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Revolution in Sudan?

Since December, there have been massive protests in the streets of Khartoum, Sudan due to the poor economy, oppressive regime, and the government increasing the price of food. President Omar al-Bashir has been in power since 1989 when he conducted a military coup.

During his rule, Sudan has been under his dictatorship. He is currently accused of committing crimes against humanity, including genocide in the Darfur region. The country has also faced civil war which has created a new state: South Sudan. The citizens are exhausted with famine, war, and genocide.

They protest to have free and fair elections. In early April, al-Bashir finally stepped down and just hours later the military made a public broadcast stating that General Awad Ibn Auf ousted Bashir and the military will have a two year transition of government.

The cheers and joy in the streets immediately turned to anger. The people did not want a transitional military government, they want a civilian run government now.

They realize that this military coup will not last only two years because Sudan as well as other African and Middle Eastern countries have seen that military coups tend to last for decades.

The citizens feel that nothing will change under the Auf regime and they are not ready to give up their fight against autocracy. The leaders of the protest movements in Khartoum and throughout Sudan have urged the people to continue their fight and to keep protesting because they say that they do not want to have a reproduction of the old regime.

Thousands of people have rallied together in the streets against this new regime.

The new military regime has enacted martial law. There is now a curfew for citizens, the constitution has been suspended, a three month state of emergency is in place, and the border is closed until further notice.

It is understandable that the new regime would want to put these in place to limit uprisings and riots by the people.

Since the Arab Spring almost a decade ago, the Middle East has struggled with creating democratic regimes that protect human rights. The Arab Spring gave false hope to many Middle Eastern countries because the world saw change happening, and yet nothing changed in the governmental system between the elites and the everyday people.

Sudan is not an exception to this rule due to the events that unfolded recently because months of mass protest have led to change of regime but not a change of the system: military dictatorship. It is important to note that the people of Sudan are resilient and will continue to fight for freedom, liberty, and justice.

It just might take more time. There is hope for democracy and the people are fighting the good fight to do so. One day it will change.


Nick Webb is the Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

Egypt’s Only Democratically Elected Leader Dies in Court

 

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CAIRO, EGYPT – (ARCHIVE) : A file photo dated August 08, 2015 shows Ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi greeting as he stands inside the defendants’ cage in a courtroom at the police academy during his trial over espionage with Qatar, in Cairo, Egypt. Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, Mohamed Morsi, 67, died Monday during a court trial on espionage charges.
( Ahmed Omar – Anadolu Agency )

Muhammad Morsi, Egypt’s former President and aged 67, has died of a reported heart attack in a public court appearance in Egypt after speaking for five minutes, according to State TV in Egypt. His death was Kafkaesque. Morsi, a loyal member of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, replaced Hosni Mubarak in the first democratic election in Egypt’s history in 2012 after the Arab Revolution in 2011. However, his stint in office was short-lived. Despite winning the Presidency, he was undermined by the security services, the military, and the Mubarak-era courts.

The military removed Morsi from power in 2013 and he has since been imprisoned. The Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who is now President of Egypt, played a critical role in Morsi’s downfall. Since then, Morsi has been made to make appearances to answer for crimes such as torture and espionage in Egypt’s notoriously flawed court system. The outlawed group Morsi was part of, The Muslim Brotherhood has claimed that the death of one of their most loyal members was “full-fledged murder” on behalf of the Egyptian State.

Previously, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned but tolerated by Mubarak’s government. In 2014, Sisi said the group “will not exist” when he wins the country’s Presidential elections. Today, the group is much less organized and structured; with most members in Doha or Istanbul. Hamas, the group that de facto controls the Gaza strip and that has close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, has expressed sympathy for the death of Morsi. His “unforgettable and brave positions” were commended for the ease of trade and travel between Egypt and Gaza during his Presidency. The President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has also expressed condolences.

Egypt’s chief prosecutor Nabil Sadek is examining the cause of Morsi’s death as the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are concerned of Morsi’s treatment in custody. Calls for an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation have been raised, however, with the State’s institutions acting under the influence of current President Sisi, this looks unlikely to happen. The death of Egypt’s only democratically elected President will go down as a footnote in history.

