Natural

Europe Turns to Mozambique for Natural Resources Despite Islamic State Attacks

Allegedly, energy companies are planning to return to the Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado despite unrest caused by ISIS-Mozambique. Due to the unrest with Ukraine and Russia, liquified natural gas production has slowed. Therefore, Europe is turning to Mozambique in hopes of mitigating the slow production.

Liquified Natural Gas Project in Mozambique

The Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Project, led by TotalEnergies, began with the discovery of a vast amount of natural gas in 2010 off the coast of Northern Mozambique. It was previously on track to begin providing liquified natural gas in 2024. Still, production has been put to a halt since April of 2021 due to the security situation in Cabo Delgado. LNG was forecasted to bring in over $100 billion to Mozambique in just 25 years of production.

Origins and the Current State of ISIS-Mozambique

ISIS-Mozambique has been in operation since October 2017, with Abu Yasir Hassan as the lead. Currently, 670,000 people within Northern Mozambique have been displaced, and the ISIS-Mozambique has claimed the lives of more than 1,300 civilians. According to reports, ISIS-Mozambique allegedly pledged allegiance to ISIS in April 2018, and was officially acknowledged by ISIS-Core in August 2019.

While it is unclear how many individuals are currently fighting for ISIS-Mozambique, the number is estimated to be in the thousands. The group quickly grew by leveraging economic grievances in a poverty-stricken and resource-rich area of the country. Additionally, ISIS-Mozambique provided loans to young men without any opportunity otherwise.

ISIS-Mozambique’s Palma Attack

On March 24, 2021, a siege lasting four days by an estimated 200 ISIS-Mozambique fighters left dozens dead at the Cabo Delgado town of Palma, with much of the city’s infrastructure destroyed. The town of Palma is home to over 70,000 people. There were numerous foreign workers for the LNG project trapped at the project site in the nearby area of the Afungi Peninsula. The prospect of ISIS-Mozambique gaining access to the LNG project proved worrisome and extremely dangerous; it would be alarming if high-yielding natural resources fell under their control.

Continued Attacks by ISIS-Mozambique

In the past six months, there have been numerous attacks in Northern Mozambique by ISIS-Mozambique. The violence has continued despite growing military interventions from different groups deployed to Mozambique in hopes of mitigating the continued violence. There are 24 countries and a multitude of other organizations working in Mozambique, including troops from Rwanda, the European Union, the South African Development Community military force, Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.

Europe Turning to Mozambique for Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)

As the crisis in Ukraine continues, the shipping of LNG in Russia has reduced significantly. Russia provides one-third of the LNG to Europe, behind the U.S. and Qatar. After Russia invaded Ukraine, most international investors involved in Russian LNG projects froze their financing shares.

Europe has now turned to Mozambique in hopes of filling their need for LNG. Italian Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio traveled to Mozambique in hopes of developing new deals regarding LNG supply partnerships as well as European government officials and parliament members have met to discuss how to best reduce its reliance on Russia’s liquified natural gas.

Outlook for Future Company Involvement

Mpho Molomo, the head of the Southern African Development Community mission in Mozambique, stated that it was too early to declare Mozambique safe enough to renew operations. The current state of Cabo Delgado has not reached a point of stability to guarantee the safety of energy company workers.

Environmental activists have viewed this as an opportunity to emphasize renewable energy sources instead of depending on fossil fuels, such as LNG. While attacks have slowed in Mozambique, it is still not safe enough to continue production despite the need of liquified natural gas in Europe. If the safety of the workers are not guaranteed, production should remain halted until ISIS-Mozambique is no longer a threat.

 

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Germany

Why Right-Wing Extremism Has a Strong Presence in Eastern Germany

Germany has been reunified since 1990, yet tensions remain between West and East Germany that right-wing extremist groups, parties, and movements exploit in the more vulnerable half: East Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall brought the promise of democracy and better economic conditions. In the past 30 years, certain issues in East Germany have been left unresolved and unaddressed, allowing right-wing extremism to prey on the grievances of East Germans. East Germany is still affected by the policies and challenges of reunification. According to a 2019 poll, almost 60% of residents in Eastern Germany regard themselves as second-class citizens, and more than half stated that German reunification was not a success.

For the past decade, right-wing extremists have gained momentum and have become a priority security threat for the German government. According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), at the end of 2020, the number of right-wing extremists classified as “violence oriented” rose to 13,300, an increase of almost 4% from 2019. Eastern states such as Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Brandenburg have noticeable voting trends different than their western counterparts, particularly in favor of the right-wing AfD Party (Alternative for Germany). Right-wing extremists such as the National Socialist Underground (NSU), Third Path, and the social movement Pegida, either stem from eastern states or have a large support from Eastern Germans who identify with their movement.

Economic Structures   

Preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall, West Germany absorbed the remains of East Germany’s weak political and economic structure. East Germany only contributed 8% of the total GDP as productivity was weakened by unemployment upon reunification. Without consensus or debate as to how to reunify, the East was forced to assimilate into the West. East Germany had no option but to undergo an extensive privatization through an agency known as Treuhandanstalt (“trustee agency”) with the intention to privatize and liquidate every firm in the former GDR (German Democratic Republic) within the span of five years. As a result, it was all in West Germany´s favor as Western investors had better access to financial capital, more experience in managing companies, and better economic and political connections than investors in the former Soviet regime. Since the Western German government set the Treuhandanstalt measures, Western investors were perceived more suitable as future company owners. The redistribution among these companies was asymmetric, providing the West more financial benefits. Western investors were able to make major profits from this privatization program, while the majority of Eastern Germans gained little to nothing from their labor and were forced to move west, a divide which continues today through East Germany’s young adults.

