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Africa
Lafiya Dole
 by Joan McDappa

Lafiya Dole: Africa’s Old Narrative

The eternally fascinating continent of Africa is home to fifty-four beautiful countries, which are rich in resources, diversity, strength, and sadly conflicts. In the words of Patricia Danzi, Regional Director for Africa for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “conflicts last and they don’t stop – and more are added.”

Leaders in Africa continue to make efforts to lessen the number of conflicts constantly arising and persisting. The challenge, sincerely, is a great one and one that has come to form, over time, the identity of Africa.

An Africa which is at peace with itself was the dream of Nelson Mandela and continues to be the dream of many other passionate leaders in Africa, but then, how can this be achieved? Could it be through Lafiya Dole?

Lafiya Dole

As part of the efforts to rework and add renewed vigor to the fight against terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, especially in the Northeast, the Nigerian Army has decided to rename Operation Zaman Lafiya” to “Operation Lafiya Dole.”

Former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Major General Tukur Yusufu Buratai addressed the 103 Battalion Nigerian Army based in Konduga, Borno State. He commended the Nigerian troops on their efforts thus far in the ongoing war against terrorism, all the while urging the army to fight harder in the pursuit and destruction of Boko Haram terrorists.

Lafiya Dole is a phrase in the Hausa dialect meaning, simply, “peace by force.” Quite a paradox, but unfortunately, acceptable not only in Nigeria but across the globe. If anything, the strategy of “peace by force” has done more harm than good.

Even with the Lafiya Dole campaign, peace, in reality, remains a mirage for the people of Nigeria. There is no peace in sight for Nigeria, not with the way it seeks to drive home its point to terrorists.

In Africa

Many African leaders hold firmly to the success of the Lafiya Dole philosophy. Similar strategies are continuously developed and implemented throughout Africa, both on state and regional levels. Silencing guns with bigger guns summarizes peace efforts in Africa. In reality, these efforts only help to further enhance resistance as the continent has seen increased activities among non-state actors, despite its efforts to cripple these activities.

Merely eliminating a leader of a violent group or members without first dealing with the conditions that allowed for such will only create a bigger problem. It is only a matter of time before another conflict arises. For a long time, this pattern has existed in Africa.

Finally

The philosophy of imposing peace rather than teaching it defeats the ideology it seeks to promote. The world seems to have lost itself in the pursuit of something it is yet to understand and fully accept. We certainly do not need to inflict more injury to heal a wound. Simply put, the antidote to these conflicts is peace.

A timeless example is Libya, where the quest and drive to save the people from oppression and Gadhafi required the use of oppressive techniques. Peace was thought to be attained through force, and now, what we have is nothing close to peace and everything far from it. Today, Libya is the source of everything that refutes peace, openly serving as the continent’s illegal arms depot for criminals and terrorists alike.

From a problem within control, it has grown to become a problem that seems like it will never end. Before Africa, or even the world, speaks of peace, justice must first be achieved, for there is never peace without justice. Currently, the tactic to achieve peace is to instill fear, however, given the right opportunity, chaos will erupt and worsen current conditions.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Wagner Group
 by Chris Ynclan Jr

The Wagner Group: How PMCs Drive Extremism

Fourteen years ago, the world became aware of the many atrocities committed by private military contractors (PMCs) when Blackwater killed Iraqi civilians. The incident strained relations with the Iraqi government and proved counterproductive to American counterinsurgency efforts. PMCs have existed in conflicts for hundreds of years, but they have been under the international community’s radar during the War on Terror. Over a decade later, the European Union has sanctioned the Wagner Group for human rights abuses.

The Wagner Group

The Wagner Group, a private military contractor, is reported to be led by Dmitry Utkin and has been present in various conflicts throughout the globe. A significant core of the group originated from another mercenary group called the Slavonic Corps, which operated in Syria to protect oil fields.

The first instance of the Wagner Group appearing in a conflict was during 2014 in eastern Ukraine, where Russian-backed separatists declared independence. Before leading the group, Utkin had worked in the Russian military intelligence service as a brigade commander. The group has also been linked to the Russian government, which they have denied. However, this contrasts reports that the Wagner Group operates in areas where the Russian government is known to also operate.

The Group’s Global Activities

In addition to Ukraine, the Wagner Group has operated in Syria, much like the mercenary group which preceded it. While in Syria, the PMCs have been accused of a wide variety of abuses which has caught the attention of international watchdog organizations. Among the most egregious was the reported torture of a Syrian man in 2017. They have also been alleged to have attacked American special forces in concert with pro-Assad forces.

An Expanding Presence

Furthermore, the group has expanded its operations within Africa to include several conflict zones. An infamous theater for its activities has been within the Central African Republic. The mercenary group was reportedly brought in at the behest of President Touadéra to help fight against rebels who opposed his rule. They, however, took liberties to the mandate given to them by their host as they were found to have committed several human rights cases of abuses. These abuses range from executions and torture to groundless imprisonment.

Another engagement of the group in Africa, which demonstrates their growing foothold in the continent, has been that of Libya. It is reported that the organization first appeared in Libya in 2019 to aid forces fighting the UN-backed government. The Wagner Group, unsurprisingly, engaged in nefarious behavior, which demonstrates a larger pattern of disregard for international law. Among such actions have included the placement of mines within noncombatant areas.

Alarmingly, there have been growing concerns of the Wagner Group continuing this disturbing pattern in a potential deployment to Mali. This comes on the heels of Mali denying the deployment of UN peacekeeping efforts to help stabilize the country. An invitation of the organization would certainly contribute to a deterioration of security for Mali’s citizens.