The current report so far reads that no mistreatment has occurred and therefore, the state is not to blame. However, it is well known that Morsi was held at the infamous Tora prison under grim conditions. It is also reported that Morsi suspected that the guards were trying to poison his food. Moreover, he was being held in solitary confinement for prolonged periods of time and denied sufficient medical care. This is in stark contrast to the treatment of another ex-President Hosni Mubarak. He was not held in Tora prison, but in a military hospital and is reported to now be enjoying retirement.

The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, known as the Mandela Rules, were adopted in December 2015 by the United Nations and set out general practices on ethical and moral confinement of prisoners under international law. It seems Egypt has violated many principles, both legal and moral, in the treatment of Muhammad Morsi. But the final medical report of the chief prosecutors given the findings of the forensic examiners can provide correct details of his death.

For now, this case serves to highlight a myriad of developing themes in international affairs; A country sliding back into dictatorship; The weakness of international law and the lack of political will to enforce them; And religious, regional rivalries dividing countries and people in a never-ending game of geopolitics and divide-and-rule.

Although Morsi was a poor President who mishandled the economy, this was no justification for the army’s actions in launching a coup, suspending the constitution, and killing and detaining Morsi supporters in the aftermath of Sisi’s coming to power in 2014. Being aware of this harsh reality is the first step to realizing how difficult, but worthwhile, it is to work to attain peace in an often unjust and complex world.

Subterranean Warfare: The New Frontier

Image Courtesy of Reuters

Ever since aircraft were created, they have been an integral part of society. While they have been an integral part of society, they have also become an important tool for militaries around the world. Whether that be for transportation, reconnaissance or airstrikes, the use of aircraft has played a major part in nearly every war.

Military technology has become so advanced now that someone operating a drone in the U.S. can strike an area in the Middle East. Drone strikes have been one of America’s most used weapons in the War on Terror. These American strikes have killed many terrorists but have also come under scrutiny for also killing many civilians who happen to get caught in the crossfire. Many terror cells have begun to recognize this and have countered it by taking their operations underground.

Subterranean warfare isn’t a new idea per se, we saw the beginnings of this during the Vietnam War. However, it has never operated at the levels seen today in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. These underground tunnels are usually operated by terror groups or rebel insurgency groups.

During the Afghan War, American soldiers encountered a tunnel in the Zhawar Kili complex which contained structures a command center, mosque, and even a hospital. This just goes to show intricate these subterranean tunnels have become.

What has been the biggest nuisance to the United States in the dawn of subterranean warfare is the locations where these groups build these tunnels.

Groups such as Hezbollah and ISIL are plotting their underground operations beneath areas filled with civilians to hinder the possibility of enemies bombing their operation.

Enemies are also reluctant to send their soldiers down into the tunnels because the builders have a strategic advantage over them. These tunnels also can be used to smuggle weapons, people and materials to various locations based on the tunnel system. However, their biggest threat is their ability to be a means for terrorists to execute sneak terror attacks such as those committed by Hamas and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah has built a vast tunnel system along the southern Lebanese border due to the fact that they do not have to fear much interference from the Lebanese government due to the strength of their operations and also because they receive aid from Iran.

The ISIS underground system was first discovered after the liberation of East Mosul in 2017 in Iraq after ISIS destroyed a Christian shrine in the area. On the other hand, it is believed that some senior ISIS officials still reside in these caves. The Syrian rebels have also instituted a tunnel system in cities such as Douma, which has helped them keep up their fight against the regime during the Civil War.

Subterranean warfare seems to be the next domain of modern warfare.  The US government has already begun to implement underground training for American soldiers in preparation for this new frontier of war. This is to avoid the soldiers being unequipped to deal with potential combat situations with terrorists in these caves.

Daphne Richemond-Barek, an army writer said that “Even for well-trained soldiers, the multidimensional aspect of the subterranean threat is not easy to handle.”

Terrorists may use these caves to plot attacks on major urban areas due to some of these underground networks being built directly under major urban cities.

