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 by Rise to Peace

Cyberterrorism in Europe Has a Clear Target, but the Motives are a Mystery

Tehrani’s description of terrorism is defined using Black Law’s dictionary and cites “the use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, especially as a means of affecting political conduct”. Tehrani argues that while an all-describing definition for terrorism has proven difficult to agree on, one common aspect of terrorism is apparent. This includes that acts of terrorism are conducted to cause fear and coerce the ‘enemy’ for the pursuit of a political, ideological, or religious goal.

Recent ransomware attacks in Europe

The application of this type of terrorism to the cyberspace has become a predominant topic of concern in the twenty-first century. The European tendency to digitize infrastructure with the benefit of it being more efficient and accessible has made it equally susceptible to ransomware attacks.

The WannaCry ransomware attack on the UK’s National Health Service in 2017 and the 2021 attack on Ireland’s Health Service Executive are examples of terrorism targeting vital institutions. Additionally, Finland witnessed a ransomware attack on a private company named Vastaamo. The company runs 25 therapy centers in Finland. The transcripts of these therapy sessions had been hacked. Consequently, clients were reportedly threatened to pay $200 dollars in bitcoin to deter their therapy sessions from being leaked. The director of Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation, Robin Lardot, estimates the number of victims to be in the tens of thousands.

Upon an internal inquiry, it was believed that the actual theft may have happened two years prior, in 2018. Despite the victims’ best efforts to adhere to advice set out by ministers and not engage with the threats, confidential notes of therapy sessions for 2000 patients had been discovered on the dark web.

Implications

The WannaCry, Vastaamo, and Health Service Executive attacks depict a grim reality of the most confidential aspects of people’s lives being leaked to the public. The implications are widespread and infringe upon multiple aspects of both personal lives and the functioning of society. The healthcare service attacks resulted in limited access to health services, often involving postponed treatment or even cancellation thereof. England’s NHS saw the cancellation of 19,000 appointments following the WannaCry hacks and cost the health service 92 million pounds. An added reason for concern is in the case hackers have access to the live documents of patients, information on the patients could be altered to result in large-scale misdiagnosis of patients.

In the case of the Irish ransomware attack, a statement made by the HSE declared that a small amount of data had landed on the dark web, much like Vastaamo hack. The curious turn of events happened when the hackers who committed the ransomware attack against HSE Ireland provided the software tool to reverse the hack. Despite this, it took a lot of work to rebuild the system. This clearly depicted how irreversible and deeply damaging a ransomware attack is, especially when data had already been leaked to the public via the internet. Here, nothing can be completely deleted. The truly harmful nature becomes especially noticeable when considering that the attack happened on May 14th, and July’s HSE statement included the warning that it was still being dealt with. This hits especially hard given the COVID-19 pandemic that not only involves more demand for the healthcare system but has also pushed back many vital treatments for those awaiting diagnosis/treatments for other illnesses even further than they already were.

How are ransomware attacks cyberterrorism?

Since ransomware attacks are committed anonymously, it’s impossible for spectators to know with certainty what the motive behind the attacks is, making it all the more difficult to label it as an act of terrorism. That being said, the commonalities in recent ransomware attacks seem quite clear. In Europe especially, health care services and companies are being hacked, and the patients are threatened.

The ransomware attacks definitely share the characteristic of terrorism which proscribes the use of violence to instill fear and coercion against ‘the enemy.’ This furthermore involves the targeting of innocent civilians. The withholding of a health service, especially during a pandemic, might be considered an act of indirect, albeit harmful, violence. What remains unclear, is the perpetrator’s motives, whether they were ideologically or financially motivated. The targeting of civilians, which included demanding ransom from minors, as well as the intentional destabilization of an infrastructure a country and civilians depend on, may be a message in itself which could constitute a new type of terrorism – requiring a new or separate definition. In this case, it may not be the motive, but the target that sets the tone for terrorism.

Conclusion

Moving forward, an increase in cyberterrorism is to be expected. This will become especially pronounced as more companies and institutions make plans to work remotely even post-pandemic lockdowns. For this reason, it is crucial for governments to clearly define cybercrime and cyberterrorism that can be utilized in prosecution.

Additionally, European governments should work towards protecting vulnerable adults and minors who are at risk of becoming victims of cyberterrorism. It must remain a high priority to get students vaccinated and back into educational facilities with safety measures implemented on site. If not possible, institutions are urged to use effective encryption for any data that is handled online.

The Vastaamo attack may have been preventable if the data had been encrypted properly. The continuation of online learning could open doors for cyber-terrorists to gain access to a wide range of new material for ransom threats.

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 by Connor Bulgrin

Iran’s Ambiguous Role in the Afghan Peace Process

On July 8, Iran hosted talks between delegations from the Afghan government and the Taliban. This effort provided a new venue for Afghan negotiators to engage one another as the Taliban advance continued and the U.S.-backed talks in Doha stalled. The Iranian position toward the Afghan war has been complex and often ambiguous. While the Iranian government is now advocating peace, its geopolitical interests in Afghanistan are much broader.