Thirty years after reunification, there is still a stark social divide between East and West Germany. East Germany is well known to have consistently lower employment and wage levels than its western counterpart. The East German economic output is almost always a third lower than the West, with incomes being 10% lower, and overall, it lacks the West’s economic structure. Due to the lack of proper investment into building a lucrative East Germany, resentment from East Germans is still felt today.

Immigration

Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, immigrant rhetoric in the GDR led to right-wing attacks and news of violence against foreigners was frequently not reported. Many urban areas of West Germany became more diverse in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas East Germany remained largely homogenous. During Soviet Occupation, the GDR attempted to form bilateral relations with other socialist states. Agreements were made to allow foreign workers from Vietnam, Mozambique, Cuba, and Angola to work in coal mining, kitchens, consumer goods industries, and others in the GDR. Most foreign workers soon experienced vicious amounts of xenophobia, as unskilled East German workers blamed them for taking their jobs and for a shortage in consumer goods. During reunification, that xenophobia and racism did not leave. One famous incident is the 1992 Rostock Riots, where neo-Nazis targeted asylum seekers as well as Vietnamese and Mozambican workers in the town of Rostock.

As East Germany struggled with internal migration to the West and adjusting to a new political system, immigration that supported West Germany ́s manufacturing industry slowly crept into Eastern Germany. While struggling to transition into a new political and economic system, adding a new population fueled public dissatisfaction and resentment towards new immigrants and refugees, which is still felt today.

Weak Institutions    

The collapse of the Soviet Union left an authority vacuum in East Germany. State institutions were weakened by the period of transition. Police officers were associated with the former regime, therefore, discredited. Dierk Borstel, researcher of right-wing extremism at the University of Bielefeld, links the lack of functioning institutions, “the police force was destabilized and the church had little influence anyway. The eastern German trade unions and the PDS, the successor party to the former ruling communist SED, had little authority, and the trade unions and industry associations coming in from the West were all very weak in the east.”

Right-Wing Extremism  

During the Soviet occupation, the GDR laid an extensive and thorough denazification process in terms of a remembrance culture. However, with its own agenda to push, the communist regime imposed its ideology so extensively that East Germans were ready to renounce socialism by the 1990s. However, the reunification they anticipated didn´t exactly come to fruition, as many East Germans were unemployed, and conditions seemed to become worse than before. With disappointment and poverty, these semi-anarchic conditions were fertile ground for far-right activists and extremists. Originally, many neo-Nazi cadres were from West Germany. Many of these neo-Nazi groups moved to the east, a strategy still used today, with the intent to mobilize and recruit. Although there were right-wing groups present in Germany before reunification, the addition of more right-wing extremists amplified their views. When the transition period betrayed the trust of East Germans in western democracy and having a market economy, right-wing extremist perspectives became more prevalent and normalized.

Recommendations

The rise of right-wing extremist violence has become alarming and is not losing any momentum. As a response, the Cabinet Committee for the fight against right-wing extremism presented a list of 89 measures to combat right-wing extremism and anti-Semitism. From 2021 to 2024, the German government will provide over one billion euros to aid these measures. The funds will be used to provide research and prevention, and reinforce cooperation between security authorities, the judiciary, and relevant state and civil society bodies.

According to Anetta Kahane, an East German who runs the Amadeu Antonio Foundation, which seeks to combat racism and right-wing extremism throughout Germany, extremist views are the result of a lack of civil society infrastructure. Kahane states, “in the West there are large churches, and labor unions: powerful institutions that ensure a certain kind of social stability. In the East after reunification, we didn’t have that. Civil society infrastructure has to be built from the ground up and be made stable so that they can withstand right-wing extremism.”

While these solutions are a great investment, it does not heal the bridge between the psychological divide between the East and West. It is easier said than done, but restarting the economic convergence process may fully bridge this gap. Through economic incentives for foreign investment in Eastern Germany, policymakers could help bring the economic vibrancy East Germans once hoped for. In addition, economic recovery could persuade East Germans to be less likely to vote for extremist parties or support extremist groups.

 

Camille Amberger, Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Spies

Ukraine Claims to Have Obtained a List of Russian Spies Operating in Europe

Ukraine asserts that it has acquired a list of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents involved in criminal activities in Europe. More than 600 alleged Russian spies are purportedly operating in Europe.

According to reports, Ukraine has released names, addresses, and even SIM cards in an attempt to destroy these agents and damage Russia’s intelligence activities across Europe. Ukraine has been providing a list of FSB workers, which is the successor of Russia’s infamous and feared intelligence agency, the KGB.

Profiles, contact information, card details, “registration addresses,” and some financial details of 620 putative Russian spies are provided on the list, which was released in Russian and appeared to be unavailable on the ministry’s English version of the website.

John Sawers, who directed MI6 from 2009 to 2014, commented, “we are seeing the breadth of Russian aggressive intelligence activity across Europe. We probably only know 10% of what they’re doing; there will be a lot that intelligence services conduct that we don’t know about.”

The main concern is whether or not the list is accurate. Several of the identities appear to originate from prior leaks of FSB officers, according to Aric Toler, a specialist at the investigative reporting organization Bellingcat, but then other information on the list seems to be fresh.

He said that after doing some fact-checking, a lot of the items on the website’s list were massive database dumps since then. In other words, some of these spies have been revealed before and are not novices to the spy ring. However, several of these names are unfamiliar and could have far-reaching implications for Russian agents.

