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Terrorism Southeast
 by Rise to Peace

Security and Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Southeast Asia

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), a comprehensive study prepared by the Institute for Economics and Peace on the impact of terrorism in 163 countries, reports that since 2020, the Southasia region has recorded a higher fatality rate compared to other regions. According to GTI 2022, among Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia top the list. On the other hand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos are least impacted by terrorism.

Although GTI is an ideal tool to assess the impact of terrorism on countries, the study is not without limitations. The countries are ranked based on four indicators: incidents, fatalities, injuries, and property damage. It means that the index relies only on the ensuing consequences of terrorism and fails to take into account the persisting threat of terrorism. For instance, according to the GTI 2022, Singapore is least impacted by terrorism. However, the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2021, published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, acknowledges that the terrorism threat to Singapore remains high. The situation is similar to that of an active volcano. It means that a ‘zero score’ in GTI, as in the case of the majority of Southeast Asian countries, may not necessarily imply that the country is free from terrorism threats.

The terrorism activities reported in the Southeast Asia region reveal the changing dimension of international terrorism. In March 2021, a woman lone wolf attacker, inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), opened fire at the National Police Headquarters in Jakarta. In the Philippines, two women ISIL terrorists staged suicide bombings to avenge the death of their terrorist leader. Dr. Rommel C. Banlaoi, the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research chairman, warned of the increased active participation of women in terror attacks. Further, he stated that women also teach and encourage children to be their successors after martyrdom. The situations indicate the spread of female militancy in the region and the intergenerational succession of terrorism.

The Singapore ministry of home affairs cited self-radicalization, Islamist terrorism, and far-right extremism as a potential threat to its homeland security. The ministry confirms that within Southeast Asia, ISIL remains the primary terrorism threat actor. ISIL’s success in digitalization of radicalization has accelerated the spread of propaganda and lone wolf attacks in the region. The situation makes it challenging for law enforcement agencies to identify sleeper cells and prevent acts of terrorism.

The nexus between conflict and terrorism is apparent in Myanmar. Political turmoil fuelled violent conflict leading to terrorism has landed Myanmar on top of GTI 2022. Since the military coup in February 2021, there has been a significant rise in terrorist attacks, and the  Anti-junta armed groups are responsible for causing the majority of deaths. Terrorism continues to breed on push and pull factors or vulnerabilities born out of conflicts, such as political instability, violence, poverty, unemployment, forced displacement, and oppression.

Thailand continues to be a transit and facilitation hub for terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hezbollah. The country is facing political instability, which impedes the government’s efforts to implement a counter-terrorism strategy. Further, Bangkok has become a hub for global organized crime syndicates. A report of the Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime confirms that organized crime syndicates are targeting Southeast Asia to expand operations, and the profits generated by such groups have reached unprecedented and dangerous levels. There exist a nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Organized crime facilitates terrorism and vice versa. Organized crime breeds in areas with political instability and a weak law enforcement system. Terrorism creates fertile ground for organized crime to breed. On the other hand, organized crime aids terrorist organizations in recruitment, funding, and logistics. In short, this nexus is capable of eroding regional security, as is the case in Southeast Asia.

An analysis of the counter-terrorism efforts made by Southeast Asian countries evidences the success of regional cooperation in overcoming the challenges and threats posed by evolving terrorism. A joint declaration of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN)  to counterterrorism strongly condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and declares terrorism as a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress, and prosperity. ASEAN has established a regional framework to control, prevent, and neutralize transnational crime. The ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism aims to strengthen mutual legal assistance, cooperation, and rehabilitative programs to combat terrorism.

At the national level, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia are pioneers in counter-terrorism efforts. Indonesia is effectively implementing the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy. It means that the country is making an effort to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, prevent and counter-terrorism, support member states and the UN to combat terrorism, and promote the rule of law and human rights. Indonesia has sought the support of the international comity in addressing the issues of terrorism financing and foreign terrorist fighters. The Singapore government has initiated the ‘SGSecure movement’ to empower its citizens to effectively identify radicalization signs and report suspicious activity. The programme is spread through educational institutions, civic societies, workplaces, etc. The government acknowledges the importance of people’s participation in countering self-radicalization and terrorism. Similarly, Malaysia has established specialized institutions, including the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT), to counter terrorism and extremism through partnerships for goals, capacity building, and research.

Varun VM, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow 

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Marawi
 by Rise to Peace

Five Years After the Philippines’ Marawi Siege: Lessons from Within

It has been almost five years since armed militants from two ISIL-affiliated organizations, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute, battled with Philippine government forces on May 23, 2017. The siege ensued when the military attempted to arrest senior ISIL leader Isnilon Hapilon.

As a result, attackers retaliated, proclaiming the city a nascent caliphate of ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant, more commonly known as ISIS. Before capturing the city’s major thoroughfares and significant bridges, the armed militants caused severe damage to Catholic churches, the city jail, and two schools. Militants also beheaded a police officer and took churchgoers and residents hostage.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte imposed martial law across the entire island of Mindanao on the evening of the assaults. Initially, President Duterte expected the fighting to finish in a matter of weeks. However, he had no idea that this was simply the beginning of a more bloody and horrific assault.

