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EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA
Afghans in Turkey
 by Chris Ynclan Jr

Restless in Ankara: A Report on Conditions for Afghans

As the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August, many Afghans became fearful of what life under Taliban rule would resemble. This fear prompted a wide array of Afghans from across civil society to try and flee the country before their worst fears would actualize.

Those who could flee traveled to Kabul to evacuate Afghanistan via airlift or went into neighboring states such as Pakistan  While those who were lucky enough to make it out were spared from the Taliban’s reprisal killings, they still face many challenges in the new nations they find themselves in. One of the states which has become a top destination for Afghan refugees is Turkey.

Conditions Faced by Afghans

In 2021, over 40,000 Afghans made the dangerous trek into Turkey from Afghanistan. Afghan refugees within Turkey face a myriad of issues that present a critical threat to their security. One such threat that the refugees have faced on their journey has been their mistreatment by the Turkish police. This comes at a time when Turkey has seen an influx of Syrian migrants in recent years, which has resulted in a rise of anti-immigrant sentiments. Based upon reports by Rise to Peace founder Ahmad Mohibi’s trip to Turkey, only a small amount successfully make the crossing from Iran due to heightened security measures.

Another critical threat Afghans are presented with is the human smugglers who have taken advantage of their dire situation. The operations of these smugglers are often sophisticated in nature, using coded messages on popular messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram. These operations demonstrate cyber capabilities, allowing them to stay ahead of law enforcement agencies of the states receiving Afghan refugees. More importantly, these capabilities allow them to endanger the lives of one of the world’s most vulnerable populations.

Furthermore, while the journey to Turkey is harrowing for many Afghans, it is simply a stopover for seeking asylum within member states of the European Union (EU). For some, the journey takes them by boat, which puts them in danger of becoming victims of drowning from boats capsizing, such as the unfortunate incident in the English Channel. For others, they have made dangerous treks through mountain ranges, such as the Alps, where they run the risk of freezing. Another route Afghans have chosen has been to cross the Bosnia-Croatia border, where they hope to claim asylum within Croatia since it is a member of the EU.

A Path Forward for Europe

Most importantly, it is imperative for the regional bloc to address this humanitarian disaster through policy. This can be achieved by states within the bloc implementing a uniform policy for the absorption of the Afghans claiming asylum. For this to happen, the states that do not care for international humanitarian law must be persuaded with a pragmatic argument presenting the threat to their security, should an uncoordinated response be the norm.

This disregard for humanitarian obligations by some EU nations is best represented by the likes of Hungary, which has refused to accept more migrants to embolden their base. The last instance of a migration crisis which the EU faced was exploited by members of terrorist organizations who posed as refugees. Should a response not be unified, they would be at risk of further exploitation by extremist organizations that capitalize upon a disorganized effort.

The EU has become a beacon for migrants due to its political stability and the opportunity for economic advancement which outpaces the states from which migrants arrived. So long as this is the case, the EU will face more waves of migration in the future. By refusing to address the issue of migration, it will ignore one of its most persistent issues for decades to come. While its adversaries may not recognize this fully, it provides the bloc with an opportunity to shore up one of its most salient challenges to its integrity.

Furthermore, resources should be made available to states which are facing the migrant crisis by other states within the bloc as well as international organizations like the UNHCR. The issue of migration has become a divisive issue among the EU, as other states are seen as taking the lion’s share without any help. This only serves to divide the EU politically and provides an opportunity for nefarious actors to pursue their interests at the expense of EU states.

The bloc must recognize the current geopolitical climate which it finds itself in and understand that it is another arena in which other powers will try to project their influence. Only by effectively managing the current crisis through solidarity will the EU protect its interests as well as its security.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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 by Rise to Peace

Azov Battalion – Guardian Angels or Notorious Extremists?

History

Civil unrest took place across Ukraine during the 2014 revolution. This resulted in an overthrow of the elected government led by Viktor Yanukovych. Following the riots, Russia decided to send military units to Crimea and declared the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as the 84th and 85th federal subjects of Russia. Since then, collisions between pro-Russian separatists and pro-Ukrainian militias have continued.

The Azov Battalion is one of the most well-known military units that emerged during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. It was initially founded as a voluntary militia in the Azov Sea coastal area. In October 2014, it formally became a branch of the National Guard of Ukraine. The Battalion was first observed on the battleground in Mariupol. Here, they recaptured the town from pro-Russian separatist forces in June 2014. With its rapid growth, Azov Battalion has become an unignorable military force and a tangible icon of Ukrainian patriotism. 

Ideology

The Azov Battalion faces accusations claiming its close ties with neo-Nazi ideology when it was first recognized by the international society. In 2014, a German public broadcaster named ZDF released videos showing Azov soldiers wearing helmets with the Nazi Swastika and SS symbols.

The Guardian describes Azov’s symbol as “reminiscent of the Nazi Wolfsangel”, while the battalion denies it by saying it simply represents the letter N and I crossing over each other, implying “National Idea” in the Ukrainian language. Some of Azov’s leaders have been linked to neo-Nazi ideology. Andriy Biletsky, the battalion’s first commander, also leads neo-Nazi organizations “Patriot of Ukraine” and “Social-National Assembly”.

Members of Azov Battalion have attempted to separate themselves from Nazi stereotypes. Instead, they have claimed that the organization is founded upon Ukrainian patriotism. Some of them even take a more “Robin Hood alike” approach, legitimizing their gathering by saying that “the police are ineffective, corrupt or drunk.”

Andriy Diachenko, a spokesman for the Azov Battalion, stated in an interview with USA Today that ‘only 10% to 20% of the group’s members are Nazis’ and it’s all about ‘personal ideology [that] has nothing to do with the official ideology of the Azov.’

The designation of Azov battalion has been controversial internationally. In April 2021, U.S. Representative Elissa Slotkin sent a list of “Violent Extreme Right Wing” (vXRM) organizations to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, pressing the Biden administration to recognize these groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs). The Azov Battalion is included within this. Kacper Rekawek, an affiliated researcher at Counter Extremism Project, denied such an accusation and stated that Azov “does not engage in terrorist activity.”

Furthermore, former FBI officials called members of Azov Battalion “white supremacists” and compared them to “jihadists,” as enemies of the U.S. in a New York Times op-ed. In response, the Atlantic Council published an article written by Anton Shekhovtsov to deny such a claim. Shekhovtsov states that the nature of Azov Battalion has changed over time. This makes it simply a military unit controlled by the state. He also disproved the connection between the American bomber and the Ukrainian organization, claimed by the New York Times op-ed authors.

Recruitment

When Azov Battalion was first formed, it used extremist ideology and comparatively high pays to attract new members. Evolved over time, it has employed multiple new methods to recruit both domestically and internationally. According to published news pieces, foreign fighters from Sweden, Croatia, the United Kingdom, and even Russia joined Azov Battalion.