Another problem may be that some of these tunnel networks may be rigged with explosives by these terror cells that could lead to even more deaths of their enemies. Lastly, as was mentioned earlier, these tunnel networks can be used to smuggle weapons and high-value targets covertly.

They can serve as a means for a terror group to invade another country, commit their terror act, and easily travel back to their point of origin without a trace.

It is important that America continues to train soldiers for the subterranean battlefield because terror cells are building new tunnel networks every day with greater capabilities and we must be prepared for this new frontier of war.

Boko Haram and Nigerian Instability

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Since November, over 60,000 refugees have fled from Nigeria in fear of Boko Haram.   Image Source: IRIN

Boko Haram, or the Islamic State in West Africa, is a formally nonviolent militant organization based in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The group aims to “purify” Nigeria and other territories based on their own Salafist ideals. Clashes with the Nigerian government in 2009 over an investigation into the organization sparked a violent uprising, which has escalated in years since.

Decade Long Crisis

Boko Haram’s persistent insurgency in Nigeria has claimed tens of thousands of lives, and displaced millions since it began in 2009. It is estimated that about 35,000 individuals have been killed in the insurgency, making this conflict the region’s deadliest of all time.  The United Nations Refugee Agency claims that attacks across the Lake Chad Region have left over 2.5 million individuals displaced, including 250,000 individuals from Nigeria alone.

On February 5th, President Muhammadu Buhari declared that Boko Haram had been “decimated.”  He stated that his government had achieved enormous feats in the campaign against Boko Haram, and had reduced their criminal activity to a minimum.  While major military operations by the Nigerian military have been able to contain and significantly degrade the organizations territory, Boko Haram remains a major threat which has continued to devastate northeastern Nigeria. The continued attacks have limited Nigeria’s economic development, disrupted community life, destroyed infrastructure, and now pose a threat to the upcoming general elections.

Increased Severity of Attacks

Since November, a wave of renewed attacks has forced over 60,000 Nigerians to flee their homes and marked the highest level of disruption in over two years.  Attacks in recent months by Boko Haram have also become increasingly deadly. On November 18th of last year, Boko Haram infiltrated a military base in Metele of northeast Nigeria. They were able to overpower Nigerian troops, loot valuable military equipment, and allegedly kill over one hundred soldiers- essentially destroying the base.

Earlier this year, Boko Haram attacked the city of Rann in northeast Nigeria after the withdrawal of troops left the town vulnerable to attack. The town had been set up as a shelter area for the millions of individuals displaced in the conflict.  Around 9:00 am on January 28th, a group of Boko Haram fighters arrived to the town of Rann and set fire to the structures of the town in order to kill any displaced individuals still hiding.  According to Amnesty International, the attack killed 60 individuals, making it the deadliest confirmed Boko Haram attack to date.

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Satellite image of Rann, Nigeria after the January 28th Boko Haram attacks.  The red coloring shows healthy vegetation, while the dark brown and black coloring shows areas heavily burned from the attack.  Image Source: CNES/Airbus and Amnesty International

Is Military Inadequacy is Causing Vulnerability?

In recent months, Boko Haram has been escalating attacks, building their arsenal, and shifting tactics in order to remain a threat to the Nigerian military.  As Boko Haram’s tactics have shifted away from conventional strategies- including increasingly sophisticated tactics such as the use of drones to track the military’s positions, the adaptation of foreign fighters, hiding within the local population, and the use of guerilla warfare tactics and infrastructural buildings- Nigerian forces have struggled to adequately adapt to new threats.

Nigeria’s defense strategy has left them increasingly vulnerable to attack. While Boko Haram’s attacks have been escalating, security in northern Nigeria has been deteriorating, and troops have been provided with inadequate weaponry and equipment.  Despite Nigeria’s large military defense budget, it appears as though troops have been pulled out of high-risk regions and left without sufficient weapons. Even further, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Sean McClure, the Nigerian military has not been able to adjust to the advancing threat of Boko Haram, and continues to rely on conventional warfare tactics.  Without a change in their military strategy, the Nigerian Army may not be able to defeat Boko Haram in the near future- and with elections soon approaching, many question how the next government can regain control of the country.

