Liverpool

The Liverpool Attack: A Need for Community-Based Counter-Terrorism Efforts

The Liverpool bombing on Remembrance Sunday has once again raised questions about the U.K. Counter-Terrorism Prevention Program. The alacrity with which these attacks have occurred in recent times has once again highlighted the rise of extremism in the Western world.

Just before the national two minutes of silence commenced on Sunday, November 14th, a taxi exploded outside the Liverpool Women’s Hospital.  The taxi driver, who locked the taxi doors before the attacker could escape and prevented him from entering the hospital, has been released from the hospital.  The attacker, Emad al-Swealmeen, has been declared dead.

Four men have been arrested under the Terrorist Act but have since been released from custody. Counter-Terrorism Police detectives have stated that they are keeping an open mind so far.

Home Secretary Priti Patel has confirmed that the United Kingdom’s threat level has been raised to “severe;” indicating that an attack is now judged to be “highly likely.” The Liverpool bombing closely follows another incident that rocked the country last month when conservative MP David Amess was stabbed to death in a shocking event described as a terrorist incident.

A miasma of uncertainty and fear surrounds the United Kingdom. Four people have been arrested on suspicion of being connected to the Liverpool bombing, while Ali Harbi Ali has been charged with the murder of Amess. Ali has also been accused of preparing terrorist acts.

The Rise of Islamist Extremist Groups in the West

In the last 20 years, various Islamist extremist groups have sought to spread their message through various ways, with radicalisation being the prime intention. The West has been accused of slowly malforming the culture and the religion, and this has further radicalised lone-wolves.  In addition, the extent of social media and various online platforms carries with it certain banes, and terrorist groups have found it easier to convey their message through such platforms.

The Liverpool attack has once again sharply brought the focus onto the United Kingdom’s Counter-Terrorism Prevention Program. Despite various new initiatives and strategies to counteract terrorism (including the Prevent scheme as part of the Contest strategy), the U.K. continues to act as a hotbed for consistent terrorist activities.

In 2005, four coordinated attacks were carried out by Islamic terrorists in London, which killed 52 people. This was the country’s first Islamist suicide attack, the impact of which continues to reverberate to this day. In 2017, an Islamic extremist detonated a bomb that killed 23 people following an Ariana Grande concert.

The Militarisation of Counter-Terrorism and the Neglect of Community-Based Approaches

However, the Liverpool bombing has once again revived the discussion around the impact of U.K. counter-terrorism programs.

The U.K. response to the rise in extremist attacks has been met with efforts to train and equip a Counter Terrorist Police Force in the hopes to meet terrorist attacks with immediacy. However, the elite group of firearms officers portrays a militarised approach to counter-terrorism. While this may be effective in deterring attacks when they happen, they do little to address the push and pull factors of radicalisation.

In May of this year, Al Jazeera released a report assessing a mental health program run by the U.K. Counter-Terrorism Police. Disturbing facts have been revealed in that report. The “Vulnerability Support Hubs,” as they have been termed, were utilised as a way of tracking and accessing sensitive medical information on certain people. As a result, Muslims with poor mental health have come under heavy scrutiny.

An additional argument regarding the U.K.’s approach to counter-terrorism is that it could do more to be proactive, rather than reactive. The West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit documents that 80% of their investigations connected to seized weaponry stem from Islamist extremists. Far-right extremists comprised a fifth of their investigations. However, in the last two years, far-right extremism has been rapidly increasing. Should this trend continue, the U.K. must act promptly to implement effective counter-terrorism policies across various religions, socio-economic groups, and ethnicities.

Origins of extremist behavior need to be analyzed and combatted before meeting the point of seizing weaponry.  The U.K. must raise active involvement by civil society, religious communities, their respective leaders, teachers, and doctors to preemptively recognizing and addressing extremist behaviors.

The U.K. must steer clear from inflammatory rhetoric, evidenced in areas of Europe, in an effort to avoid alienating certain minorities, thus risking the loss of their cooperation.

The Need to Build Trust and Confidence

The U.K. must put more thought into building trust and confidence between its wide range of communities and counter-terrorism units. There is no denying that every program will have its setbacks and challenges. The aim should be to educate the masses and build trust. There should be an emphasis on a more open counter-terrorism program that offers civil-society a chance to approach counter-terrorism units with independent research and recommendations to compliment the law enforcing element, as opposed to militarizing it entirely.


Abhinav Anand, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Carla Bilson, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism, served as a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and later supported national security initiatives in Washington, D.C.
Nigeria

What Measures Should be Taken to Counter Nigeria’s Insecurities?

Nigeria has benefited from several projects and programs, all aimed at resolving the issue of insecurity including, addressing identified root causes and engendering factors. While these efforts seem promising, over time, one realizes its temporal traits. Being a significant player with yielding influence in Africa, Nigeria must understand all that is at stake for the continent if it fails to address its internal problems.

Insecurity in Nigeria 

Since its independence, Nigeria has experienced, at an ever-increasing pace, a series of conflicts and insurgencies.  These conflicts have turned the budding land in the Sahel to a leading figure on the list of unstable regions in the continent. From political violence to ethnoreligious conflicts, social agitations, resource conflicts, and now radical extremism, the nation continues to navigate these issues in hopes of survival.

Having survived a terrifying civil war, as well as spates of violence and conflicts, one would expect that Nigeria’s resilience will lead to stability. But in reality, this is not the case, as fears that the worst is yet to come remain strong. It was, therefore, no surprise to many when events of extremism began to gradually build up in the northern region of Nigeria, with Boko Haram taking the lead.

