Assessing their Effectiveness of Over-the-Horizon Strategies and Its Viability in Afghanistan

As Afghanistan descends into conflict amid the US withdrawal, President Biden and senior military leaders have pledged to maintain “over-the-horizon” capabilities. This is to prevent the fall of Kabul and terrorist organizations from using Afghanistan as a safe haven. The Afghan air force is in an increasingly precarious position to support ground forces. This is because the contract personnel responsible for maintaining its aircraft left with US forces.

As seen by recent Taliban victories, without the threat of air support from the last 20 years, the future of Afghan forces to defend against Taliban offensives is grim. Therefore, it is crucial to understand OTH strategies to effectively assess its potential as an alternative to on-the-ground forces.

Over-the-horizon refers to the capacity to detect, neutralize, and monitor threats from very long ranges using manned or unmanned aircraft. This often comes from hundreds or thousands of miles. The collapse of ANA ranks amid Taliban pressure makes this strategy one of the only ways to slow the Taliban’s advances and counter-terrorists threats.

OTH offers several advantages; it can bypass Afghanistan’s rugged terrain which hindered ground troops and facilitated easy movement for militants. Furthermore, it is not constrained by frontlines. Subsequently, it can now deal debilitating blows to enemy positions, supplies, and infrastructure anywhere in the country. It was arguably the main reason why the Northern Alliance broke the months-long stalemate with the Taliban after 9/11. Similar campaigns in Iraq, Syria, Serbia, and Pakistan provide interesting case studies to evaluate the future viability of OTH targeting in Afghanistan.

The use of air assets in Kosovo, Serbia was one of the first extensive uses of OTH strategy. Because drone technology was in its infancy, techniques to attach munitions to UAVs were not utilized. These made them strictly surveillance platforms. To neutralize targets, they laser-designated the enemy personnel or equipment which would be transmitted to manned aircraft to conduct the strike. Although drones can carrying considerably more weaponry now, this two-aircraft approach may allow for great capacity to target Taliban positions. 

Manned aircraft can carry more ordinance and may assure military leaders with two confirmations (human and video) of targets. Serbian soldiers quickly adapted to UAV strikes by placing anti-aircraft gun in most likely flight paths, concealing tanks and artillery under foliage or infrastructure. Like all enemies, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda will have adapted to 20 years of drone attacks. Likewise, OTH must similarly adapt to counter their tactics. 

Across the border in Pakistan, OTH was used extensively to eliminate militants. These were mostly used against those who exploited the Afghan-Pakistan border to avoid death, much to the anger of Pakistani officials. UAVs mitigated physical risk to pilots who could be shot down. Similarly, political risk was mitigated to the President, who would receive backlash for violating a country’s sovereignty. UAVs still crossed into Pakistan but at much lower risk. Subsequently, they presented more favorable optics than a human pilot entering Pakistani airspace.

Despite media reports of drones indiscriminately killing civilians, they were privately supported by Pakistani military leaders and by some civilians. Those of who had grown tired with Taliban atrocities.

According to senior government officials, UAV civilian deaths were routinely reported incorrectly. Consequently, they proved extremely precise in eliminating only Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants. Unfortunately, the death of civilians likely created anti-American sentiment and makes it difficult to evaluate the campaign’s overall effectiveness. Much like the increased safety and precision by drones in Pakistan, an OTH strategy using manned and unmanned aircraft will only increase target precision when used in Afghanistan.

OTH campaigns in Syria and Iraq by Russian and US air assets in their respective conflicts differ from those in Pakistan. This is because they actively support a ground offensive, which is the more traditional way of using airpower. The intervention of each country’s air force decisively changed the course of the conflict. This included saving Bashar Al-Assad from near collapse and giving Iraqi forces a much-needed boost to drive ISIS from its positions in Mosul. The presence of ground troops who were aware of how to communicate with air assets, however, distinguishes this campaign from Afghanistan.

The presence of airbases in-country also contributed to the ability to launch quick, reactive strikes. This is something that is now lost. Tens of thousands of airstrikes later and likely more to come, the OTH strategy gave the Iraqi and Syrian governments time to reorganize their forces and stop their oppositions’ momentum. The objective is similar in Afghanistan. However, policymakers must understand the general limitations of OTH and how Afghanistan’s unique tactical environment could limit its effectiveness.

Afghanistan presents unique challenges to implementing superior air power against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The obvious difference is that without airbases, pilots and UAV will have to fly six to eight hours to get to Afghanistan. This is due to the closest airbases being located in the United Arab Emirates or Kuwait.

The inability to secure basing in Central Asia and Pakistan may severely limit quick strikes. Furthermore, this may provide time for the enemy to move away from the target area. The lack of US presence on the ground will also complicate air-to-ground coordination for strikes. Afghan forces have yet to prove their abilities to remain cohesive under pressure and communicate well with pilots.

In asymmetric warfare where the Taliban blend into the local populace and lack traditional infrastructure attack, OTH is limited. This is without extremely precise discrimination between civilians and combatants. Thus, military leaders must constantly push innovation to increase strike precision. They should also consider how covert, lethal aid by Russia or Iran will pose risks to airframes. This is especially important, with anti-aircraft missiles.