For the last 25 years, Iranian policy toward Afghanistan has been driven by a dual mandate. Iran has aimed to prevent the rise of Sunni fundamentalism while also contesting American power in the Middle East.

As a Shiite-majority nation, Iranian disdain for Sunni fundamentalism is palpable. Fundamentalist Sunni groups like the Taliban often assert that Shiites are not true Muslims and wage vicious attacks against them. In the last few decades, Iran has branded itself the “protector of Shiites” in the Middle East. At first, this made Iran an adversary of the Taliban. In 1998, Iran nearly declared war against the Taliban after the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, in which the Taliban killed many Shiites and 11 Iranian citizens. After the September 11th attacks, Iran, in alignment with American policy, supported the Northern Alliance campaign against the Taliban.

However, Iranian fear of American power has made it an inconsistent ally of America and the Afghan government. Since the initial defeat of the Taliban in December 2001, Iran has played a more nuanced role in Afghanistan, trying to cozy up with Afghan elites while also providing occasional support to the Taliban. Iranian officials fear that if America enjoys too much success in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran might become the next target of American regime change efforts. The numerous American military bases surrounding Iran and frequent calls for regime change in the American media exacerbate these anxieties. While Iran is glad to see the American presence in Afghanistan end, its policy toward Afghanistan must now chart a new course that consists of more than mere anti-Americanism.

Inside Iran, public opinion is divided regarding the ideal policy toward Afghanistan. The reformists have been hawkish regarding Afghanistan, disgusted by the Taliban’s religious fundamentalism and their recent outrageous targeted attacks against Shiite Hazaras. Etemad, a prominent reformist newspaper, recently warned of “unpleasant consequences if extremist and violent movements like the Taliban come to power.”

Iran’s hardliners have the upper hand politically and support a more conciliatory approach to the Taliban. This June, Kayhan, a paper funded by the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, remarked that “The Taliban today is different from the Taliban that used to behead people.” Statements like these are not expressions of political solidarity. While Iran and the Taliban are united in their anti-Americanism, the Taliban has much closer ties to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rivals. Instead, Iranian hardliners make these statements to signal Iran’s belief in the possibility of a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Lately, Iranian officials have been stressing their hopes for peace. Rasoul Mousavi, leader of West Asia policy in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has stated that: “Opportunities pass like clouds. The opportunity of peace must be taken today, not tomorrow, as it might be late.” Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, the Iranian special representative to Afghanistan, recently met with the Afghan foreign minister to assure him of Iran’s commitment to peace. A cursory look at The Tehran Times, an Iranian newspaper with close ties to the foreign ministry, reveals an array of headlines promoting “talks” and “peace,” a tact that is strikingly similar to American rhetoric on Afghanistan.

But Iranian policy toward Afghanistan is more interested in stability than peace. Hostilities around Herat are ongoing, and Iran is concerned that the violence could spill into its territory. This July, the Taliban captured many districts in Herat province that are adjacent to Iran’s eastern border. They have also captured the Islam Qala border crossing that leads into Iran.

Fighting in Afghanistan also poses a threat to the Iranian economy, a chief concern for incoming President Ebrahim Raisi, who made economic renewal a centerpiece of his campaign. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan totals over $3 billion annually. Fighting also renders inoperable the newly-inaugurated Khaf-Herat railroad that links Iran and Afghanistan —and which is part of the much larger East-West Railway Corridor project—.

Continued fighting in Afghanistan is also guaranteed to bring more refugees to Iran, which will place a significant economic burden on the country and exacerbate Iran’s already troublesome surge of COVID-19 cases. Iran is already home to nearly a million registered refugees and hundreds of thousands more who are undocumented. Incoming Iranian President Raisi and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, in a recent telephone conversation, made cooperating to manage the influx of Afghan refugees into their countries one of their primary goals.

The Iranian desire for stability in Afghanistan has led it to hedge its bets on the Taliban. If the Taliban can secure a decisive victory, allowing commerce to proceed and the flow of refugees to slow, the Iranian government will be glad to align with them. If the Taliban cannot win decisively, Iran is likely to promote a power-sharing agreement in Afghanistan that allows it to forego the repercussions of a protracted Afghan civil war.

To maintain a flexible policy, the Iranian government has maintained ties with the Afghan government while also pursuing its own policy, including backing an anti-Taliban Shiite militia called Hashd al-Shi’i. Much like Afghanistan’s other neighbors, Iran has not decided whether Taliban rule or a political settlement is more in line with its national interests. The most crucial factors shaping Iran’s determination will be the success of the Taliban on the battlefield and the vulnerability Iran feels to the threats posed by Sunni fundamentalism and American regime change.

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The Crisis in Cabo Delgado: A Policy for a New Generation

This is the final piece in a series examining the ongoing extremist threat in Mozambique.

After understanding Cabo Delgado’s history of economic marginalization, socio-political agitation, and geographic remoteness, one might not be surprised by the government’s military-oriented approach to dealing with ASWJ. With politics dominated by FRELIMO since independence, Mozambique ranks 149th in the world on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Consequently, only 27% of Mozambicans see a difference between the ruling party and the state.