Burkina Faso: Local Instability, Global Implications

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Figure 1 Retrieved from Nationsonline.org Link

Rampant political instability in Burkina Faso, stemming from the overthrow of dictator Blaise Compaoré, has resulted in a rapidly expanding crisis for counter-terror operations in the tri-border region between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Ongoing conflicts across the region are complicated by local issues that reach back hundreds of years, such as ethnic and tribal divisions, combined with modern global terror networks that are exploiting the instability. Efforts to solve these issues have global significance; the United States has actively trained regional security and military forces to better equip them to combat terrorists, while France has conducted ongoing military operations in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.

Since 2016, there have been 200 terror attacks in Burkina Faso, with at least 263 confirmed deaths stemming from these attacks. This is astounding considering that prior to the removal of Compaoré, Burkina Faso had never experienced a terror attack in its recorded history. While some of these attacks have been attributed to former elite special forces of the military of Burkina Faso from Compaoré’s regime, several terror networks operate in the area. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) remain the largest regional representatives of global terror operating in the region and have conducted ongoing attacks across multiple countries, capitalizing on weakened governments and ethnic and tribal conflicts. Local militias have been known to engage the global terror networks in armed conflict on occasion as the militaries and other security forces appear to be ineffective or incapable of conducting military operations against them.

The Burkinabé military, which was trained by French and U.S. special forces, has contributed to further instability. Counterterror operations conducted by the Burkinabé military have resulted in accusations of false arrests, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses- further eroding trust between local communities and the weak government. Both ISGS and AQIM will likely be able to capitalize on these strained relationships to increase recruiting capabilities as their affiliates globally have done in the past. Terror groups have begun to cement their long-term presence in Burkina Faso, operating at least partially in the open and driving the shutdown of many schools and hospitals. The closing of these establishments represents the failures of local government, and highlights the government’s inability to conduct successful counterterror operations. The school closures also decrease opportunities for local youth, increasing the likelihood that they will ultimately turn to extremism.

ISGS was created by Abu Walid al Sahrawi, who previously had allegiance to al Qaeda. ISGS still recruits heavily from al Qaeda ranks, but saw a drop in activity after recent French military operations killed several of its high-ranking members. Like so many terror groups in the past, ISGS operates most successfully in areas with weakened government institutions with weak border regions. Until further stabilization is secured in the region, counterterror operations will be unsuccessful in the long-term.

France has recognized the need to develop stability in the tri-border region as critical to African security. French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian pledged €34 million to programs that will increase stability in the areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. However, this funding will likely be insufficient to solve the vast underlying issues that are contributing to the destabilization. The U.S., who is already devoting significant funds to the region by way of military training and military equipment, must increase funding and develop solutions that will legitimize the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Corruption, which is an issue observed in each of these countries, must be addressed to ensure further legitimacy as well as to ensure that the funds being devoted to stabilization go to appropriate channels on the ground.

 

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Research Fellow with Rise to Peace and a Law Enforcement Professional.

Defining the Problem and Reaching a Solution: A Reflection on How to Counter Violent Extremism

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“Violent extremism knows no boundaries.” That was the message that Rise to Peace founder Ahmad Mohibi used to open “How to Counter Violent Extremism,” the latest Rise to Peace panel discussion, which took place this Tuesday at the Elliott School of International Affairs. With that in mind, the panelists – Leanne Erdberg, U.S. Institute of Peace; Jesse Morton, Parallel Networks; and Edward Burkhalter, U.S. Department of State – offered their perspectives on the best ways to counter violent extremism.

The panel’s first challenge was defining extremism and terrorism. Leanne Erdberg offered a legal definition: terrorism is limited to action, while extremism also includes violent thoughts. Jesse Morton focused on the definition’s practical implications. Terrorists, he poses, are cemented in their action, and thus countering terrorism is necessarily catching and punishing those who commit violent acts. An extremist is undergoing a cognitive radicalization process and can pulled away from extremist movements. Counterterrorism, he says, is the realm of law enforcement, but CVE is more complicated, and requires the engagement of more stakeholders.