A robust OTH strategy is the only way to delay the Taliban’s quick gains and ensure peace can be implemented in Afghanistan. The ability for Afghan troops to coordinate these strikes with US aircraft will determine the strategies overall success. Over-the-Horizon targeting has the potential to deal devastating blows to the Taliban’s momentum and maintain the remaining stability in Afghanistan. However, US leaders must understand its limitations and constantly push the military to innovate lighter, stronger, and more precise air capabilities.

What Is Next For Turkey in Afghanistan?

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Bagram Airfield, the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul has become the last stand in America’s 20-year campaign in Afghanistan. With the Taliban on the offensive, the issue of security arrangements at this highly strategic installation must be resolved before the U.S. and NATO complete their withdrawal. 

Recently, Turkey has offered to keep its troops in Afghanistan and continue guarding and operating the airport post-U.S. withdrawal. Before agreeing to this offer, the U.S. and NATO should take into consideration how this offer is going to benefit Turkey’s interests in Afghanistan, its regional aspirations, and its position within NATO.

Background

In 2001, Turkey joined the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with the condition that its troops will be excluded from conducting explicit counterinsurgency operations. Turkey remained in Afghanistan after the ISAF mission ended as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission. The 600-strong Turkish force contingent trained, advised, and assisted the 111th Capital Division of the Afghan National Army, the Kabul City Police, and other security agencies in Kabul. 

Furthermore, Turkish troops are guarding and operating the Kabul Airport, Afghanistan’s main gateway. Being a landlocked country with roads deemed unsafe to travel due to security risks, the airport is critical for those actors wanting to sustain a strategic presence in Afghanistan. The airport provides foreign embassies the ability to maintain day-to-day operations and have an emergency evacuation route. It also serves as the port of entry for international aid workers and health care providers that assist in providing basic services. 

Turkey Priorities in Afghanistan

Officially, Turkey states that its foreign policy towards Afghanistan is based on four pillars: “maintenance of unity and integrity of Afghanistan”; “providing security and stability in the country”; “strengthening of broad based political structure in which popular participation is a priority”; “restoring peace and prosperity by eliminating terrorism and extremism”.

Turkey’s actions in Afghanistan, however, should not be seen in isolation, but as a larger effort to extend Turkey’s influence throughout the region. With ambitions for regional leadership, Turkey has been trying to expand its influence through assertive involvement in various neighboring regions, including Afghanistan-Pakistan. While officially working under NATO’s banner, Turkey distanced itself from the U.S.-led war efforts against the Taliban and launched independent diplomatic initiatives. 

First, Turkey focuses on improving trilateral relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. Turkey has hosted several Afghan-centric conferences, such as the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process, and arranged numerous meetings between Afghan and Pakistani leaders. 

Second, Turkey supports the Turkic language-speaking minorities in Afghanistan by establishing Turkish schools, providing scholarships, hosting local Turkic leaders, supporting cultural immersion experiences, etc. All serve to increase Turkey’s soft power and its regional leadership aspirations in Afghanistan and neighboring Turkic countries.

Third, Turkey believes that by offering to safeguard the Kabul airport post-U.S. withdrawal, it could decrease tensions with the U.S. and improve Turkey’s position within NATO. By taking on a job no one else wants, Turkey could repair its relationship with Washington that has been strained by years of disputes, most intensely Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 Russian missile-defense system that NATO considers a threat to its security. 

Furthermore, if the offer will be accepted, Turkey will gain additional diplomatic leverage in future negotiations with the U.S. and NATO. Already, the European members of NATO are dependent on Turkey for preventing millions of Syrian refugees from crossing into the EU. With Turkey’s growing influence in the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and across the Middle East, the U.S. and NATO could find themselves unable to act, if needed, against malign Turkish policies if they are overly dependent on it. 

Conclusions

With U.S. and NATO troops’ withdrawal almost complete, a solution to the security arrangements at Kabul’s Airport must be found. Turkey’s offer could provide that solution. However, the implications of such a solution should be taken into consideration. By understanding that Turkey’s offer is far from an act of altruism, but rather, of grand Turkish strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia, the U.S. and NATO could make a calculated decision that understands the challenges and implications of accepting Turkey’s offer.

Khalid noor Taliban

From Negotiations to the Front Line Fighting the Taliban: Hoping to End Their Fathers’ War

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A Rise to Peace Exclusive interview with Khalid Noor, member of the Afghan negotiating team.

Afghan negotiator, Khalid Noor, has been fighting the Taliban alongside his father in northern Afghanistan, with the aim to reverse Taliban advances in Balkh Province. Noor’s diplomatic shift to the military is in response to the Taliban’s military attacks across Afghanistan gaining new territories while pushing back the Afghan security forces.

Driven by a sense of patriotism and a desire to see his country at peace, Khalid Noor believes resisting the Taliban is his duty, stating:

“(We have been trying to negotiate with them, but they would drag their feet). We have no other choice but to continue the fight, given that the Afghan government does not have the capabilities and human resources to fight everywhere.” Noor added: “We are still hopeful that negotiations and a political settlement are in the best interest of Afghanistan and that’s if the Taliban are willing to negotiate or fight. Our stand is clear, that negations are the path to peace and prefer talks over fighting.”