The central government has long lacked credibility in the region due to its ties to criminal networks, acquiescence to foreign companies, and a highly publicized scandal in which government officials hid and pocketed $2.2 billion in off-budget loans. Cabo Delgado is also home to the single largest private investment in Africa, Total SA’s $15 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project along the coast. But this project has provided little profit or opportunity to the locals, fueling further discontent and rent-seeking. 

Missteps and Militarization

For the past few years, the central government has outsourced its handling of the ASWJ crisis to foreign mercenaries. The notorious Russian Wagner Group was initially deployed but replaced by the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) after sustaining losses. In 2021, Amnesty International accused government forces, ASWJ, and DAG of war crimes targeting civilians, and DAG let its contract lapse in April.

The governments of South Africa, Zimbabwe, the United States, and the European Union have all expressed their commitment to resolving this crisis, and their assistance initially came as advising, training, and financing government forces. But these government forces are the same ones frequently accused of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and harassment of civilians. 

And now international military involvement is escalating. South Africa, a regional leader, initially ruled out putting boots on the ground but ended up sending soldiers to extract its foreign nationals from the siege of Palma. Last month, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the deployment of its standby force, but much of its makeup and mission remain unclear. In early July, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda preempted them, sending 1,000 troops in a bid likely meant to increase Rwanda’s sway in the region. The EU also announced its own military mission, staffed primarily by Portuguese, to provide further training to Mozambique’s armed forces.

The government and its partners seem to be making the same mistakes that the Portuguese made when battling guerrillas in the very same region. Over the course of their ten-year fight to keep their colony, the beleaguered Portuguese made various attempts at dislodging FRELIMO from Cabo Delgado. Yet, they never seemed to try the classic counterinsurgency strategy of developing communities and protecting the populace. This, local support was pulled away from the guerrillas. Instead, they swept the jungles of Cabo in the massive Operation Gordian Knot, which ultimately failed due to its onerous death toll and resource drain. This lack of community outreach, paired with blind military violence, only perpetuated the grievances fueling the insurgency. The same cycle of government rigidity and insurgent vitality appears to be the case in modern Cabo Delgado.

Attention and Investment

The chorus of international funds and troops meant to pacify Cabo Delgado has mainly reinforced this militarized approach. International partners must instead only finance those government initiatives which support rather than antagonize communities. They must also be more discerning in which squads they are funding and training, pulling support from those government forces with bad track records on human rights and battlefield conduct.

It seems that the West has yet to learn in its dealings with Islamist insurgencies that military force and weapons proliferation are not conducive to de-escalation. Throughout the war with FRELIMO, Portugal’s semi-fascist dictatorship also formed alliances with the West, yet for all the intelligence, finances, and training provided from abroad, Portugal could not pacify Cabo by the strength of arms alone. 

In the 1960s, Cabo consisted primarily of smallholder peasants growing cash crops. Today, though this region remains largely rural, there are increased opportunities in coastal trade and energy extraction. Yet, the youth see few of the benefits. The locals should be enabled to participate in their own economy, and this starts with conscious governmental policy. Instead of abusing already-marginalized communities, the government could push the conflict in a constructive direction if it took a whole-of-society approach to peace in Cabo. This involves responsive community policing, accountability for rights violations by security forces, development partnerships that include local businesses, investment in infrastructure and education, increased space for journalists and civil society, and consultative mechanisms to communicate with locals. These are the practices and institutions that international partners should be funding instead, even if they must be built entirely anew.

Conclusion: 

One can reasonably conclude that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is only going to intensify, and will remain a major security issue in southern Africa. Though international actors from the West to SADC have expressed their willingness to provide training and even troops, the history of Cabo gives little reason to be optimistic about external intervention. The people of this resource-rich coastal province have experienced purely extractive, disinterested economics for centuries, from Britain to Portugal to Total SA. And yet, when hundreds of youth take up arms under a salvationist banner of Salafism, the government and its international partners immediately opt for clumsy militarization and pacification.

Though their violence has been brutal, meeting the insurgents on the battlefield does little to solve the problems that energized them in the first place. Instead, anyone concerned with actually de-escalating the conflict must look to NGOs, local activists, and social institutions that should be invested in and listened to.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Kurdish and Chechen Women in Separatism

Women’s activities and levels of involvement in non-traditional military organizations are diverse. Because of that, it is important to approach case studies for a better understanding of the connection between women’s personal experiences, their inner environments and their work in such organizations. In this article, Kurdish and Chechen women involved in separatism will be explored, along with the sociological, historical and ideological background of the groups they joined. 

Separatist Kurdish women

Starting with the formerly Kurdistan Workers’ Party/PKK (now Kurdistan People’s Congress/Kongra-Gel), considered by some states and organizations as a terrorist, it is important to notice that Kurdish women are an essential part of its advancement in Turkey. This is evident with a participation rate of 40-50% of the whole organization.

