.

Foreign extremists traveling to train in Lebanon, and vice-versa, hinder the fight to end extremism and strengthens such groups. But how does Lebanon secure an end to such training without drawing the ire of Hezbollah and its patron, Iran?

Beyond Syria, eight Hezbollah fighters were killed less than a month ago by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The fighters were providing military support to the Iran-aligned Houthi (Ansar Allah) group. Hezbollah denied the deaths, but are yet to rule out their involvement in the Yemeni proxy war. Saudi-backed Yemeni government officials have accused Iran, for years, of backing the Houthis in an effort to transform them into a carbon copy of Hezbollah.

Such reports coupled with ones highlighting Hezbollah’s training of Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria to legitimize the idea that Hezbollah has established itself as the manifestation of what terrorist-backers want such groups to become.

Furthermore, the continued development of these organizations’ communication methods reinforces one’s sense that the best way to cripple Hezbollah’s training and scope is to break its communication apparatus. Easier said than done, especially in Lebanon. The Lebanese military can barely secure its frontier. And due to Hezbollah’s Parliamentary presence, any military intervention against it would instantly unravel the country.

Ethical hacking methods exist, and while their implementation is difficult, and therefore improbable, a reduction in the flood of foreign financial support, and increased border security technologies could go away toward limiting extremist trainees’ movement to and from Lebanon. These considerations also come with consequences, so the question lingers, can Lebanon solve its problems without creating new ones?

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Hezbollah training ME Shiites to fight in Syria

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 by Liam Timmons

On Africa’s East Coast, Two Reformers Work to Keep the Peace

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Ethiopia’s President, Mulatu Teshome

Political rallies in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe were disrupted by grenade attacks on June 23, shedding light on the dangers that the political opposition represents to politicians in these countries. In Ethiopia, a grenade attack killed two and wounded more than 150 at a rally featuring the country’s new prime minister Abiy Ahmed.

The rally took place in Addis Ababa’s Meskel Square and was attended by tens of thousands of people. Thirty were arrested after the attack, but the culprits are yet unknown. Abiy’s office claimed the attack was part of a larger disruption of the economy: power and telecommunications outages occurred and government agencies have been prevented from delivering services.

Abiy’s office said in a statement in the week following the attack that the attack stemmed from anger at reforms implemented by Abiy in April. Abiy, who replaced former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn after he resigned in February, is the first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group in 27 years. Abiy found support from young Ethiopians after he released jailed dissidents, liberalized the economy by opening state-owned companies to private investment, and allowed for greater media freedoms.

He has also asserted his willingness to implement a peace deal with Ethiopia’s neighbor, Eritrea, to end their two-year war. But Abiy still faces political opposition from within the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, the dominant party in Ethiopia’s governing coalition.

Ethiopia has created a committee to investigate plots against the reforms, which include efforts to sabotage infrastructure and increase inflation. According to Ethiopian scholar Mohammad Girma, if Ethiopia is to continue to liberalize, Abiy must continue spreading his message in the face of “anti-peace elements” who are attempting to halt progress and damage his narrative.

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Zimbabwe’s President, Emmerson Mnangagwa

In Zimbabwe, two people died and nearly 50 were injured in a grenade attack at a Zanu-PF rally in Bulawayo. President Emmerson Mnangagwa described the attack as an attempt on his life. On July 1, two men were arrested on suspicion of carrying out the attack. Both suspects were from Bulawayo despite Mnangagwa’s claims that they were assassins from another province. The men are being held on charges of insurgency, banditry, sabotage, or terrorism.

Just as Ethiopia’s Abiy faces internal political opposition, Mnangagwa’s party control is being questioned by the Generation 40 faction lead by Grace Mugabe, wife of former president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe. Mnangagwa’s Lacoste faction has seen the internal rivalry with Generation 40 since battling them for succession in 2016.

Mnangagwa blamed members of Generation 40 for carrying out the grenade attack, although there is no conclusive evidence as yet. With national elections taking place in Zimbabwe on July 30, it is yet to be seen how Zanu-PF’s squabbles will impact the political landscape. Mnangagwa is running against Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change, and more than five million Zimbabweans have registered to vote. Like his neighboring reformer, Abiy, Mnangagwa will allow international observers into the country to ensure it is a fair election.

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 by Maya Norman

How Overfishing Led to Piracy

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Source: www.voanews.com

In Canadian journalist Jay Bahadur’s film, The Pirates of Somalia, Bahadur travels to Puntland, embedding himself in a world known to few Western journalists. Oscar contenders have little to fear from Bahadur’s release, but The Pirates of Somalia does something remarkable: it gives us a naturalistic impression of Somalis as friendly and welcoming people and it shines a light on the rationale some give for turning to piracy.