In an interview with TIME, an Azov recruiter named Joachim Furholm attributes Azov’s successful propaganda efforts to its pervasive use of social media, especially Facebook. Azov recruiters track potential members and support other right-wing organizations on Facebook. Facebook reacted quickly that it announced to ban Azov’s homepage and related accounts first in 2015 over “hate speech”. However, an article published by Buzzfeed News pointed out that advertisements related to Azov Battalion were still observed on Facebook in November 2020.

Additionally, Azov Battalion also run military summer camps domestically. Here, they taught children aged 9-18, military skills such as shooting rifles, practicing combat poses, and patrolling. Kyiv post reported that strict rules and nationalism ideology are practiced in these camps. In a documentary filmed by the Guardian, trainers at the camps teach children to salute to the Azov flag and shout “Ukraine above all”. Geopolitika, an organization based in Russia, accused such camps of ‘inciting hate by innocent children against ethnic Russians as well as opponents of the Kiev regime.” It also states that such acts are “broadly supported by US military aid”.

Conclusion

As a branch of the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov has transformed from a paramilitary organization to a national force. Its efforts to separate itself from the stereotype of “neo-Nazis” have convinced some. However, it still draws a significant number of critics. The designation of the group should be exercised deliberately and apolitically.

 

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The Red Brigades and far-left terrorism
 by Rise to Peace

The Red Brigades: What We Can Learn From Italian History

Origins of The Red Brigades

The Red Brigades, an Italian far-left guerrilla group, were active between the 1970s and 80s. They represent the most important terrorist group in all Italian history. The Red Brigades are also known for the abduction and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The group grew in universities of the north of Italy. Its aim was to change Italian politics and law to create a revolutionary state according to communist principles. They saw themselves as the continuation of the Italian Partisan Movement, and they opposed both the right and capitalism.

Political Background

The group began by expressing its dissatisfaction with the status quo through the sabotage of industries and private properties. Then, their strategy changed to the carrying out of high-profile political kidnappings in order to obtain resources, capture attention, and fight the state and capitalists. The Red Brigades were against the state because they believed that the state was an “Imperialist collection of multinational corporations.”

Instead, their aim was to guide the working class towards revolution. To recruit people, they distributed propaganda in factories to attract the “proletariat” to join their fight against capitalism and power. The killings of high-profile figures and propaganda were their main tactics to attract attention and new recruits. Their most well-known act was the abduction and killing of Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Moro was the main mediator between the Christian Democrats Party and the Communist Party. The killing of the Prime Minister was defined by the group as the last expression of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary action. They believed that Aldo Moro was the symbol of the imperialist counter-revolution.

Violence and Political Agenda

Though the violence of the Red Brigades has to be understood in its historical context. The Red Brigades grew during the Italian Years of Lead, a period of political turmoil and violence in Italy. This period was marked by violence from both the far-right and the far-left. Far-left groups drew inspiration from Communism and the far-right sought to push Italy back towards Fascism. This far-right agenda grew from the fear of Communism during the Cold War.

The group’s growth happened in a period when the Christian Democrats had ruled since the early 1940s. And it was during a time when there was no prospect of change. The Christian Democrats Party contained many ideas, it integrated many different political figures and maintained a hold on power. This created a sentiment of inability to change politics. This, together with the influence from other ideologies spreading in Europe, pushed some groups towards extremism and violence.

The Red Brigades and Terrorism

The theory of terrorism arising from the inability to change the status quo, legally, was developed by Professor Deniz Aksoy. Aksoy hypothesised that some opposition groups have no access to a legislature, they are more likely to turn to terrorism. According to her empirical findings, there is a positive correlation between the presence of an opposition party in the absence of a legislature and the emergence of terrorist groups. This was not the precise case during the Italian Years of Lead, due to the presence of a legislature and the opportunity to compete in politics. However, the political scenario in Italy seemed stagnant to many young people. For this reason, they engaged in violent means to change the status quo.

The Red Brigades existed in a specific Italian historical context in which democracy was new and there was a lot of instability across Europe. However, we can learn from this case how the inability to change politics and express ideas can be a source of frustration and means towards violence. In order to have peace, it is important to listen to different actors and to take them into account. Implementing new reforms and being open to political debate may be a source of strength moving forward if we want to create peace.

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Europe counterterrorism
 by Sébastien Thys

Investment in Prisons as a Counterterrorism Approach

At a time when Europe is undergoing a new wave of terrorist attacks, the challenges posed by prisons and the monitoring of ISIL prisoners should be a focus in the fight against terrorism.

Prisons are places where inmates may be vulnerable, in contact with extremist ideas, and subject to recruitment. There the creation of networks between skilled criminals and radicalized detainees is facilitated. But prisons also face new challenges as the number and the diversity of profiles of radicalized detainees are increasing. And although they serve very different sentences, they are mainly of short duration, which poses a threat to Europe as many of them will soon be released. To reduce this threat, governments should invest in the prison system, even if it is not popular.

All these challenges regarding radicalized detainees were highlighted in a report published in July 2020 by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR). At the time of its release and amongst the ten European countries they surveyed, 54% of detainees who showed signs of radicalization were convicted for “regular” crimes. And 82% of all extremist inmates categorized by ideology were jihadists. According to Europol, it is indeed the terrorist affiliation that counted the most arrests in Europe between 2015 and 2019.

stchart - Investment in Prisons as a Counterterrorism Approach

Source: Basra, Rajan, and Peter R. Neumann. “Prisons and Terrorism: Extremist Offender Management in 10 European Countries”, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), July 22, 2020, pp. 7-8.

The ICSR report indicates as well that the repatriation of European ISIL fighters – due to the loss of the territory of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq – is an element that could impact radicalization in prison. The danger with their incarceration is that they may influence others and create more radicalization within the prisons, which could aggravate this problem even further.

Radicalization in prison is true all the more worrisome since some of the terrorists who have carried out attacks in Europe have been radicalized or have had contact with affiliations in prison. A case that illustrates this is the shooting at Charlie Hebdo and the siege of the Hyper Cacher in Paris, which took place in January 2015. Two of the assailants, Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibali, met at the Fleury-Merogis prison, the largest prison in Europe. There, they met Djamel Beghal, who trained in Al-Qaeda camps and who became their mentor.

This case, which is back in the news with its trial, shows that the prison system has failed to prevent radicalization. Currently, most of the countries have adopted a mixed approach in their prison regimes to prevent extremism, which means that the most dangerous inmates are separated while the others are dispersed among the prison population. But even separated, dangerous detainees are not totally prevented from interacting with others or taking action.

Another challenge is the imminent release of hundreds of radicalized prisoners due to the fact that most of them have received short sentences. According to Europol, the average length of prison sentences for terrorist offenses in Europe was six years in 2019. Because some prisoners strengthened their beliefs and commitment to their extremist ideas in prison, they emerged much more dangerous than before. The challenge then is to reintegrate them into society in the best possible way.