Embedded in a paternalistic and restricted society, many Kurdish women felt the grievances of not being allowed to pursue education and secure employment. Women would have to silence their memories in fear of retaliation. Additionally, many were forced to marry when teenagers and experienced abuses and honour killings, throughout the 70s. This is similarly present in the modern day. The politicisation of women started to grow, however, when the conflict intensified in the 90s, when Ankara was destroying Kurdish villages, and when Kurdish people were killed or disappeared.

Therefore, women’s condition and their desire to escape it, following liberation beliefs, maybe the strongest factor for them to join the PKK. This may be done voluntarily the majority of times (according to ex-PKK terrorists that decided to give interviews). But different factors might also be relevant to other women, such as trauma, and/or revenge, for instance. The group’s message evoked justice, gender equality and freedom, to deter the male-dominated sphere and power in their inner circles and in the Turkish state. As a result, women perceived themselves as leaders, receiving political and military training. Subsequently, they observed the prohibition of domestic and sexual violence, conducting their own military units, between other implementations.

Those advancements came with some debates from men. They did not recognize women with enough strength for combat or as a figure of authority from the start. Women were seen to have constantly argued with them, did not obey their orders, and challenged their roles. The consequences of this reaction went from women being put in auxiliary activities to constantly trying to prove their value in harsh duties. This included volunteering for suicide bombings – until the implementation of penalties by the PKK’s board destined to men that disrespected women’s positions or instructions.

After this episode, a new code of conduct was established, reaching the Kurdish society. This is where Kurdish men could be separated from their wives if there was any denunciation of husband abuse to the PKK. 

Another characteristic involving women is that sexual relationships are not allowed inside the organization. The death penalty was utilized as a means of punishment in the past (actually banned) amongst jail sentences, disconnection from the group, or denials of leadership positions all as forms of punishments. If there are pregnancies, the newborn children are considered to belong to the group. As a result, they are separated from their parents, with only limited visits per year.

Separatist Chechen women

Although a dormant movement now, it is interesting to examine Chechen women that joined terrorist groups, with their participation rate in more than two-thirds of suicide bombings from 2000 until 2014. The origin of such an involvement relies on the Second Chechen War, where tactics by Islamist extremists started to be implemented. Consequently, one of them consisted of female suicide bombers, labelled as “Black Widows” by the media.

With a limitation to state how many groups were formed, it is not possible to detain a whole image of Chechen women’s participation. However, it is notable that the crisis was between the Russian army and semi-independent commanders from the separatists. Talking about the condition of women, some suffered honour killings, domestic violence and abductions. The ones that had opportunities to enter university and full-time jobs saw their hopes of securing them vanished by the two conflicts.

On the side of women’s reason for participation, the majority of them witnessed the brutalities of the Russian military. This included death, beating or mistreatment of relatives, and the destruction of their neighbourhoods. Against this background, Chechen women usually had a strong desire to be martyrs as the conduction of their entrance into such groups. This was largely in response to their own visions and their country’s fight to be independent of Russia. Furthermore, this was aided to have justice for them and their families.

There is also evidence that the recruitment was based on their friendship and familial ties. However, womens experienced changed their lifestyle once they joined those organizations. Mostly, they were in charge of traditional roles, such as cleaning, nursing or cooking. Furthermore, they wore the traditional Arab dress and hijab. When they took suicide missions, there was the protocol of only travelling with an older woman or designated chaperone.

Another difference from Kurdish women is that, if training existed for Chechen women, it was very short. This was due to the two weeks it took from leaving their homes and beginning to act. Their roles were also distinct, with Chechen women having traditional and subsidiary activities. However, the male-run command did not have a problem using women as suicide bombers, as it could also signify propaganda to attract more recruits.

Conclusion

The context of separatist Kurdish and Chechen women is different in terms of historical times and players. Nonetheless, the issue of women’s restrictive conditions in their societies and post-war settings are a trend in both. Although their organizations grew in ideological basis away from each other, they may reveal a large image of women’s situation, their needs, the observation of any conflict escalation in the following years, and the initial de-radicalisation strategies that have to emerge.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Historical Overview

The world watched as Israel and Hamas has exchanged rocket fire prior to the cease-fire issued on May 25th, 2021. The death toll stands at over 200 with 1,235 Palestinians injured. Ten Israelis were killed by rockets from Gaza. The recent tensions increased at the beginning of Ramadan as Israeli police put up barriers around Jerusalem’s Damascus Gate causing widespread protests. Israeli police say the barrier was erected to regulate people entering the plaza. Clashes increased as dozens of Palestinian families were evicted from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood inflaming longstanding property disputes between Israelis and Palestinians.  

Palestine theoretically includes the Gaza strip and the West Bank. Both Israel and Palestine consider Jerusalem as their political capital. Both regions consider the city religiously sacred. Hamas, a Sunni Islamist militant group, governs the Gaza strip. Several countries consider Hamas to be a terrorist group due, in part, to their violent attacks against Israel. 

Global protests have mobilized thousands in support of Palestine. Protests have engaged thousands in the middle east, New Zealand, Japan, Europe, Canada, and United States.