At just 25 years old, Khalid Noor was the youngest negotiator for the Afghan government in the Doha peace talks with the Taliban. The son of a legendary mujahideen commander, Ata Muhammad Noor, and a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and George Mason University, he is capable of bridging the gap between Afghanistan’s traditional politics and its rising younger generation.

As negotiations stalled, the Afghan government with its fragmented leadership has failed to turn back Taliban offensives. Instead, instigating heavy casualties for Afghan forces and territory loss. The situation turned brutal for Afghans when President Biden announced troops withdrawal by September of this year. This ultimately furnished a psychological moral to the Taliban militants, leveraging their cause – the “defeat” of the “world’s super-power.” Whilst Afghan security forces were pushed back by the Taliban, a national mobilization or uprising forces started across Afghanistan. This gave hope, that the Taliban cannot succeed militarily.

Within days and weeks, thousands of Afghans like Khalid Noor, used their ancestors’ guns to defend their communities and loved ones from the Taliban. Among them, women and teenagers as young as 15, have been seen with Ak-47 and machine guns. Instead of returning to Doha, Noor and his two younger brothers, Tariq Noor and Suhaib Noor, opted to defend their home province.

Along with his father, Noor mobilized a militia that intends to retake districts captured by the Taliban. On June 27, we interviewed Khalid Noor regarding his activities on the ground.

Video: by https://www.facebook.com/dw.dari/

Noor stated that thousands of his uprising forces, comprised of the grassroots, are fighting to retake Kaldar, a small district near Afghanistan’s border with Uzbekistan. On June 27, Uzbekistan’s state news agency reported that a Taliban attack on a government checkpoint in Kaldar, forced 17 Afghan soldiers to retreat. This left the district in Taliban control. Only days later, with Noor’s forces on the front lines, the district governor’s office and police station were retaken by government forces.

Noor reports that the Taliban has engaged in little face-to-face combat. Instead, they have primarily focused on guerrilla tactics. This has included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as artillery strikes targeting local infrastructure.

“The next target will be Balkh district, which is near the city of Mazar-e-Sharif,” said Noor. Balkh, the capital of Mazar-e-Sharif, has been seized by the Taliban recently. However, Noor’s operation days later was a huge success.

The Taliban do not have strong grassroots support in northern Afghanistan, unlike other parts of the country. However, in the last decade, their support has grown. This is primarily due to the government’s inability to secure the region. During their regime in the 1990s, the Taliban left a dark chapter with bitter memories. This was due to their destructions and killings of thousands of people when they overran Mazar-e-Sharif. The majority of Noor’s forces are volunteers who are willing to fight and prevent another catastrophe.

While demanding, these district-by-district advances are slow and dangerous, but the only way for the uprising militias to retake Taliban-held territory with their limited resources.

In response to Taliban aggression, forces like Noor’s are rising across Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani has called on them to form a “united front” to support the Afghan security forces, but their efforts currently appear uncoordinated and localized. Ata Muhammad Noor recently presided over a meeting of the political parties in northern Afghanistan and was subsequently selected as head of the military council for National Mobilization.

Noor’s forces have been on the front lines against the Taliban for weeks now and yet have over 22 casualties; six killed and 16 wounded. “The first three of our soldiers martyred by IED and the rest including four of my own personnel guards died in face-to-face combat,” said Noor. 

But Noor understands the potentially harmful implications of an uncoordinated militia-led resistance. His father, during the 1990s, was party to the intra-mujahideen civil war that left Afghanistan in ruins and without a government after the Soviet withdrawal.

It is very dangerous if we [Afghans] go back to the ‘90s. That’s why my father has been pushing the government to work together to control the public uprising forces to avoid any future crisis. (My father believes in consensus. He sees a united front and voice the only way forward; a front that will decide unitedly at this difficult moment),” said Khalid Noor.

It will be up to young Afghan leaders like Noor to ensure that Afghanistan progresses into the future without forgetting the important lessons of its past.


Ahmad Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

The Security Threats to Afghanistan and its Problematic Shift to Peace

As the conflict status for Afghanistan resides on worsening, there has never been more reasonable grounds for troops to patrol and protect their people and prevent attacks from awaking.

With a robust Afghan National Security Force of approximately 350,000 troops, (1,000 UK and 3,500 US troops) deployed from the country Army Forces, its violence and security threats are supposed to have decreased under the freedom and protection intended under the NATO political and security agreement. After all, 30 countries are making executive decisions and a consensus on the actions best used to provisionally deter the threats and control of the Taliban and its ‘safe haven’ to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, such as Al-Qaeda.

There is still doubt among the citizens of Afghanistan, that deadly violence will most likely persist as a national surge. This is said to last until the Taliban and Afghan Government can form an alliance. Principally, this agreement is realistic in terms of how safety and control can be preserved. This is without further disruption from adversary parties or terrorist groups. To understand what could influence a peace alliance for Afghanistan, it is best to explore its current and emerging threats. 