More alarming, it appears that governments in the region are turning away from long-established international norms for diplomacy and instead turning to mercenary groups to resolve political opposition.

Mercenaries only serve to instill a greater hatred for the governments that employ them and drive individuals to seek out organizations that oppose them. In some instances, they join extremist organizations that provide them that opportunity, as well as economic security which their governments have denied them.

Policies to Curtail Mercenary Activity in Africa

For the Wagner Group to operate within Africa, there must be an understanding of what allows them to do so. The reason stems from the political instability within the region as well as the perceived ineffectiveness of UN peacekeepers to bring stability to the states.

A critique of UN peacekeeping missions is with merit as there have been allegations of misconduct regarding different peacekeeping operations throughout Africa. One of the most recent is the allegations of abuse within the Central African Republic, which have damaged the credibility of the institution. Additionally, the procurement of mercenary groups allows these governments to not abide by international law and use whatever means are at their disposal to eliminate armed opposition.

Thus, it is necessary for nations who contribute to UN peacekeeping missions and the institution itself to implement harsher penalties on their citizens who have been found to be guilty of abuses while serving in an official capacity. Without institutional integrity and trust from fragile states, they will look for alternatives, such as mercenary groups.

Nations who comprise the UN should also consider providing more resources to peacekeeping missions. These resources may be more effective in providing credible deterrence and bringing stability to the region through tried and tested diplomacy.

Lastly, the international community must pressure nations that employ mercenary groups through sanctions and forbid their citizens from engaging in such efforts.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Shekau
 by Joan McDappa

Abubakar Shekau: His Many Deaths and Lasting Impact

Very little is known about Abubakar Shekau, the late leader of the group Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-jihad. The little we know is that he was a one-time deputy to Mohammed Yusuf, founder of the group commonly referred to as Boko Haram.

Following Yusuf’s execution by the Nigerian forces in 2009, Shekau assumed leadership until his death on May 19th, 2021. In the almost 12 years of Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram witnessed a steady rise in global recognition, media attention, and publicly acknowledged partnerships with other international terrorist organizations.

Boko Haram’s activities significantly transformed over the years, including a change in its targets, the nature of its attacks, and the weapons it used. Year after year, the group’s choices and standards of weapons continued to improve and the question of funding became louder and more critical to decipher. Additionally, while Boko Haram’s recruitment strategy continuously evolved, it nonetheless continued to produce its desired results.

Regarding Shekau’s leadership, even though deeply flawed and occasionally challenged by top group members, it would be wrong for any counter-terrorism strategy to make light of the capabilities of such an individual.

His Deaths

Conceivably, the Nigerian government may not have thought too lightly of Shekau, due to their many attempts to eliminate him. Since 2009, the Nigerian military, on at least four occasions, declared Abubakar Shekau dead before being debunked by Shekau’s typical video statements.

With such back history, it was no surprise that many would question what may now seem accurate, the announcement of the death of Abubakar Shekau on May 19th, 2021. Although, this time, the Nigerian military did not take credit for his death; rather, ISWAP, a rival faction, accepted responsibility for the events that led to his death, death by suicide.

Some have described the “mystery man” to be a psychopath and a joke. Regardless, Shekau remains an integral part of the group’s expansion. Psychopath or insane, joke or not, was he a dangerous person? Yes. Did he take advantage of the loopholes the Nigerian system graciously afforded him? Yes. Did he get what he wanted? Most definitely.

If his goal was to undermine the Nigerian military and destabilize the country as a whole, then Shekau found success. From influencing, whether directly or indirectly, the current violent crisis and criminalities on multiple fronts, the group’s desire is being fulfilled in the nation.

The growing unrest, much of which receives minute media coverage and security responses, is having a far-reaching effect on the entire nation. One of those many ways that is quite relatable is in the area of heightened food prices resulting from food scarcity.

A Hungry Nation

Northern Nigeria, which is home to numerous crises, such as farmers’ versus herdsmen, bandits, and kidnappers, is a key player in the agricultural sector and contributes significantly to the nation’s entire crop and livestock production output. Indeed, it is not beyond the expectation, that the Nigerian government highly prioritizes the region’s development.

The failure of the nation’s leadership to consider simply this grave consequence over the years has now put the entire nation in an avoidable struggle for daily survival.  A more worrying knowledge is the projection of the hardship that awaits the country in the coming years.

In Conclusion

Unless something is done, and quickly, the present, increasing criminality among citizens will only be the tip of the iceberg. With the grave damages brought about by one “mystery man” and the ripple effect of the actions of Boko Haram, alongside the response or nonresponse of the Nigerian government, a greater problem awaits.

While the Nigerian government continues to do its best to deal with the multiple fixes, perhaps unmasking the man, the group, and the truth behind them all, may lay a solid foundation to winning this blind war against an unknown enemy.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Congo
 by Chris Ynclan Jr

ISIS in the Congo: A Counter-Terrorism Perspective

With much attention spotlighting ISIS-K’s increased capabilities, little attention has been brought to their counterparts within Central Africa. Much like their counterparts in Central Asia, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) has increased its activities within Central Africa this year.

As ISCAP has carried out attacks, they have united the governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in combating them, despite their past differences. While ISIS has lost territory in the Middle East, it is evident that its affiliates remain salient threats to the regions they operate in, as well as international security as a whole.

Origins of ISCAP

The formation of the Islamic State in Central Africa traces back to ISIS’s ambitions to expand into Africa in late 2018. The first attacks in the region occurred one year later within the DRC. That same year, the group expanded operations into Mozambique, which cemented their threat to Central African security.