With the exception of a minority, the terrorist attacks linked to prison since 2015 in the countries surveyed in the ICSR report have generally occurred between four months and two years after the release of the offenders. To take a current example, Kujtim Fejzulai, the perpetrator of the attack in Vienna on November 2, 2020, was released from prison 11 months earlier, in December 2019.

The rate of recidivism is low, but a characteristic of terrorism is that the impact of attacks is disproportionate to the resources and people involved. This rate is also not representative of reality and could be undervalued because some die in their attack or go abroad and do not return to prison.

In order to reduce radicalization in prisons, governments should take what may be unpopular but necessary decisions by investing in prisons. According to Rajan and Neumann, the ICSR report’s authors, they must ensure that prisons are neither overcrowded nor understaffed to ensure their security and control. Prison staff should also be trained to develop expertise that would help them notably to differentiate radicalized behavior and prisoners who just practice their faith.

Moreover, governments should encourage the sharing of information between the different services involved in the prison system and the fight against terrorism. Failure to communicate is recurrent and can lead to the release of radicalized prisoners who commit attacks. Also, extremism assessment tools should be frequently evaluated with a prison staff trained in their use and provided with the resources to implement them. And defining what “success” means is important to evaluate the results.

Prison regimes should be evaluated as well and readjusted to the behaviors and characteristics of specific offender groups. In addition, probation should be linked to prison and be seen as a stage of the same process and governments should adapt proactively their procedures and processes to changes in reality.

Last but not least, treating radicalized prisoners with respect and fairness should be the norm. Extremist ideologies rely on tales of humiliation and representations of their enemies. This game should not be played rather there should be a focus on fundamental values such as human rights and the rule of law.

Radicalization in prisons is not a new phenomena but it is currently reaching high levels. The prison population is changing and includes more radicalized inmates with more diverse profiles who serve different but often short sentences. While the repatriation of European ISIL fighters could aggravate radicalization in prison, the imminent release of radicalized prisoners worries European countries and that is why prisons should be at the center of the authorities’ concerns in their fight against terrorism. Investing in prisons may be unpopular but it is necessary.

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Rise to Peace Crime, Punishment and Deradicalization
 by Rejeanne Lacroix

Crime, Punishment and Deradicalization

Deradicalization programming is an essential element in wider reintegration efforts of individuals who have fallen victim to extremist philosophies, however analysts often critique any inefficiencies of such initiatives. This is often the case when individuals convicted of past terrorism infractions later go on to commit subsequent acts. A legal case earlier this year of a Bosnian citizen and the emergent deradicalization process inherent in the Balkan nation reiterate the actuality that any such initiatives are complex and require multifaceted solutions.

Legal Precedence

In a European context, Bosnia presented a unique situation as the small Balkan nation exported the most foreign fighters per capita in comparison to other continental states. Attention later transitioned to how the fragile nation would manage complicated issues related to repatriation,  trying citizens through appropriate legal channels, and deradicalization programming in the immediate post-caliphate period.

The case of Munib Ahmetspahić is not unique in the context that an individual was tried and convicted for terrorism-related offences. Ahmetspahić had travelled to Syria to fight on behalf of Daesh twice and received a three-year prison sentence for these actions upon his return to Bosnia. Rather, the legal proceedings are notable because Ahmetspahić is the first foreign fighter to be medically certified as deradicalized.

Psychologists and psychiatrists reached this conclusion after seriously studying the statements made by the former foreign fighter. Ahmetspahić spoke bluntly about his regrets and expressed that he had been manipulated to take part in the terrorist campaigns through false propaganda. Once on the battleground in Syria, he witnessed a corrupt situation in which specific individuals fought for personal power and advancement, rather than the promotion of wider objectives for the Muslim people, as he originally thought. The loss of his brother, amputation of a leg, and wanting to be a part of the lives of his children initiated the first pangs of a deradicalized mindset. Any sort of rehabilitation cannot proceed without a serious reflection of conscience and personal acknowledgement of guilt.

Faulty Programming and Better Approaches

More often than not, anytime a previously incarcerated individual with terrorist-related convictions makes headlines, critics highlight the failures of the penal system and its deradicalization programming. This is an extremely ‘low-hanging fruit’ sort of critique as anyone with knowledge of how prison programs work knows that they are often underfunded, understaffed, restricted to a set amount of sessions that often do not cover all aspects, and success is dependent upon the attentiveness of the inmate. Perhaps, this is an issue with academic analysis because those trained in academia often present detached abstract solutions based on theoretical outcomes without first-hand experience or little to no contact with those personally influenced by the criminal underworld.

Deradicalization programs in this setting may be beneficial to those willing to absorb the lessons and engage in an examination of self, but recidivism in other aspects of crime with specific programming, such as narcotics offences and addiction counselling, teaches prison is indeed a revolving door. For instance, psychologists speaking in reference to the Ahmetspahić case highlight that, “neither radicalization nor deradicalization can happen overnight” and “little can be done if an individual has not already come to question their own actions.”

In both cases, inmates are asked to shed either a philosophy or a chemical that has taken a hold of their psyche, physical being and how they engage with their communities. And thus, any remedy requires an intensive and holistic approach that extends beyond punishment, but into the realms of intensive mental health services, social work, and supportive frameworks post-release.

Further, specific needs of the individual must be tailored into such programming and this cannot be done in a prison setting with its aforementioned issues. It is clear that these elements require not only a long-haul approach, but devoted resources too. For this reason, neuro-psychiatrist Ćemalović states that, “there is no patented deradicalization procedure” and such an endeavour requires systemic cooperation with society and religious communities.

The Wayward

It is prudent to acknowledge that not all radicalization cases can be effectively neutralized as hardcore proponents of extremism become so enmeshed with ideologies that they never relinquish hate or violence. Nonetheless, the Ahmetspahić case presents as one that has similar characteristics to many others.

In 2013, he was acquitted of destroying evidence connected to an armed attack on the United States Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011 and this experience fostered a sense of disillusionment with the Bosnian state. Ahmetspahić was a resident of Gornja Maoča — a village known as a stronghold of Islamist extremism in the Balkans. Employment opportunities were offered to wayward young men in the battlefields of Syria and it seemed like a profitable idea. A lawyer that worked with Ahmetspahić contends that he was not religiously radicalized, but rather, looking for a path.

The same conclusion can be applied to young people in other parts of the world that feel as though they have few prospects ahead of them. As an example, it has been noted that extremist groups often focus their recruitment drives in areas of economic downturn or working-class neighbourhoods. Arthur Snell, a former government official in the United Kingdom in charge of an anti-extremist program, once stated in an interview that, “They almost universally were young men without much sense of direction or status, and by joining the insurgency… they felt for the first time in their lives that they mattered, that they were doing something important, almost heroic.”