Conversation then moved to how the problem of extremism has grown. Jesse Morton observed that mainstream media informs social media radicalization. For example, Islamophobic narratives in news media fuels polarization narratives used by radicalizers online. In a similar vein, Edward Burkhalter noted that A 24-hour news cycle can make problems seem more severe than they really are, and it is important to focus discussion on proven research.

Panelists then discussed the shortcomings of past efforts to curtail violent extremism. Jesse Morton provided historical background by discussing the roots of the “hearts and minds” in marketing campaigns and advertising.

Leanne Erdberg built on this theme by questioning the framing of programs and success in general. She argues that CVE that operates within an advertising scheme, which treats the communities they serve as an audience rather than giving them agency over the process. Programs that abandon that approach and instead emphasize people taking their future into their own hands are more empowering and more successful.

Ahmad Mohibi discussed CVE shortcomings in the context of Afghanistan. He said that CVE is impossible without trust, and in Afghanistan the trust between the Afghan and American government and the Afghan people is lacking. As long as people feel disconnected and distrustful of their leaders, extremism will continue. Edward Burkhalter provided a U.S. government perspective, acknowledging the futility of trying to improve a community without consulting its members. He elaborated, saying that the U.S. tries to follow a “do no harm” approach, and be sure that CVE or development efforts do not have unintended consequences. The only way to accomplish that is by relying on local partners.

The Threat of Drone-Based Terror

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On August 4, 2018, President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela was attacked with explosive-laden drones during a political rally. Although the drones were not successful in assassinating the Venezuelan leader, they managed to injure seven national guardsmen who were at the rally.

A few weeks earlier in July, the Public Safety Secretary of Mexico’s Baja California was also targeted by an armed drone, although the attached IED did not detonate. Attacks such as these are indicative of the burgeoning threat that drone-related terror can play in today’s world.

No longer is drone technology limited to the militaries of countries like the United States, Nigeria, or Pakistan. Instead, groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels, and the Islamic State are getting in on the action. In fact, ISIS recently threatened Paris with a drone attack. As drones become easier to obtain and use, attacks using this technology will become more frequent, more sophisticated, and more deadly.

The barriers to carrying out a drone-based terror attack are lower than ever. Lightweight hobby drones are cheap, easy to purchase and allow terrorist groups to carry out attacks from a distance. While military drones are less accessible and harder to operate, they do provide a higher operational capacity and have a number of avenues by which terrorist groups can obtain them. In this way, drone-based terror is comparable to nuclear terror.

Hobby drones, like a dirty bomb, can easily be weaponized, but have a relatively small impact, while military drones, like a weapon of mass destruction, can be stolen, bought from a rogue state or corrupt official, and has a high potential impact. Additionally, improvements in battery and camera technology will only increase the negative impact of drone-based terror as groups learn to harness these ever-increasing capabilities. In recent testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that drones, “will be used to facilitate an attack in the United States against a vulnerable target, such as a mass gathering.”

The Security Challenges of Drone-Based Terror

Drone-based terror presents unique security threats and challenges. The particular tactical flexibility inherent to drones forces a rethinking of current security strategies. Traditional notions of perimeter defense and target hardening no longer apply when the threat is as maneuverable and flexible as a drone.

Small drones can be used in swarms to destroy commercial airliners, disrupt military operations through hyper-local targeting, or inflict asymmetric damage on civilian targets. Additionally, drones can and have been used in conjunction with more traditional methods of terror.

During the Islamic State’s defense of Mosul, drones were used to guide suicide bombers and improve the accuracy of rocket and mortar fire. The coalition’s anti-drone no-fly zone was quickly counteracted by a do-it-yourself solution implemented by fighters on the ground. Further, drones can conduct both intelligence and counterintelligence operations: terrorist groups could use drones to jam military communications, survey battlefields, and download sensitive data.