History of Conflict

The conflict has been occurring in this region for hundreds of years over land occupation and independence. The disputed territory almost found a solution in 1947 when the United Nations proposed Resolution 181, this resolution would create the two independent states of Israel and Palestine. Arab leaders rejected the resolution due to the territorial division while the Jewish leaders had satisfaction over territory lines. The resolution was adopted yet immediately Mandatory Palestine broke out the civil war between the Jewish and Arab communities leading the plan to not be implemented. 

In 1948, following World War II, Israel was established as a state when the British withdrew from Palestine. The Israel-Palestinian conflict began. As a result, this dispute is a continued fight over land occupation and independence. Since this time, there have been several wars, violent encounters, protests, and more failed resolutions from the United Nations. This is the conflict that continues today. 

Jordan had invaded this region in 1948, seizing homes from Jewish homeowners. Israeli law allows Jewish citizens to claim the land back in the West bank which their family owed prior to 1948. Palestinian residents in this region do not have the same opportunity under the law to reclaim their land. Thousands of Palestinians have lost homes due to this law. Many of these homes have been in the family for generations.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The United Nations along with countries around the world have called for a peace agreement in the region. If violence continues ally countries are considering putting conditions on weapons sent to Israel. Protecting human lives is the primary initiative needed in this region followed by peace discussions involving both Israel and Palestine leaders. The United Nations has been meeting with global leaders on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seeking resolution. The two independent state solution has been identified by global leaders as a solution to consider. 

 

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The Growth and Impact of ISIL in Mozambique: The Difficulties to Defeating their Insurgency

Mozambique’s conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has experienced a notable increase in the level of violence within the last year. Although active in the region since 2017, it is only more recently that ISIL’s attacks have escalated in both frequency and severity. The bloodshed caused by ISIL throughout Mozambique has had an alarming impact, evident from the recurring raids on innocent villagers and the growing number of casualties, as seen by the increasing rate of people beheaded or raped.

Furthermore, the details of these raids have become even more brutal and cruel in recent times, in that dozens of the decapitated victims have been young children. This not only serves to highlight the extent of terrorism within the state but its rapid escalation. This merits further discussion and analysis, as it arguably provides an indication as to the future of the insurgency, whether ISIL extremism will continue to grow and intensify, or if they will be ultimately defeated. 

All throughout the country, thousands of citizens have been reported as missing or misplaced as ISIL target their communities at a shocking rate from previous years of the conflict. The statistics reveal that the increase has multiplied several times over, with 172,000 misplaced in the spring of 2020 to over 732,000 this spring one year later. This demonstrates the impact that ISIL has had on a multitude, which has grown exponentially within a relatively short timeframe. This, therefore, illustrates the extent of their power as a terrorist organization. 

To further expand upon this is ISIL’s attack on the town of Palma last March. Although the local security forces were reported to have secured control of the town and defeated the terrorists, ISIL’s actions certainly left their mark there, with multiple buildings destroyed, several dozen military personnel killed and beheaded bodies covering the streets. The main image that can be taken from this fight in Palma is the barbarity and destructive power of ISIL. The counterinsurgencies victory and claim to have retaken the town pales in significance and impact when the atrocities of ISIL are brought to attention.

Upon examining the level of violence by the terrorists, the success of the security forces appears to be a mere detail in comparison to the widespread brutality of the insurgency. The extent of this is that ISIL activity nowadays seems to capture the spotlight whenever their presence is noted, their reputation and crimes far more prominent than the efforts of those who try to stop them.

This interpretation shows an alarming undertone as it can be argued that, regardless of whether ISIL wins or loses its battles with Mozambique’s forces, it leaves behind a clear atmosphere of death and destruction and from this an obviously daunting degree of fear. This fear is evident in that that so many citizens have been misplaced due to the terrorists; hundreds alone fled during the fighting at Palma.

So many in Mozambique clearly feel greatly threatened by the presence of ISIL. Thus, the danger that this organization presents cannot be understated. Indeed, this is apparent given that the primary goal of a terrorist is not always to overthrow a regime, but rather to spread chaos and terror amongst their victims. From this, it can be argued that ISIL is becoming more and more successful when discussing its actions, reputation, and infamy.

A worrying thought that comes from the Palma attack is that, on a certain level, the efforts of Mozambique police and military make little difference. If they are defeated in battles with ISIL, this increases the terrorists’ strength and reputation and damages the state’s morale, as well as likely resulting in a large number of deaths in both security personnel and civilians. However, even if the counterinsurgency technically defeats ISIL, as seen by the fight in Palma, the terrorists will still have been successful in their goal of causing casualties and spreading fear amongst a multitude. It can be determined from this that ISIL stands to gain whatever the outcome of their skirmishes and perceivably always one step ahead of the authorities.

In order to combat them, it has been more recently announced that multiple allies of Mozambique from other regions of Africa have promised to contribute their forces to the effort to eliminate ISIL, whilst Portugal and the United States have been providing training for Mozambique’s troops. Although the results of this are yet to be seen, it makes sense that a strong international backing is likely to increase Mozambique’s chances of defeating ISIL in the long-term. Whilst ISIL is fearsome and enjoys clear advantages in their conflict, it must be remembered that they had a similar experience in the Middle East, yet were successfully driven out. The same can occur in this current conflict. The combined efforts of multiple nations focused on overwhelming ISIL appear to be the best option to ending terrorism in Mozambique.