Similar feelings of disillusionment and the inability to escape environments that cause one’s psyche to question social arrangements often lead to the adoption of extremist thinking or alignment with others that feel the same way. However, it does not mean that this cannot be overturned with the proper resources that direct individuals to education, gainful employment, and positive social interactions. As such, it is difficult to ask a radicalized person (or released prisoner, for that matter) to make the transition to a peaceful existence if they are released from prison without adequate tools for the job market and return to the same communities that stoked extremist thinking in the past. These are resource-heavy solutions, but they must be examined and acknowledged as imperative.

Incarceration is an integral part of the crime and punishment of terrorism offences in societies with punitive legal systems. However, significant attention must be focused on the rehabilitative aspects not only behind bars, but especially when an individual has been released. The prison environment is one in which convicts become used to routine and program completion is often a mandatory part of release preparation, but reentry into communities is more difficult than it appears. It is this period of deradicalization programming that is indeed the most important and while ‘one size does not fit all’, networks focused on mental health care and skills development are primary needs.

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 by Rejeanne Lacroix

Small Steps Towards Reconciliation Matter: Lessons from Croatia

Reconciliation is often lauded as a key objective of any discussions intent on ending conflict, but it often remains elusive decades after the conclusion of decisive battles. Hesitancy to overcome hurdles that impede reconciliation are rooted in the fact that traumatic experiences typical of war are experienced differently according to national affiliation, ethnicities and dominant historical narratives. A recent event at a commemoration ceremony in Knin, Croatia highlights the reality that the path towards reconciliation is arduous and controversial, but even the smallest of steps forward matter.

Context

Each August, Croatian politicians gather to commemorate Operacija Oluja (Operation Storm). It is important to first acknowledge the events of this battle and its repercussions to fully examine the question of reconciliation later; therefore, one must place this confrontation in the wider context of the Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995).

In the simplest of explanations, the ‘Homeland War’ as it is known to Croats pitted independent Croatian forces against the Serbian-controlled Jugoslovenska narodna armija (Yugoslav National Army) as well as local affiliated Serb forces as part of the greater breakup of Yugoslavia. Croatia proclaimed independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, but local Serb rebels disagreed. Their subsequent military campaign to ensure Croatian territory remained a part of Yugoslavia captured over one third of the country — the proto-state of Republika Srpska Krajina— and displaced over 500,000 Croatians and other non-Serbs.

Operacija Oluja, conducted between August 4-7, 1995, is acknowledged as the decisive battle between the Hrvatska vojska (Croatian Army) and rebel forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina that ultimately ended in favor of Croatian independence. Nonetheless, as in other cases of recent wars in the Balkans, accusations of war crimes deeply complicate how this battle and the wider war is reflected upon according to ethnicity.

International media showcased photographs and footage of some of the 200,000 Serbs that fled Croatia in what would become a serious humanitarian and refugee crisis. Hundreds of Serb pensioners were killed in the months after the operation. Much of the property left behind was looted, seized and sometimes burned. It is for these reasons that Serbs in the region cannot view Operacija Oluja in the same gusto or celebration as their Croatian neighbours. There are understandably disparate views on how such anniversaries should be viewed and these sentiments remain entrenched in local populaces.

25th Anniversary

Commemoration this year took on a unique tone as it was not only the 25th anniversary of Operacija Oluja, but for the first time an ethnic Serb politician in Croatia attended the memorial service. The appearance of Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Milošević has been widely viewed as a small step towards reconciliation on a day that often pushes unresolved traumas to the forefront. For context, the grandmother of Milošević was killed during the incursion, so these matters undeniably hit close to home not only for him, but others in the Serb minority in Croatia.

However, there were undeniable conciliatory messages about the need to recognize the anguish of the past, but to move towards peaceful co-existence in the regional journey towards prosperity. Milošević stated that the “time has come for the politics of understanding and of respecting each other to defeat the politics of hatred.” This opinion was echoed by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković who hoped that the first-time attendance by an ethnic Serb would “send a new message for Croatian society, relations between Croatians and Serb minority” and “between Croatia and Serbia.” Sentiments such as these are welcome after a quarter century of apprehensive relations.

On the other hand, nationalism and ethnic grievances still remain insofar that the attendance of Milošević was not universally applauded. Across the border, in Serbia, media lambasted the statements by the aforementioned leadership. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić unequivocally expressed that, “We do not want to celebrate the tragedy of the Serbian people and Serbia will never accept humiliation” whilst speaking at a memorial service that too recognized Operacija Oluja, albeit in a different manner and narrative. This statement by Vučić succinctly embodied very real hurdles deeply felt by peoples affected by conflict that make it seem reconciliation remains out of reach.

While Serbo-Croatian relations — either bilaterally between Belgrade and Zagreb or in the context of a Serbian minority in Croatia — may be considered a niche cause without wider implications, that is simply not true. Lessons can be learned from this one particular case study and thus considered in states with past or ongoing internal conflicts.

Broad Lessons

The concept of reconciliation after a period of war or ethnic strife is often bandied about as the ultimate objective by even the most well-intentioned peacemakers, but it must be viewed with the same seriousness as more distinct solutions and identifiable benchmarks. First and foremost, it is not immediate and outside actors cannot induce it until local populations are ready themselves. Those that have suffered through actions committed by national armed forces, rebel groups or extremist non-state actors have the right to remain reluctant to trust the opposition or even be willing to easily let go of their trauma. The addition of divergent ethnic narratives or religious affiliation of specific events further complicate entrenched feelings. Many seek legal accountability at relevant tribunals as an avenue, but this too is a drawn-out process. Reconciliation happens at its own pace and in the right context.

Secondly, there must be a focus on grassroots cooperation and a means for affected peoples to openly discuss any impediments to compromise and understanding. Younger generations may not have experienced the shocks of their elders, but ethnic narratives shared within communities often keep invisible barriers intact. In order for this to occur, a willingness to listen and take accountability for past infringements in the most benign manner is required. This is obviously easier said than done, but it is best achieved by civilians willing to foment coexistence through education and engagement within their respective multi-ethnic states. It is only then that tides shift at the higher echelons of governance, and reactions such as those to the attendance of Milošević in Knin will be a thing of the past.

Reconciliation is a requirement for states and societies to move past painful events that have significantly marked their history. As the case discussed here illustrates, it can take decades to reach a point for one party to make the first move — even a small act in the grand scheme of ethnic dynamics — but this should not dishearten those intent on a durable resolution and beneficial cooperation.

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Refugees
 by Ahmad Mohibi

How Refugees Make their Way to Europe: A special report by Rise to Peace

Greek border police shot and killed a refugee as he attempted to cross the border following Turkey’s announcement that the border is open.

Rohullah, an international student studying at Trakya University, stated, “I was there when I heard the gunshots. I saw a woman knocked to the ground. We were scared and ran away. I did not know about the Syrian refugee that was killed but I saw the women that were shot.”

