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Katibat Macina
 by Rise to Peace

Katibat Macina: A Growing Threat in Mali

According to a statement by the Malian government, heightened attention is on Katibat Macina, an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization, for its massacre of 132 civilians in central Mali.  Mali has not seen a death toll that high from an isolated incident since 2012, leaving the country in a complete state of grief since the attack in late June. Katibat Macina continues to grow throughout Mali and is becoming an increasing security threat in the region.

The Mali War and Current State of the Conflict

In 2012, the Mali War began, and its roots are attributed to the fourth uprising by the Tuareg separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. This uprising led an Islamist takeover of all northern cities of Mali. It included an improvised military coup against the standing Malian military. This conflict has led to the deaths of over 25,000 people and caused the displacement of over four million. With the severity of this conflict and requests from the Malian president, France, and the UN Peacekeepers became involved in hopes of mitigation. However, French troops are withdrawing due to disagreements between leaders on best practices. This leaves the Malian government with UN Peacekeepers and their military committee that has yet to be able to counter the continued insurgency.

In the past year, the Malian government has heavily relied on Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group to support their fight against jihadists. Efforts to mitigate the growing jihadism in Mali have yet to be stopped and have spread throughout the Sahel, leaving the Malian military without significant progress towards peace.

Background of Katibat Macina

Katibat Macina first found its roots in 2015 from its founder and current leader, Amadou Kouffa, a former member of Ansar al-Din, another terrorist organization in Mali.  Katibat Macina first gained attention for their attack on the Byblos Hotel in Mopti. By 2016, the group’s operations focused more seriously on the Niger Delta, an area known for its rich agriculture, which only exacerbated the number of displaced persons throughout Mali.

After much public rejection for their harsh interpretations of Shar’ia, Katibat Macina was forced to hold a softer approach when aiming to gain more recruits. The group was able to grow and eventually shifted its main focus to attacking UN operations and personnel throughout Mali.

Massacre of 132 Civilians

From June 18, 2022, to June 19, 2022, Katibat Macina attacked the villages of Diallassagou, Diamweli, and Deguessagou in the Bandiagara area of Mali. Katibat Macina arrived armed on motorcycles and executed mostly men throughout the villages and set fire to many of the homes, vehicles, and barns forcing survivors to flee to Bankass.

Local sources have attributed this attack to the people of these villages for their cooperation with the Malian government and Russian mercenaries on counterterrorism efforts in the area. Katibat Macina attacked two additional cities; however, the fighters were ousted by traditional Dozo hunters or armed Dogon militiamen before the attack reached civilians. The Bandiagara area has often experienced jihadist violence, but nothing as severe as this recent massacre of innocent civilians. Some sources have claimed that the actual death count is lower than what has been reported in an effort by Dogon militiamen to gain more weapons; the Malian government has rejected these statements.

Current Mitigation Efforts & Outlook

Efforts to counter Katibat Macina have included ground combat, interviews of victims, and airstrikes. The Malian government has sent airstrikes in an effort to counter Kabitiat Macina in the vicinity of Bankass and Segue, as well as in Djenne and Tenenkou, where some of its members were located. Both the Malian government and Russian mercenaries have ramped up their counterterrorism efforts in these areas following the massacre.

The growth of jihadism in Mali and its presence throughout the entire Sahel has continued to grow without fail. The UN continues its peacekeeping efforts throughout Mali with its operation, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. However, this UN mission is often referred to as the most dangerous mission for peacekeepers due to high attacks targeting UN officials.

Following the withdrawal of French troops from Mali, the Malian government is struggling to properly counter these terrorist groups on their own, even coupled with the help of the UN. The Malian military needs proper funding and support from the international community o mitigate this growing security threat and prevent further massacres.

 

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

 

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Famine
 by Rise to Peace

Impending Famine in Somalia Exacerbated by Al-Shabaab

Somalia has been facing the region’s worst drought and possible famine conditions within the past 40 years.  Experts confirm climate change contributes to the drought conditions impacting the Horn of Africa, including Somalia. Somalians are living in a territory under the control of al-Shabaab and are paying high taxes on the sale of livestock, soil preparation, and harvests; many farmers are fleeing the situation, thus lessening harvests and in turn contributing to the famine conditions worsened by the drought.