Afghan Threats: Now and Tomorrow

Since 1978, there has been internal conflict, centred around revenge violence and political insurgence. This is between Afghan anti-communists and Afghan’s communist Government, known as the ‘Afghan War.’ Deadly threats soon turned into actions. This was largely in response to the September 11 terrorist strikes, which were mostly US-led invasions on the Afghan people. Subsequently, this guided the withdraw of the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan.

Ever since the devastating attacks, the US has been Afghanistan’s greatest threat – and in many ways – enemy. However, it is agreed that whilst both forces work together in the fight against terrorism, the elimination of “real threats” is underway. This is evident with the Taliban, ISIL, Al-Qaeda and their offline and online affiliates, in light of “#TalibanOurGuardians” circulating on Twitter as a top trending hashtag as they attempt to takeover across Central Asia. 

Today in the small and large cities of Afghanistan, there are ongoing security threats from Kabul towards Pakistan that highlight a potential resurgence of Al-Qaeda after the Taliban fails to cut ties, even after they pledged to do so. The Taliban are utilizing Al-Qaeda’s men that reside in Afghan, as their military position is stronger than ever before. If the Taliban choose to echo Al-Qaeda’s chain of commands, there will likely be an increase in violence.

Furthermore, there may be a disturbance to homes when used as ‘shields’ and predominantly women’s rights. This may jeopardise the progress made towards education and work for Afghan women and girls.

While terrorist groups become more advanced with technology and intelligence, the rationale for defence and preventing further threats is to form a relationship and offer cooperation between the Taliban and outside Governments. This may be an attempt to end the ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan. 

Many argue that the Afghan War will heighten with bloodshed and brutality. Consequently, this may result after its mutuality is lost between the NATO groups and the withdraw of US and British troops. This is evident with the Taliban capturing over 30 districts across Afghanistan, 48 hours following the US withdrawal announcement on June 19.

This is further reinforced with approximately 200 Humvees having been captured from All Nippon Airways in just 3 weeks. This will cause substantial disruption for US and British Air Forces in conflict zones. Essentially, this a faster reign of power than ISIL in Iraq in2014.

Could this jeopardise the US Government’s hold on the fight against terrorism? Many have argued that it has at least confirmed that their 20-year led mission to defeat has. Consequently, there is a difference in opinion. This is due to the conflicting opinion that peace action will bring great alliances for Afghanistan. This may eventually prevent the level of terrorism on their soil in years to come.

However, it is most likely the Taliban will continue to surge without cutting ties with Al-Qaeda. This is both a terrifying and dangerous period for the Afghan people; especially for those who disagree with the Taliban’s extreme beliefs.

Conclusion

There will always be crime and extremism among Afghan communities. This is likely due to its unrepairable history of terrorism conflict. Consequently, the momentum for change to peaceful neighbourhoods is heading in an undepictable direction.

Without ground protection from troops, threats will become harder to suppress and may be too late to prevent. Nevertheless, there is a somewhat logical basis for the Government’s decisions to build trust and alliance with Afghanistan’s violent extremist organisations. Most importantly the Taliban.

The progress towards peace will be determined in the forthcoming months. This will be measured by the Afghan Government’s attempts to tackle the Taliban insurgency. Beyond all, this will depend on how the control takeover is targeted whilst utilizing the advantages of Counter-Terrorism strategies, such as networking and negotiation, for inviting cooperation and harmony in Afghan. This is before there is no way of “containing” terrorist groups and their affiliates in such countries.

 

Biden Has Shown An Economic Commitment to Afghanistan. Now, He Must Show a Diplomatic One

The fate of Dr. Mohammad Najibullah haunts contemporary discussions over the future of Afghanistan. In the spring of 1992, Najibullah’s government collapsed under the pressure of mujahideen forces. While the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan weakened his government, the cessation of Soviet aid flowing into the country marked the final nail in his coffin.

Since President Biden announced America’s intention to fully withdraw from Afghanistan by September 11th, observers have worriedly speculated whether or not Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, might meet the same fate as Najibullah. The American intelligence community has predicted that the Afghan government could fall in as soon as six months. Despite this bleak projection, Biden is committed to bringing American troops home.

Over the last few weeks, American soldiers have transferred major American bases in Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces. Americans have already departed Kandahar Airfield; Baghram Airfield is expected to be vacated in the coming days. Additionally, Biden plans to evacuate the military’s Afghan contractors from the country if they wish to leave, a move Ghani warns will damage morale among Afghan soldiers. Still, Biden insists that this withdrawal does not amount to an abandonment of Afghanistan.

Accompanying his decision to withdraw, Biden is providing $300 million in additional aid to the Afghan government. This aid appears to be the crux of his strategy for defending the Afghan government. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has succinctly explained Biden’s policy: “As the United States begins withdrawing our troops, we will use our civilian and economic assistance to advance a just and durable peace for Afghanistan.”

Already, the folly of an aid-driven strategy is becoming apparent. Without American military support, Afghan security forces have been reluctant to put up a fight, abandoning dozens of military bases and police checkpoints across the country. According to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, 81 of Afghanistan’s 419 district centers are now under Taliban control. While the Taliban has thus far been unable to seize any provincial capitals, they have encircled the capital of Kunduz and appear to have momentum on their side. Beleaguered by corruption, ammunition shortages, and high casualty rates, the Afghan security forces have failed to put up adequate resistance.