ISCAP has traditionally been composed of the Congo-based Allied Defence Forces (ADF) and fighters within Mozambique. In 2020, the Mozambique branch had conquered cities within Mozambique, which alarmed states within the region. This year, the branch within Mozambique has been the target of a multilateral offensive from a coalition of states, which has weakened their operational capacity compared to their previous success in 2020.

Growing Operational Capability

The ADF did not begin life as an exclusively Islamic militant organization, but rather as a rebel group seeking to oust the current Ugandan government. As the group went into remote regions of Uganda it began to change into the militant group it is today, recruiting disaffected Muslim youth.

The branch within the DRC has seen its capacity grow in 2021, as they have been attributed to an uptick of attacks within the country. They have also become increasingly brutal, demonstrated through released videos of beheadings as part of their propaganda. This is in light of this branch conducting over 20 attacks this year alone. Moreover, their attacks within Uganda have become indicative of an augmentation in their capabilities to harm the people of Central Africa. The most brazen of such attacks occurred on November 16th in which they bombed the capital of Uganda.

Ghosts of the Past

While both governments are interested in the defeat of ISCAP, relations between the DRC and Uganda have been fraught with tensions. These strained relations stem from the actions of the Ugandans during the Congo Wars, which ended in 2003. The Ugandans were found to violate the DRC’s sovereignty and were forced to pay reparations by the Hague.

As these wounds are still fresh in the minds of many within the DRC, skepticism of another Ugandan intervention underlies their thoughts. Despite these reservations, the government of the DRC has invited Ugandan troops into the country to aid in the fight against the insurgents.

A Roadmap for Peace

The fight against Islamic militants within Africa is not a new endeavor. However, it is important to note the evolution of such groups within Africa and their capabilities. More than 20 years ago, the United States’ embassy in Kenya was attacked by suicide bombers. Since that time, a small group, which at one point pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, captured large swathes of sovereign territory in the Levant, and created a network of global affiliates that carried out their own attacks. No longer are such groups content with attacking government symbols, such as an embassy, but rather they seek the prestige of carving out states from the territory of sovereign nations.

As this is Africa’s new reality, there are policy directives that should be considered to effectively address the current situation of the Congo. To effectively rout this group, it is imperative that a formalized dissemination of intelligence exist between states in the region. While the DRC and Uganda are engaged in combating the DRC-based branch, the Mozambique-based branch still can provide refuge to any escaping combatants to regain strength. Without such a coordinated effort, it is unlikely that ISCAP’s threat to Central African security will subside.

Secondly, a concrete timeline should exist detailing when Ugandan troops will be present and what they must abide by while in the DRC. Any such violation would be met with recourse similar to the previous deal given by the Hague.

The DRC has deemed that the Ugandans would be beneficial to combat ISCAP; however, any such breakdown of relations between the two would detrimentally impact security. Finally, the states of Central Africa must address the underlying conditions which have driven their Muslim youth to join ISIS affiliates.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Nigeria
 by Joan McDappa

What Measures Should be Taken to Counter Nigeria’s Insecurities?

Nigeria has benefited from several projects and programs, all aimed at resolving the issue of insecurity including, addressing identified root causes and engendering factors. While these efforts seem promising, over time, one realizes its temporal traits. Being a significant player with yielding influence in Africa, Nigeria must understand all that is at stake for the continent if it fails to address its internal problems.

Insecurity in Nigeria 

Since its independence, Nigeria has experienced, at an ever-increasing pace, a series of conflicts and insurgencies.  These conflicts have turned the budding land in the Sahel to a leading figure on the list of unstable regions in the continent. From political violence to ethnoreligious conflicts, social agitations, resource conflicts, and now radical extremism, the nation continues to navigate these issues in hopes of survival.

Having survived a terrifying civil war, as well as spates of violence and conflicts, one would expect that Nigeria’s resilience will lead to stability. But in reality, this is not the case, as fears that the worst is yet to come remain strong. It was, therefore, no surprise to many when events of extremism began to gradually build up in the northern region of Nigeria, with Boko Haram taking the lead.

In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf, a famous preacher and proponent of the Izala sect of Islam and the founder of Boko Haram, began to radicalize his followers in Maiduguri, Nigeria. Establishing a religious center and an Islamic school, Yusuf reached many people from poor backgrounds across the country. In no time, Yusuf’s teachings attracted many followers and expanded into other states including Yobe, where it established a base nicknamed ‘Afghanistan.’ The ‘Afghanistan’ base (just like other operation bases) enjoys a geographical advantage, as it is within close proximity to Nigeria’s borders, thus aiding their expansion into neighboring West African countries.

Responses to Insecurity and Terrorism

Almost always, the first response to quell reports of security disruptions in Nigeria is the use of force. Following this response is an attempt to create a lasting solution through program developments, usually aimed at management and recovery.

Many of these initiatives, such as the NYSC scheme (introduced in the aftermath of the civil war), the Amnesty program (focused on ending militancy in the Niger Delta), and the de-radicalization program, all fail to address root causes; instead, they manage the situation for as long as possible.

Consequently, we see a resurgence of the same issues across Nigerian regions: in eastern Nigeria, there is a reawakening of secession agitations by Biafra, in the Niger Delta, an increasing rate of crime and kidnappings, and in the North East, terrorism is growing with reports of abductees willingly returning to their captors.

Recommendations

Nigeria’s rising insecurity may remain unresolved until the government understands the importance of engaging and collaborating with relevant stakeholders in the country. Thus, while external aid has its role, the outcome may not be as desired, until every group in the country bears its responsibility and the right environment to execute them is created.

Collaborate with CSOs

Civil society and humanitarian organizations have been present in Nigeria for decades, closely collaborating with the Nigerian government to maintain security and stability. Their role in Nigeria’s security largely revolves around responding to conflict situations by offering relief support, spearheading mediation and reconciliation, and rehabilitating victims and perpetrators.