Overall, it is clear that the extent of ISIL activity and its impact on Mozambique is significantly growing. Furthermore, the threat they pose may also increase and become more serious. Unlike with other conflicts, ISIL terrorism is likely to continue to remain strong as the results of their fighting with local security forces appear to have less consequence for them. So long as they are able to spread chaos and fear, they remain a successful threat.

From this, it is apparent that ISIL is likely to be successful from its current methods. Their position as terrorists makes their ambitions, whilst highly cruel, simpler and easier to accomplish than those of counterinsurgent forces, placing them at an advantage. Despite this, they are not unbeatable and there is hope that the foreign support Mozambique has received will be enough to ultimately defeat ISIL.

 

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Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Afghan Peace Process

Following the ongoing U.S troop’s withdrawal from Afghanistan after the 20-year campaign in the country, the insurgency of the Taliban remains resilient. The Persian Gulf States played a key role during the Afghan conflict, in terms of mediation and reconstruction efforts. Consequently, their involvement is likely to increase once U.S troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan.

As a regional power with strong historic relations with Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia is expected to actively participate in the peace process. The “Declaration of Peace in Afghanistan”, signed in Makkah on the 11th June 2021, witnesses Saudi Arabia’s commitment to promoting peace and dialogue so as to prevent every form of violence and extremism, in line with the Islamic principles. However, it is relevant to take into consideration that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by the anti-Iranian agenda. Additionally, their goal is to expand Saudi religious, political, and cultural spheres of influence in Afghanistan.

Background

The Saudi monarchy has a long history of engagement in Afghanistan. In 1980, Saudi Arabia partnered with Pakistan and the United States to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan by financing the mujahideen in the 1980s for humanitarian aid and weapons. Osama Bin Laden was among the Saudi financiers of the mujahideen. In 1996, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan were the only three Gulf states to recognize the Taliban, after they took control of Kabul.

After 9/11, Saudi Arabia formally cut ties with the Taliban. This was due to international pressure, prompted by Bin Laden’s involvement in the attacks.

The shift in the Saudi policy in Afghanistan is evident in the Saudi support of the Afghan government, in terms of investment, reconstruction, and mediation efforts in the country. In 2010, the former Afghan President Karzai (2001-2014) sought Saudi mediation to reconcile with the Taliban. Saudi Arabia’s mediation with the Taliban failed, and Qatar emerged as the privileged actor in the Afghan peace negotiations.

Saudi Arabia Agenda in Afghanistan

Recently, Saudi Arabia hosted the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. Important decisions and agreements between the two countries were reached.

In regards to political relations, the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GCC signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The goals of which were to strengthen cultural, political, and economic cooperation. Furthermore, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia are committed to enhancing security cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This is subsequently a common threat.

Concerning the educational development, both sides agreed to accelerate the establishment of the International Islamic University in Nangarhar. This is a district where ISIL-K has not been entirely eradicated. The university will deliver religious classes in Arabic rather than Afghanistan’s national languages.

However, Saudi Arabia’s reconstruction and investment efforts in the country should be seen in the bigger picture of the Kingdom’s interests. Additionally, expanding its influence in Afghanistan should be seen as a way to balance the influence of Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran as the two leading Islamic powers, Sunni and Shi’a, are committed to the building of Islamic universities and higher education institutions in Afghanistan to exert their influence.

As stated by Simon Mabon, a lecturer in international relations and director of the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies at Lancaster University, “Funding schools and universities is an increasingly popular way of cultivating soft – cultural – power, with education seen as a way of empowering people and providing them with the means through which to improve their socio-economic positions within society”.

Conclusion

All in all, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the country may increase to fill the void after the U.S troops. In case of a full-scale civil war in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia may support armed groups based on its political and religious allies to exert influence within the peace process. Saudi Arabia and Iran should not lose their opportunity to engage in Afghanistan to mediate and stabilize the country. The result of its loss could result in a destabilization of the Middle East. Ultimately, this is not in any of the countries interests.

Saudi Arabia should rather focus on its commitment to supporting lasting peace in Afghanistan. This may be achieved by promoting peace and dialogue amongst the Afghani and Pakistani leaders, according to Islamic principles. A sustainable peace process in Afghanistan, as well as stability, can only be achieved by including Shi’a minorities.

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Pakistan’s Support of the Taliban Might Come Back to Haunt Islamabad

The scenes from recent Taliban military successes in Afghanistan were positively received among members of Pakistan’s security establishment. While denying it publicly, these Pakistani hardliners have funneled support to the Taliban for decades. If the current trajectory of the conflict continues, they will get what they wished for: a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. A Taliban triumph, however, will provide a merely pyrrhic victory for Pakistan, a victory that it will come to regret.