Some representatives of the Afghan government have begun independently fighting the Taliban. In Mazar-i-Sharif, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Abbas Ibrahimzada, has taken to arming his supporters. Many similar militias have sprung up across northern Afghanistan. Districts under Taliban siege lack not only supplies but national leadership. It will take more than foreign aid to hold the Taliban back. Biden must make a diplomatic commitment to Afghanistan, in addition to his economic one, if the “senseless violence” he detests is to end.

In a recent statement, Biden’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, affirmed that the U.S. will continue “providing diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian assistance to support the Afghan people.” But the strength of America’s diplomatic commitment to Afghanistan remains unclear. Biden’s administration is likely to keep encouraging a resumption of the American-backed peace talks in Istanbul. While these talks can produce temporary ceasefires, they will never sustain a long-term peace without the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Most crucially Pakistan.

Biden’s administration has been reluctant to engage Pakistan. Biden has not even called Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, even though Ghani sees Pakistan as central to the Afghan conflict. Talking to American lawmakers last Friday, he reportedly remarked that “the Taliban is the hands, but Pakistan is the brains” of the insurgency.

Pakistan’s position toward the U.S. withdrawal has been ambivalent. Khan has been adamant that U.S. troops will “absolutely not” be permitted to conduct operations in Afghanistan from military bases in Pakistan. However, in a Washington Post op-ed, he stated that “Pakistan is ready to be a partner for peace in Afghanistan.” While Pakistan is unsupportive of the Afghan government and many American objectives in the region, Khan has repudiated the idea of a complete Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Despite its long history of interference in Afghan affairs and support for the Taliban, Pakistan has an interest in peace. It does not want to endure the potential spillover effects of a prolonged Afghan civil war, no longer constrained by the presence of American troops.

Biden could work to promote the common objectives of America and Pakistan. His reluctance to do so suggests a sense of apathy about Afghanistan. Or, alternatively, a desire to take a new tact with Pakistan, given its increasingly close relationship with China. Regardless, Biden clearly has priorities that rank higher for him than Afghanistan.

Biden’s policy toward Afghanistan suggests that he has adopted the same war-weariness as the American public. For this, he can hardly be blamed. For the duration of the war, policymakers have struggled to define the preferred outcomes of the American military presence in Afghanistan. Still, Biden must avoid the aimlessness of his predecessors. He must articulate a clear alternative vision for America’s policy toward Afghanistan that puts diplomacy first.

Biden’s recent statements on the Afghan peace process are a combination of boilerplate and platitudes. One can expect this from an administration that wishes to politely exit America’s “forever war” while morally saving face. Biden has insisted that “Afghans are going to have to decide their future,” but he knows they will not be able to. Instead, the country that most forcefully devotes its resources to dominating Afghanistan will determine the country’s future. Biden seems reluctant to challenge this status quo, but he could.

A diplomatic solution to the war in Afghanistan is possible, but it would require multiple tracks of diplomacy. Biden cannot only rely on reviving the multilateral Istanbul talks. He must unilaterally engage with the key players in Afghanistan: Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Biden does not appear interested in unilateral engagement, but he should be. It could help promote a settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It could also help Biden build necessary diplomatic relationships for his upcoming focus on the rise of China.

What We Can Learn About the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan in Anticipation of the U.S Troops Withdrawal

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, signaling the end of a nearly decade of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the beginning of a period of uncertainty.

As in 1989, the upcoming U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan on September 11, 2021, fosters much of the same uncertainty concerning the competence of the Afghan security forces and their ability to prevent the Ghani government from collapsing. According to U.S intelligence assessments, this may be as soon as six months after U.S withdrawal. Like their predecessors, the Afghan security forces and their foreign supporters will experience similar challenges.

In the aftermath of the Soviet force withdrawal, the Afghan security forces continued to be fully dependent on the USSR. The USSR continued supporting the security forces with advisors, ammunition, fuel, and funds. Furthermore, with the main raison d’être that unified all Mujahideen factions together, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan disappeared. Soviet agents managed to leverage those tensions and reach agreements with different factions to support the security forces.

Whilst security forces were successful in holding off Mujahedeen for three years, the dependence of the Najibullah government on Soviet support eventually led to its demise. Consequently, the government collapsed shortly after Soviet support ceased. This demonstrated the failure of the USSR to develop an Afghan security force that could sustain a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan. In part, failure is a product of the USSR and the Afghan government’s inability to develop a functioning Afghan state.

The security structures implemented by the Soviets in Afghanistan raised public distrust, which were frequently prone to corruption and bureaucracy. Consequently, many structures established by the Soviets collapsed shortly after their withdrawal. Others, such as the interior ministry structure, survived, however, they became components of militias, receiving orders from strongmen.

KhAD, the government’s intelligence agency, was the most successful and effective of the security forces. Consequently, the government was heavily dependent upon KhAD for regime survival. Nevertheless, even KhAD couldn’t prevent the government’s collapse.

One might question, whether the security structures implemented by the Soviets were appropriate for the mission they were designed to accomplish. As effectiveness is not merely a measure of the number of arms or quality of forces but rather of mission compatibility, some believe the answer is probably not.