In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf, a famous preacher and proponent of the Izala sect of Islam and the founder of Boko Haram, began to radicalize his followers in Maiduguri, Nigeria. Establishing a religious center and an Islamic school, Yusuf reached many people from poor backgrounds across the country. In no time, Yusuf’s teachings attracted many followers and expanded into other states including Yobe, where it established a base nicknamed ‘Afghanistan.’ The ‘Afghanistan’ base (just like other operation bases) enjoys a geographical advantage, as it is within close proximity to Nigeria’s borders, thus aiding their expansion into neighboring West African countries.

Responses to Insecurity and Terrorism

Almost always, the first response to quell reports of security disruptions in Nigeria is the use of force. Following this response is an attempt to create a lasting solution through program developments, usually aimed at management and recovery.

Many of these initiatives, such as the NYSC scheme (introduced in the aftermath of the civil war), the Amnesty program (focused on ending militancy in the Niger Delta), and the de-radicalization program, all fail to address root causes; instead, they manage the situation for as long as possible.

Consequently, we see a resurgence of the same issues across Nigerian regions: in eastern Nigeria, there is a reawakening of secession agitations by Biafra, in the Niger Delta, an increasing rate of crime and kidnappings, and in the North East, terrorism is growing with reports of abductees willingly returning to their captors.

Recommendations

Nigeria’s rising insecurity may remain unresolved until the government understands the importance of engaging and collaborating with relevant stakeholders in the country. Thus, while external aid has its role, the outcome may not be as desired, until every group in the country bears its responsibility and the right environment to execute them is created.

Collaborate with CSOs

Civil society and humanitarian organizations have been present in Nigeria for decades, closely collaborating with the Nigerian government to maintain security and stability. Their role in Nigeria’s security largely revolves around responding to conflict situations by offering relief support, spearheading mediation and reconciliation, and rehabilitating victims and perpetrators.

While these are commendable efforts, the government and these organizations need to take progressive steps to ensure appropriate mechanisms are in place to identify and address early warning signs of extremism and incitement.

Community Engagement

The role of the community has largely been ignored in Nigeria’s decision-making system, regardless of it being a democratic nation.  A review is essential with relevant measures made effective immediately. The government should fully engage communities in various approaches to counter violent extremisms, as well as identify and prevent future cases.

Deliberate efforts to ensure a balanced representation of women and youth in counter-extremism approaches is necessary, as they introduce a unique perspective from a largely marginalized and vulnerable population.

Contingency Plans

As a nation whose primary responsibility entails protecting the lives and properties of its citizens, expecting a contingency plan is in place at all times is not out of the ordinary. Due to Nigeria’s porous borders, Boko Haram and other extremist groups are in an advantageous position. Unfortunately, even with the lessons learned from Boko Haram, Nigeria’s borders remain largely unprotected.

Address Root Causes

The impoverished state of the country and the northern regions, alongside poor tenets of its society, are some factors that aid extremists’ growth. Time and time again, we have seen extremist groups all over the world garner support from citizens by providing basic amenities that governments fail to supply. Some abductees who willingly returned to Boko Haram camps after being freed by Nigerian soldiers cited the harsh economic conditions as the reason they rejoined. The government must rise to its responsibility in driving development in Nigeria.

In addition to developmental challenges, other root causes such as intolerance and marginalization remain unaddressed. Intolerance remains a bane in Nigeria and is the bedrock for the many ethnoreligious conflicts and radicalism that Nigeria has suffered over the years. The government, alongside relevant national stakeholders, must find ways to address these root causes and allot as much attention to these challenges as they do for terrorist acts.

Conclusion

Resolving insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria does not require additional funds or aid; all that is needed is a reformation of its systems, structures, and values. Merely formulating policies without a system that allows and ensures effective implementation would yield no result; this remains the case with Nigeria.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

ISIS-K

ISIS-K Grows as the Taliban Struggles to Maintain Power

According to a senior Afghan intelligence officer who spoke with Rise to Peace, ISIS of Khorasan (ISIS-K) is growing rapidly in the Char Bolak district of the Balkh province in Afghanistan, notably since the Taliban’s takeover. Recently, ISIS has claimed responsibility for two other attacks, one occurring outside of a women’s hospital in Liverpool, U.K., killing only the ISIS member himself.  The second attack occurred in Kampala, Uganda, killing three people and injuring 36. These attacks illustrate the rapid expansion of ISIS’s growth and activities.

Additionally, ISIS-K’s attacks have been characterized by violent expansion and retrenchment combined with periodic clashes with the Taliban, international forces, and Afghan security forces.

ISIS-K has been responsible for nearly 100 attacks against civilians in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as around 250 clashes with U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani security forces since 2017.

A senior Afghan intelligence officer informed Rise to Peace that ISIS-K is getting stronger due to a concentrated focus on increasing capabilities and power after the recent Taliban takeover.  There are no current counter-terrorism operations; however, the previous Afghan government used to have many counter-terrorism resources and operations, such as drone attacks. In addition, due to the Taliban takeover, there is no significant resistance against ISIS-K, leaving them with plenty of room to grow rapidly.

Furthermore, poverty is rampantly increasing in Afghanistan. So, not only does this make people more willing to join a terrorist organization, but also results in former Afghan security forces joining as a means to financially support their families. For example, an Afghan intelligence officer informed Rise to Peace that ISIS-K will pay 15,000 AFG to new recruits with no experience and 25,000 AFG for those with experience. Likewise, many top-level ISIS-K commanders who were captured during the previous five to six years were released after the Taliban takeover.