Pakistan’s Support for the Taliban

Since the Taliban’s emergence almost three decades ago, Pakistan has continuously provided a safe haven and financial and military assistance to the Taliban. Following the U.S. invasion in 2001, Pakistan became a safe haven for Al-Qaeda’s leadership as well. There are a couple of reasons why Pakistan continues its support for the Taliban.

First, Pakistan’s security apparatus believes that the Taliban gives it strategic depth, securing the Afghan frontier and permitting the concentration of Pakistani forces on the Indian frontier. The Taliban is the only ally of Pakistan among Afghanistan’s political actors. Pakistan believes that maintaining positive relations with the organization will prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for anti-Pakistan militants and outside powers.

Second, Pakistan fears that targeting Afghan militant groups will invite retaliation against Pakistani targets. While Pakistan sponsors these groups, it lacks full control of them. Nevertheless, it continues to argue to the contrary, believing that this strengthens its position in international bargaining.

Third, Pakistan fears a strong and independent Afghanistan that is aligned and supported by India. Such an Afghan-Indian alliance, Pakistan believes, will encircle Pakistan. The 2011 Afghanistan-Indian strategic partnership agreement and the recent call by Ambassador Mamundzay, the top Afghan diplomat in Delhi, for India to play a bigger role in Afghanistan, increases Pakistan’s paranoia regarding Indian engagement in Afghanistan.

What Can Go Wrong for Islamabad?

Internationally, the Taliban takeover will affect Pakistan’s strategic depth and its diplomatic relations with its neighbors.

First, as mentioned earlier, Pakistan sees the Taliban in Afghanistan as its strategic depth in its confrontation with India. The Taliban, however, has its own interests. The Taliban would probably intensify its diplomatic campaign to gain international legitimacy. India has already established a new direct line to the Taliban and an Indian delegation has met Taliban officials last month in Doha. Normalization between the Taliban and India will undermine Pakistan’s conception of its strategic depth.

Second, Pakistan should expect increasing pressure from its Islamic neighbors Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. These countries have accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban in the past, and with the intensification of fighting between the Taliban and Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen warlords, this pressure is sure to increase.

Third, with diminishing influence over the Taliban and increasing international demand to rein in and influence the Taliban, Pakistan will find itself in a diplomatic nightmare. A victorious Taliban is less likely to defer to Islamabad in its moment of victory. At the same time, the international community will increasingly defer to Pakistan to act and impose its influence over the Taliban. The failure of Pakistan to influence the Taliban will inflict a blow on its international bargaining power.

Domestically, the Taliban takeover will create economic and security challenges for Pakistan. First, escalation of the war and a Taliban takeover will propel a massive flood of refugees into Pakistan. These refugees would join the 3 million people already seeking refuge in Pakistan. As Pakistan has its hands full, these new refugees will further exacerbate its economic situation.

Second, a Taliban win will embolden the jihadists’ anti-government factions in Pakistan. In the past, the Taliban has already inspired extremist movements in Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban have launched attacks against Pakistani targets, horrifically killing 132 kids in an army school in Peshawar in 2014 in one such attack. Taliban success in neighboring Afghanistan will lead to the import of sectarian violence from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Conclusions

While the Pakistani military establishment is cheerful about the recent Taliban successes, Pakistan might face an international and domestic blowback if the Taliban will take over Afghanistan. It might be in Pakistan’s best interest to confidentially ask the U.S. to intensify its air support to Afghan government forces operations to prevent the Taliban from taking over.

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 by Sydney Neuman

The Reemergence of Right-Wing Extremism Groups in the United States

It has been a scary realization for many people in the United States as more people are witnessing the re-emergence of right-wing extremism. We are living through a moment of profound yet positive change in attitudes toward race, with a majority of citizens coming to understand more about the deeply embedded historical legacy of racist structures and ideas.

However, there is another more dangerous, group of people. They are seeking to rehabilitate the toxic political notions of racial superiority and stoke fear of immigrants and minorities to inflame grievances for political ends. Furthermore, they are attempting to build a notion of an embattled white majority that has to defend its power. This, achieved by any means necessary.

Extremism in the US

In the United States, terrorists are usually associated with one of the six most commonly known ideologies: right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, environmental extremism, nationalist/separatist extremism, religious extremism, and single-issue extremism. In recent years, the threat of right-wing terrorism in the United States appears to be rising at an alarming rate. More specifically, we have seen an increase in white supremacy anti-government extremists, such as militia groups and so-called sovereign citizens interested in plotting attacks against government, racial, religious, and political targets in the United States.

The terms “right-wing extremists” and “left-wing extremists” do not correspond to political parties in the United States, such as Republicans or Democrats. However, the election of Donald Trump as the President has been cited as a factor in inciting the reemergence of activists in America. These groups both reject left-wing ideology and mainstream conservatism.

The Increase in Recent Years

Another huge factor inciting this reemergence is the role of social media in promoting these ideologies. White supremacy has made its return to mainstream media, as deadly acts of violence are occuring in states all around the country. A prominent US civil rights group, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported that it is currently tracking more than 1,600 extremist groups within the United States.