In addition to conventional attacks and military-based operations, drones could be engineered to disperse chemical weapons, biological agents such as viruses or Anthrax, or even radioactive material. A September 2018 National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin warned that, “some terrorist groups overseas are [pursuing] new technologies and tactics, such as unmanned aerial systems and chemical agents,” while Hezbollah may have the ability to carry out biological warfare using drones.

Finally, aerial drones are not the only technology terrorist groups can exploit. In January 2017, Houthi rebels killed two Saudi soldiers with a sea-based drone. As aquatic drone technology continues to proliferate, terrorist capabilities may widen to include attacks on coastal cities. Aquatic drones maintain the security challenges of aerial drones but can dramatically widen the target range of drone-based terror. Land-based drones may pose a threat as well, since “fighters in Syria and Iraq have been […] experimenting with remotely controlled vehicles and small robots for nearly a decade.”

Countering Drone-Based Terror

US doctrine focuses on active and passive defense, as well as a proactive intelligence-based approach, to countering air threats. Because of the small size, speed, and maneuverability of drones, they may not be detectable to forms of active defense reliant on radar. However, communication jamming may be a particularly effective form of defense against drones, reducing targeting accuracy and thus the potential threat.

Additionally, acoustic and radio detection methods can make up for radar’s shortcomings in countering drone incursion. On the passive side of defense, simple behavioral changes like hosting high-profile events indoors, varying arrival and departure agendas of potential target personnel, and changing transport routes can make all types of terror, not just drone-based attacks, more difficult. Finally, greater control and oversight of the supply chain, through the monitoring of suspicious purchases and cooperation with manufacturers, would decrease the likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring drones in the first place.

Drone-Based Terror Takeaways

Drone-based terror can be seen as an emerging threat to the global security environment which demands immediate and creative solutions. Terrorist groups are already making use of drones in the air, at sea, and on land in a variety of situations and capacities. The barriers to acquiring, arming, and using drones are lower than ever, and drone-based attacks come with their own unique security challenges. As drone technology improves, becomes cheaper, and proliferates, militaries will have to reckon with new security paradigms to combat this rapidly-evolving threat.

Lone Wolf Bio-Terror: Are We Prepared?

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It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening. However, it’s not just an increasing number of lone wolves, but the variety of tactics they’ll employ in terror’s service that makes prevention a challenge. 

It’s no secret that the lone-wolf threat to Europe is bad, and worsening.

According to Britain’s Security Minister and top counter-terrorism officer, Ben Wallace, it is likely that a biological or chemical terror attack is on the horizon. At a security conference in London, last Tuesday Wallace warned, “The only limit to the ambition of our adversaries is their imagination.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer.

Chemical and biological weapons are getting closer. They have developed and worked on a better arsenal. We have to be prepared for the day when that comes to our streets.” Implicit in his remarks was the notion that counter-terror specialists, as well as governments, must be equally imaginative in their pro-activity.

One major challenge governments face in trying to thwart chemical and biological attacks is the scale. If one person releases tiny amounts of a chemical agent like Anthrax, it could have implications for hundreds, or, millions of people. Traffic flow disruptions, water supply tainting, exposure areas untouchable, these are just some of the possibilities. 

Governments and private contractors have little experience with bio-terrorism. If terrorists were to release biotoxins in civilian areas, the damage could be enormous.

A terrorist need only infect one person, who could then infect her (sic) social circles. Epidemic exposure rates could be a reality faster than you can say Cipro, bringing repercussions on a global scale. The terrorists would need to do very little. The disease would naturally spread at a velocity that grows exponentially.

The probability of these attacks is increasing, and it’s time that governments took note. Currently, there is no international system in place specifically to combat chemical and bio-terror.

If a terrorist infected someone with a biological agent in New York, and then that person flew to Germany infecting people in Berlin, German and American authorities would have no pre-existing framework within which they could cooperate, info-share about how to stop the disease’s transmission, and help those infected. 

The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.

It is critical that such a framework is in place before the scenario unfolds. In the event of a biological or chemical terror attack, time will be of the essence. The international community will have to work together with maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, it seems governments, unlike terrorists themselves, have a fixed view of terrorism.