ISIS-K/Daesh Techniques

ISIS-K’s techniques are known to be chaotic and devastating.  ISIS-K strategically creates chaos and uncertainty through guerilla tactics in an attempt to discredit a government’s ability to provide security for its citizens.  Additionally, through these tactics, ISIS-K seeks to shift fighters from other groups into their own.  Through these efforts, ISIS-K aims to position itself as the leading jihadist organization in the region by recruiting new members, and poaching members affiliated with other groups.

Moreover, ISIS-K engages in various tactics to incentivize recruits, varying from marriage arrangements to threats.  One example includes sending out nightly letters to recruit people to join their cause.  They have even sent letters to Taliban soldiers, warning them to leave the Islamic Emirate or ISIS-K will assassinate them.

According to a senior Afghan intelligence officer who spoke with Rise to Peace, a new group within ISIS-K operates at night to kill members of the Taliban.  The unique aspect about this group is not only do they live seemingly normal lives, fighting at night while continuing to be farmers during the day, but they conduct their operations barefoot.  Thus, they have become known as the “barefoot fighters” among locals.  The “barefoot fighters'” tactics are comparable to those that the Mujahideen used during their existence, since the Mujahideen were referred to as “guerrillas” or “mountain men” and were similarly excellent in night combat.

Who are the targets?

Ever since ISIS-K’s founding, it has usually targeted Kabul with sophisticated and complex attacks.  In the majority of the attacks, ISIS-K has a high proclivity to target civilians whom they regard as infidels of Islam.

Capabilities

Most analysts and researchers, including the United Nations, gauge that ISIS-K’s capabilities have reached about 2,000 fighters, and increased when the Taliban released prisoners from the Afghanistan jail. This amount is somewhat comparable to the Taliban who have around 10,000 fighters at their disposal.

Financial Routes

It is not exactly evident where ISIS-K receives its funding, but the public U.S. government assessments provide the clearest understanding.  ISIS-K primarily receives funds by extorting the local population and businesses, taxation, illicit criminal commerce, donations, as well as support from the ISIS-core.

ISIS-K moves its money around the world and throughout Afghanistan via the Hawala. The Hawala is an alternative or parallel transfer system which exists outside of traditional finance channels. Hence, it has been used widely in funding terrorist groups and activities both in Afghanistan and abroad. Further, ISIS-K has cultivated relationships with specific Hawala dealers who store thousands of dollars for them.

The response from the international community

The international community has taken several steps to combat ISIS-K.  For example, the UN Security Council established an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze in 2019 against ISIS-K by all UN member states. Additionally, the US government has implemented strategies such as economic sanctions and counter-terrorism efforts to inhibit ISIS-K’s operational and financial capabilities.  However, since the Taliban takeover, it has become increasingly difficult for the international community to combat ISIS-K and terrorism financing in general.

Looking forward

With both financial and membership increases, ISIS-K is growing extensively, especially after the recent Taliban takeover. Not only are their attacks violent and chaotic, but they also target civilians to convey their message of jihad.

In order to face the challenges posed by both ISIS-K and terrorism in Afghanistan, the international community needs to strengthen its coordination on impeding terrorism financing in Afghanistan.  In addition, concrete steps must be identified and articulated for the Taliban to take against ISIS-K’s financing practices. Ultimately, until the international community is able to create a tangible strategy, ISIS-K will continue to grow in size and power.

 

Krista Tammila, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism, served as a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and later supported national security initiatives in Washington, D.C.
Otoniel

The Capture of Colombia’s Most Wanted Man Ignites a Series of Terrorist Attacks and Violence

Dairo Antonio Usuga, better known as Otoniel and the leader of one of Colombia’s most feared narco-terrorist organizations, was captured on October 23.  Otoniel is the head of the Clan del Golfo or the Gulf Clan, an armed terrorist and drug trafficking group that poses a serious threat to the Colombian State.

Colombian authorities captured Otoniel, however, his capture generated retaliation from the Gulf Clan against the Colombian security forces. In recent days, armed forces members have suffered terrorist attacks in revenge for Otoniel’s capture.  Additionally, this event will likely start a wave of violence between the factions of the organization as they seek to seize power.

BACKGROUND

The Gulf Clan is a drug trafficking organization that stems from the demobilization of paramilitary forces. They currently operate in areas such as the Gulf of Urabá and the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. It is estimated that the group currently has about 6,000 troops and is present in more than 211 municipalities throughout the Colombian territory. Their primary income comes from illicit drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The financial power of this organization has allowed them to increase military capabilities, expand into new territories, strengthen alliances with other criminal groups and grow their income. Today, the Gulf Clan presents one of the most significant barriers to the stability and security in many of Colombia’s territories.

Consequently, the strengthening of the Gulf Clan in recent years represents a rising threat to the Colombian State and the civilian population.  As a result, the Gulf Clan will continue its narco-terrorist activities until action is taken against them.  While Otoniel’s capture is a major blow to the organization, there is still much work to be done to defeat it.

OTONIEL’S CAPTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

After several months of tracking and intelligence, Otoniel was captured in Antioquia, a rural area in the municipality of Turbo. His capture created a power vacuum in the Gulf Clan, so it is to be expected that there will be internal disputes for control of the organization, mainly among its mid-level leaders.