It goes without saying that violent solutions to grievances should never be condoned, but contextualizing the behavior of Somalis who turn to attacking ships and taking hostages does prove enlightening.  For instance, it was 1991 when Somalia last had a functioning government. The country has staggered on as a lawless, failed state for the last 26 years. One consequence is that the waters off its coast have been treated like an international cornucopia, with, “…fishing fleets from around the world illegally plundering Somali stocks and freezing out the country’s own  rudimentarily-equipped fishermen.”

This report asserts that more than $300 million worth of seafood is stolen from Somalia’s unprotected coast by illegal trawlers every year. Not only are the waters overfished, but Somali fishermen don’t have the resources to compete with technologically advanced, large-scale fishing vessels. What’s striking is that while some reports say pirates are often former fishermen, many actually are not. In fact, some are simply poor people capitalizing on the misfortune of their anarchic and economically hemorrhaging state. While honest, hard-working people may be easier to forgive for turning to profitable, but illegal activities, both they and their non-fishermen compatriots reveal two iterations of one problem: Somalia can’t protect itself or an industry its people need to survive.

A NATO-led effort has reduced piracy in recent years, however, problems remain. Could the very thing that led to piracy also be its solution? According to PBS, “Access to domestic and international markets could change lives. But to sell fish internationally, Somali fishermen will have to raise their standards.” The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization is taking a stab at a solution by building a fish processing plant, though it is not operational yet. Changes are required to allow fish to sell in out-of-state markets, but such changes are achievable in the near future.

The Pirates of Somalia could have brought us deeper into the history of Somalia and the intricacies of the lawless coastal waters that resulted in overfished seas. But it succeeds in showing us that not all Somali pirates are what many think – violent, greedy men hoping to grab treasure for their chest. A deeper look into this enduring problem shows the solution, like that of many dilemmas, lies in addressing its root cause. Too often we get so bogged down in debating the nuances of a volatile issue that prescribing a solution takes many, unnecessary years. The solution to the piracy predicament in Somalia could really be something quite straight-forward: fish.

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 by Josephine Neulen

What Becomes of Returning ISIS Fighters?

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Graphic from the Washington Post[1]

Since the Islamic State’s collapse in Syria and Iraq, returning jihadists pose a problem to countries that don’t know how to handle the risk they present. While most are imprisoned, some are being rehabilitated. The rehabilitation process is costly and long and it raises questions about how to deal with radicalized individuals and avoid additional radicalization and violence[2].

Solutions for de-radicalizing jihadists and their children are hardly one-size-fits-all. Especially when the people in question were not directly involved in attacks or violence, but could still radicalize others. While most countries have addressed the problem of returnees in their respective criminal justice systems, some critics have been vocal about potential negative ramifications.

In an interview with I.R.I.N. (Integrated Regional Information Networks), the father of a radicalized Kosovan fighter states that steep jail sentences will not help returnees, but rather encourage more people to become radicalized[3]. That may be true. By punishing returnees harshly, states run the risk of giving extremist groups more reasons to feel antagonized and persecuted, which they, in turn, could use in their rhetoric when radicalizing others.

The problem is that there are limited options for such people. While de-radicalization programs exist, they are costly and must be tailored to each individual. The programs work if done properly, but with approximately 5,600 fighters returning home, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate so many at-risk people[4].

That said, mass incarceration does not eliminate the problem in the long run. A radicalized person needs to create a new identity and life purpose that does not revolve around violence. Therefore, a fusion of de-radicalization programs and incarceration might be the most efficient, realistic option for most states.

[1] Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/
[2] Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/
[3]Nianias, Helen. Lessons from Kosovo? How a European hotbed of Islamist extremism deals with returning fighters. (2018, March 2). https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2018/03/02/lessons-kosovo-how-european-hotbed-islamist-extremism-deals-returning-fighters
[4]  Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/

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 by Austin Ludolph

Terrorism in Africa: Will Tillerson Tip the Scale?

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson traveled to meet with leaders of five African nations this week. He is there to strengthen U.S.-African ties and discuss security and counterterrorism. The countries he will be visiting include Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Certainly, his trip will also see him mending fences with leaders in the wake of President Trump’s “sh*thole countries” comment. That notwithstanding, Secretary Tillerson is in Africa to check in on counterterrorism efforts.

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© Jeremiah Wakaya Secretary Tillerson’s plane touches down at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. He is received by Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Monica Juma and U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Robert Godec.