While these are commendable efforts, the government and these organizations need to take progressive steps to ensure appropriate mechanisms are in place to identify and address early warning signs of extremism and incitement.

Community Engagement

The role of the community has largely been ignored in Nigeria’s decision-making system, regardless of it being a democratic nation.  A review is essential with relevant measures made effective immediately. The government should fully engage communities in various approaches to counter violent extremisms, as well as identify and prevent future cases.

Deliberate efforts to ensure a balanced representation of women and youth in counter-extremism approaches is necessary, as they introduce a unique perspective from a largely marginalized and vulnerable population.

Contingency Plans

As a nation whose primary responsibility entails protecting the lives and properties of its citizens, expecting a contingency plan is in place at all times is not out of the ordinary. Due to Nigeria’s porous borders, Boko Haram and other extremist groups are in an advantageous position. Unfortunately, even with the lessons learned from Boko Haram, Nigeria’s borders remain largely unprotected.

Address Root Causes

The impoverished state of the country and the northern regions, alongside poor tenets of its society, are some factors that aid extremists’ growth. Time and time again, we have seen extremist groups all over the world garner support from citizens by providing basic amenities that governments fail to supply. Some abductees who willingly returned to Boko Haram camps after being freed by Nigerian soldiers cited the harsh economic conditions as the reason they rejoined. The government must rise to its responsibility in driving development in Nigeria.

In addition to developmental challenges, other root causes such as intolerance and marginalization remain unaddressed. Intolerance remains a bane in Nigeria and is the bedrock for the many ethnoreligious conflicts and radicalism that Nigeria has suffered over the years. The government, alongside relevant national stakeholders, must find ways to address these root causes and allot as much attention to these challenges as they do for terrorist acts.

Conclusion

Resolving insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria does not require additional funds or aid; all that is needed is a reformation of its systems, structures, and values. Merely formulating policies without a system that allows and ensures effective implementation would yield no result; this remains the case with Nigeria.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

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Boko Haram
 by Joan McDappa

What Went Wrong with Nigeria’s Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Mission?

Nigeria has continued to grapple with the issue of terrorism, and as expected, has had to launch many counter-terrorism missions. While domestic conflicts and extremism were not exactly new phenomena to a fragile state like Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram would understandably raise concerns, mainly because of its religious ideologies and fatal potentialities in constituting an existential threat.

Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda’wati Wal Jihad, fondly known as Boko Haram, has in its almost two decades of existence; carried out several attacks targeted at civilians, security officials, infrastructures, security facilities, international organizations etc. All these attacks, Boko Haram claims, are done to drive their mission of establishing a caliphate – a goal it briefly achieved during their brief occupation of large swathes of territories in the North East region.

Counter-Terrorism Operations

For the period that this group has existed, counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria seem to have substantially focused on the use of force, however extreme it may be: chiefly on the defensive and occasionally on the offensive.

With the military at the forefront of this campaign, alongside the collaborative efforts of other security agencies, the tactics employed to solve one problem often create a much bigger problem for the nation. Unfortunately, looking through history, this is becoming a pattern in Nigeria. The lack of restrictions in using excessive force by security agencies as a response tool (regardless of the situation, whether it is a peaceful protest or terrorist incident) significantly hampers their genuine efforts.

For instance, Boko Haram initially started as a religious sect with somewhat radical ideologies that were of no significant risk (at the time) to the nation’s security. Although there was a need to be wary of the group, at that point, perhaps a softer approach would be ideal, but this was not the case.

An unnecessary military operation that saw the maiming and killings of members of the ‘religious sect,’ and worst of all, the extrajudicial killing of the then leader of the group Mohammed Yusuf by the police; birthed a mountain of problems that have only complicated things for the Nigerian counter-terrorism campaign. Gradually, translating from a religious sect with Yusuf, the reluctant fighter as the leader- to an unstable group led by the highly erratic Abubakar Shekau, the outcome of counter-terrorism operations in the North East is visible.

The instability in Boko Haram resulted in many offshoots notable among them are Ansaru, which shares links with Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) with links to ISIS. Regardless of how the choice of strategy to counter terrorism seems to be multiplying the problems rather than reducing, it seems Nigeria has still not realized the glaring lessons before them.

Current counter-terrorism missions still have the military at the forefront, with its recent operations recording the elimination of leaders of terrorist groups. Again, we see the same mistake made with Boko Haram repeated, and in this case, the consequences are far graver as these groups now have international links and are not necessarily working on their own. These operations by the military may widen access for these international terrorist groups to further launch their campaigns, and in turn, gain more grounds in the already fragile region.

Recommendations

While these military operations may have their usefulness, we have seen over time that they are usually short-lived. There has been a rise in terrorist activities in the North East region, despite all the efforts and revenue invested in countering it. These groups still manage to onboard voluntary recruits amid the heated military operations.

A successful counter-terrorism approach should encompass strategies that focus on addressing development issues such as poor governance, low literacy, poverty, and unemployment; that these groups readily take advantage of to promote their campaigns. The failure to pay as much attention to extensively resolving developmental issues in the region while intentionally minimizing military tactics (which only infuriates terrorists and does nothing to deter or disengage them); continues to foil Nigeria’s counter-terrorism campaign.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Islam vs Islamism? The Realpolitik of Islamic Jihadism in Africa

Decades of internecine conflicts, and bloody civil wars have left inedible scars across Africa, and the consequent weakening (or failure) of multiple nations across the continent. Islamist terrorist groups such as Ansar Dine (Mali), Boko Haram (Nigeria) and Al-Shabab (Somalia) have found fertile ground by exploiting the specific deteriorating political and economic conditions of individual African states. Jihadist groups have positioned themselves as a superior alternative to the corruption of central governments across Africa, and in doing so allowed them to win the support of some of the most desperate communities on the continent.