However, the most worrying implications of Otoniel’s capture are the current retaliations his organization is taking against the Colombian military.  On October 26, army soldiers were attacked by members of the Gulf Clan in the department of Antioquia with explosives and gunfire. In the terrorist attack, three soldiers were killed and three others were wounded.

A few hours later, another military platoon was ambushed by the Clan, leaving one soldier dead and another wounded.

For this reason, it is feasible to affirm that retaliations against the Colombian armed forces will continue in the coming days. It is also highly likely that an increase in homicides and displaced persons will result from disputes within the organization’s factions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the demanding public order and security situation in Antioquia, which will likely escalate, in the short term it is recommended that the Colombian State deploy more troops in the area. This is necessary as greater territorial control is required, and operational results are needed to reduce regional violence.

On the other hand, in the medium and long term, more effective intervention strategies are needed against this narco-terrorist group due to the risk level it represents. From an operational and tactical perspective, it is necessary to attack its sources of financing, such as illicit crops, strengthen intelligence capabilities to anticipate terrorist attacks, and prevent this organization from forcibly recruiting young people from vulnerable populations.

Finally, in terms of public policy, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the populations in areas such as the Urabá region of Antioquia.  This can be achieved through the generation of formal employment, the provision of public goods and services, and an improvement in the health and education systems. In other words, comprehensive state action is required to guarantee security, but also better living conditions, so risk factors, such as the emergence and strengthening of these groups, disappear or are considerably reduced.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Afghan refugees

Afghans Stuck in Limbo at Emirates Humanitarian City Seek Answers to their U.S. Entry Status

Tens of thousands Afghan Evacuees at Emirates Humanitarian City Seek Answers to their U.S. Entry Status. Many are now in limbo in overflowing processing centers, fearful of what comes next.

Unlike other Afghan refugee camps in Ramstein Air Base in Germany and US army base in Qatar where evacuees have had relatively quick entry processes into the U.S., these individuals live in a state of fear and uncertainty as to their futures.

Afghan Evacuations

Thousands of Afghans were evacuated and fled Afghanistan after the Taliban regained control on August 16, 2021.  After the fall of Kabul, the United States began evacuating Americans and Afghans, sending refugees across the globe to camps in Germany, Qatar, Spain, Uzbekistan, and UAE.  While thousands of Afghans have already been vetted and brought to the United States, a much different situation has unfolded at the Emirates Humanitarian City refugee camp. 

Emirates Humanitarian City Refugee Camp

An estimated 9,000 Afghan evacuees are currently housed at the Emirates Humanitarian City refugee camp in Abu Dhabi. These refugees were among the initial wave of evacuations by U.S. forces after the fall of Kabul. Ultimately, these evacuees have been housed at the Emirates Humanitarian City for three months and have since observed new Afghan refugee arrivals come and go in a matter of days. 

While the Afghan refugees are grateful for the U.S.’s assistance in evacuating them from Afghanistan, the conditions at the refugee camp have become untenable, causing them to raise their voices and demand answers.

Living in Limbo

One of the loudest concerns from the evacuees at the Emirates Humanitarian City is the uncertainty of when they will be processed and brought to the United States, most notably for those who have valid documents or family sponsorship.  

Evacuees have criticized the insufficient amount of personnel at the site to process and transfer them out of the camp. 

Thus, the undefined timeline at Emirates Humanitarian City coupled with threats of deportation has resulted in a state of anxiety and distress among refugees. On top of this, reports from inside Emirates Humanitarian City state that several refugees have died from unknown causes. The news of their deaths has been intentionally suppressed by the media. 

Ultimately, the situation at Emirates Humanitarian City has risen to a level where the refugees feel compelled to voice their concerns, especially regarding the camp’s educational, financial, and health issues. 

Educational Concerns

One concern raised by the refugees is the now three-month, and seemingly indefinite, hiatus in education for the children at the Abu Dhabi camp.  Since arriving, the children have lacked the opportunity to continue their studies, causing concern that they will fall behind educationally.  While students have already had to navigate educational barriers caused by the coronavirus pandemic, this interruption in education at the refugee camp will exacerbate academic delays in students.

Financial Concerns

Another concern for individuals is that time spent in the refugee camp equates to money lost, due to the inability to work. This three-month gap in income negatively affects these individuals’ success once they immigrate to a new location and financially hinders family members from relying on their financial assistance.

One Abu Dhabi camp member voiced her concerns about employment impediments posed by the prolonged immigration delay. 

Mina 45, was the breadwinner of her family as a governmental employee in Afghanistan but was forced to evacuate on August 21st as a result of the resurgence of the Taliban. Consequently, without Mina’s income, her family remaining in Afghanistan is impoverished. 

Mina’s story is not unique, as countless individuals and families at Emirates Humanitarian City are unable to work and earn money to support their families.  The refugees are eager to work and therefore motivated to transfer out of the camp to find employment and provide for their families.

Health Concerns

While at the Abu Dhabi camp, refugees have voiced their concerns over inadequate health care. Not only have several individuals died at the camp, but a handful have been deported back to Afghanistan due to mental health concerns. It is no surprise that the stress and anxiety of living in the refugee camp, in combination with the strains of fleeing one’s home, has led to mental health concerns and a state of depression among many Afghans at the camp.  

To recap events, individuals at the Abu Dhabi camp have previously lived in a war zone, were forced to flee from their country, and are now placed in a refugee camp with no set date for leaving. Research has found that refugees often experience high levels of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.  This is undoubtedly true for the refugees at Emirates Humanitarian City. 