According to Representative Ritchie Torres from New York, the FBI should investigate the Russian diplomatic residence in New York City. At the same time, they have been appalled and alarmed by Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. In that context, Representative Torres has formally requested that the FBI open an investigation into reports of espionage at the Russian diplomatic compound. Representative Torres also spoke to reporters about the white high-rise tower at 355 West 255th Street in the Bronx borough last month.

Since Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Data has been Compromised.

When Russian troops breached Ukraine’s borders in late February, massive volumes of information concerning the Russian state as well as its operations have now become public. According to WIRED, the new access provides fresh prospects into closed private entities, and it could be a valuable resource for authorities ranging from journalists to war crimes experts.

The material is subdivided into two categories: that which Ukrainian officials or their partners intentionally publicize and that which is obtained by hacker groups such as DDoSecrets and Anonymous. Many hackers have demonstrated their support for Ukraine by hacking Russian websites and exposing secret Russian material. As a result, hundreds of gigabytes of data and thousands of communications have been made public.

What Is the Difference Between the SVR and the FSB?

The FSB is much more than a typical security agency. It has progressed significantly since the early 1990s, when it was on the verge of disintegration, combining the tasks of an exclusive police service with those of an espionage agency and wielding great power. According to sources, the FSB recruits a wide range of tech-savvy and competent individuals to help them improve their activities across the cyber world. IKSI, the Institute of Cryptography and Information Security, is the agency’s unique institute that used to specialize in code-breaking but now concentrates on data protection.

The distinguishing factor between the FSB and the SVR is the scope of their operations. The FSB is responsible for guaranteeing the safety of the entire population of Russia, whereas the SVR focuses on the security of predominantly state officials. The FSB has a variety of specific capabilities that the SVR does not, while on the other hand, the SVR also has a wide range of scope in which the FSB cannot perform. The SVR is primarily responsible for foreign intelligence, whilst the FSB is responsible for domestic intelligence. After all, both of these groups continue to collaborate on analysis and exploration, which still results in keeping their government’s power and balance.

Spy-Master: What Now?

Historically, after a spy is uncovered, an intelligence agent may be imprisoned. On the other hand, professional case agents are practically always working beneath diplomatic cover and enjoy sovereign immunity, so they are promptly released. While the operatives they oversee could face long prison sentences, the worst that foreign intelligence agents can anticipate is public exposure and a statement by the opposing government that they will be declared persona non grata and should leave forthwith. However, in the event of an aggressive invasion, this is no longer the case and it now becomes a contest of wits and bravery.

Russian agents could have been a high-value target for the Ukrainian government because their names had previously been disclosed, and they may have withheld top-secret information. Furthermore, a large number of Russian officials have been expelled from European countries. More than 20 European countries have removed some suspected Russian intelligence officers who may have been identified on the leaked list, according to Greg Myre, a national security correspondent for NPR and an American journalist for over 15 years.

As the invasion progresses, expulsions are becoming more common, and Russia’s invasion has caused these large-scale expulsions in a rather coordinated manner thus far. While it’s too early to determine, it is possible that this would lead to a long-term reduction in diplomatic operations between the West and Russia.

As per this assessment, Russia’s constant and abrupt data and information leaks could provide Ukraine an advantage, especially because Europe is supporting them in this effort. Russia’s intelligence assets would be compromised, and their operations may not proceed as well as intended. For Russia, not having cybersecurity can lead to consequences, ranging from aggravation to complete shutdown, which could be seen as a gain for Ukraine.

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Prevent

Censorship Through the UK´s Prevent Program

As a part of CONTEST, the Prevent program aims to stop people from embracing different forms of extremism that may lead to terrorism in the UK. The Prevent program targets lawful activity such as thought, expression and behavior to predict future criminal activity. In 2015, the UK drafted its public sector to carry out the “Prevent Duty.” Teachers, doctors, therapists, and other professionals in these institutions are legally obligated to carry out national security duties by referring individuals to Prevent and adhering to “British values.” Prevent has had some criticisms in the past and continues to raise significant concerns in determining the signs of radicalization and who is thought to be radicalized.

According to a report by Rights & Security International and another report by Child Rights International Network, Prevents´ counter-terrorism measures are leading to self-censorship among political activists and students in educational settings, especially if they are Muslim. Both organizations have reported observing an effect known as the “chilling effect,” which describes the byproduct of regulations in deterring people from exercising their rights. These groups self-censor from fear of attracting the attention of authorities, being subjected to extensive surveillance, or being subjected to harsher measures, such as arrest.

The UK national curriculum for secondary education states that schools should use citizenship education to “provide pupils with knowledge, skills and understanding to prepare them to play a full and active part in society” through “equipping pupils with the skills and knowledge to explore political and social issues critically, to weigh evidence, debate and make reasoned arguments.” With the awareness that their behavior is monitored, students are more reluctant to express themselves in certain forms of expression that are seen as indicators of “radicalization” or “extremism,” like religious expression, particularly if they are Muslim, political activism, as well as discussion and debating terrorism as a political and social issue.

One peace activist from the report by Rights & Security International regularly attends schools throughout the UK to engage with students in citizen education. He observed the awareness among school leaders is producing a risk aversion when it comes to hosting debates on wider topics unrelated to terrorism.

In recent years there has been a higher proportion of Prevent referrals for far-right rather than Islamist related extremism; however, both reports suggest there is an over reporting of Muslims. Referrals for Islamist-related concerns are less likely to be assessed as requiring a Channel intervention than referrals for far-right extremism. One interviewee from the Rights & Security International report argues right-wing extremists are not treated with the same urgency since they target ethnic minorities who, by virtue of their minority status, are not considered to be representative of the UK. Imagining a “Muslim threat” through radicalized assumptions is presumed to be a threat to western democratic values, whereas far-right extremists are considered to threaten only individuals and community cohesion.