Why is Islamism able to spread?

In the past twenty years alone almost a hundred political conflicts have occurred in West African states alone. In north Africa Chad and Sudan are still witnessing a fratricidal war that has been going on and off for more than forty years. While in central Africa Angola has experienced thirty years of civil war. This instability and violence mean that the threat to regional peace and security posed by Islamist terrorist groups often goes overlooked. During the same period, more than 40,000 people have lost their lives in more than 9,000 terrorist attacks by religious extremist groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

Regional conflicts, prolonged internal violence, and civil wars nearly invariable leads to collapses of governance.  Throughout history, in any country whose central government fails to guarantee the security and welfare of its citizens, its people are driven to alternative organizations to fulfill such basic needs as food, shelter, and security. Often in such crises smaller entities (ethnic groups, tribes, clans, armed insurgencies, criminal gangs, and religious sects) find it necessary to step in, to cover many essential statal functions. And across all African regions Jihadist groups have done so too. Organizations such as Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Mali, have all established some forms of para-state structures within their territory.

One of the primary motivations behind such moves is it endears support for the Jihadist groups among regional populations. The support generated by such “hearts and minds” operations will be crucial for further Jihadist insurgent operations within this territory. And crucially jihadist organizations are heavily reliant on discontented young recruits drawn from local populations to sustain their forces. Jihadist terror groups often provide a form of hope and agency to those mired in endemic poverty and desperate social inequality. 

Regional Disparities

In the countries of the Sahel region, where the population mainly resides in marginal rural areas, the people are heavily reliant on the complex network of organized crime that was already embedded in the region before Islamist ideology. None the less jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), have also exploited the regional power vacuum to engage in both people and drug trafficking already rife in the region. This vacuum has also allowed Jihadist groups in the Sahel to recruit, train, and arm the local population, undisturbed by government interference.

If potential recruits in the Sahel are drawn to Islamist groups primarily by social and economic reasons, in East Africa and Somalia, decades of petty tribal conflicts and endemic corruption have stripped the traditional regional clans of legitimacy. Into this void Al-Shabaab have stepped in, recruiting among the disillusioned and those already vulnerable to Islamist ideology.

In cases like central Mali and western Niger, jihadists offer protection against bandits, justice against abuses by central governments, training, and armaments to address territorial disputes between local ethnic groups. In the north of Burkina Faso, on the other hand, the jihadist occupation of rural areas through intimidation and violence has had the effect of provoking clashes between locals and jihadists, rather than basic cooperation.

Islamist groups have been able to exploit not just political instability but specific regional rivalries between clans, ethnicities, and religious groups to their advantage. Clashes, such as the ethnic conflicts between Sufis and Islamists in Nigeria and Senegal, often dating back to the times of European colonialism continue to ensure Sufi’s political dominance and has been the source of much ethnic tension and violence

European nation’s influence on the African continent continues to this day such as the French intervention of 2013. While regional national governments have coordinated anti-terrorist operations such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger combined intervention, also changed the impact of Islam in the sub-Saharan region. The immediate result was a weakening of their jihadist groups and their removal from the city centers. The jihadist groups have retreated to their base of support among the population of rural areas, where Islamist ideology is prevalent among the most marginal ethnic groups.

The impact of ideology

In addition to the lack of social mobility, religious education must also be considered, since spreading basic Islamist education can predispose (or prime) the population to jihadist doctrine. In Somalia after the collapse of its state education system in, private Islamic schools proliferated. Often funded by Saudi Arabia, many of these schools are heavily focused on religious studies, were Wahhabism ideology dominants.

However, the presence of a strong tradition of the Islamic faith in a country is by no means a prerequisite for Islamist terrorism.  Senegal, where about 90% of the population is Muslim, has experienced relatively minor religious conflicts. In comparison, Nigeria, where Muslims make up 50%  of the population, Islamist extremism ideation has featured in many disturbing episodes of regional violence.

Conclusion

The impact of Islamist ideology in Africa is highly context-dependent on the specific geopolitical realpolitik of their base of operations. Individual Jihadist groups have adapted their strategies and tactics to exploit the unique characteristics of regions, and the specific needs of its ethnic groups. Such significant disparities mean it is both useless and unhelpful to apply a unified and singular explanation for the rise (and impact) of Islamist ideology in Africa.

When developing anti-terrorist and anti-extremist policies rather than focus on forced military interventions, the international community should focus on measures that enable regional governments to peacefully manage local conflict. And to limit the ability of Jihadist recruit by supporting efforts to improve the provision of services, and governance to marginal communities in rural areas throughout the sub-Saharan Region

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: Mali’s Challenging Future

The Long Road Ahead

The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Mali faces an uphill battle to stabilize the country, made even more difficult by recent events. The peace that this operation hopes to keep stems from a 2015 peace agreement between northern Tuareg and Arab rebels and the government of Mali. But the civilian government was deposed in an August 2020 coup, hampering mission goals and further destabilizing the country. This article highlights three challenges to the mission mandate and how best to respond to them. 

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in April 2013 by Security Council resolution 2100, has become the UN’s most dangerous current peacekeeping operation. To date, there have been 253 fatalities out of the 15,209 authorized personnel in-country. On April 2nd, four peacekeepers were killed and nineteen wounded in a direct assault on their camp in Kidal region. Significant challenges abound for this mission aiming to implement its transitional roadmap and seven-part mandate. Its main goal since June 2015 has been safeguarding and implementing an Algiers peace agreement signed between the government and the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA) rebel coalition. Further complications come from jihadist insurgents such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as well as brutal communal violence in central Mali. Understanding these hurdles, concrete strategies must follow. 