Going Forward

Ultimately, while the evacuees are deeply grateful for the help from the United States, they seek transparency on whether they are being processed for entry into the United States. However, being left in a state of limbo for the past three months, while thousands of other refugees have had speedier transfer processes, has left the Abu Dhabi camp refugees confused and frustrated.  As a result, the refugees are calling for increased personnel at their camps to expedite their vetting and transfer process by U.S. officials.  

Presently, the Afghan evacuees at Emirates Humanitarian City have reached a point where silence and inaction are no longer an option.  And while their gratitude remains, their patience has dwindled, leading to plans of a hunger strike if continued inaction persists.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder Rise to Peace

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism, served as a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and later supported national security initiatives in Washington, D.C.
Boko Haram

What Went Wrong with Nigeria’s Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Mission?

Nigeria has continued to grapple with the issue of terrorism, and as expected, has had to launch many counter-terrorism missions. While domestic conflicts and extremism were not exactly new phenomena to a fragile state like Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram would understandably raise concerns, mainly because of its religious ideologies and fatal potentialities in constituting an existential threat.

Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda’wati Wal Jihad, fondly known as Boko Haram, has in its almost two decades of existence; carried out several attacks targeted at civilians, security officials, infrastructures, security facilities, international organizations etc. All these attacks, Boko Haram claims, are done to drive their mission of establishing a caliphate – a goal it briefly achieved during their brief occupation of large swathes of territories in the North East region.

Counter-Terrorism Operations

For the period that this group has existed, counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria seem to have substantially focused on the use of force, however extreme it may be: chiefly on the defensive and occasionally on the offensive.

With the military at the forefront of this campaign, alongside the collaborative efforts of other security agencies, the tactics employed to solve one problem often create a much bigger problem for the nation. Unfortunately, looking through history, this is becoming a pattern in Nigeria. The lack of restrictions in using excessive force by security agencies as a response tool (regardless of the situation, whether it is a peaceful protest or terrorist incident) significantly hampers their genuine efforts.

For instance, Boko Haram initially started as a religious sect with somewhat radical ideologies that were of no significant risk (at the time) to the nation’s security. Although there was a need to be wary of the group, at that point, perhaps a softer approach would be ideal, but this was not the case.

An unnecessary military operation that saw the maiming and killings of members of the ‘religious sect,’ and worst of all, the extrajudicial killing of the then leader of the group Mohammed Yusuf by the police; birthed a mountain of problems that have only complicated things for the Nigerian counter-terrorism campaign. Gradually, translating from a religious sect with Yusuf, the reluctant fighter as the leader- to an unstable group led by the highly erratic Abubakar Shekau, the outcome of counter-terrorism operations in the North East is visible.

The instability in Boko Haram resulted in many offshoots notable among them are Ansaru, which shares links with Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) with links to ISIS. Regardless of how the choice of strategy to counter terrorism seems to be multiplying the problems rather than reducing, it seems Nigeria has still not realized the glaring lessons before them.

Current counter-terrorism missions still have the military at the forefront, with its recent operations recording the elimination of leaders of terrorist groups. Again, we see the same mistake made with Boko Haram repeated, and in this case, the consequences are far graver as these groups now have international links and are not necessarily working on their own. These operations by the military may widen access for these international terrorist groups to further launch their campaigns, and in turn, gain more grounds in the already fragile region.

Recommendations

While these military operations may have their usefulness, we have seen over time that they are usually short-lived. There has been a rise in terrorist activities in the North East region, despite all the efforts and revenue invested in countering it. These groups still manage to onboard voluntary recruits amid the heated military operations.

A successful counter-terrorism approach should encompass strategies that focus on addressing development issues such as poor governance, low literacy, poverty, and unemployment; that these groups readily take advantage of to promote their campaigns. The failure to pay as much attention to extensively resolving developmental issues in the region while intentionally minimizing military tactics (which only infuriates terrorists and does nothing to deter or disengage them); continues to foil Nigeria’s counter-terrorism campaign.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

 

The Emergence and Expansion of ISIS-K and the Taliban

The Taliban blamed ISIS-K for the Kabul explosion on Afghanistan’s largest military hospital near Kabul, killing at least 30 people and wounding dozens this Tuesday. Though there is no immediate claim of responsibility, it’s more likely that IS-K is behind the attack. IS-K has carried out some of the deadliest attacks since its appearance in 2015.

This included the August 26 suicide bombing that killed 13 US service members and 180 Afghans at Kabul airport. Hundreds have been killed and wounded in two separate suicide bombings this past month, in Kundoz and Kandhar at two Shia mosque gatherings.

One of the group’s greatest strengths and factors that sets them apart from the Taliban is not only their ability to leverage the local expertise of its fighters, but also the funding they have.

There is substantial evidence that the group has received money, exceeding $100 million, along with training and advice from the group’s core organizational body in Syria and Iraq. With their funding and expertise, IS-K has launched numerous attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating chaos, uncertainty, and fear – one of their main goals.

Background

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the deadliest and well-known terror groups the world has known. Emerging in the Middle East due to inter-state fragility, failed foreign policy, and instability in the region, ISIS emerged as a force to be recognized and feared. ISIS is present in Afghanistan under the name the Islamic State Khorasan, also known as IS-K. It was formed in Pakistan in 2014 and later appeared in Afghanistan in 2015 at the height of ISIS’s power in Syria and Iraq.