Who Were the Perpetrators?

The main commanders of this unprecedented assault, Isnilon Hapilon, and brothers Abdullah and Omar Maute were members of the local armed groups, Abu Sayyaf and Maute. Both groups have historically been responsible for bombings, attacks on government forces, and hostage-taking in the Philippines. However, foreign militants participated in the war, including those from Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Chechnya. There is also evidence that the terrorist members involved in this attack enlisted a significant number of radicalized children and teenagers, many of whom were recruited from Marawi’s local schools.

During the conflict, an estimated 1,200 people were declared dead. Although the majority of these were militant extremists, Amnesty International claimed that the militants also carried out kidnappings and extrajudicial executions.

Mission Accomplished

The capture of Marawi prompted the Philippines’ most prolonged armed combatant insurgency. Government troops seized a stronghold on October 16, 2017, killing both Hapilon and Maute. After troops subdued the remaining ISIS fighters on October 23, 2017, five months after the siege began, Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said there were no more “militants” in Marawi, which ended the long, weary battle.

The Aftermath of the Marawi Siege

The Marawi crisis, which affected many residents, had a significant impact on the local market and the daily needs of Marawi families. According to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Philippines, the Marawi armed conflict between government troops and pro-ISIS insurgents has internally displaced 98% of the area’s overall population, as well as villagers from nearby municipalities, who were forced to flee due to severe food scarcity and political and economic restrictions.

How is Marawi Now?

After years of planning and reconstructing the country’s sole Islamic city, Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) is nearing the completion of the major rehabilitation operation for internally displaced families. Even within Marawi’s most impacted area, or “ground zero,” the Maranaws, particularly those displaced by the 2017-armed war, are now reaping the first dividends of the government-led rebuilding.

Meanwhile, the Marawi Fire Substation, a Maritime Outpost, the Rorogagus Barangay Health Station, the Marawi Central Police Station, and a solar power irrigation system were all completed, to help the Maranaws embrace a complete and secure community with peace and stabilization.

Furthermore, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) administration has set aside P500 million for Marawi’s reconstruction in 2021 as part of the newly-formed government’s 12-point priority plan.

Lessons Learned and Reflections as a Filipino Counter-Terrorism Practitioner

I have learned that the scars of this historic siege will undoubtedly persist in the hearts of those who were affected, as well as the troops who were determined to defend the people, even if it meant risking their lives. The standard narrative is that it is their job. However, I am referencing their fortitude in the midst of their weapons’ failure; terrorist groups have also leveraged technical advancement in plotting, recruiting, and networking, making it even more difficult to obverse.

Filipinos are known for their “resilience.” Most people define it as the ability to bounce back from setbacks, embrace change, and persevere in the face of adversity. It is meaningless to be resilient if the Philippine government’s response to these issues is ambiguous. How eager and probing is the government to promote research to fight atrocities in the aftermath of the Marawi Siege? Is this enough, if there is a movement at all? What was the intensity of the response to the Marawi crisis?

We should not box our belief that resilience is the only chance. There is also hope, the ability to recognize important goals, the measures required to achieve them, and the willingness to take those steps. This requires an extensive effort of the government to connect with the civil society in order to prioritize their goals in the field of local security. Although the resilient superhero is often thought to be preferable, it has a dark side; it possesses the same characteristics that hinder self-awareness and, as a result, the ability to maintain a realistic self-concept.

As a Filipino, I believe we should start by assessing where we stand in terms of counter-terrorism operations, such as preventing and suppressing terrorism financing, and encouraging constructive dialogue on counter-terrorism challenges, particularly based upon the principles between state officials and the private sector, social service organizations, and news outlets. Although there is evidence of a deterrent, the government should always consistently take action to prevent such unprecedented happenings.

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Myanmar
 by Rise to Peace

Insurgency and the Narcotic Chain in India and Myanmar

Moreh is a small commercial gateway between India and Myanmar. It rests on the Northeastern side of the Indian border and is linked with Tamu, a small town in the Sagaing region in Northwest Myanmar. It is here that 99% of all land-based trade takes place between the two countries.

Amid the commercial exchange, the gateway also serves as a smuggling route for illegal trade and human trafficking. Narcotics like heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants are illegally smuggled across borders through this route. Other goods such as teak, gold, and firearms which are banned for trade without official license are also illegally traded.

A report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GIATOC) stated that serious smuggling ‘which has the potential to destabilize the wider Northeast’ takes place despite the counteractive measures taken by the state. The Northeastern region which is highly reliant on informal economy makes it arduous for state policies to be strictly enforced. It is for this reason that concerned officials, at times ‘tacitly ignores’ the illegal flow of contrabands which do not pose ‘political threat’ to the country. Given, the recent pandemic crisis which devastated the formal economy, it has been reported that the smuggling cases in the region have been exacerbated.