Governments use major resources to plan for shooters, suicide bombers, and other common acts of terror. Diversifying those resources and intensifying the focus on biological and chemical terrorism could, in the future, save countless lives.

Nuclear Terrorism: Threat Profile and Potential Impact

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The typical profile of a terrorist attack may include gunmen storming a government building or a suicide bomber detonating his explosive vest in a crowd of festival attendees. However, arms wonks, policy makers, and scientists have long been attuned to a more sinister threat: a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb. A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive outfitted with a radiological contaminant such as strontium or cesium, which kills not only through explosive force but radioactive contamination as well.

Terrorist groups can create dirty bombs without much scientific expertise–the difficulty is not in designing the weapon but acquiring the radioactive material. However, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, radiological sources are common in commercial or medical devices and are often poorly secured and vulnerable to theft. In fact, as early as 1998, nineteen tubes of radioactive cesium were stolen from a hospital in North Carolina and were never recovered. Poorly secured nuclear facilities in Russia and former Soviet states are also at threat for theft of nuclear materials, with facilities in a number of Russian provinces and Georgia reporting theft.

A Center for Nonproliferation Studies outlined four possible threats of nuclear terrorism. These include the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon, the theft or purchase of radioactive material and subsequent construction of an improvised nuclear device, attack against nuclear power plants, and the construction and detonation of a dirty bomb. Some sources have stated that nuclear terrorism may already be a reality: documents found in Herat, Afghanistan have indicated Al-Qaeda has been in possession of a dirty bomb since 2003, and radioactive contaminants before then.

In 2017, Indonesian militants acquired low-grade radioactive Thorium-232, which they hoped to transform into more potent Uranium-233. This uranium would then be combined with a homemade explosive to produce a dirty bomb. When ISIS conquered Mosul in 2014, radioactive Cobalt-60 was housed on a university campus in the city, ripe for the taking.

While the terrorist group proclaimed they had seized radioactive material and took over laboratories at the same university, Iraqi government officials later discovered they had not touched the Cobalt-60. Terrorist groups have long been aware of the deadly capabilities of a nuclear attack and have sought to plunder, purchase, or create dirty bombs with which to carry out nuclear attacks. At the same time, governments and nuclear scientists are aware of the threat posed by terrorists to nuclear facilities and actively work to upgrade security systems to combat it.

Despite efforts by a number of terrorist groups to obtain radioactive material and build a nuclear bomb, some experts believe the threat of nuclear terrorism is overblown. A number of explanations for terrorist nuclear abstinence have been proposed. These include the difficulty of carrying out such an attack, the disruptive impact of counter-terrorism efforts, and the potential for a nuclear attack to undermine the terrorist cause rather than advance it. Since the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks to date have been simplistic strikes such as those utilizing knives, conventional explosives, or vehicles, a RAND Corporation analysis concluded, “Governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combating the spread and use of conventional weapons,” as opposed to countering nuclear terrorism.

Even assuming a terrorist group was able to carry out a dirty bomb attack, its impact may be limited. While the public may imagine dirty bombs as capable of killing hundreds or thousands of people, the death toll would more likely be limited to fewer than 100 people. If impacted civilians leave the area quickly, remove contaminated clothing, and shower to wash off radioactive debris, a dirty bomb does not pose much of a threat. However, the economic, psychological, and social costs of a dirty bomb would be much larger. As such, governments must be prepared for the long-term impact of a nuclear terrorist threat more than an initial attack. Costly, long-lasting decontamination efforts may be necessary depending on the level of radioactive contamination, and the public may be afraid of returning to the attack location, causing economic and social disruption.

Nuclear terrorism is a threat that has been underappreciated by the general public, but it has been recognized by counter-terrorism experts, governments, and scientists for some time. While the likelihood of a nuclear terror attack may be slim and the initial deadly effects small, the long-term threat of a dirty bomb attack means governments must upgrade nuclear security efforts at hospitals, power plants, and other facilities containing nuclear materials. Although prior thefts of radioactive material have not yet resulted in nuclear terrorism, it is only a matter of time before a dirty bomb or other nuclear threat becomes a reality.

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