Moreover, they are known as the most extreme and violent of all the jihadist militant groups in Afghanistan and one of the top four deadliest terrorist organizations in the world.

The group recruits both Afghan and Pakistani jihadists, especially members of the Taliban who do not see their own organization as extreme enough. Throughout its history, IS-K has carried various attacks on different targets. This has included Afghan security forces, the Taliban, US and NATO forces, religious monitories, Afghan politicians and ministries, international organizations, and many more. Consequently, there will be an increase in activity by IS-K due to the instability of Afghanistan.

 Different in idea, same in nature

IS-K and the Taliban are two different sides of the same coin. Both are extremist groups, fighting for the same idea, but with different goals, both voicing their disdain for each other. However, ISIS and the Taliban are not as different as IS-K claims to be. One of the reasons is that IS-K is essentially copying attacks and tactics that the Taliban deployed in the past. One example is in the northern part of Afghanistan in the Balkh Province, IS-K is expanding in the eastern and northern provinces with their night operations and coordinated terror attacks, while in the day they are dormant. This draws a parallel to the Taliban who has and is doing the exact same thing.

Moreover, as IS-K and the Taliban are strategic rivals with IS-K branding the Taliban as “filthy nationalists” who only want to form a government within the borders of Afghanistan and therefore contradicts the IS’s goal of establishing a global caliphate, one would assume that IS-K would adhere to different strategies. But, IS-K is following similar patterns that the Taliban launched against the government over the past 20 years. For example, almost a year ago on the 12th of May 2020, the Taliban attacked a maternity ward of a hospital in Kabul. On the 2nd of November 2021, IS-K launched an attack on Afghanistan’s largest military hospital near Kabul.

The only thing that really sets the groups apart is that the Taliban is struggling against ISIS as they do not have the same training and resources to enable them to maintain their power. To further emphasize the similar patterns, ISIS knows that in order to obtain power for political objectives, violence is the key.

Therefore, ISIS is taking the same measures that the Taliban took to gain the same power in the name of jihad. Consequently, the method of their attacks and strategies are very similar to those of the Taliban. IS-K simply justifies their tactics as being better, even though most of the attacks and methods are the same as the Taliban.

What is next for ISIS-K and Afghanistan?

Since its emergence in 2015, IS-K is continually growing and expanding. Not only is this because IS-K is conducting more attacks and gaining more territory, but also because Afghanistan is a country ridden in poverty. Most people think that people join ISIS or IS-K due to religious causes, but it is quite the opposite.

Many people, especially youth join ISIS to get out of poverty. Furthermore, it is a historical fact that poverty has determined the fate of many Afghans. So, while the Taliban struggles to maintain power in Afghanistan with the financial crisis along with the fact that half of the country is facing starvation before the winter, there is and will be a rapid increase in IS-K fighters because they will have the opportunity to gain money when joining to provide for their families.

Additionally, it is a researched fact that one of the main incentives for people to join extremist groups is economic hardships and poverty. For example, CNN reported an Afghan father selling his daughter in order to take care of the rest of his family. The money being offered to new recruits with or without experience is a huge reason for the increase in IS-K soldiers. Moreover, this is occurring while the Taliban cannot afford to pay their own soldiers. This tells us that the trajectory of the number of IS-K fighters in Afghanistan will increase because there is more money involved.

Looking Forward

With more and more attacks occurring, it is not senseless to expect even more. It will be important for international players and organizations to actively aid the civilians caught in the middle, who are being treated as collateral damage. There is a lot to be done in order to stabilize an increasingly fragile and hostile area. Relative peace is not on the horizon, but there must be steps in motion to aid in the facilitation of some sort of coordination in the nation.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism, served as a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and later supported national security initiatives in Washington, D.C.

Daesh Within the DMV? Assesing the ISIS-K Threat in Northern Virginia

Bereft of the territory which they conquered at their height, ISIS seeks to restore their ability to instill fear in those who don’t share their fringe ideology. Recent operations conducted by the group such as their attack on the Kabul airport are congruent with this aim. With their fervent desire to be seen once again as the preeminent jihadist group, officials within the United States have sounded the alarm over potential lone-wolf attacks within Northern Virginia. These warnings from the law enforcement community come at a time where ISIS has increased its online activity.

At the height of their power in 2015, ISIS shocked the world with how swift they were able to capture large swaths of territory within the Levant by exploiting political instability. Through this success, they were able to create a global network of affiliates like ISIS-K and inspire lone-wolf attacks throughout the world. The most infamous of these attacks was the 2015 Paris attacks which were carried out by radicalized European-raised nationals. The Paris attacks ultimately took the lives of 130 people with injuries sustained by many more.

The attacks also provided the impetus for a wide coalition of nations with differing interests to combat the group and its affiliates. Air support tied to Operation Inherent Resolve proved critical in aiding regional forces in reducing the amount of territory held by ISIS. As a result of these multilateral efforts, ISIS had lost almost all of its territory by 2017. Furthermore, Operation Inherent Resolve proved effective at dismantling the leadership of ISIS.

As ISIS lost territory in the Levant, they began to direct resources toward ISIS-K to bolster their presence within Central Asia. ISIS-K has also received hardened veterans as well as foreign fighters dedicated to furthering the aims of the organization. The ultimate goal of the affiliate is the establishment of a Caliphate within the region in which they operate. They have also been known to advocate for attacks against the West.