Act East Policy and its Challenges

New Delhi’s plan is to fast track the development process in the Northeast through the Act East Policy, which paves the way for locals to gain more income opportunities and employability. However, in such a region which is overwhelmed with insurgency and illegal trade, major challenges arise for the implementation of developmental policies.

Developmental funds tend to indirectly finance insurgent groups through extortion and ransom demands by insurgent groups. Insurgent outfits who operate in these regions extort significant sums of money for every cargo truck that passes through National Highway 102 and 37. The GIATOC reported that for every cargo truck that passes through the NH, a sum of 50,000 Indian rupees (680 US Dollars) is being extorted. In cases of failure to make such payments, workers and truck drivers are often kidnapped for ransom.

In the case of developmental projects, extortions take place in the form of percentage demands. The department responsible for setting up any projects are illicitly levied taxes on a range of 2-10 percent. With such illicit activity thriving in the region, it curbs and delays development initiatives taken up by the government or multinational corporations.

The ongoing India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project which aims at linking India with the Southeast Asian countries has potential in creating ample opportunities for the region. However, the issue of insurgency and illegal trade can run parallel and can be exacerbated with the outset of new roadways to the region if such activities are not counteracted.

The thriving drug trade through the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos) can further expand its domain through these new linkages, influencing the wider northeastern region in India. It is reported that 80 unofficial crossing points exist between Moreh and Tamu. These crossing points are primarily used for smuggling. Hence, a substantial amount of drugs makes its way to Imphal which further leads to Kohima and on to Dimapur where, through its railroad, the drugs end up in Assam. From there the drugs are further distributed to the rest of India. Accordingly, the insurgents from the region make the best use of this opportunity and actively participate in this chain of narcotic supplies.

Extortion and the illicit trade of narcotics continue to destabilize both countries economies. The rising number of unemployment and the fatality rate of youths can both be attributed to these factors. Hence, a joint effort needs to be taken by both the countries to contain and curb such activities.

Recommendations

The Indian government has strategic approaches to tackle the supply of narcotics and drugs in the country, through both domestic policies and diplomatic approaches. However, with the thriving narcotic supply and extortion through the Moreh-Tamu roadways, it is evident there is more to do and that India along with Myanmar need to develop ground-level economic and security policy approaches in tackling the issue.

Though India has already elicited corporation from Myanmar in a bilateral agreement on narcotics control, more efforts are needed on the ground level. The exchange of intelligence and information is crucial; however, they are insufficient to tackle an issue which is linked to the heart of the narcotics trade.

Both India and Myanmar should set up more checkpoints on the newly established roadways and pay close attention to the 80 unofficial crossing points between both countries. For the Myanmar government this would be arduous, given, the Arakan Army and other insurgent group’s strong control over the region. However, with India, who has a slight upper hand in tackling the insurgency issue in the Northeast through its political approaches, security measures can be taken by strategically intensifying the presence of Border Security Forces and Paramilitary forces like the Assam Rifles in the border roads. Further, joint military operations with proper intelligence, the likes of Operation Sunrise in 2019, can be effectively utilized.

It should also be noted that economic measures are also paramount amid the security issues in both India and Myanmar. Hence, identifying the narcotic production and supply chain and further initiating better employment drives for the farmers and youths engaged in the illicit activity should also be prioritized.

With the ongoing political dialogue with some insurgent groups in the Northeast, there is potency in curbing the extortion and drug trades in the future. Hence, once a final settlement is reached, India can utilize the intelligence and manpower of the ex-insurgents to curb future drug trades and contraband supplies.

 

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Philippines
 by Rise to Peace

The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Proactive Countermeasure Against Abu Sayyaf

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) come from a split of the Moro National Liberation Front, which was renowned as an active terrorist organization in the Philippines in the 1990s. Additionally, reports indicate that Al-Qaeda has funded and backed Abu Sayyaf. The organization is affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah and specializes in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, assassinations, and extortion, and are responsible for numerous violent incidents between 2011 and 2018.

The ASG is concentrated in the Sulu Archipelago’s Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan Provinces, with a strong and active presence in Mindanao. On occasion, members also travel to the capital of the Philippines, Manila. Unsurprisingly, the ASG has also been characterized as a criminal-like group because they are more profit-driven than philosophical. Most of its factions declared their allegiance to Daesh in 2014.

Abdurajak Janajalani, the group’s founder and senior leader, founded ASG in 1991. Janjalani studied in numerous Middle Eastern countries with the help of a so-called “fundamentalist organization.” He grew politicized and formed extreme ideas after studying and traveling in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other nations. Janajalani encountered Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, according to the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and may have been one of the fighters who defended Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. He considered Bin Laden’s philosophical narrative a gift because of his strong links with the past and was inspired to bring the ideology back to his homeland, the Philippines.

So, what exactly is Janjalani’s objective in Mindanao, Philippines? Janjalani’s goal is to create and execute an Islamic territory in southern Philippines, and an independent Salafist Sunni Islamic organization dedicated entirely to the Moros moiety.