9692898d bfe2 401c 9fa1 22f37b77ef69 - How Refugees Make their Way to Europe: A special report by Rise to Peace

Rohullah is distributing food and clothing to refugees in the border of Turkey-Greece in the province of Edirne. March 4, 2020. 



He added, “My school is about a 10-minute drive from the border, and as soon as the Turkish government opened the border, refugees poured into our city on their way to the border. My classmates and I went to greet the refugees on the day that the shooting took place. All of them had crossed the Turkish border and were right in the center of the Turkish-Greek border. Some children were playing football and then suddenly, a group of refugees pushed towards the border, about 15 meters, and the Greek police began to shoot and fire tear gas.”

The victim was Ahmed Abu Emad, a Syrian refugee from Aleppo. He represents one of the thousands that have left their homeland to escape ongoing tensions and terrorism in order to have a better life. Like many before him, his journey ended before he could reach his dream. So many refugees here tell our researcher “we want to study and build a new life.” This situation is a tangible example just how conflict disrupts lives, causes immense pain and pushes the human condition to its limits.

Nearly 4500 refugees from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine and Somalia are currently seeking to enter Greece. At this particular encampment, there were around 500 refugees and our researchers interviewed as well as aided them in ways that they could. “They camp in places near the river and by resources such as wood so they can make fires to keep them warm”, said Rohullah. 

The Interview Project 

We were able to interview one young man on his second attempt to reach a better life in Europe. Ahmad Zahir, 22, from Balkh, Afghanistan is just one of the thousands leaving with or without their families to reach Europe for a better life. Since the refugee crises of 2015, thousands of these ‘dream-chasers’ have drowned in the Aegean sea, along the Afghan-Iranian border or in perilous journeys fleeing Syria to reach Turkey. It has been a difficult endeavor full of risk, but those seeking prosperity or security consider it worthwhile to attempt.

Zahir relayed that he reached Greece on the first day that the Turkish border opened, but was arrested shortly after by the Greek border police. He paid about $25 US to get to Edirne from Istanbul.

The 22-year-old summarized his experience as: “We crossed the border on the first day, but soon we were arrested. The Greek police took our money, phones and belongings and then deported us back to Edirne with one pair of pants and a shirt. I am cold and a Turk gave me this jacket to keep me warm.”  He added that, “When the Turkish government announced that the border was open, we left everything behind, but the Greek border is closed now. We cannot go back and do not know what to do.”

Why did you leave Afghanistan?
The security situation in our country is bad with an ongoing insurgency and no jobs. My family and I decided to leave for Europe mainly to live a good life and this is now my second attempt. Without money, a place to stay or live, we do not know what our destiny will be. They said the border is open, but it has been three days since we have been here.

Where do you stay?

We have no option, but to sleep here. It is not a problem for me although it is cold, but you can see children 4-5 years old, pregnant women, and older people here. These conditions are really bad for them. The weather is extremely cold as this is winter. We are lucky to be near the trees as we burn them night and day to keep us warm. 

What’s your plan for going to Europe? New life? Work?
Everybody has this plan, not only me. Let’s see if the border will open or not*. At this point, we have nothing left to lose if we go back to Istanbul or anywhere else because we already lost everything we had. Let’s see what’s going to happen. Wait for the border to open and start a new life for ourselves. I want to go to school. *He means the Greek border.

Do you have plans to go back to Afghanistan?
If we have to, we might. But no plans now to go back because if we go back, there will be no jobs or life there for us.

Why Turkey opened its borders to Greece?

The reasoning is complex and percolated for years. In 2016, Turkey signed an agreement with the European Union during the 2015-16 refugee crisis to stem the flow of refugees in exchange for the allocation of funds to help the millions of refugees from war-torn countries. (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria had the highest number of refugees.) “All our efforts contributed significantly to the security of Europe. However, our calls were ignored by the EU and member states,” said Sami Aksoy, the Turkish foreign ministry spokesman to Aljazeera.

Turkey has subsequently pointed fingers and accused the EU of reneging on its 2016 promises and consequently opened its borders for refugees to cross into Europe on February 29, 2020. This decision came shortly after 35 Turkish soldiers were killed in an a Syrian regime airstrike near Idlib on February 27. Turkey’s decision to open its borders can be seen as a strategic move to gain the support of the EU in support of Turkish involvement in the ongoing Syrian war as well as remind them to implement the articles on the previous agreement.

Turkey currently hosts nearly 4.1 million refugees and asylum seekers, including 3.7 million Syrians. 

How do refugees cross the Turkish border? 

In 2015, when I first reported on the refugee crisis in Istanbul, Turkey was inundated with refugees from everywhere. They slept in national parks as well as beaches out of necessity and poverty. The Turkish people were generous and helped them, particularly the police. Although they came illegally to Turkey, the police did not question them unless they committed a crime.

While there, I met a human smuggler who went by the alias “Dadar.” Human smuggling is a lucrative business in Turkey and Dadar was especially prepared as he had four cell phones upon which he spent most of his time speaking with refugees. New refugees transitioned into new clients and after reaching a deal, Dadar helped them settle and provided them with food. He acted like a humanitarian aid worker, but his end goal was payment for his services.

Dadar charged refugees a fee for his services and additional charges for those traversing countries. He not only helped refugees cross the border, but also helped bring refugees from Afghanistan and Iran as well. “I enjoy doing this work because first I make good money and second I help them reach their destinations,” said Dadar.

Here are some of the fees Dadar charged the refugees for his smuggling services:

From Afghanistan to Turkey — $2000 

From Turkey to Greece — $3500

From Turkey to Germany or London — $6500

On Day 3, I went to see where he kept his clients— the refugees. We drove to a place called Zeytinburnu about 25 minutes from Sultanahmet mosque. It was there I encountered many Afghans engaged in restaurants, shops and other businesses. Thousands of Syrians and Iraqis were there too. This was the place where many new refugees from Afghanistan and Syria stayed due to the proximity to resources and the low costs.

My research has often revealed that refugees and migrants typically tend to stay in communities where there are commonalities and similarities with others. For example, there are numerous cities in the United States and European countries, such as Germany, where refugees tend to settle and create communities of their own whilst engaged in their unique cultures. They adopt these urban areas as their new home.

Dadar took me to a residential apartment complex in the crowded streets of Istanbul where he kept even more of his clients. As I walked into a unit on the fifth floor, I saw 18 people — new arrivals from Afghanistan and Iran — living together in a one-bedroom apartment. Upon arrival, Dadar greeted his clients and explained all the next steps of their journey to them.

 
“We will inshallah leave the city in a couple of days. Please let me know if you need anything. Your food will be on time and I’m going to buy you guys vests and then hit the road towards the border,” said Dadar to the refugees. 