Moreover, the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan has proved to be beneficial for ISIS-K. The withdrawal allowed for many of their members to be released from prison who could aid in their pursuit of a Caliphate. In addition, the lack of military pressure by the United States allows them ample space to revive an operational capacity similar to what they had in the Levant. To achieve this they will likely seek to radicalize foreigners to carry out lone-wolf attacks. Successful attacks would bring them prestige for recruitment while they direct their efforts to establish their Caliphate. Furthermore, by occupying Afghanistan they lay claim to a heritage of Islamist groups of the past who have successfully resisted great powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States. With this in mind, ISIS-K will likely attract foreign fighters using this as a tool for recruitment.

The chaos caused by the withdrawal has caused a multitude of refugees who sought asylum to avoid living under Taliban rule. With the primary focus of the United States being to safely evacuate Americans out of the country, the disarray allowed for a lack of vetting of those seeking to exit Afghanistan. According to those on the ground, there could have been the possibility of ISIS-K members entering the United States with asylum seekers. The prospect of this proves a challenge to our national security.

To meet the challenges presented by ISIS-K the United States must be cognizant of the threats which are posed by the group. One such threat is that the group may adopt new technology in the same manner in which their predecessor did. As the technology evolved, ISIS had been able to create videos that inspired waves of attacks to be conducted in their name. Secondly, the group has entrenched itself in one of the most geographically intense terrains on the globe. As a result, the group will likely be active for years to come given the advantage which their geography affords them.

Although the chance of a successful ISIS-K attack within Northern Virginia is slim, the U.S. should take concrete steps in mitigating an attack. This can be achieved by building trust in local Muslim communities with law enforcement agencies within the DMV region. Furthermore, the U.S. could also partner with tech companies to block content from ISIS-K. They can also work with regional partners to weaken the operational capabilities of the group within Afghanistan. Finally, the United States can also set up a strict vetting regime to screen for potential extremists. By thwarting a potential attack, the political capital which the group uses to recruit and fundraise is significantly reduced.

ISIS-K represents the latest iteration of a jihadist group that has learned from their predecessors. The group also seems to be poised to experience an increase in their breadth of capabilities and foreign combatants. Without proactive action by the United States and the international community, the group could very well establish a Caliphate within Central Asia. In doing so, the group would have safe haven to orchestrate plots worldwide on those it considers its targets. While their capacity to carry out an attack on the homeland is limited now, their ability to do so only increases with time.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism, served as a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and later supported national security initiatives in Washington, D.C.

The Nexus Between Environmental Stimuli and Violent Extremism

Introduction

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, academics and policymakers have struggled to pinpoint a distinct factor that drives individuals towards violent extremism. In light of this, many have tested the hypothesis of whether poverty and poor economic conditions lead to an increase in violent extremism. Whilst other external stimuli can contribute to individuals perusing violent narratives, environmental factors can be understood to significantly shape approaches towards violence and peace.

Violent extremism thrives in environments with unsafe and harsh living conditions with limited resources. In societies with poor and fragile states, corruption tends to be vulnerable to terrorism. So long as there are conflicts and social injustices, these issues will not disappear.

The Role of Environment in Violent Extremism

The environment plays a key role in shaping a person’s physical and mental wellbeing, which can be both positively and negatively influenced. If a child is born and raised in a peaceful community, they will unlikely have the same outlook compared to a child who is raised in a community rife with conflict. The one that fights forgets the beauty of nature and what life has to offer, as the environment they have been exposed to has shaped that person to resort to violence as their first instinct.

Individuals born into war-torn countries with little opportunity are more likely to find themselves joining gangs in a bid to find a sense of belonging. The crime-nexus between criminal gangs and formal terrorist groups remains strong. Subsequently, analysis of data has indicated that individuals who already see violence as a justifiable course of action are more vulnerable to involvement in violent extremism, which is exacerbated by environmental strains.

Countries that are engaged in conflict, including Yemen, Iraq, Ethiopia, and Cameroon, are nations suffering from toxic environments. This includes war, pollution, social injustices, unemployment, and a lack of healthcare resources. Boko Haram significantly exploited environmental stresses in North-eastern Nigeria to expand its influence and gain control of territories. Similarly, when having a physical presence, ISIS paid $600 dollars in a bid to recruit fighters in Syria and Iraq. Due to a lack of monetary opportunities, individuals began to join on the basis that some form of income is better than non.

The manifestation of ‘welfare terrorism’ has significantly increased in light of fragile economic conditions. Hezbollah established multiple schools and medical facilities whilst al-Qaeda began funding money to improve youth education in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This not only fuels recruitment but encourages alienation and resentment towards the governments that are unable to fill this void.

Afghanistan

In the last decade, multiple religious and political groups have exploited the vulnerable youth in Afghanistan to advance their ideological agendas. However, little to no effort has been made to address this. Since the Taliban established their new interim government in early September, a toxic environment has flourished. Due to a lack of governance and stability, the de-factor military role the Taliban has assumed has bred more violence. A significant reduction of international grand support and a loss of offshore assets has led to an increase in poverty and economic instability. This, in turn, has the potential to breed more extremist groups in Afghanistan with the potential to radicalize many more.

Extremist narratives are carefully crafted to appeal to those most vulnerable. The Taliban have previously used traditional and modern media platforms to encourage the youth to participate in violence, which often projects a constructive role that they can play in society. Whilst Afghanistan is on the brink of universal poverty, the Taliban are able to exploit vulnerable citizens who are desperate for aid.