This has inevitably led to an increase in domestic terrorist attacks by right-wing extremists in the United States. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of such attacks was five or fewer per year. The number of attacks then rose to 14 in 2012. This remained consistent between 2012 and 2016, with a mean of 11 attacks and a median of 13 attacks. This then jumped to 31 in 2017 and has continued to rise every year since then. Most recently, in the summer of 2020, there was a specific increase in the number of attacks on protesters and street violence. This included car attacks, street fights, small explosives, and many non-fatal shootings.

How to Move Away from This Upward Trend

U.S. federal and local agencies need to shift some of their focus and intelligence resources to penetrating far-right networks and preventing future attacks. There needs to be a challenge of exposing white nationalist ideologies and the opportunistic politicians who are appropriating their language. This will demonstrate to the American people that these ideas are fundamentally un-American and are all too often a cover for corruption, graft, and racism.

In an analysis of the January 6th Capitol Hill riots, it became clear that an alarmingly significant number of members of both police and military had joined in on attacking the nation’s institutions. Consequently, many have been exposed to disinformation that led them to conclude that violent action was needed to save democracy. This kind of information will be crucial for prevention efforts. Furthermore, to stop the radicalization and recruitment of white supremacism in many countries. However, it will also be imperative in understanding how to address and remove the motivations for joining.

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 by Rise to Peace

The New Reality in Afghanistan Requires the Afghanistan Government to Change Its Strategy

Since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement in February 2020, the Taliban has accelerated its offensive, securing major gains. The Taliban has expanded its control of the country and captured border crossings, routing entire Afghan National Army units in the process.

Clearly, the current government strategy is failing. The Afghan government should realize the fact that without the presence of U.S. and NATO troops, they are the weaker side in this war. Instead of denying it, the Afghan government should adopt a new strategy that better represents the evolving reality in its war against the Taliban.

Current Strategy

Operationally, under the authority of Joint Order 125, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) holds an active-defense posture, concentrating on defending major provisional capitals. The Active Defense consists of ANDSF patrolling forward from checkpoints, conducting limited offensive actions and counterattacks within the vicinity of checkpoints, and consolidating checkpoints. With the exception of the Special Security Forces, the Afghan conventional forces rarely take the fight to the Taliban and increasingly often surrender without a fight.

Diplomatically, the Afghan government continues to ask the U.S. to keep its contractors in Afghanistan and its air support to Afghan troops. With diminishing U.S. military presence, the government also calls on other countries to provide technical and anti-terrorism operation support. At the same time, the Afghan government maintains its commitment to peace talks with the Taliban.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on two of Sun Tzu’s hierarchy of strategies, attacking the enemy’s strategy and disrupting the enemy’s alliances.

First, the Taliban strives to gain international and domestic recognition. Domestically, the Taliban tries to rebrand itself as a capable government able to provide the population with basic needs. Internationally, the Taliban strives to expand its international recognition. From its Doha-based political office, Taliban officials visit world capitals and conduct negotiations.

To confront the Taliban domestically, the Afghan government should focus on the population. Using tools of propaganda, the government should portray the Taliban as corrupt, oppressive, and foreign-controlled. With more than 60 percent of the Afghan population under the age of 24, the majority of the population never lived under Taliban rule and are not familiar with the organization’s ways. With increasing reports of Taliban committed assassinations and executions of government forces and officials, oppression of women, and reports of foreign fighters in its ranks, the government could mobilize the population against the Taliban.

Internationally, the Afghan government should defame the Taliban as untrustworthy and urge world governments to refrain from negotiating with the Taliban and providing it a façade of international recognition. The continued participation in the peace talks with the Taliban should also be reconsidered. The participation of the government provides the Taliban recognition with no substantial gains for the government.

Furthermore, the Taliban knows that the government forces are static, trying to keep control of provincial capitals. While the government forces are pinned down in cities, the Taliban takes control of more territories and expands its operations in the north. This dynamic needs to change and the government needs to take the initiative.

The government should retreat from “lost causes” such as defending overrun southern districts and solidify the government’s control in the central and northern regions. Then, it should wage guerrilla warfare in Taliban-controlled regions against the Taliban’s extended supply lines, symbols of governance, and political organizations. The successful mobilization of militias is key in bolstering the capacity of the pro-government forces. The “glue” that connects the members of these militia’s together, ethnic identity and strong anti-Taliban sentiment, decreases the chances of desertion.

Second, the Afghan government needs to disrupt the enemy’s alliances. Pakistan, traditionally perceived as the Taliban’s main ally, should be the main effort. The potential Taliban takeover of Afghanistan raises concerns in Pakistan’s halls of power. A Taliban victory will embolden Pakistan’s own anti-government Islamist movements and hinder the country’s stability. The Afghan government should take advantage of Pakistan’s concerns and urge Islamabad to cease its support of the Taliban.

Conclusion

The successful Taliban offensive requires the Afghan government to rethink its strategy. Acknowledging the reality on the ground should propel the government to consider such a change. Attacking the enemy’s strategy and its alliances is a good first step in changing the tide of war.

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