Currently, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are supported by international funds and substantial U.S. support. However, the ANDSF is undermined by lack of capacity, corruption, factorization, high casualty levels, poor intelligence, lack of willingness to launch offensive actions, and more. Consequently, the government heavily relies upon the Afghan Special Security Forces, its most competent force. The central government’s control of the country continues to erode as the Taliban captures more territories and local warlords assemble militias to confront the Taliban.

The U.S. has poured more than $70 billion in weapons, equipment, and training into the Afghan security forces. Yet, the competence of these forces to survive a massive Taliban offensive post-U.S. and NATO withdrawal is unclear. All of the above, resemble the challenges the Afghan security forces experienced following the Soviet withdrawal. The U.S should honestly and openly ask itself if the current ANDSF structure is the right one for the mission. As in 1989, the answer is probably not. The recent Taliban successes and territorial gains strengthen that assertion.

In anticipation of September 11, the U.S and Ghani governments should work together to reform the ANDSF. A framework should be considered to confront the challenges that the Afghan security forces will face, post-U.S withdrawal. The collapse of the ANDSF will raise the probability of President Ghani sharing a similar fate to former President Najibullah, scenes that nobody wishes to witness again. Furthermore, it will plunge this war-turn country into further chaos. This may result in renewed terrorist threats to the U.S and its allies.

By learning from the Soviet withdrawal experience, the U.S could structure and prepare the ANDSF in such a way, that they could effectively and independently sustain peace and regime stability in Afghanistan.

The Islamic State of Khorasan and the Afghan Peace Process

The recent attack on the girl’s school in a Hazara neighborhood warrants discussion concerning the threat of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 85 and wounded over 100. However, IS-K has conducted similar operations in the past. The Hazara Shia are particularly threatened because IS ideology considers them to be more problematic than foreign actors. The group challenges the implementation of the delicate peace process between the Taliban and Afghan government. IS-K can also strain trust within the Taliban as more radical factions join the group to continue a successful insurgency. Due to the challenges of controlling territory, more civilian attacks are likely as the group struggles to maintain relevancy amid the American withdrawal. Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will also serve as a recruiting bed for the group to make inroads in the border region. The future of the Afghanistan after US troops leave is unclear, but IS-K may unify Taliban and government forces against a shared threat. To understand where IS-K fits into Afghanistan’s recent history, we must explore its beginnings.

IS-K History

Like other IS franchises, IS-K gained disaffected members of other terror groups. These groups operated autonomously until several high-ranking Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders pledged allegiance to IS in 2014. These initial defections created a domino-effect of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan joining the group. IS’s increasing notoriety in Iraq and Syria catalyzed its expansion. The Taliban and IS-K eventually declared war on each other because of ideological differences and competition for resources. From its stronghold in Nangarhar province,, IS-K began a campaign to overrun Taliban positions to consolidate its power. At one point, it controlled over one-third of the province. By 2015, the group began losing popularity because of its policies banning poppy cultivation and harsh interpretation of Sharia Law. Taliban, US, and Afghan offensives have weakened IS-K control over Nangarhar. Despite this, the group has responded with horrific suicide bombings on minorities and election centers around the country. Although it has little support in Pakistan, TTP defectors in the group have utilized Islamabad’s intelligence apparatus to increase its strategic depth in Afghanistan. 

Challenge to the Peace Process

Although IS-K is a mid-level threat in Afghanistan, it still poses challenges to the implementation of a peace settlement, fostering trust between the Taliban and Afghan governments, and maintaining 2-decades of progress for women and minorities. For radical Taliban who disagree with peace negotiations, IS-K represents an alternative in order to continue their campaign against the central government. They will not negotiate a settlement, especially if the opponent approaches defeat. Tragic attacks on minority communities like Hazaras and Sikhs, women, and schools undermine public confidence in the government to maintain safety. Little faith in government motivates Afghans to join terror groups as well. These attacks reduce trust between the government and Taliban leaders if the latter provided support to IS-K. Although the two groups are technically at war, IS-K attacks provide Taliban leadership plausible deniability when they conduct attacks on security forces or “illegitimate” institutions. The recent attack on a girls’ school highlights the danger of losing hard-fought gains. The resilience of these institutions is unclear, but these attacks will quicken their deterioration. If a group threatens political rights, a civil war between ethnic militias jostling for influence could occur. A disenchanted public could prevent Afghanistan from overcoming its challenges and reaching its economic and social potential. Education is important to increase mobility and de-radicalize, but Afghanistan’s decades-long problems will persist without addressing these concerns. 

Future Cooperation

The sincerity of the Taliban in peace negotiations is debatable, but IS-K presents an opportunity to fight a mutual threat. Beyond prisoner exchanges, the two parties do not trust each other. However, cooperating on this issue could set the foundation for greater security cooperation in the future. It would also mitigate radicalization concerns because people will not join extremist groups out of concern for safety. Here, the government will cooperate with an extremist group to counter an even greater threat. Like Afghanistan in the 1980’s, both sides must put aside differences to defeat a common enemy that complicates their negotiations. After each group deal with the external threat, a compromise in achieving their respective goals in Afghanistan becomes possible.