Recommendations 

Prevent focuses on monitoring activities, views, and behavior of individuals instead of uncovering the underlying causes and conditions conducive to an individual’s exploitation by extremist groups. According to the Neuchâtel Memorandum, the leading international standard on criminal justice and children in the context of counter terrorism, prevention strategies should focus on “key structural and societal factors” which renders children vulnerable to exploitation such as exclusion and discrimination, lack of access to education, domestic violence, lack of social relations, poor economic background, and unemployment.

State institutions should be willing to engage with nonviolent activists and civil society groups. Civic actors play a significant role in countering violent narratives by creating spaces for frustrated individuals to vent their grievances as well as a chance to challenge state injustices through nonviolent approaches. Allowing freedom of expression and enabling democratic spaces can make unknown issues visible and innovate potential solutions.

Finally, Prevent needs to reconsider its approach to human rights. In democratic societies, nonviolent individuals or organizations have the right to question, challenge, oppose, or support specific counter-terrorism laws, practices or policies. The Prevent program lacks proportionality, undermining human rights and the rule of law. The program may believe it is protecting the rights and safety for all but fails to realize it creates an environment of mistrust and misunderstanding, feelings vulnerable to exploitation by those who Prevent sought to protect against.

 

Camille Amberger, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

 

French

Historical Perspectives: French Terror and Emergency Measures

Since 9/11 terror attacks have been presented as an ever-increasing threat in liberal democracies and almost no democratic regime has been immune to these heinous acts. These attacks present a dual menace: both as a genuine threat to the safety of the citizens and, based on the reaction of the government in question, a more insidious risk of undermining the base democratic ideals upon which the state was founded.

French Terror Attacks and State of Emergency Measures

After nearly two decades of relative tranquility, France suffered a string of attacks in 2015 and 2016. Three major attacks hit the country in a short period of time. The offices of Charlie Hebdo, a French political satire magazine, were attacked between January 7th – 9th, and 17 people were killed in shootings both at the office and at a Jewish delicatessen in Paris.

Barely a year later, in November 2015, France again suffered a terrorist attack when a series of coordinated strikes in bars, restaurants, a concert venue and a stadium injured more than 200 people and killed 130.

A few months later, in July 2016, a lone attacker drove a cargo truck through the crowd celebrating Bastille Day on the streets of Nice, injuring more than 400 and killing another 86.

Finally, less than two weeks after the Nice attack, two terrorists attacked a church in Normandy, holding a priest and some of the parishioners hostage. The priest was assassinated, and one parishioner was gravely wounded. The severity of the casualties and the symbolism behind the attacks were unprecedented in France.

Shortly after the coordinated attacks in November 2015, the French government formally declared a “state of emergency,” which had wide reaching impacts on the French government’s executive and legislative powers to quickly curtail any potential terrorist activity.  These emergency measures also removed the necessity for prior judicial authorization for police to search houses day or night, and even allowed authorities to impose residence orders, de-facto house arrest, without legislative oversight. In July 2016, these measures were expanded to restrict freedom of assembly and expression, and authorities were expressly permitted to ban public demonstration. Amnesty International described these emergency measures as humiliating and traumatizing to hundreds of citizens.

Slide Towards Civil Liberties Abuses

In light of the extreme nature of the terrorist attacks and widespread public pressure to act, these temporary measures did not initially violate the civil liberties of French citizens. The temporary suspension of some civil liberties, especially with widespread public support, falls within appropriate governmental behavior. However, these powers, once created, did not remain within the stated aim or goal of countering terrorism, but were also applied to inconvenient civilians who posed no legitimate security threat. Protestors of the proposed reforms to labor laws and protestors against COP 21 were both subjected to the same measures as potential radical terrorists.

Emergency powers tend to be like a soft leather glove, they expand to fit the size of the hand wearing them and never again return to the size they were before. In the same fashion, emergency powers tend to expand and grow as they are used, and rarely return to the status quo which existed before they were implemented. The French government, by making some of the draconian emergency measures a permanent part of their legislative framework, has undermined the social contract and has begun to normalize authoritarian-style governance.

It is particularly troubling considering the ambiguity of much of the legal framework of these emergency measures. The unilateral freedom to stop and search, to detain without charge or trial, and to broadly surveil society without a well-defined target beyond the “war on terror” is deeply problematic and opens French society to a myriad of governmental abuses.

Civil liberties have been curtailed and the state of emergency has become entrenched as the new normal. More democratic and legal oversight is needed for such extenuating circumstances. A permanent state of emergency is a paradox used by authoritarian governments as a useful means of social control and the nature of the practice of the security measures in question creates a diminishment of the body of citizenship. Anyone from a migrant background, or Islam, or anyone viewed as being not French enough, became a different class of citizen.

Deradicalization in Civil Society

Any action which silences, marginalizes, or persecutes a particular group in a pre-emptive manner must be resisted by democratic regimes. The insecurity which may accompany this liberty can be addressed with less authoritarian means. France has experimented with softer strategies of de-radicalization; Prime Minister Valls, for instance, pledged to increase the number of moderate imams available in prisons, and that their training would be improved. French prisons tend to be a hotbed of jihadism and working to avoid extremism in the first place is more in line with the responsibilities of a government. It was not, however, a fully-realized measure because, apart from increasing the numbers of prison imams, their status was not elevated or professionalized, a fact that will continue to hamper their overall potential.

France’s admirable effort to introduce moderate imams into the prison chaplain system is an example of a softer attempt to diminish nascent jihadism. Finding a balance between recognizing both the rights and potential threats of Islamic French citizens, while at the same time remaining committed to classic French republican secular values is certainly a difficult task.