The next day, I called Dadar and inquired about what to expect next. He told me to meet him for breakfast — Kahvalte. While enjoying the Turkish sultan style breakfast, he laid out his plans and offered to take me to the border. I agreed. After breakfast, he took me to the downtown of Zeytinburnu where he purchased 95 lifejackets. In order for him to transport the refugees, he worked with Kurdish Turks fluent in the language, familiar with police checkpoints and back routes.

Early morning the next day at 04:00, Dadar picked me up from the hotel and took me to a bus where we greeted the driver and 25 refugees. It is important to recognize that many refugees are not all young or travelling by themselves, but rather, families with children account for the largest number of refugees. I encountered a family of four from Kabul, Afghanistan. They sold their house in Kabul and entrusted their money with a dealer from there who would wire it upon their arrival in Germany — their final destination. For them to get to Germany, they had to go through one of the riskiest routes — the Aegean Sea.

Refugees departed by a bus while Dadar and I left in his Fiat. He chose a specific long route to avoid any ferries where a car loaded with refugees could be easily spotted by the police. After 5:40 hours, we reached our destination — Canakkale.

Canakkale was the main point of operation for smuggling refugees to Europe. From there, Dadar took them to the sea between trees and bushes. Kurdish and Afghan had already prepared the rafts and boats to depart. All 25 refugees were loaded on one boat and they were handed a knife with explicit instructions to cut the raft once they reached their destination. They were to leave absolutely no evidence behind for the Greek border police to notice.

Upon their arrival in Greece, some turned themselves in and then the Greek government sent them to different European nations. Germany received the most refugees at that time and this consequently compelled many others to risk the trip to enrich their lives. Out of the 25 refugees that I met and with whom I made the trip to the border, 8 of them are in Germany. Two added me as a connection on Facebook and we continue to be friends.

Nonetheless, not all stories have a happy ending. Thousands have drowned in the Aegean Sea whilst on their way to seek a better life, including the viral image of a Syrian toddler, Alan-al-Kurdi, whose body washed ashore on a Turkish beach in 2015.

Business continued for Dadar. This was a day-to-day enterprise for him and he continued until Turkey reached a deal with the EU to close its borders to refugees. He was able to turn a large amount of money he received to a successful real-estate business in Istanbul.

Should refugees leave Turkey?

Turkey has been generous in its support of refugees across the country and even gave that eligible citizenship to make a new life in the country. It has its merits. Turkey is a beautiful and safe country and attractive to Muslim refugees as it holds the historical significance as the place of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan who conquered Europe and Africa. Further, it is a state with a respectable Gross Domestic Product (GDP), so refugees can make a living there if they truly want.

However, most refugees prefer Europe over Turkey and this is rooted in a drive for prosperity, rather than a search for security and aversion to terrorism. They choose this logistically treacherous path rather than settling in Turkey where the government has been generous towards them. Not all refugees can receive permanent residency or citizenship to remain in Turkey, however, there are ways to improve their lot. If they decide to stay and work hard, legal residency in the country is a possibility.

Authors note:

I left Turkey and tried to reach Dadar via the phone number he provided me as I wanted to do another interview project with him. The attempt was unsuccessful. His job was not easy as he regularly fought with Kurdish human smugglers as competed with rivals over prime territory that could act as points of departure for refugees. It was a war between smugglers as they fought to smuggle more refugees to make the most money.

Editorial note:

A researcher with Rise to Peace traveled to the border between Greece and Turkey at Edirne to file a report on Day 3 of the refugee attempts to cross the Turkish border following an announcement that the Turkish border is open. All photos and videos were taken by Rise to Peace with permission and right of usage by the refugees. As part of this initiative, we interviewed one of the refugees whose interview and video are featured below. 

Numbers: Approximately 500 families in one area on the beach. In about 4 days, they left their jobs in different parts of Turkey and came here. They are in need of blankets and I even saw a newborn baby.

Ages: A diverse range from a newborn baby to the elderly. The average age is approximately 40 years old though there are a lot of young adults. There are many families with 2-3 children though there are some traveling in groups with as many as 7.

Refugees origins: Most come from Syria, followed by Afghanistan, then Iraq, and Somalia. Those from Bangladesh, Iran, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan and Palestine round out the rest.

Reasons for leaving: In search of a better life, security and an escape from terrorism.

Interview:  Ahmad Zahir, 22 years old from Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. This is his second time crossing the border.

in Ahmad Mohibi / EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA / MENA 0 comments
 by Rejeanne Lacroix

Bosnia Needs a Smooth Repatriation Process to Benefit Counterterror Efforts

Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated significant steps recently toward repatriation of its citizens accused of being foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict. Security matters in the small Balkan nation are already complex, however this development highlights the need for deradicalization and reintegration programs, especially in a state that struggles to achieve cohesive unity. It is only through these measures that Bosnia can challenge any new allegations that it is a key source of foreign fighter recruitment in Europe.

A Short History

Bosnia is no stranger to the sensationalism of violent acts for terrorist recruitment. Barbarous events committed against Bosnian Muslims during the 1992-95 Bosnian War — part of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — compelled those at home to take up arms, but provided terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, with an opportunity to usurp a domestic tragedy and turn it into a transnational recruitment campaign too. The foreign Bosnian mujahideen rose from this situation. Arrival of foreign fighters from the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and the United States provided violent extremists with a preliminary foothold in the Balkan nation.

For the most part, Bosnian Muslims were immune to radicalization efforts because they follow a tolerant version of Islam. However, those that were continued to espouse extremist interpretations of the Islamic faith. They retreated to mountain villages in the north and detached from wider Bosnian society. It is in these villages that children are instructed in an extremist curriculum organized by private entities, such as clerics linked to terrorist organizations.

These factors led Bosnia to be considered a terrorism hotspot in Europe and a security failure on the brink. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron recently expressed, “If you’re concerned about this region, the first question is neither Macedonia, nor Albania, it’s Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time-bomb that’s ticking right next to Croatia, and which faces the problem of returning jihadists.”*

Leaving Home

By 2015, it was widely reported that approximately 300 Bosnian citizens left to fight in Iraq and Syria. This was an alarming number for a country with a relatively small population of 3.3 million. Analysts highlighted that this ranked the Balkan nation as the top exporter of foreign fighters per capita in Europe. Further, continued political instability and a government often in deadlock led many to believe that the security situation would quickly deteriorate in Bosnia — as well as the wider region — were these foreign fighters to return home.

Daesh recognized the unique qualities inherent in recruitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Villages that purposely disconnected with Bosnian society provided recruiters with ample young minds. Extremists breathed new life into past injustices of the Bosnian War to remind confused youth that only a caliphate would protect Muslims. Some religious leaders went so far as to command that defending the caliphate was the only proper path. Fighting for a greater cause offered young Bosniak men an occasion for “self-validation, self-respect, group belonging, and purpose” in a nation struggling with ethno-nationalist divisions, economic development and unemployment. Propaganda emerged that directly targeted Bosnian citizens to travel as foreign fighters or engage in attacks at home.