Secretary Tillerson will be, “…visiting nations engaged in battling Islamist terrorism, including Djibouti, home to Camp Lemonnier, America’s largest and most vital African military base,” [1]. Countries most steeped in conflict with prominent terrorist groups al-Shabaab and Boko Haram will command the bulk of the secretary’s time. Tillerson spoke at George Mason University hours before leaving for Africa. He provided the rationale for choosing the five countries, explaining that the United States has key prospects, troops, interests, and allies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Doubtless, he will be visiting Ethiopia which,“…is a close U.S. ally in its counterterrorism operations in East Africa, notably against al-Shabab,” [1].

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© Austin Ludolph Before his departure for Africa, Secretary Tillerson discusses security, economic welfare, and counterterrorism with George Mason University’s President, Ángel Cabrera 

Tillerson gives an impression of equanimity, praising, “…the role the African Union and G5 Sahel Group have taken on the security and counterterrorism front.” Tillerson pledged, “…$60 million from the U.S. to the G5 security force,” this year. [2] Trump’s feelings may differ. His, “…latest budget proposal in February slashed spending for Africa by 37%, down $3.1 billion from current levels,” [3]. Time will tell how the trip affects counterterrorism and security measures in Africa. As you read these words, imagine Mr. Tillerson trying to repair this:

http://abcn.ws/2G5Yh71

Sources:

1. https://www.dailyrepublic.com/wires/tillerson-arrives-in-africa-with-a-narrow-mission-counterterrorism/
2. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/politics/tillerson-africa-challenges/index.html
3.http://abcnews.go.com/International/tillerson-cleaning-trumps-derogatory-comments-day-africa-trip/story?id=53609344

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 by Rise to Peace

Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso

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Twin terrorist attacks targeting Burkina Faso’s army headquarters and the French embassy shook the country’s capital, Ouagadougou on March 2nd (Associated Press). The attacks were conducted by two groups of men, each with 4 to 5 people, and left 30 dead (including nine perpetrators) and 85 wounded. According to the International Crisis Group, “The attacks represent an alarming escalation for Burkina Faso in terms of organization, lethality of armaments and length of engagement,” (BBC). Symbolic locations in the capital were chosen as they represent power and authority to terrorist groups throughout the region. The attacks have heightened concerns about Burkina Faso’s increased jihadist violence.

The attacks appeared to be coordinated. One set of men drove to the army headquarters’ main entrance. Using a rocket-propelled grenade they made their way through the front gate. Inside the complex, a second vehicle packed with explosives hurtled toward the headquarters’ main building, at which point it detonated, causing damage not only to the building but also to the infrastructure surrounding it. The attackers then opened fire on military personnel near the main building’s courtyard. Reports have been confirmed by French and Burkinabe forces. Measures have been taken to heighten security around the complex but more measures are in order to secure additional terrorist targets throughout the country.

A group of attackers tried to enter the French embassy but were repelled. They then shifted positions, encircling the embassy and exchanging fire with Burkinabe security forces.  Burkinabe forces were supported by French military personnel, who in turn, had been deployed by helicopter around the building. The ensuing gunfight lasted several hours. French support was crucial to the local security force’s defense. According to a French military source, “Burkinabé forces were crushed at the beginning. We helped them,” (Depagne). According to Rinaldo Depagne, West Africa Program Director at The International Crisis Group, despite that Burkinabe forces were unable to counter the assailants on their own, “…compared to the previous two attacks in Ouagadougou in 2016 and 2017, the response time and organization of the reaction seem slightly improved.” Burkinabe security forces would benefit from additional training from international forces in the area in order to be more effective should a similar attack unfold in the future.

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AFP PHOTO / Ahmed OUOBA (Photo credit AHMED OUOBA/AFP/Getty Images)

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin claimed responsibility for the attack the next day, March 3rd.  JNIM, or, translated to English: The Group to Support Muslims and Islam, aka GSIM, is an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel region, comprised of formerly disparate jihadist groups including Ansar Eddine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front. JNIM’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, said the attack was retaliation for French military airstrikes on February 14th. During that attack, a number of JNIM’s leaders, including the deputy of Mourabitoun, al-Hassan al-Ansari, and Malick ag Wanasnat, an ag Ghali confidant, were killed. That mission was part of an increased effort by Malian armed forces (FAMA) working closely with French counter-terrorism, aka The Barkhane, in support of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Burkina Faso has experienced a spate of terrorist attacks since experiencing a coup in 2015. Notably, in January 2016, 30 people were killed in the capital by an attack claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On August 13th, 2017 jihadists shot up a Turkish restaurant in the capital killing 19 and wounding 25. Areas in the country’s north, along its border with its unstable neighbor, Mali, have also seen jihadist violence. Many of the attacks have been conducted by Ansarul Islam, a local Islamist group with working ties to jihadist organizations in Mali.