It is also imperative that France continually recommits to the protection of civil liberties. A temporary infringement of civil liberties in the face of a crisis is the prerogative, and the absolute duty, of good governance. Proportionality and specificity are of the utmost importance when moving to limit or shape individual freedoms in a democratic society. Creating a permanent state of emergency and using emergency powers, created ostensibly for a single crisis, outside the context in which they were intended is not acceptable in a democratic regime.

Conclusion

It is troubling that France, the birthplace and testing ground of many precious democratic ideals, has taken what can only be described as opportunistic steps towards the violation of civil liberties. If France wishes to remain the citadel of liberty, fraternity, and freedom, it needs to accept a broader plurality of voices contributing to the social contract.

Rather than pathologizing an entire group, and potentially undermining the future civil liberty of other marginalized groups, France should continue its grassroots and societal de-radicalization strategy. This recommitment to an egalitarian society, one which is true to the republican secularism upon which it was founded while giving voice to every citizen, would do credit to the ideals of democracy. The symbol of French liberty, Marianne in her Phrygian cap, losses all meaning if she cannot also be imagined wearing an Islamic headscarf with the same connotations of freedom and fraternity for all.

The biggest challenge presented to the government of France is balancing the long-standing secular republicanism, which has been a cornerstone of French governance since the revolution, against the reality of an ever-growing plurality amongst its constituents, and the genuine threat of terror attacks targeting civilians indiscriminately.

Rory McDonell, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

PIRA

Sitting Down with the Enemy: The IRA, Good Friday Agreement, and Negotiated Peace

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was one of the world’s longest lasting terrorist groups. The group came into being in 1969 after a splintering of the IRA leadership; and, the PIRA represented a more militant and extreme approach to the cause of Irish republicanism in Northern Ireland. The PIRA mounted a sustained terror campaign against the British, with the aims of bringing about universal civil rights, as well as a united Ireland, sovereign and independent from the United Kingdom.

The PIRA depicted themselves as the legal voice of the Irish people, which seemingly vindicated the violent course of action they pursued against both foreign occupation and domestic collaborators. The PIRA is a “nationalist” terror group, with similar tactics, but wildly different goals of other terrorist organizations.

The PIRA used bombings, shootings, beatings, assassinations, and kidnappings as a means of coercion. They killed thousands of people and injured countless other. Their victims included members of British, Northern Irish, and Irish security services, politicians, as well as both republican and loyalist paramilitary rivals. However, many of their victims were innocent civilians who had no connection with any paramilitary, political, or security organization.

Hard British Counterterror Responses

As the sectarian violence spreading through Northern Ireland increased, so did the violence and intensity of the British response. In 1969 the U.K. deployed soldiers on the ground in Belfast and other contentious northern areas.

When U.K. soldiers were first deployed, the Catholic and republican minorities initially welcomed the military, as they were viewed as a bulwark against loyalist violence. This perception was soured by three events in the 1970s. The first two events included The Falls Curfew in 1970 and Operation Demetrius in 1971, in which hundreds of Catholics were subjected to internment without trial, and the third event was the Bloody Sunday massacre in 1972. Bloody Sunday, in particular, was viewed as a direct attack on innocents; 14 unarmed civilians, peacefully protesting, were killed in a horrific shooting. This escalation of military presence, and extra-judicial violence, led to an equal and opposite escalation of violence on the republican side.

Each of these British interventions was justified as a method of bringing peace and order to the streets, yet each served to strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the Provisionals, who utilized each as a recruitment tool.

This is a common issue with “hard” counterterror strategies. Like a Hydra, for every head that is severed, multiple heads regrow in its place. It also gave the PIRA the opportunity to portray the nationalist minority of Northern Ireland as the victims of inhumane treatment at the hands of security forces. This, in turn, was used to validate their ongoing terrorist activity.

Soft Response: Peace Process and Politicization

Despite this escalation, softer methods were being implemented behind the scenes. In 1988 John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), began a series of secret discussions with the Sinn Fein president, Gerry Adams. It was Hume’s belief that peace would only come to Northern Ireland if the PIRA could be persuaded to pursue their agenda solely through their political wing.

An agreement was reached that the responsibility for the future of Northern Ireland should be in the hands of the people who lived there. The British agreed to negotiate from a position of neutrality, and Hume and Adams released a joint statement arguing that self-determination was the right of the Northern Irish people as a whole. This marked a significant steppingstone that moved the conflict away from terrorism and towards political negotiations.

The Good Friday Agreement in 1998 was the culmination of this negotiated peace. Central to the agreement was the statement that all those engaging in talks gave a commitment to “democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issue.”

After 29 years of violence, the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was the major political breakthrough that laid the foundation for peace. The PIRA disarmed, and while there are still flashes of sectarian and communal violence, the peace has held for more than two decades. The road to peace has brought the PIRA from the murder of close to 2,000 people to having their political wing in a power-sharing government with their former adversaries.

Lessons for Counterterrorism

When approaching strategies to deal with terrorism, it is critical to remember the adage of Sun-Tzu: to know yourself and know your enemy. The British failure to recognize the legitimacy of the PIRA’s base goals, their unwillingness to fairly treat the Catholic minority, and their aggressive military response did little to mitigate the violence. The very strength of their response invited challenge and resistance, which led to violent calamity and catastrophe. Understanding their own culpability, and moving towards a softer approach, allowed more moderate and reasonable voices to be heard, ultimately leading to a cessation of hostilities and a politicization of the PIRA.