Link for Photo

مركز المستقبل – Is ISIS-Khorasan Province Seeking to Consolidate its Role in Afghanistan? (futureuae.com)

Rahmatullah Nabil discusses Istanbul conference and Afghan Peace Process

Rahmatullah Nabil Discusses Afghanistan’s Peace Process

An Impossible Task?

Rahmatullah Nabil, Former Director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan discussed what lies ahead for Afghanistan’s Peace Process while referencing the Istanbul conference on his Twitter account.
The Istanbul conference was originally scheduled for April 5th but is likely to be delayed due to ongoing arrangements. Given the date of May 1st for US troop withdrawal, the 11,000 troops that remain in Afghanistan, and the many other moving parts concerning the process – it is almost impossible for the deadline to be met. Ahmad Shah Mohibi, founder of Rise to Peace, reiterated the impossible task of a quick troop withdrawal and also mentioned the possible need for another conference in the style of the Bonn Conference in 2001.

Troop Withdrawal Extension

What is expected to happen? The United States (US) will ask Pakistan and the Taliban to agree to a 6-month delay in the withdrawal of American troops. The extension would be for the implementation of decisions to be made at the Istanbul conference – not for the sake of delay on the part of the US.
U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad and the State Department appear to be satisfied by the break of the Taliban. However, Al-Qaeda, the US Congress, the intelligence community, and the UN sanctions committee still have doubts about the break.
The 90 day period of violence reduction talks are ongoing and appear to be successful. The Taliban is expected to request the release of all remaining prisoners and the removal of the Taliban from UN and other sanctions/blacklists. Ghani’s removal no longer key. To Taliban, as other stakeholders have already agreed to his stepping down.

New Istanbul Conference?

If all continues smoothly behind the scenes, a new date for the Istanbul conference will be selected. And a power-sharing transitional government will be discussed – likely to be agreed to with minor modifications. The current Resolute Support mission may be changed to UN peace-keeping forces – perhaps with some Muslim country forces as additions.
The Afghan Special Forces and the Taliban’s Special Force Unit will possibly be set up under the UN peace-keeping umbrella also. An Islamic country, perhaps Turkey will monitor the political arrangements of the conference. If none of the above transpire – Afghanistan will likely be dragged deeper into crises and conflict with spillover effects to the region and the rest of the world. This would also likely impact the flow of refugees currently spilling over into Europe.
Rahmatullah Nabil’s discussion is available in full on his official Twitter account here.
Foreign Investment impact on Afghanistan peace process

The Role of Foreign Investment in the Afghan Peace Process

Previous efforts to invest in Afghanistan’s economic future have had poor results. But, the role of foreign investment in the Afghan Peace Process has never been more important. Afghanistan has made little progress in terms of economic development, despite the United States having spent over $24 billion on economic development and another $30 billion on reconstruction programs. Approximately 90% of the Afghan economy takes place within informal sectors. They are primarily attached to the drug trade, and over half the population lives below the national poverty line. However, the signing of Afghanistan’s peace agreement, will make it is more important now than ever before to create a vibrant economy. Economic growth would reduce poverty, a huge factor in the growth of violence or the drug economy. If Afghanistan’s economy is to develop, responsible investment is the only path forward. 

Past Investment

Past attempts to invest in Afghanistan have been largely unsuccessful. The country’s systemic corruption, lack of infrastructure, ongoing insurgency make operating even the most simple businesses a challenge. The few American companies willing to work in Afghanistan were those that received lucrative contracts from the federal government. Often, these companies caused more problems than they solved. They would frequently hire cheap Afghan subcontractors instead of doing work themselves. They would make protection payments to the Taliban to gain access to roadways and ensure their safety from attacks. And they would often leave behind poor quality work that would crumble within the next few years. A few large symbolic projects have been completed – the luxurious Aino Mina neighbourhood in Kandahar and Afghanistan’s first Toyota dealership – these are token projects of Afghanistan’s elite, not the emergence of a real economy.

What Needs To Be Done?

While the end of the Taliban insurgency will provide a more stable environment in which economic development can take place, Afghanistan will retain many of its previous challenges. To avoid the waste and failures of the past, actors seeking to invest must be hyper-sensitive to the political and economic limitations that come with doing business in the country.

The most successful development projects will be those that can reduce their reliance on subcontractors and middlemen and must provide training and a living wage to Afghan workers. They will also need to foster a workplace environment that promotes a sense of community and civic responsibility. Projects will need to begin on a small scale and will need to engage with district and provincial governors. These is needed to provide an economically feasible alternative to insurgency and the drug trade.

While meeting all of these demands simultaneously will prove challenging, there is no alternative. The Afghan economy has incredible potential for growth. If all elements of society can share in that growth, then a long-lasting peace is within reach. Alternatively, if a peacetime economy fails to support Afghan families, another outbreak of violence will be inevitable. We must invest in Afghanistan’s future but invest responsibly. 

 

 

The Taliban in Afghanistan

The Taliban And Mujahideen: Comparisons And Lessons Learned

At the time of the Soviet invasion, those fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan were one of the largest refugee populations in the world. They flooded border towns like Peshawar and Quetta. These locations aided mujahideen leaders in recruitment efforts from growing refugee camps, for their militias. Hundreds of madrassas indoctrinated these refugees to justify their holy war against Soviet forces. Twenty years later, the Taliban utilised the same infrastructure to radicalise their followers against the Americans. 