Dual Military Coups

The most immediate challenge facing MINUSMA’s mandate is the August 2020 coup, which saw the resignation of President Keïta and Prime Minister Cisse after they were detained by the Malian Armed Forces. On January 18th, 2021, the military junta’s transitional National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) was disbanded, with interim president Bah Ndaw supervising an 18-month transition back to civilian rule. This promise of civilian rule gave cause for optimism, but the second coup in late May saw the removal of Ndaw by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who also organized last year’s coup. Goïta has since become Mali’s new president while maintaining that elections and the release of Ndaw and his prime minister will eventually occur. 

Both coups have demonstrated the militarization of politics and the weakness of government legitimacy in Mali, and have significantly undermined item 2 in MINUSMA’s mandate; to support “national political dialogue and the electoral process.” Though protestors before and during the first coup had been calling for Keïta’s resignation due to economic woes and ongoing violence, a coercive resolution to an unpopular administration undermines national stability. Credibility has been damaged twice now among key allies of both Mali and MINUSMA, with the African Union (AU) suspending Mali twice, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposing sanctions for the first coup, the United States cutting off military aid, and the UN Security Council condemning the military’s actions all throughout.

Close coordination with the government in Bamako is required for MINUSMA’s continued operation. Mission policymakers have the unenviable task of cooperating with the self-preservationist military regime while simultaneously upholding item 1’s ideals of “constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” The strategy moving forward must be one of continued pressure on and agreement with Goïta’s government on the timeline and specifics of a transfer back to civilian rule. The real power brokers in Mali must be identified and engaged, and the UN must not be satisfied with easy promises from the military. Together with AU, EU, and US partners, MINUSMA’s liaisons must extract from the military firm dates for elections and guarantees that they will be “inclusive, free, fair, and transparent,” as per the mandate.

Protection of Civilians

Alongside the tragic loss of 253 UN peacekeepers since 2013, MINUSMA has also witnessed a great deal of civilian casualties in areas outside of government control. Peacekeepers have been patrolling and expanding social services in these areas, in line with items 1 and 3 of the mandate; supporting “reestablishment of State authority throughout the country” and “protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.” But as peacekeepers navigate deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes, the multitude of violent actors, vast expanses of contested land, and complicated communal dynamics have allowed thousands of civilian casualties to slip through their fingers since 2013. Atrocities and possible war crimes have been well documented, further driving a wedge between hostile communities in central Mali. This continued violence against civilians undermines mission legitimacy and the 300+ development projects it has carried out.

Protecting civilians is often an issue of policing. Protecting them from separatists requires greater policing of the vast, contested northern regions, while population centers must be protected from jihadists. Communal violence in central Mali must be lessened by policing the boundaries between feuding communities. The number of police on mission should be increased, as MINUSMA has a 13-2 split of soldiers and police. More importantly, peacekeepers should step up technical assistance and recruitment drives for local police; this is a classic method to build peace and is included in the mandate. 

A new, complex frontier in peacekeeping

The final challenge concerns a relatively important shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine. Of sixteen active UN missions, MINUSMA is the only one authorized to conduct counterinsurgency. Its mandate allows it to use “all necessary means… [to] deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” Resolution 2164, an update to the mission, identified “asymmetric threats” as spoilers of peace; military jargon for insurgent groups. This has created challenges on the ground and great debate in the policy world. Strategically, peacekeepers appear not to have been deployed to keep the peace, but to reach peace through force, conducting counterinsurgency alongside France and the G5 Sahel (soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Tactically, counterinsurgency requires specialized training and equipment, two things that are far from standardized or even guaranteed in the UN system. Mission effectiveness is hampered by the unique challenges and confusions presented by this dissonance between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. And with France recently announcing the end of its eight-year campaign in the Sahel, now is the time for MINUSMA to take up the mantle with clear and confident policy.

Any good counterinsurgency must clearly lay out its strategy. An understanding of the insurgents and of one’s own capacities is essential in choosing how to train soldiers and allocate resources. The 9 experts on-mission and 514 staff officers need a proper division of labor and understanding, including programs for intelligence, search-and-destroy, and public relations. All of this can only come from a unified, top-down doctrine. That is why this new arena for UN peacekeeping needs a field handbook that systematically demarcates tactics and limitations of action. This also lowers MINUSMA’s high death rate: training troops not for pitched battles but for countering IEDs and ambushes is vital, as argued by former mission commander Michael Lollesgaard.

Overall, much needs to be done. Two coups in under a year, the protection of civilians, and counterinsurgency strategy must be addressed through diplomatic pressure, increased police efforts, and tactical guidance, respectively. Relative peace is not on the immediate horizon, but these strategies will push the situation in Mali in a constructive direction.

 

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: South Sudan’s Quest for Stability

Background

On July 9th, South Sudan celebrated ten years of independence, remembering how its people overwhelmingly voted for independence from Sudan in 2011. But another entity, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), is also marking ten years of existence this year. Initially meant to consolidate peace and development in the world’s youngest country, UNMISS has grown into the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, currently deploying 19,233 personnel. With a budget of over $1.2 billion for the 2020-2021 fiscal year, it is also the second most expensive ongoing UN mission. This is after the mission in Mali. This article hopes to analyze this monumental mission that has shaped a country.