For many years, it was assumed that this small group was fighting against the governments of the United States, Spain, and the Philippines. They claimed they had been repressed, resulting in the Bangsamoro fight, which molded their historical narrative. Furthermore, in 2016, the Islamic State released a video in which four “battalions” of militants from the Abu Sayyaf vowed loyalty to the group, indicating a visible allegiance to the Islamic State.

Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Comprehensive Efforts After the Marawi Siege

After the Marawi Siege in 2017, the Philippine government has increased its efforts to persuade ASG members to hand over their arsenal and surrender. A ground campaign had been implemented to retake the city of Marawi in southern Philippines, where militants connected with Daesh had assumed control, which resulted in a subsequent crackdown on the ASG leadership.

Since 2017, there has been a decrease in ASG-related incidents. According to statistics from the 11th Infantry Division, a Philippine defense force tasked with countering militancy in southern Sulu Island, ASG’s heartland; the number of militants operating in the area has reduced from around 300 in 2019 to about 100. Militant groups associated with Daesh reportedly lost foreign support in Sulu. “We are no longer monitoring fund transfers from the outside,” said Maj. Gen. Patrimonio, commander of the 11th Infantry Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Capitulation and Clash: Continuous Efforts of the AFP in Mindanao

In the province of Basilan, a follower of the ASG was killed in a quick shootout. On Friday, March 4, 2022, the clash occurred in Mangal village, Sumisip, as per Brigadier General Domingo Gobway, commander of Joint Task Force (JTF)-Basilan. According to Gobway, the forces were in the middle of a tactical operation when they were informed of the presence of Buloy Parang, an ASG supporter, in the Mangal village. Parang operated as a courier and anti-personnel explosive planter in the Sumisip area for the ASG alongside Pasil Bayali.

Army commanders reported that troops of the 41st Infantry Battalion tracked down and fought pro-Islamic State terrorists in a firefight in the village of Bungkaong in Patikul town on March 26, 2022, one of the Abu Sayyaf’s few surviving sanctuaries. There were no “issues of enemy fatalities,” but Patrimonio said soldiers found numerous items left behind by the insurgents, including one M16 automatic gun. According to him, no soldiers were seriously injured or killed in the incident.

On April 2, 2022, two suspected members of the ASG were killed, and nine others were injured in confrontations with government troops in the Basilan area. According to Brig. Gen. Domingo Gobway, head of Joint Task Force-Basilan, four of the nine casualties were soldiers from the 64th Infantry Regiment.

Since January 2022, there have been more than four reports of ASG surrendering or clashing with the AFP every month. Along with these stories, local governments have sponsored programs to attract militants to return to the folds of the law and bring peace together. Various reports have been made about prominent ASG officials surrendering. “Our struggle was going nowhere,” remarked Faizal engagements with government troops, as per the military, the first of which occurred in 2014. Several of the ASG’s trainees come from the communities where the militants take refuge. Furthermore, other senior leaders at ASG have either been killed or surrendered to the AFP.

What is Next for Abu Sayyaf?

The apparent absence of Islamist militant operations in Mindanao, the Philippines’ southernmost island, is beguiling. Militancy in the region appears to be on the wane in 2020 and 2021. The AFP besieged terrorist strongholds and welcomed large numbers of insurgents’ surrenders, mainly from the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the ASG.

Following that, unsuccessful operations and the decapitation of global terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and ISIS, among many others, may have influenced the militant groups’ demise in the Philippines. Because these enormous organizations have also been crippled to their core, no support, allegiance, or finances have been shown to Philippine-based Islamic groups. Regardless of this gradual win, the presence of these groups is still evident. They may rise again, and may have spotted the right timing, for they still value their ideology. But then again, as long as the campaign against them is upheld, it might continuously dissolve in the coming years.

 

Kristian N. River, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Neo JMB
 by Rise to Peace

The Threat of Neo JMB in Bangladesh Since the 2016 Holey Artisan Attack

Attacks spread panic and chaos among civilians and law enforcement agencies. Following the 2016 attack at the Holey Artisan Café, security forces in Bangladesh established various counterterrorism and peacekeeping measures. Although there was a decline in terrorist attacks, the current trends and analysis of interactions with ISIL indicate that the Neo Jama’ Atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo JMB) can launch an unprecedented terrorist attack.

Terrorist groups such as Neo JMB are leveraging social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to spread misinformation and recruit members through radicalization and spreading fear. JMB seeks to replace Bangladesh’s system of governance with Sharia law and the Islamic model. There is a significant increase in domestic extremism and radicalization in Bangladesh through modern advanced technologies and social networks that could result in attacks in the future.

Funding and support from various individuals and organizations have ensured that terrorist organizations thrive despite efforts to eradicate the groups. Terror attacks negatively impact the lives of civilians and peacekeepers in the country. This analysis focuses on terrorism, extremism, and counterterrorism measures. In addition, it focuses on bringing peace among different groups of people with respect to gender, race, and religion.