Lessons To Learn

Parallels can be drawn between the anti-Soviet resistance in the 1980s and the mujahideen and Taliban. The ideas that advanced American policies in Afghanistan during the 1980s can provide useful lessons concerning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Although the Taliban and mujahideen have different adversaries, their origins and ideology remain rooted in Islamic teachings.

The same actors of the 1980s are still actively influencing local politics today. For this analysis, mujahideen will refer to the Afghans who drove the Red Army out of Afghanistan in 1989. The refugee crisis served to fuel both groups’ objectives and many of the poor conditions from the 1980s remain today. Policy makers can learn valuable lessons from the Taliban and mujahideen’s resistance and address the conditions that lead to violent extremism.

The same names from the Soviet resistance appear frequently in current Afghan politics and in the Taliban’s leadership. Abdullah Abdullah, Abd Rasul Sayyaf, and Amrullah Saleh, were vital in military successes against Soviet forces. They also currently hold senior political or governmental positions. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was one of the most effective rebel commanders during the resistance, also leads the Jamaat-Islami party. Although much about senior Taliban leaders like Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Ghani Baradar are unknown, their estimated birthdays put them in their teens or early twenties during the Soviet occupation. This would have made them impressionable to years of anti-Soviet, anti-occupation ideology.

Indoctrination in Pakistan

Afghan asylum seekers in Pakistan have bleak prospects because there is no path to Pakistani citizenship. Persistent, dismal conditions during the 1980s and 2000s were prime recruitment opportunities for armed groups, providing religious purpose and money. According to Ahmad Shah Mohibi, many young Taliban fighters are children of former mujahideen and refugees indoctrinated in Pakistan. Additionally, disenfranchised Islamist leaders in the current government could inspire their relatives to join the Taliban or other militant groups.

Radical mujahideen-era commanders like Hekmatyar and Jalaladdin Haqqani did not achieve their political visions for Afghanistan and may retain motives to undermine the government. After the 1996 fall of Kabul, many in Hekmatyar’s circle joined the Taliban after he was exiled to Iran. After two decades of foreign occupation, why would Hekmatyar change his 1980s-era anti-American sentiment? Some in his party support the Taliban and call their victories against NATO forces, “the pride of Afghans.”

Pakistan was and remains the most important actor for the mujahideen and Taliban. During conflict, Islamabad covertly supplied both groups with weapons and money to increase costs for their respective adversaries. As conflict subsided, Pakistan manipulated aid to favour proxies and increase the prospects of a Pashtun government, friendly to Islamabad. It seeks the same goals with the Taliban. Its madrassas and training camps in the semi-autonomous regions prepare fighters spiritually and physically, using decades of experience fighting Soviet and American forces. Its territory also provides both movements sanctuary to recruit and direct combat operations without fear of assassination. To understand how issues from the Cold War impact the current peace process, leaders must familiarise themselves with Afghanistan’s past.

Comparisons And Future Recommendations

Policy makers must simultaneously address the plight of refugees and work to limit Pakistan’s influence. The conditions and corruption of today, that force refugees to join terror groups, were also present after the Soviet withdrawal. They actually facilitated early support for the Taliban, who provided long-absent social and civil services after the civil war. Leaders in the region must facilitate refugees’ return to Afghanistan because they will continue to deteriorate in Pakistan with poor education and job insecurity.

Violent spoilers will complicate their return but relying on kinetic strikes only treats the symptoms of poor living conditions. More funds must be utilised to solve issues for counterterrorism methods like reforming children’s education, de-radicalising and integrating former Taliban. Other methods include creating a more inclusive political systems, and providing stable employment. With improved standards of life, Afghans are less likely to be less radicalised or resort to the Taliban to make ends meet or fulfil “religious” duties.

Pakistan’s role in covertly assisting armed groups and indoctrinating fighters must be also curbed. Solving only one of these issues would allow people to continue crossing the Pakistani border to fight or continue suffering in conditions that motivate extremism. In Islamabad’s constant rivalry with Delhi and its closer relations to China, how U.S. leaders can achieve cooperation after years of attempts is unclear. Islamabad’s security apparatus must reform internally for optimal results but this is unlikely because it uses religion to justify violence in Kashmir. Critics would argue that these steps are unrealistic, however, in a conflict with diverse actors and regional rivalries like Afghanistan’s, there are no easy steps. In addressing the underlying factors contributing to the Taliban’s growth can the U.S. help the Afghan people achieve peace.

Ending American Involvement

The United States learned the consequences for disengaging with Afghanistan too quickly in 1992. The environment that they left caused a civil war and an emerging Islamist movement. These circumstances provided sanctuary to terror groups. American presence in Afghanistan is a complex topic but the costs of their disengagement are far greater. America should not  back out after more 2-decades of investing in partners, aid, and losing thousands of lives. Our leaders must know Afghanistan’s history and what conditions created and destroyed peace. Many are recurring themes throughout the world’s conflicts. It is the only way to invest resources effectively to stop terrorism.

Rise to Peace