Early UN attempts at state-building were violently reoriented by a civil war between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar and by broader communal violence between (and within) their respective Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. Though a 2018 peace agreement facilitated the tenuous formation of a unity government in 2020, a recent UN report found that violence has only gotten more brutal, unaccountable, and decentralized since the end of the country’s civil war. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has failed to implement major security and accountability measures from the peace agreement. Consequently, its security forces are frequently accused of obstructing peacekeepers and violating civilians’ human rights. With the UNSC recently renewing UNMISS’ mandate until 2022 and establishing a three-year “strategic vision” for the country, practitioners are tasked with interpreting mission effectiveness within the four key pillars of the mandate. 

The UN Mandate

Keeping in mind the centrality of the mandate to any UN mission, this article uses UNMISS’ updated mandate as a point of departure for evaluating mission effectiveness. It will also keep the 2018 peace deal as an additional guideline. The terms of the mandate reaffirmed in 2021 are essentially the same as those in Resolution 2155 (2014), which was updated when the nascent country fell into civil war. With some important clarification in the language in the 2021 resolution, the four pillars are broad: protection of civilians, monitoring of human rights abuses, facilitation of humanitarian aid delivery, and supporting the active peace agreement. 

Sadly, these four pillars look nothing like the original mandate from 2011. This is because UNMISS has had to drastically scale its ambitions back from consolidating the state to alleviating and containing a multi-dimensional crisis. Using the mandate itself to measure effectiveness is essential. In part, it reflects the wishes of concerned multilateral actors and frames what the mission is actually allowed and expected to do. This article distills the goals of the mandate into two broad, dynamic criteria for evaluating UNMISS: providing protection and facilitating aid to civilians and promoting institutional stability and security. These have been constant, salient challenges facing UNMISS, and they encompass much of what the mission is there to achieve.

Providing protection and facilitating aid to civilians

Though UNMISS can only exist with the consent of the GoSS, one might forget considering how often peacekeepers are blocked or even attacked by government forces. The UNSC acknowledged this in 2014 and again in Resolution 2567 (2021), when it “[condemned] the continued obstruction of UNMISS by the GoSS and opposition groups, including restrictions on freedom of movement, assault of UNMISS personnel, and constraints on mission operations.” Government intransigence amid vast civilian suffering presents UN personnel with difficult decisions and frequent occasions of paralysis in the face of violence against civilians. Since it cannot achieve protection of civilians (PoC) in every case, UNMISS has also been tasked with reporting on government privations, hoping for long-term accountability through documentation and human rights pressure.

Though UN missions are frequently criticized for the lives they fail to save, a critical analysis must try to understand what would have happened had peacekeepers not been there. As of 2020, there were almost 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside UN-administered PoC sites. UNMISS’ recent focus has thus been protecting civilians and administering aid and basic services in and around these sites. This establishment of veritable peace corridors is reminiscent of early visions of peacekeeping, but even through this lens, UNMISS can only be viewed as semi-successful. This is because it has frequently been unable to protect civilians and aid workers within its own PoC sites. Subsequently, it has had little success expanding the domain of its PoC sites outwards. There remain 1.5 million IDPs outside of PoC sites. Ultimately, violence against civilians and aid workers has continued and even worsened since the end of the civil war. 

Similar things can be said for humanitarian aid. The UN has estimated that 8.3 million South Sudanese are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase of 800,000 from 2020. Both sides were known to intentionally starve communities during the civil war, and the GoSS continues to block access to peacekeepers and aid workers seemingly at will. Though a great deal of aid has moved through roads restored and protected by UNMISS, GoSS corruption and violence and the frequent pilfering of humanitarian goods have deterred major international donors in recent years. UNMISS should leverage these once-eager financiers against GoSS intransigence, putting economic pressure on a government reliant on international support.

Promoting institutional stability and security

In terms of building a stable and responsive state in South Sudan, the 2018 Revitalized Agreement offers valuable metrics, such as refugee resettlement, rebuilding of physical infrastructure, and finalization of a permanent constitution. Unfortunately, any traction on these issues is largely out of the hands of UNMISS. This is because African regional organizations have led the way in mediation and implementation. Relations with the GoSS have soured ever since the 2014 mandate said UNMISS would protect civilians “irrespective of the source of…violence,” tacitly pitting it against government troops. 

But the mission is not completely ineffective on the political front. At a community-level, UNMISS-facilitated dialogues have deescalated violence in numerous areas recently. There is significant potential to partner with communities instead of the GoSS, but UNMISS has yet to hire a sufficient number of community liaisons to foster engagement. Subsequently, its patrols have been notably hesitant to engage on foot in communities. These are tangible policies UNMISS must correct if it is to overcome the challenges posed by the government. UNMISS should institutionalize and expand these often-successful dialogues for reconciliation and deradicalization in local South Sudanese communities.

Conclusion

It is certainly better for hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese that UNMISS was deployed, but with its resources, the mission could do far more to push the country in a constructive direction towards peace. From a strictly peacekeeping lens, UNMISS receives a somewhat passing grade for establishing areas of relative protection. But with the post-Cold War pairing of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, UNMISS has fallen flat. Frequently marginalized from the peace process, it has largely abdicated its role in shaping post-war South Sudan. 

Most South Sudanese remain susceptible to factional violence and dire humanitarian need, and little has been done to grow state capacity or even state interest in helping them. As much good as UNMISS has done in specific areas, it can only be national stability that helps those millions of South Sudanese still living on the precipice. And now that UNMISS has begun transitioning its PoC sites into GoSS-controlled IDP camps, it is unclear what major tools are left for this mission to fulfill its mandate. 