Threat Analysis on Bangladesh

The Neo JMB claimed responsibility for the Holey Artisan Café terrorist attack in July 2016 in Dhaka. In addition, the group has natured a network of female jihadists. Several members of the military wing of the Neo JMB group were arrested in 2021 by various anti-terror organizations in Bangladesh. Following the attack in 2016, Security Forces (SF) have combated over 47 terrorists, including prominent group leaders.

Many youths in Bangladesh continue to resonate with the Islamist ideologies that claim to continue the fight to establish Caliphate. Videos released by ISIL in August 2019 urged support from Bangladesh to carry on the war by targeting the enemies around them, including political leaders, non-Muslim communities, and law enforcement agencies. Numerous arrests were made in Dhaka for Neo JMB members who had explosive devices and other weapons for conducting terrorism.

Following the recapture of Afghanistan by the Taliban may encourage Neo JMB in Bangladesh, resulting in a surge of militancy attacks on civilians and peacekeeping forces. The return of Jihadists from Afghan and Syria is equally a critical challenge to the authorities. In addition, the radicalization of youths in Bangladesh could result in unprecedented extremism and a resurgence of violence.

During crackdown and operations in 2021, Bangladesh security forces were experiencing heavy exchanges and discovering advanced ammunitions in possession of members of the Neo JMB group. They have arrested some members of the terror group who are experts in bomb manufacturing and possess explosive materials, remote controls, and manuals to produce weapons that could be used for mass destruction. Therefore, there is a high possibility that the group could be preparing to launch an attack in the future.

Despite ongoing joint counterterrorism efforts, the residue members of the terrorist organizations and continued radicalization cannot be ignored. According to intelligence sources, the parent JMB group was founded in 1998 and conducted synchronized blasts in August 2005, which injured over 100 people and claimed the lives of three. Although the organization went quiet later, the members of the initial organization are now operatives and a crucial part of military planning and radicalization for Neo JMB. For instance, Mohamed Enayet, arrested in 2006 with explosives, spread radicalization inside the Kashimpur jail.

Although security forces are trying their best to break structures and terror organizations, the group is advancing its recruitment methodologies through radicalization and extremism, internal communications, and preparing for attacks. In addition, Neo JMB is recruiting highly trained youths who combine the knowledge from different educational disciplines with advanced technology to overwhelm security forces and evade counterterrorism measures.

Recommendations

Multiple factors result in the violent extremism and radicalization of Neo JMB recruits. These include economic, political, religious, and social reasonings. Bangladesh can employ several strategies to minimize violent extremism by incorporating economic development, tolerance, and peacebuilding strategies.

Effective economic development models can address challenges that youths face. There is a need to reduce economic issues, including corruption, unemployment, and poverty. Early intervention safeguards young people from recruitment into terrorist groups. Additionally, the government has a role in countering individuals and organizations that finance terrorist groups through the Financial Intelligence Unit.

Also, the government must provide equal rights to minimize conflicts among social and religious groups. The government should use an inclusive economic development model that promotes development, tolerance, and diversity. The Bangladesh government must focus on better methods for gathering intelligence and changes in criminal justice systems.

Crackdowns on group members can disrupt the recruitment process, the radicalization of youths, and attacks from the Neo JMB. The government must pass legislation that secures the borders of Bangladesh. It is significant to ensure that returning fighters from Afghanistan, Syria, and other nations affected by violent extremism do not become agents of terror groups by providing technical and strategical aid to other terrorist organizations.

 

Aru Rongchitim Tisso, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Rise of ISIS in Afghanistan
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Special Report: The Rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the deadliest and most potent terror groups the world has ever known and has made its way to Afghanistan. It emerged due to interstate fragility, foreign policy failure, and perennial instability in the Middle East. The 2003 United States’ intervention in Iraq and the Arab Spring contributed to the creation of ISIS. The United States’ removal of late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein — hardly the region’s first socio-political convulsion — facilitated figurative tectonic shifts in political and religious realities. Sunni Muslims, who long ruled Iraq, suddenly found themselves overtaken and systematically oppressed by Shiites. ISIS capitalized on the subsequent Sunni grievance. Given the recent developments which have included President Trump dropping the “mother of all bombs” which targeted a network of tunnels used by ISIS in 2017,  the loss of territory in Syria and the continued battles with the Taliban, has led ISIS to look for new opportunities. This search has led ISIS to move toward Afghanistan as they are geographically strategic and currently the government is very fragile.

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 by Rise to Peace

Remembering Rajani Thiranagama and Examining the Roles of Women in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka

”One day some gun will silence me and it will not be held by an outsider but by the son born in the womb of this very society, from a woman with whom my history is shared.”

The quote above is from Rajani Thiranagama just few months before her assassination in 1989. She was assassinated by the people she sought to represent. While this event occurred 31 years ago, it begs the question where do women in Sri Lanka stand now, especially after the Sri Lankan Civil War?

Rajani was an individual who loved peace, order, equality and strove for a harmonious society. What made her memorable was her courage to realize this philosophy into reality. When the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) betrayed her hope for peace for the people of Jaffna, she officially cut ties with the organization. She was forced to flee to the United Kingdom with her children shortly afterwards.