Sitting down with the enemy is an often difficult, sometimes impossible task. Yet providing a less violent means of enacting change was the only strategy which had any measurable effect on the three-decade long cycle of violence in Northern Ireland.

 

Rory McDonnell, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

United Kingdom

The State of Terrorism in the United Kingdom

Terrorism within the United Kingdom, over the past decade, has encountered many critical threats that have challenged its security. While the island nation is not unique in the threats it faces, it serves as a useful case study to analyze upcoming trends affecting its allies for the foreseeable future. By doing so, the United Kingdom and its allies can better understand emerging challenges and better support transatlantic security. To complete this aim, policymakers must investigate the history of terrorism within the United Kingdom and newer hazards to British society.

Challenges of the 20th Century

In the 20th century, one of the United Kingdom’s greatest threats was insecurity derived from Irish separatism threatening its territorial integrity. One of the earliest incidents of this insecurity occurred over a century ago during the Easter Rising of 1916. During this event, a coalition of Irish groups hoped to demand greater autonomy for Ireland while the United Kingdom was preoccupied with fighting the First World War. Although initially taken aback, British forces overwhelmed those involved in the rising. When the dust had settled, hundreds had died from the fighting and the event leaders were sentenced to death.

The Easter Rising would be a pivotal moment in Irish political history because it drew the Irish public’s support for their cause. Consequently, the rising would also inspire future generations of Irish separatists to use violence for a united Ireland.

The most infamous terrorist group which the Easter Rising would inspire was the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The group traces its heritage to the first organization to hold that name which fought the British Army during 1919. Ireland would be partitioned two years later and serve as a backdrop for the worst fighting between the IRA and loyalist paramilitary groups.

The IRA truly became infamous during the period known as the Troubles, which lasted from the 1960s to the 1990s. The sectarian violence claimed the lives of thousands and ended in signing the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The agreement created several integral institutions such as the Northern Ireland Assembly providing lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Critical Threats in the 21st Century

In the new millennium, the United Kingdom’s primary threat to their national security stemmed not from Irish separatism but from Islamic extremism. This was made clear after the July 7th London bombings which killed 52 civilians. For much of the 2000s, al-Qaeda was the group responsible for either perpetrating or inspiring attacks in the United Kingdom. However, this changed with the rise of ISIS, which grew in capability and resources to inspire attacks. By the end of the 2010s, ISIS garnered attention with the 2017 Manchester bombing.

During 2022, the United Kingdom still faces an acute threat from Islamic extremism, but it also faces a rising challenge from right-wing extremism. In January 2022, a 17-year-old in the United Kingdom was arrested on suspicion of wanting to commit violence against members of the Muslim community and kill thousands of others. The head of MI5, Ken McCallum, stated that his agency is seeing young teenagers radicalized through the internet.

Policy for the Future

While the rise in right-wing extremism is not exclusive to the United Kingdom, it must understand the conditions causing this rise. In the present century, there has been a proliferation of technology designed to create a global public square and enable democratization of knowledge. Instead, the generations who have grown up with this technology have become increasingly isolated and have fewer friends than previous generations.

Many individuals have scoured the internet in search of companionship and comradery but instead are preyed upon by extremist groups who have grown in capacity to do so. Furthermore, the country which they find themselves in is also expected to become more ethnically diverse over the coming decades. Such conditions have compounded to create an environment rife for British youth to be wrangled into right-wing extremism.

To combat such developments, the United Kingdom should institute initiatives to alleviate the isolation which their youth face. The United Kingdom should also bolster its security through increased engagement in Northern Ireland and its domestic Muslim community; both areas could become sources of unrest.  Brexit and the increased capacity for ISIS recruitment efforts following the withdrawal from Afghanistan are both sources of increased unrest.

Moreover, they should also bolster their cybersecurity capabilities as competition will intensify in the coming decades. The United Kingdom will be subject to attempted penetrations in cyberspace by foreign governments to ascertain sensitive information. Should they back a harder line on authoritarian governments, there will also be efforts to weaken their resolve to do so. By taking initiative, the United Kingdom can be prepared for the upcoming years that will certainly present a challenge to their security.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Repatriation

The Repatriation of European Women and Children

In 2019 there was a major incident of the capture of women and children possibly linked to ISIS. Approximately 1,000 women and children from Europe were imprisoned in camps in northeastern Syria, occurring after the crisis with ISIS.

Major Obstacles for the Repatriation of Children in EU

Diplomatic roadblocks created challenges for Europe to repatriate children. There were countless European and global efforts to resolve the problem of repatriations. However, continued refusals to repatriate children stemmed from legal excuses.

Unfortunately, the inability for the children to identify themselves as European citizens was another crucial obstacle they faced.  It was infeasible to prove their identification, especially under the barbaric and inhumane conditions in the detention camps. This resulted in an urgent call for help for the children to the European states in order to provide a practical solution to the nonexistent legal and identification documents so that they could return home.

European Security Endangered by ISIS

Former members of ISIS and their families detained in camps and prisons in northeastern Syria mean “a ticking bomb” for European security, the EU’s new counter-terrorism chief reported recently. Ilkka Salmi, the new counter-terrorism coordinator, provided for the first time at the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defense a detailed speech related to the most concerning threats in Europe. Salmi pointed out that in order to improve the humanitarian situation, the EU must support Syrian and Iraqi refugee camp residents to reintegrate into local communities.

Also, Salami emphasized that the consequences of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan led to the conclusion that the EU had to prevent the infiltration of terrorists “through the development of a common procedure for systematic and timely security checks of biographical data, for instance, against all the relevant EU and internal databases.” Salmi also warned that they “might have a not insignificant number of Afghans” evacuated by the U.S. and now waiting in Kosovo, who could pose security concerns for the EU.