To further complicate matters, many women joined to become wives of fighters. Many claim that they were manipulated whilst others fully embraced the radical ideology of Daesh. Nonetheless, it is the children of these unions that are often considered to be the most problematic, as they are stateless, as well as raised in a questionable system of beliefs.

Countering the Threat

Despite these developments, it would be unfair to deduce that Sarajevo has done little to address extremism. The country passed legislation in the early 2000s that outlawed participation in terrorist organizations and their funding. In 2014, Bosnia amended its Criminal Code to extend prison sentences for those convicted of terrorist recruitment to ten years. Those condemned for fighting overseas faced a three-year prison term. It became the first country in Europe to implement such severe penalties.

Further, Bosnian intelligence and law enforcement agencies actively conduct investigations and raids on those suspected of engagement in terrorist organizations. Extremist clerics face conviction in the courts, as demonstrated by the widely covered trial of Husein ‘Bilal’ Bosnić. These combined efforts contributed to the collapse of the number of individuals that left Bosnia to fight in foreign lands by 2015.

Repatriation Problems

As it currently stands, approximately 260 Bosnian citizens remain in detention camps holding those that travelled to be a part of the Islamic State. On November 11, Bosnian Security Minister Dragan Mektić announced that Sarajevo would accept all confirmed Bosnian citizens accused of involvement with Daesh and initiate legal proceedings against them. The Bosnian initiative to transfer these individuals spurred Macron to utter his prior statement and highlighted the need for Sarajevo to pursue specialized deradicalization and reintegration schemes once again.

A number of issues must be addressed so that Bosnia can have a smooth repatriation process for all foreign fighters returning home. Such an effort would extend into a broader counter terrorism endeavor that would benefit the entire country. First and foremost, Sarajevo must invest heavily in the development of deradicalization programs, especially in the prison system. Foreign fighters that return home — without psychological supports — will find their kin with others incarcerated and consequently remain active in terrorist movements. Additionally, clerics that speak out against extremism should be supported, consulted and their messages applied to those seeking non-extremist interpretations of Islam in Bosnia. These are more common than the loud voices of extremism.

Reintegration programming is key, however Bosnia has not exerted much effort in regard to these objectives. The fact remains that even lengthy prison sentences come to an end and former fighters must reengage with the community around them. It is a difficult task, especially for youth, that entered the battlefield young and with little life experience. Therefore, reintegration of children of Daesh fighters and wives is of paramount need. They must be exposed to common social interactions, education and civic opportunities to ensure their futures do not involve extremist rhetoric or violence. It is the only way to quash such tendencies in the future.

In general, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces significant domestic problems separate from the return of foreign fighters. The country remains chronically economically stagnant, therefore social programming in this regard may not have been high on the agenda, especially under the spectre of weak government institutions. Nonetheless, it is palpable that Sarajevo comprehends the wider consequences of mishandling the repatriation of fighters, their wives and children. Rather than a focus on the issue being a ‘ticking time bomb’, it is best to present it as an avenue towards development of a strong deradicalization and reintegration strategy, with lasting effects.

  • While a contentious term, jihadist was kept to retain the integrity of the direct quote.
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 by Jack Ryan

What Does a Chinese Invitation to the Taliban Mean for Afghan Peace Talks?

In a sudden development, China invited the Taliban to a two-day intra-Afghan peace conference in Beijing. This is a peculiar development as Beijing demonstrated little interest towards the prior peace process and Afghans remain critical of any potential for peace with the Taliban. Peace talks resumed weeks ago in Islamabad, Pakistan, however, the addition of Chinese interests reflects the international nature of what is at stake with stability in the region.

The Taliban publicly announced that they would travel to Beijing to initiate another round of peace talks.  Suhail Shaheen, a Taliban political spokesman, said on September 23 that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s co-founder, met with Chinese diplomats in Doha, where the group has a political office.

This is concurrent with information received by Rise to Peace. A source from Kabul stated that there will be another round of talks with the Taliban soon. They expressed that,

“It’s going to be different to before, stating that the conditions of peace would be different now. Thus, it would appear that the Taliban are open to a new round of peace talks, but not only with the US.”

China’s abrupt involvement in the Afghan peace process will undoubtedly impact the US counter-terrorism strategy in the region. Recent visits to Afghanistan by United States Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Defense Secretary Mark Esper already reveal the differences of opinion offered by US foreign policy decision-makers.

Trump’s growing impatience with the presence of American armed forces still entangled in the Afghan conflict — fueled by the 2020 presidential election — is matched by Pelosi’s urgency to maintain a presence in the region. Pelosi counters that US troops are needed for the sake of stability and the possibility that Afghanistan might return to its previous role as a haven for terrorism.

Despite multiple stakeholders in the Afghan conflict — including multi-national organizations and numerous nation-states — China’s active interest in the region reveals the vast reach of regional instability and as a result, could provide an alternative to the peace talks that have already failed.

Beijing has cooperated with Kabul over the years in regard to economic development and trade, therefore Chinese interests in a stable Afghanistan are easily identifiable. As one of the co-heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China — along with Russia — considers Afghan concerns as innate to discussions on security in the Central Asian space. It is logical that they would pursue a proactive stance in regard to inviting the Taliban for peace talks, as well as meetings with Chinese diplomats, due to ongoing diplomatic efforts between the two states.

Mainstream media coverage of Afghanistan has faded since the end of a turbulent election period and the rise of conflict along the Turkey-Syria border. However, July 2019 witnessed the highest number of civilian casualties that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has ever recorded in a single month. The third quarter of this year saw an unprecedented spike in civilian casualties, with 1,174 civilian deaths and 3,139 injured.

It appeared that a revival of peace talks between the United States was possible last week despite hostile rhetoric between the two camps and an increase in violent attacks. Zalmay Khalilzad, the top US envoy for Afghan reconciliation, met with the Taliban in Pakistan. Each side is alleged to have discussed confidence-building measures that could include a possible prisoner swap or a reduction in violence to help with the peace process.

The EU Perspective 

Tadamichi Yamamoto, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, has decried “the tragic uselessness of such death in the face of widespread recognition that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.” His words were echoed by Khalilzad and EU envoy Roland Kobia, among other representatives from the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations. All acknowledged that “a sustainable peace can only be achieved through a negotiated political settlement.”

Aftermath of US-Taliban Peace Talks Collapse

The breakdown of talks between the US and Taliban earlier this year led both pro-government troops as well as other insurgencies within the region to step up attacks. Last week, Afghan forces performed a clearing operation in Baghlan province.

The operation took place in the areas of Dand-e-Shahabuddin, Dand-e-Ghori and the Kela Gai areas where at least 16 Officers were killed. A Ministry of Defence spokesperson justified the military action by citing previous successes in which dozens of Taliban insurgents, including commanders and shadow district governors, had been killed during operations in Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz provinces.