In the 2005 documentary “No More Tears Sister” it was mentioned how Rajani felt like evading the conflict and moving far away. However, for the people of Jafffna, she overpowered her fear and returned to Sri Lanka.

When atrocities committed by the Sinhalese government, the LTTE militants and the Indian peacekeeping forces peaked, Rajani along with fellow university colleagues formed an organization that criticized the actions of the atrocious groups and strove to achieve basic rights for the people of Jaffna. She also documented each and every local woman whose male family members were either killed or missing, and highlighted their plight. She compiled her report and named it “No More Tears Sister.”

Looking into the situation post-war, according to an article by United Nations Women, there is underrepresentation of women in political and public decision making in Sri Lanka. Even though it claims that women are 56% of voters, there is only 5% representation through legislators. The source of such plight is considered to be lack of educational opportunities and lack of encouragement of women in decision-making.

During the civil war, political movements and organizations that strove for peace were initialed by women, such as Mother’s Front. However, after the war, hardly any such large-scale representation of female participation is evident. In consequence of poor representation, laws in the country discriminate against women. To give some examples, marital rape remains legal, there are discriminatory legal restrictions on women in the workforce and limitations have been imposed in relation to inheritance and property.

In a common-sense point of view, women are linked with peace. Due to perceiving their roles as nurturers, women are considered to be effective mediators. Ironically this role seems to be limited to only resolving conflicts at the familial level or just remains unsung as “unofficial” contributors to their communities. There are few instances of the official recognition of women in the peace-building process as well as much less encouragement of their role in it.

During the period of the Sri Lankan Civil War, women suffered the most. They had to go through the trauma of losing their children, husbands, fathers and brothers throughout the conflict. In those times of helplessness, they had to gather courage and run their household. As they have experienced the state of vulnerability during the war, they know the value of peace.

This is why there is a need to empower, encourage and acknowledge women in their potential to take on roles in the peace-building process. The first step towards it can be through proper representation, especially in decision-making.  Peace can be only achieved through equal access to opportunities and proper representation.

–Nelofer Laskar

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 by Rise to Peace

Understanding Memories of the Sri Lankan Civil War

Memory is not just the process of retaining events that happened in the past as it has a major function of validating reality. Memories do not have a predefined structure as they are shaped according to the emotions, relations, and the locations of the one recollecting an event. By preserving memories, the narrative of an event is kept alive and it further allows people to share among other fellow memory-bearers, thus creating cultural memory and establishing a new identity of one’s own. When these harbored memories are threatened, the bearers aggressively show their discontent. This is what happened in Sri Lanka last month.

Memories related to the Sri Lankan Civil War were threatened and it gave rise to two incidents. The first one surrounded controversies related to the making of a film about veteran cricketer Muttiah Muralitharan. The supposed lead actor Vijay Sethupathi faced anger and threats from the Tamil community for accepting the role of a person who is accused of dismissing the Sri Lankan government’s brutality during the war and having ties with the oppressor, being a Tamil himself.

The second incident is related to Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. He was invited as a special guest to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the United Nations. This raised some eyebrows as he is often accused of being one of the perpetrators of the Civil War.

Both these events had the same functional problem: perceived threats against a collective memory. The protests against the film were made by the Tamil community as they feared that such representations threaten the memory they have of the Civil War. The invitation of Rajapaksa as a chief guest in an UN event was criticized for similar reasons.

In the controversy around the film, it seems like protesters were immersed in these memories that bittered the present for events from the past. However past is never discontinuous from present. When there is an audience to remember, the event no more remains only a component of past, but also of the present. That is why people scrutinize how memories of past events are represented. Representations are ways to remember and they have the potential to change memory or its interpretation.

These incidents also portray the phenomenon of cultural trauma — where groups of people that share the same identity collectively remember atrocities against them — in relation to the Sri Lankan Civil War. This war lasted for 26 years and it has been barely over a decade since it ended. No wonder the country is still recovering from the horrors of those days.

The traumas experienced by the people during that time have become a shared memory and thus giving it the shape of cultural trauma. Trauma is not instilled due to the potential of harming oneself or due to the rupture in the usual routine, but because they are perceived to have abruptly and harmfully affected the collective identity. Now imagine the trauma being invoked when proper reconciliation approaches are not made or the perpetrator of the war (the reason of their trauma) is acknowledged as chief guest for an event at an organization that promotes the idea of peace and security. This is what Human Rights Watch meant by “slap” on the face of the victims.

As long as there is difference in remembering an event, there will be conflict as different groups of memory-bearers will feel threatened by misrepresentation of the memory and further distortion of it. This risk of distortion even threatens their much shared identity in the present.

The first step to reconcile these differences or to avoid conflicts is the recognition and acceptance of different ways of remembering an event. This can be done by acknowledging not only the dominant narrative of a particular event, but also that of the invisible or the “unheard” part. The way an individual remembers an event is important as it paves the way to connection to past events that facilitates the construction of history. A past which is accepted by all will also lead to acceptance of all.