Overall, UNMISS has a great deal of experience and success to pull from but has not been bold enough in tackling one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The UN must either recommit to the political process in South Sudan or accept that it is merely being used to protect a civilian population ignored by the government. It should also expand and standardize conflict resolution initiatives of the kind frequently highlighted in its own reports. Much of the violence in South Sudan stems from specific, community-level disputes. Engaging with at-risk communities and investing in specialized civilian personnel would go a long way towards saving lives in South Sudan.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: Introduction and Analysis

Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping operations are meant to help countries down the complex path of peace and reconciliation. Such peacekeeping missions are mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A smaller subset of peacekeeping missions, stabilization operations, are not regulated by the UN Charter, but make-up three of the four largest ongoing peace operations. Their legitimacy rests between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (use of force to restore peace), constituting the so-called “Chapter VI and a half.” These operations are a joint instrument of the Security Council (the highest political authority) and the Secretary-General, the highest administrative and functional authority of the organization.

Peacekeeping interventions are based on some strategic points, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and the possibility of deploying and integrating police forces and civilian personnel. The work that the UN conducts during peace operations is based on three fundamental principles, namely consent to intervention by countries in conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force (unless in self-defense or in defense of the mandate).

Thousands of “Blue Helmets,” the military body belonging to member states and “loaned” to UN missions, have over time morphed from mere observers limited to logistical and technical support to being assigned sensitive functions. They now operate more complex programs including political mediation, de-mining, public affairs and communication, protection and promotion of civil rights, and reintegration of combatants into society. The missions have thus become multidimensional and integrated.

Instability is not just a military fact, with a truce to guard or a cease-fire line to patrol, but has many causes. Stabilization operations thus include ever greater responsibilities, including the democratization of local institutions, economic and social development, environmental and natural resource protection, and the retraining of military forces, police, and prison services, according to modern, democratic criteria.

Africa 

An example of these new and expanded functions are assistance and support missions, which are deployed in countries that have seen the total collapse (or almost total degradation) of state structures, countries such as Libya, Sierra Leone, Mali, Central Africa, and South Sudan. UN functions are also diversified and no longer restrained to patrolling truce lines. They have been involved in such diverse efforts as decolonization in Namibia, independence in Eritrea, protection of populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the transition to democratic regimes after years of civil war in Angola, Mozambique, Central America, or West Africa. All these missions see not only the change in the profiles and structures of the missions but also their composition. 

In West Africa, there are two very different missions, MINURSO and MINUSMA. The first aims to ensure, sooner or later, the holding of a regular referendum in the territories of Western Sahara, still disputed between Algeria, Morocco, and the local population. The mission has been active since 1991 and has 485 units, of which 245 are military.

MINUSMA, in Mali, started in 2013 shortly after the French military operation Serval, which halted the advance of Tuareg and other armed groups towards Bamako. Despite the collaboration with Operation Barkhane (formerly Serval) and the G5 of the Sahel, the area is still deeply unstable. MINUSMA’s annual budget exceeds one billion dollars and over 15,000 military personnel are deployed. The states that support the mission militarily are interested in containing the Malian crisis (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal).

As for Central Africa, MINUSCA is the stabilization mission of the Central African Republic. It was born in 2014, following the outbreak of civil war. Despite numerous peace agreements signed between parties, skirmishes and structural violence remain. The mission has an almost exclusively “regional” character since the troops present are Rwandan, Egyptian, Zambian, Cameroonian, and Senegalese. MONUSCO, on the other hand, is an operation that started in 2010 and aims to stabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo, devastated first by spillover from the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and then by its own wars from 1998 to 2003, which left over 5 million dead.

Additionally, three peacekeeping missions are active in the Horn of Africa, two in Sudan and one in South Sudan. The last one, UNMISS, was born in 2011 in South Sudan. After gaining independence, the country fell into a bloody civil war, dictated by patriotism and exploitation of ethnic tension, which have been intensifying since December 2013.

Analysis

Over the years, this United Nations instrument has been criticized extensively but has also received some positive feedback. Too often, in the initiatives of the powers that act in the name of the so-called international community, in which Africa, politically speaking, seems to be considered more an object than a real subject, the goal of “security” prevails. Very often, the issues of jihadism and human mobility towards Europe are considered separately from other issues plaguing African governments. There is a need for a repositioning of international diplomacy that considers the constant and progressive modification of the African geopolitical chessboard in the age of globalization.

The colonial and postcolonial models, to the test of facts, no longer represent a paradigm of reference in Africa for the control of aid institutions or even investments. The traditional partners of African countries (the former colonial powers) must now compete with the low index of “conditionality” strategies of emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Turkey, and Russia itself, which is reappearing in Africa after the withdrawal imposed, about thirty years ago, by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is precisely within these parameters that the United Nations, as an organism of peoples, is called to play an indispensable role. It is worth recalling what happened in the early 1960s with the wave of African independence movements. At that time, the UN, established as an organization after World War II with the aim of preventing future conflicts by replacing the ineffective League of Nations, played a politically relevant role.

In particular, the recognition of the principle of self-determination of peoples, sanctioned by the United Nations Charter, received a warm response. International law also outlawed war, in particular, due to Articles 2 & 4 of the Charter, declaring that member states must renounce war and resolve their conflicts.

To weigh negatively on these missions are a series of factors found in many investigations. The first of these factors is the lack of discipline among Blue Helmets and the fact that the contingents are sometimes composed of soldiers from countries where training standards are not adequate for modern crises in Africa. There have also been pervasive issues of sexual violence against women and minors.

Regardless, the United Nations has taken a central and irreplaceable role in the building of congenial international relations in the modern era. In the case of the African continent, the UN provides international legitimacy and an irreplaceable and indispensable forum for negotiation at global level on the issues of development, peace, and security.

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