Burkina Faso’s security forces deteriorated following the departure of President Blaise Compaoré in October 2014, rendering them incapable of repelling attacks like those on March 2nd. According to Burkinabe sources, the army has become disorganized. The Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), Burkinabe’s special forces, were dismantled and have not been replaced since the president left. According to the International Crisis Group, “Intelligence gathering appears to be weak, judging by the failure to detect or disrupt the major attacks that happened on Friday. Two teams totaling at least eight men were able to cross the city center carrying heavy weapons and driving a car full of explosives without being spotted,” (Depagne). Burkinabé authorities suspect members of their own army leaked vital information, aiding the attackers. Military attaches under President Compaore’s leadership, including spymaster Gilbert Diendéré, had been in charge of a comprehensive, international intelligence network that was quite effective. Key counterterrorism structures have not been replaced since their departure.

Steps have been taken to operationalize the G5 Sahel Joint Force, supported by France plus Burkina Faso and four of its neighbors. Military officials claim task force meetings were in progress when the attacks occurred. The attacks, in fact, may have been aimed at discouraging the mobilization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Failure to address security challenges in Burkina Faso could lead to the intensification of an already complex regional conflict. The international community, including organizations like the United Nations, should cooperate to prevent the country from falling further into violence and instability. Cooperation to implement such efforts and foster stability in the region has worked in the past. It can work today and in the future as well.

Sources:

  1. Depagne, Renaldo. “Burkina Faso’s Alarming Escalation of Jihadist Violence.” Crisis Group, ICG, 7 Mar. 2018, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/burkina-fasos-alarming-escalation-jihadist-violence.
  2. “Burkina Faso Attack: French Embassy Targeted in Ouagadougou.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43257453.
  3. Press, Associated. “Burkina Faso Authorities Arrest 8 after Jihadist Attacks.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 6 Mar. 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-authorities-arrest-8-after-jihadist-attacks/2018/03/06/6dd16370-2164-11e8-946c-9420060cb7bd_story.html?utm_term=.85043c6874e5.

 

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 by Josephine Neulen

Women and their Role in Violent Extremism

Recruitment of women by violent extremist organizations has increased in recent years due to their value as strategic, political, and social tools in service of the organization’s mission. They attract less suspicion, making them valuable in bombing missions, but they also are of deep symbolic importance in the organization’s daily progress.

Al Qaeda Women - Women and their Role in Violent Extremism

Recruitment of women by al-Qaeda disturbs Iraq government

In 2016, Indonesian police arrested two women, Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari, after they had planned a suicide bomb attack.[1] These occurrences are often puzzling to officials since it is usually assumed women are only indirectly involved in extremist organizations through supporting or hiding their husbands or other men. This is not necessarily true.

While the exact number of women in terror organizations is unclear, the recently collapsed IS caliphate sheds light on the tally, like the approximately 800 women who had joined Daesh that are now being detained in northern Syria[2]. Roughly 10% of radical Islamic groups’ members are women, a portion that is surprisingly large and inspires questions about why women join these organizations. [3]

Women join terror organizations for the same reasons men do, despite the disparity in numbers from each gender who join. While women are often portrayed as more “virtuous” and “passive” than violent, they are drawn to the community, the ideology, and the identity just like men are. The promise of liberation, empowerment, and a cause to live for draws men and women alike to extremist groups[4]. In recent years, both women and men have come from all over the world to join the cause they believe in.

The presence of women in violent extremist organizations is important due to the symbolic significance they carry. Women joining ISIS, for example, are vital to the ideological effort through social-media recruitment. They represent the future of the cause and perpetuation of the ideology as wives and mothers.[5] While research suggests that they are not involved in daily violence as much as men are, they are far from passive.

While there are some valuable accounts, more research is needed to shed light on the exact roles women play in these communities, and what potential impact they have. Terror organizations have long understood women’s significance to their cause. They are potentially even more dangerous due to the lack of suspicion they arouse, and the support they are able to inspire in young recruits.[6]

Sources:

[1] Ayuningtyas, Kusumasari. Indonesian Seminar Outlines Women’s Roles in Terror Prevention. (January 26, 2018). 
[2] 800 female Daesh terrorists detained in northern Syria. (February 10, 2018). 
[3] Moss, C. (2017, July 2). Why Do Women Become Terrorists? The Daily Beast. 
[4] Attia, B. M.-E. and S. (2017, May 9). Female terrorists and their role in jihadi groups. 
[5] Baker, Aryn (September 6, 2014). How ISIS Is Recruiting Women From Around the World. 
[6] Says, A. E. (2016, October 28). Increasing number of women recruited by terrorists.

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