US-Afghan Relations  

Given the nature of the relationship between the US and Afghan security forces, it is clear that the US was aware of the provincial ‘clearing’ campaigns and likely provided support. This emphasizes their stance as being currently committed to military action in the region despite the fact the Pentagon released a plan for an abrupt Afghan withdrawal. Officials cautioned, however, that the planning is a precaution and there is currently no directive from the White House to pull American troops out of Afghanistan.

Taliban Military Action

In addition to US and Afghan government military action, the Taliban have also increased attacks. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, confirmed in a statement that fighters used a large truck packed with explosives in an attack near a police headquarters, leaving dozens of Afghan security forces dead and wounded. The attack occurred during a relative lull in violence in the post-presidential election period that saw a surge in attacks by the Taliban, who denounced the vote as a sham. Severe attacks continue as sixteen police officers were killed in attacks on security checkpoints in Northern Kunduz province this week.

US-Taliban Relations

The New York Times reported that “a news website with deep access to senior Taliban officials reported that Mr. Khalilzad had met “repeatedly” with the Taliban during his time in Islamabad,” suggesting it was more than one meeting. This, in addition to the EU/UN urging immediate steps to reduce violence and civilian casualties, resulted in a call for a ceasefire while intra-Afghan peace talks take place.

Peace Talks vs Violence: The Challenges Facing the New Afghan Government 

The Taliban and the Afghan government remain in a cycle of violence where one attacks and the other retaliates, sometimes with foreign support. This continues to happen despite demands for peace from Afghan civilians, hints towards resolution from the Taliban, US interests and now China in favor of the resumption of peace talks.

The key factor influencing the cycle is the lack of intra-Afghan dialogue. Talks between the Taliban and the US did not lead to discussions between the Ghani administration and the Taliban. Therefore, it could be argued talks produced little progress, if it all, and the two remain more divided than ever. This is a result of the state of limbo faced by the government as they await the results of the September 2019 election.

Engaging in dialogue with the Taliban will be one of the major challenges facing the victors of the Afghan presidential elections. However, it is integral that such lines of communication are opened to maintaining peace in Afghanistan whilst allowing a US withdrawal.

As China readies itself to engage, President Trump remains confident in his relationship with Imran Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, and in the ability of the Pakistani government to play a positive and productive role in the negotiations between the United States and Taliban stakeholders.

Conclusion

As Afghanistan awaits the results of the September election, it will be crucial for political parties to ensure they are represented at the Beijing talks and in any potential talks between the US and the Taliban. This ensures that the winning party is able to open up direct discussions between the government and the Taliban.

However, if efforts in Beijing or with the US are successful — subsequently transitioning to intra-Afghan dialogue — the US must maintain a presence and military support in the region, as peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government does not necessarily mean peace for the other 21 active terror organizations in the region. Afghanistan’s fragility due to terrorism means that foreign support for counter-terrorism campaigns remains crucial for the foreseeable future.

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Nancy Pelosi in Afghanistan
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Pelosi and Esper in Afghanistan: To Leave or Not To Leave?

Two United States envoys visited Afghanistan this week: the Secretary of Defence Mark Esper under the direction of President Trump and a congressional delegation headed by Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi. These trips signify the growing divide in opinion related to the US strategy in Afghanistan.

Trump’s growing impatience with the presence of American armed forces still entangled in the Afghan conflict — fueled by the 2020 presidential election — is matched by Pelosi’s urgency to maintain a presence in the region. The Speaker counters that US troops are needed for the sake of stability and the possibility that Afghanistan might return to its previous role as a haven for terrorism.

Esper’s unannounced trip on Sunday marks his first visit to the country since being confirmed as Pentagon chief. His unannounced arrival comes amid uncertainty about the administration’s strategy after the collapse of peace talks with the Taliban.

The Secretary told reporters on Sunday that the number of US troops in Afghanistan could be reduced to 8,600 — while maintaining counterterrorism operations — but the reduction would have to coincide with a peace agreement. The United States currently has 14,000 troops in Afghanistan. This is significantly less than the 130,000 troops that were stationed there in 2009 as part of broader counter-insurgency operations.

The Pelosi-led delegation met with President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, Afghan women and ‘briefly compared notes’ with Secretary Mark Esper. Pelosi concluded: “While Afghan women have made some progress in some areas, more work is needed to ensure their security and durable economic and educational opportunities for women and girls in Afghanistan,” which highlights her belief that US support is integral to peace and development in Afghanistan.

Trump consistently critiques any US involvement in the Middle East and a series of tweets reflected that sentiment. He noted: “Fighting between various groups has been going on for hundreds of years. The USA should never have been in the Middle East. The stupid endless wars, for us, are ending!”

Although these tweets were specifically defending his withdrawal from Syria, the president’s view on US military involvement in Afghanistan is clearly in support of exiting the region. Meanwhile, Pelosi’s comments — especially those urging the need for support of Afghan women — appear to support the need for extended US involvement in the region, providing both military and societal support.

Esper told reporters “the aim is to still get a peace agreement at some point, a political agreement.” However, the Taliban’s propensity for violence continues to divide opinion in US circles as Trump’s initial decision to host a Taliban delegation at Camp David was met with heavy criticism.

The Taliban refuses to compromise on their demands, such as their desired institution of the patriarchal Islamic Emirate, characterized by strict social and cultural policies based on man-made principles and radical ideologies. As long as their use of violence and patriarchal political ideologies continue, the US will face divisions over its Afghan strategy.

The US is by no means the only international stakeholder in Afghanistan. The European Union envoy to the region Roland Kobia said, “The EU would like to see a swift resumption of the US bilateral talks with the Taliban and the start of negotiation between the government and the Taliban.”

The EU diplomat also called on the Afghan presidential candidates to contribute to the transparency of the electoral process and avoid any moves that could create problems for the election results.

Kobia’s comment on the presidential candidates re-enforces an important factor to consider when assessing the differing US opinions on the region: the Afghan elections. Putting aside the US-Taliban talks and the conflict itself, it is important to note that all of this is taking place while the country’s politics are in limbo.

Afghanistan is awaiting the results of the September 28 election. Riddled with accusations of fraud and voter-discrepancies, the post-election period has been tumultuous. This chaos is multiplied with the constant onslaught of Taliban instigated violence.

Opening a dialogue with the Taliban will be one of the most significant challenges facing the victors of the September 2019 elections.

Dialogue between political actors is integral to the maintenance of peace in Afghanistan whilst allowing a US withdrawal. However, intra-Afghan dialogue will be impossible without continued support from the US. It is integral that the US keeps its policy towards Afghanistan distinct from its withdrawal from Syria, despite growing criticism and support for Trump’s decision in the Middle East.

Military support in the region remains crucial, especially during this fragile transitional period as Afghanistan nervously awaits election results.

Although the envoys are divided in opinion, they must focus on insight gained during the 18-year Afghan intervention and put domestic political conflicts aside for the time being.

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