–Nelofer Laskar

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Trump on Afghanistan
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Afghan Promises and a Peace Plan in Trump’s State of the Union Address

At the State of the Union, President Trump endorsed peace talks with the Taliban and promised that he continues to work to “end America’s wars in the Middle East” and bring troops home. He stated:

“In Afghanistan, the determination and valor of our warfighters has allowed us to make tremendous progress, and peace talks are underway. I am not looking to kill hundreds of thousands of people in Afghanistan, many of them innocent. It is also not our function to serve other nations as a law enforcement agency. These are warfighters, the best in the world, and they either want to fight to win or not fight at all. We are working to finally end America’s longest war and bring our troops back home!”

The US-Taliban talks

Mark Esper, the United States Defense Secretary, stated intent to reduce the number of troops to 8,600 from 14,000 with or without a deal with the Taliban. This aligns with statements made this past Monday by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the Taliban must first give “demonstrable evidence of their will and capacity to reduce violence” for peace talks to progress.

 In the past week, US Special Envoy for Peace and Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad completed talks in Doha, Qatar where he met with the Taliban political office and later with the Afghan political community in Afghanistan. There have been numerous talks behind closed doors and open discussions with the Taliban on issues of reduction of violence, US troop withdrawal, and a possible interim government to end the Afghan conflict. Nonetheless, nothing is promising, and Afghanistan is an unpredictable country with so many elements in flux.

A US deal with the Taliban will be condition-based primarily anchored on the US troop withdrawal, the Taliban commitment to cut ties with al-Qaeda and the renunciation of Afghan soil as a place to plan  attacks against the United States and its allies.

The Afghan dilemma

The prolonged ethnic conflict in Afghanistan is at the root of the political rift in Afghanistan. A race for power and supremacy supplanted any rational opportunities for compromise in the inner workings of the Afghan political community. Ethnonationalism is on the rise thus escalating tensions between tribes and ethnicities and  — most importantly — among the youth of Afghanistan. A September 2019 presidential election stirred deeper chaos and left its people uncertain over the future of their country. 

The Taliban game of politics

Taliban has been rather successful in the advancement of their interests of power and recognition.  A regime that was established in the 1990s and toppled by the US in 2001 has now emerged with a mission to build a global reputation and controls a significant portion of Afghan territory, where they set up an Islamic Emirate or similar form of government. Establishment of such a political system nationwide is their strategic objective and a peace deal — or no deal — will not change that.

Taliban have said recently that they agreed to a short-term ceasefire, but left any questions about a permanent ceasefire unanswered until an agreement with the US on troop withdrawal is reached. They hesitate to hold any talks with the Afghan government as they believe the Afghan government is weak and is unready to negotiate and respond to Taliban demands. The Afghan government simply wants the Taliban to surrender and end the violence. This has become a deal-breaker for intra-Afghan dialogue. 

 Talks between the US and the Taliban are only the first step of a long process. Intra-Afghan dialogue — where the Taliban meet with Afghan officials — is the next step. In this phase, both sides of the conflict will discuss key barriers, demands, amendments to the constitution to increase the likelihood of success in reaching sustainable peace in Afghanistan.

 Promising future?

Convincing the Afghan political community to negotiate with the Taliban is the hardest part of achieving Afghan peace. Throughout the nine rounds of peace talks, the Taliban presented themselves professionally with one voice and one strategy while the Afghan representatives seem to lack a clear vision with a government that appears unsupportive of their efforts. The Afghan government has not finalized the list of peace talk participants yet.

 Here are three possible scenarios for Afghanistan

  1.     Presidential election: A new government should be established through a second round of elections between the two front-runners given that candidates failed to reach 52 percent of the vote. The winner with 52 percent of the vote would become the president of Afghanistan and will have to negotiate with the Taliban in the next 5 years.
  2.     Interim government: It is a reasonable option that an interim government should be formed until a stable Afghanistan can create a new government. The last elections were a complete failure due to security challenges, electoral fraud, technical difficulties and a low voter turnout (approximately 1.5 million voted in a country of 35 million citizens), thus an interim government offers a path forward for now.

  3.      The continuation of the current regime: It is even more likely that the current regime retains power in a situation where a second round of elections are indecisive and the Afghan political community cannot compromise on an interim government.

Afghanistan’s future is unpredictable with so many moving parts though Afghans are hopeful that peace is possible. Trump’s State of the Union speech acted as yet another reminder that the situation in the country continues to perplex domestic and international political actors as they continually seek opportunities to end the decades of violence.

in Ahmad Mohibi / Asia / Rise to Peace blog 2 comments
Afghanistan
 by Ahmad Mohibi

An Afghanistan peace might be in reach, after all

It is a rational assumption that President Trump is likely to resume peace talks in Afghanistan after comments made during a Fox News radio interview. Trump said that the United States is “working on an agreement now with the Taliban” as well as “Let’s see what happens.”

The impetus towards this change of heart is rooted in recent events in which two university professors — an Australian and an American — were released this past week in exchange for the top three Taliban commanders, including Anas Haqqani. 