According to sources and recent events, jihadist terrorism constitutes the greatest threat to Europe. The Islamic State looks for Europeans to join them in developing future attacks. Overall, more attacks were reported in 2020 than in 2019. Ten attacks occurred in 2020, resulting in 12 deaths and traumatizing nearly 47 people. In addition, lone-actor-jihadist terrorists, often linked with larger terrorist groups, have organized several attacks over the last seven years.

The Repatriation of Children and Women in 2021

On October 28, 2021, the United Kingdom repatriated three British children from detention camps in northeast Syria, according to Rights & Security International (RSI). Although the repatriation of the children was highly important, RSI demanded to have a more organized plan for the return of all the British children, their parents, and their caregivers.

Sweden is one of the highest-ranked countries in Europe for individuals participating in ISIS. The beginning of the repatriation process resulted in confusion and panic as several Swedish relatives searched to bring their relatives home. The Kurdish government organized a solution by bringing everyone back to their roots. However, it was a temporary relief and has not been repeated since.

Throughout 2021, Belgium and Finland repatriated children via organized methods. Since then, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kosovo have also completed a safe return for women and children previously held in the Syrian camps.

Germany has returned eight women and 23 children from a camp in northern Syria who participated in the Islamic State.  According to German officials, they were brought back in a joint operation with Denmark, in which three women and 14 children were returned.

Most of the European members of the Islamic State were usually held in Kurdish camps in northern Syria. In March 2019, most of the European Islamic State members were exiled in Kurdish camps since the fall of ISIS. Overall, the German Foreign Ministry announced in October that women and children had arrived at Frankfurt Airport from the Roy Prison Camp in northeastern Syria.

After approximately two years of indifference to the circumstances in the repatriation of children and women in Syria, the time has come for the European states to take drastic measures in order to process their repatriation.

 

Katerina Rebecca Paraskeva, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Ukraine

Resisting Russia: Ukraine on the Verge of a Far-Right Insurgency

An unclassified U.S. intelligence document, first reported on December 3rd by The Washington Post, revealed that Russia is planning a massive military offensive against Ukraine as soon as early 2022, involving up to 175,000 troops.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly expressed concern regarding NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. In 2008, NATO, an American-led military alliance, promised membership to Ukraine. Russia saw this offer as a threat to its borders and an intrusion into its sphere of influence. Whilst Ukraine is still working to meet the admission criteria for NATO membership, the U.S. has declared an “ironclad commitment” to Ukraine’s security. The current crisis has provoked fears of an escalating war on European soil.

Should Russia enact its planned offensive, Ukraine’s military would quickly fall. “If Russia really wants to unleash its conventional capabilities, they could inflict massive damage in a very short period of time,” said Robert Lee, a Russian military expert at King’s College, London. “They can devastate the Ukrainian military in the east really quickly, within the first 30-40 minutes.”

In 2014, when Russian troops seized the Crimean Peninsula, Russian-backed separatists launched a takeover of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Ukraine’s military was unable to mount an effective resistance, and volunteer brigades took up arms to defeat the separatists. Eight years later, Ukrainian military officials have begun to speak of how they could mobilise a similar guerilla resistance of irregular military units to counter Russian occupation. One senior military official has stated that, if all else should fail, the Ukrainian military would simply open its weapon depots and allow the Ukrainian people to arm themselves.

Extremism within Ukraine’s Security Forces

The increasing possibility of a counter-Russian guerilla insurgency prompts further analysis of the ideologies of the armed units and volunteer battalions already operating within the country, and who would likely play a key role in such a resistance. Indeed, these groups have already been referred to as “Ukraine’s most potent and reliable force on the battlefield.”

Whilst many of these groups officially fall under the command of the Ukrainian government, they are far from a conventional military force, with many of them retaining their own distinct identity and command structure. The loyalty of these groups to the current government is far from certain, and some volunteer battalions have even been accused of war crimes.

The Azov movement was among the 30-odd volunteer units that helped defeat the takeover of the Donbas region by Russian-backed forces in 2014. Since then, Azov has become one of the most powerful militias in Ukraine. Whilst the group has sought to downplay its more extreme elements, Azov’s ideology of far-right ultranationalism is hard to deny. The group’s logo is a mirrored Wolfsangel, a symbol used by Nazi Germany, and most widely known as an emblem of the SS division Das Reich.

The group’s members openly espouse white supremacist and fascist ideology. Many of them have links to other neo-Nazi groups and have been accused of targeting minorities in Azov-controlled territory. The group’s first commander, Andriy Biketsky, stated in 2010 that Ukraine’s national mission was to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade… against Semite-led untermenschen [subhumans].” The group has already been accused of numerous human rights violations and war crimes, including mass looting, torture, and rape.

Groups like Azov are central to Ukraine’s expanding prominence as a major international hub for far-right extremism. Azov’s online recruitment strategy has helped establish a cult-like global following of fascists and white supremacists and has contributed to a flow of more than 17,000 foreign fighters who have come to Ukraine since 2015. This flow of foreign nationals is motivated by the allure of fighting alongside other far-right extremists. Many of them see Ukraine as a training ground to develop combat skills which they can bring home.

Security experts warn that Ukraine is radicalizing far-right foreign fighters in the same way as Syria has with Islamist extremists, creating an international network of combat-trained extremists. “I believe Europe is in great danger” says Alberto Testa, an expert on far-right radicalization at the University of West London. Testa describes Ukraine as a staging ground for a “white jihad struggle” where extremists can “train for what some would call racial holy war.”