Recommendations

Physical nature, governance, food, and healthcare are important when it comes to a person’s ability to fight extremist ideologies. Poverty feeds into terrorism by stripping away one’s basic human need to belong. The United Nations recognises the importance of creating social and economic opportunities for both rural and urban locations. This involves investing residents with the relevant skills and education to promote development. Many studies have concluded that high levels of civil liberties along with strong governance have correlated with a low number of terrorist attacks. Thus, government responsibility extends to establishing appropriate governance and opportunities for their civilians.

Civil Society must step in to assist in war-torn countries that are rife with conflict. If not, the potential for individuals to become more suspectable to extremist beliefs is a significant possibility. Likewise, the ability for formal terrorist groups to recruit vulnerable individuals could present a significant security threat, both domestically and internationally. In the case of Afghanistan, it remains paramount that the country is supplied with humanitarian aid in a bid to assist residents.


Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the founder of Rise to Peace and a former US counterterrorism Adviser in Afghanistan 

Neglecting Afghanistan: Lessons to be Learnt From the 9/11 Attacks 20-Years Later

Exactly two decades ago, the United States witnessed a deadly attack that transformed the international security landscape overnight. Only six weeks following the attacks, the Patriot Act was passed by Congress in an attempt to catch ‘terrorists among us,’ on both an international and domestic scale. Consequently, then US President George Bush launched the global War on Terror. This resulted in a 20-year war in Afghanistan, led by US coalition forces which cost the US over $6.4 trillion dollars.

It is believed that if US intelligence had been able to puzzle the pieces together sooner the attacks – which claimed the lives of almost 3,000 individuals – could have been prevented. This may have likely been the case, had the US not turned their backs on Afghanistan only 10-years earlier in the 1990s.

Cold War Origins

Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, US forces began to engage in Afghanistan by proxy. Through Pakistani intelligence services, then President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, initiated a programme to arm the mujahedeen. In 1981, Operation Cyclone became the largest covert operation, which saw the US supply money and weapons to the mujahedeen. In total, it is estimated that the operation cost approximately $3bn US dollars.

Only 8-years later, politically, socially and mentally drained, the Soviet Union gave up on Afghanistan. In the Geneva Accords, signed in 1988, the US agreed to cease funding to the mujahedeen whilst the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan completely. Only three years later, the Afghanistan government had collapsed. The country was subsequently enveloped in a civil war between the older mujahedeen factions. As a result, the Taliban quickly gained power, whose interpretation of Islamic sharia laws made life repressive and brutal for various women, opponents and ethnic/religious minorities.

The political climate in Afghanistan leading up to the attacks was a result of both the US and Soviet Union abandoning their foreign policy in the Middle East. As the Soviet Union Ambassador recognised, “We meddled in Afghanistan, and then we stopped paying attention.” Only 10-years later, al-Qaeda orchestrated the deadliest terrorist attack in history on American soil. The group’s involvement with Afghanistan was brought to light in the weeks following the attacks. From 1996-2001, then leader of the Taliban, Mohammed Omar, had developed close ties with Bin Laden as he plotted the deadly attacks.

9/11 stands as a stark reminder that for policymakers, walking away from the problem is not the solution. Instead, it can exacerbate existing issues and create significant security risks. In light of this, it is imperative that policymakers do not repeat the same mistakes 20-years later.

Two Decades Later

The Taliban have a poor track record of sticking to their promises, often stating one thing then doing another. In turn, they promise actions but do not follow through. Currently, the US has placed a great deal of faith in the Taliban.  Whilst the group has advocated that they will not harbour terrorists, they still maintain a close relationship with al-Qaeda. Consequently, many of the new leaders announced in Afghanistan’s interim government have former ties to the group.

If the Taliban are not monitored closely, US national security may face severe security threats in the near future. It is a prominent possibility that under Taliban control, radical Islamist terrorism could resurge, with attacks aimed at democratic societies. The 9/11 attacks should act as a forceful reminder, that US citizens safety is not guaranteed if the Taliban are allowed to operate on their own terms.

Intelligence

Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban is an indicator that US intelligence needs revising. The Biden administration hugely underestimating the magnitude and speed of the Taliban’s ability to conquer cities and towns across Afghanistan. As Richard Fonataine from the Centre for a New American Security recognised, “the key miscalculation was the assumption that the US would have the luxury of time.”

This is not the first time that American intelligence has failed to predict and prevent such security failures. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the US Department of Defence failed to recognise the magnitude of the threat from al-Qaeda. In 1997, the US intelligence community regarded Bin-Laden as a financier of terrorism, but not as a leader himself. Domestically, the FBI had little to no knowledge of the broader national security risks. Those working on counterterrorism strategies did so in spite of limited intelligence, which was worsened by legal barriers between both the CIA and FBI in intelligence sharing. If both organisations were able to do so, a comprehensive picture of al-Qaeda’s strategic framework may have been uncovered and disrupted.

The US must engage and have a prominent diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with intelligence that focuses strongly on the region. If not, an attack comparable to the magnitude of the ones witnessed on 9/11 may be a dominant possibility.

The Future of Afghanistan

The Taliban’s ideology has not fundamentally changed. However, their strategy has. Instead, the Taliban are engaging in a much more persuasive game of psychological warfare. The lessons learnt from the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, demonstrate that neglecting Afghanistan can have grave consequences for international security. The US must ensure they have a strong diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with adequate intelligence closely monitoring the political landscape in the upcoming months.