This past September, Trump abandoned the peace agreement with the Taliban due to the death of an American soldier and the high level of violence in Afghanistan. A subsequent United Nations meeting with the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and the latest hostage release compelled the US to pursue an agreement with the Taliban. 

Sayed Akbar Agha, a former Taliban commander, told TOLOnews that “the talks right now are underway secretly and I think that they are in favor of Afghanistan.” He added, “based on my information, official negotiations are not underway like they were in the past.”

Afghan presidential spokesman Sediq Sediqqi said that “this time, we are in agreement in the sense that our goals and priorities for peace are completely clear, with issues like a reduction of violence which will result in a ceasefire, and, ultimately, the start of direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.”

Any effort to reduce violence in Afghanistan is in the best interest of all sides of the conflict, including the Taliban. With or without a peace deal, no circumstances justify the targeting of civilians.

A Civilian’s View

While the secret meetings are taking place, Afghans are confused, discouraged, uncertain and lost over the future of their economically unstable and politically corrupt country. Key factors fomenting these sentiments include:

  1. a lack of election results for the presidential elections that occurred two months ago
  2. a peace process without a true destiny that only results in violence
  3. withdrawal of US troops and the potential development of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorism and a battleground for regional rivalries.

Afghan citizens remain hopeful and willing to make sacrifices for peace as it has been the norm over the past 18 years. However, dealbreakers include political manipulation, destruction of schools, mosques and the lives of their children.

Political Complications

Taliban are not the only problem in Afghanistan; political, religious and influential leaders contribute to political instability as well. Historically and culturally, Afghans have been at war with each other as the result of toxic politics and ethnic conflicts provoked by foreign interventions continue into the present day. 

Afghan domestic rivalries remain a serious concern and an obstacle to peace. The incumbent Afghan government is posed to be the victor in the latest elections and consequently aim to extend terms. Conversely, opposition parties currently boycott the election counts, are engaged in building resiliency and regrouping for a possible state of emergency in case of any attempts by President Ghani’s team to shift results in their favor. 

Opposition candidates like Abdullah Abdullah (current Chief Executive of Afghanistan) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (leader of Hizbi Islami party and presidential candidate) chastised the government over any efforts to meddle in the elections. In any case, political leaders will lead Afghanistan into a state of chaos jeopardizing any peace effort, and more critically, contributing to a strengthened Taliban.

A clear solution requires Afghan political leaders to commit to a unity government whilst combating transnational terrorism and making peace with the Taliban.

Lessons Going Forward

The Trump administration must heed lessons learned over the past 18 years. This includes the decisive support of a specific candidate and signing any peace agreement with the Taliban.

Two points are crystal clear and require serious attention. First, the Taliban are in a war for their reputation. They want to manipulate the situation to demonstrate a significant victory in their favor. The group continues to grow and regroup due to funds generated through drug trafficking, illicit resources and donations from foreign donors to ensure the continuation of ‘jihad.’

Making peace at the macro-level is good, but it is imperative to pay closer attention to the sources of Taliban financing. This is important to stop the insurgency from gaining strength and subsequently challenging local governments.

The likelihood of the peace process is significantly reduced if the Taliban continues to fund its operations through illicit means at the same time as it negotiates with the American and Afghan governments. It is vital to cut their finances (especially assistance from wealthy foreign donors) and block their drug trafficking routes.

As long as drug trafficking remains profitable, the Taliban will continue to buy weapons, ammunition and pay fighters, which leads to a continuous cycle of war. Bankrolling the Taliban means they will not enter peace process negotiations in good faith.

American interests must determine whether the Taliban’s true intentions are peace or manipulation of the entire situation to ensure a shift of dynamics for their benefit. A deal should be struck if Taliban leaders promise to reduce violence and leave civilians unharmed. At the same time, the Taliban must respect the peace talks process. They cannot engage in lethal attacks and expect to gain the support — and hearts — of Afghans and American negotiators. All sides of the conflict should work to build trust and confidence. 

Each side desires disparate conclusions. The Taliban wants all US troops to withdraw while Afghans want American forces to remain. This is a serious issue and it cannot be pushed aside. Afghanistan is not ready for the US to leave or simply trust the Taliban to rebuild Afghanistan through a negotiated settlement.

American support is required to ensure the country does not develop into a safe haven for terrorist organizations with a wider regional reach. Simply put, the US is the main actor in this situation — acknowledged by both the Afghan government and the Taliban — so they must stay as long as it takes and broker a deal.

Second, the US should be cautious about choosing a preferred president in the next Afghan government. Any attempt to support a specific candidate in the context of a fraudulent vote and with a negative reputation will further jeopardize the US presence in Afghanistan. It is best to gain respect while implementing US foreign policy focused on combatting terrorism, building Afghanistan and stabilizing the region. 

Realistically, 2 million votes are not a true representation of a 34 million population. US decision-makers must critically think about how they will manage scenarios in which the Afghan election committee announces one candidate as the victor, nationwide protests erupt or how to quell angry candidates with strong local ties. 

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