The United States’ “Ironclad Commitment”

The prominence of far-right extremist groups within Ukraine introduces substantial complexity to the United States’ security commitment. Should Russia’s planned offensive occur, the Ukrainian military would quickly fall, and a grassroots insurgency of armed units and volunteer battalions would rapidly emerge as the country’s most effective resistance.

Far-right ultranationalist units, such as Azov, would likely be among the strongest elements of this insurgency, as they were during the 2014 campaign against Russian-backed separatists. The guerilla tactics led by these units would likely represent the country’s greatest weapon. Indeed, these tactics represent “Ukraine’s best deterrent against Putin’s invasion force,” according to counter-insurgency specialist Thomas X. Hannes.

So far, the U.S. has attempted to distance itself from the extremist elements of Ukraine’s security forces. It has sought to prevent military assistance from reaching Azov. The State Department has branded Azov’s political and paramilitary offshoots as “nationalist hate groups.” However, should Ukraine face the offensive described in intelligence reports, then these elements would be central to the country’s counter-Russian effort.  The U.S. would need to make a difficult choice: does its “ironclad commitment” to Ukraine’s sovereignty justify support for far-right extremists?

Conclusions

The situation in Ukraine represents years of diplomatic failure. The international community’s inability to resolve the Ukraine crisis has fueled violence and extremism within the country’s borders, and beyond. The conflict has turned Ukraine into a violent training ground for fascists and white supremacists, creating a global network of combat-trained extremists ready to wage racial holy war. The crisis also has the potential of igniting a terrifying, and possibly catastrophic, global conflict.

The United States and Russia should work urgently to prevent the possibility of armed conflict and propose a solution for the crisis in Ukraine. The security and prosperity of the Ukrainian people should be central to any peace-seeking effort in Eastern Europe. If NATO and Russia are to co-exist peacefully, then they must work together to build mutual trust, challenge hatred, and serve the cause of peace.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Bosnia

Powder Keg of the Pandemic: Exploring the Ongoing Situation in Bosnia

Since the start of the pandemic there have been many worrying trends within global affairs. Among these have been the deteriorating relations between global powers and a stark contrast between the allocation of vaccines of affluent nations with that of the globe’s poorest nations. Additionally, there exists a dire crisis within the Balkans, which has been critically overlooked. Renewed ethnic tensions within Bosnia and Herzegovina are threatening the integrity of its governing institutions.

The Bosnian War has largely defined the small Balkan nation, which ravaged the country in the late 1990s. The conflict shaped the governance in the country, with the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords splitting the nation into ethnic divisions with the Serbs residing in Republika Srpska and the Muslim Bosniaks as well as Croats residing in the rest of the country.

As a result of the ethnic divisions which plagued the country, the government was organized into a tripartite presidency allowing a representative of each major ethnic group to have their voice heard in policy matters. This measure was intended to ease tensions between Bosnia’s ethnic groups, as they feared that an opposing group could marginalize them if given the sole monopoly on power.

The Current Crisis

The current crisis stems from Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik espousing irredentist rhetoric about leaving key institutions. Among these talking points include withdrawing from the military of Bosnia, which reignited sore memories of atrocities committed by Serbian paramilitary groups during the Bosnian War. His actions were also emboldened by nefarious regional actors who simply seek to weaken the integrity of Bosnia’s institutions at the expense of the nation’s citizens. A renewed conflict along ethnic lines would lead to a loss of economic progress made since 1995 and a humanitarian crisis.

Mounting Tensions

Prior to the pandemic, there were clear signs of political gridlock in the country surrounding several key issues. One such issue, which has become emblematic of gridlock among the major ethnic groups, is that of NATO membership.

Russia has used the separatist aims of the minority Croat party (Croatian Democratic Union) and the Bosnian Serb party (Alliance of Independent Social-democrats) to influence the ascension of Bosnia to key continental institutions, which would weaken their foothold in the Balkans. Russia has long viewed itself as a brother-Slavic nation to Serbia and came to its defense in the First World War. It now capitalizes on this historical relationship to only further its political aims at the expense of smaller states. It has long been a sphere of influence in which it sees as vital to its security.

Policy Recommendations

To reduce the possibility of armed conflict between Bosnia’s major ethnic groups, the United States and Europe need to take action. The actions of Milorad Dodik have been caused by the reduction of credible deterrence and concrete assurances of bringing Bosnia into the fold of key European institutions. The scope of Operation Althea needs to be expanded with Bosnia to send a credible deterrence to nations seeking to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. Chief among the most salient atrocities of the Bosnian War is the Srebrenica massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 8,000 Bosniaks left behind by a United Nations force bereft of deterrence.

Second, the United States and European Union should introduce sanction regimes in concert on individuals who seek to engage in continued separatist rhetoric while in an official capacity of the Bosnian government.

Third, the European Union should reengage with Bosnia to encourage permanent reform within the governance of the country, to be more inclusive of the ethnic minorities within the nation, as well as provide tangible timeframes for Bosnia to join European institutions.

A Region to Be Heeded

Historically, the Balkans have long been a source of conflict, ranging from the Balkan Wars of the 1910s to the Yugoslav Wars of the late 1990s. With a region that has produced devastating crises to international security, it is important for the aforementioned policies to be implemented to avoid igniting the powder keg of Europe.

In present conditions, the presence of COVID-19 only serves to exacerbate a potential humanitarian disaster, should armed conflict arise. Such a disaster would also serve to impede a pandemic response with larger powers backing their preferred factions rather than coordinate global public health efforts such as COVAX.

 

Chris Ynclan, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Rise to Peace