Current State of the Drought and Forthcoming Famine

Six districts encompassing over 250,000 people are at high risk of famine in Somalia. 72 out of the 84 districts within the country are impacted directly by three consecutive unsuccessful crop production and rainy seasons, leaving the country at its driest in 40 years and forcing over 500,000 people to relocate. It is estimated that Somalia could suffer from famine within the next month. In 2011, an estimated 250,000 Somalian deaths were attributed to famine. In addition, food insecurity for over six million people has left international aid organizations scrambling to provide food to malnourished individuals.

Background of Al-Shabaab in Somalia

Al-Shabaab formed in the early 2000s has quickly grown into a local and regional threat to Somalia and its border nations including Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. The organization made significant gains in its early years, however, as more forces entered to mitigate its growing security threat including the African Union, and Western forces, the group was forced from major population centers. Al-Shabaab had many different goals; their overarching theme is to establish an Islamic State in Somalia and oppose any Western-backed government. The locations of the group remain fluid throughout the country, but there are some strongholds in southern and central districts in the country and are vying to gain more control in the north. Ultimately, al-Shabaab still poses a significant security threat both locally and regionally.

Taxes by Al-Shabaab

After a briefing in Mogadishu, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s special envoy for the drought situation, Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, stated, “people are fleeing not only the drought, but also insecurity. In areas controlled by al-Shabab, the terrorist group has prevented people from farming.”

Members of al-Shabaab have continued to force crippling taxes upon Somali farmers at such high rates that people have been forced to flee their land. Farmers are forced to pay taxes at every stage of farming and harvesting; the tax when selling livestock is more expensive than the value of the actual animal. These taxes are forcing farmers to flee, thus slowing the production of the already minute harvests throughout the country.

Al-Shabaab currently has control over the majority of the most fertile areas of land in the country that include both the Jubba and Shabelle rivers. It is estimated that the group collects nearly as much tax revenue every year as the entire government of Somalia through sophisticated networks making countering this issue that much more difficult.

Contradicting Actions

In January 2022, al-Shabaab announced that it would start a “drought relief” campaign in an effort to help Somalians and boost their campaign. This action only contradicts their taxing efforts because while they are simultaneously exacerbating the drought and famine, al-Shabaab is attempting to solve the problem in an attempt to gain support from the public. This campaign by al-Shabaab has made no difference in mitigating the famine.

Outlook and Mitigation Efforts

The current outlook of the state of the drought and famine is incredibly grim and is only worsening as taxes by al-Shabaab continue. If there are no drastic changes in the amount of aid currently provided, thousands of Somalians are at risk of famine and will continue to suffer the impacts of climate change firsthand.

The U.S. has decided to redeploy almost 700 ground forces to Somalia to train the Somalian military to counter the growth of al-Shabaab. The Biden administration believes that a persistent presence of U.S. forces in the country will help the Somalian military make more gains against al-Shabaab than they have made in the past year. The African Union has continuously kept forces in the country with the same goal as the U.S. Aid organizations continue to work in Somalia, but as al-Shabaab grows, it makes it harder for them to distribute life-saving aid. One can only hope for a more positive future for a country that has already suffered so much, and hopefully, the end of al-Shabaab could bring Somalia some much-deserved peace.

 

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Sub-Saharan
 by Rise to Peace

Islamic State Allegiances in Africa: A Sub-Saharan Breakdown

The ideology of the Islamic State has taken a significant hold in Sub-Saharan Africa. The group’s ideology has spread from just the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to a rapidly growing movement throughout Africa encompassing thousands of members. The Islamic State has various affiliates throughout Africa, including the Islamic State West Africa Province, Islamic State Central Africa Province, Islamic State Mozambique, and others who have pledged their allegiance to the organization.

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was first officially recognized by the Islamic State in the spring of 2019. Its first operations occurred in Burkina Faso near the Malian border and western Niger, and northeastern Mali. The ISGS has spread to southern Mali, and along the border of Niger and Burkina Faso. This organization has claimed the Tongo Tongo attack that occurred in Niger in 2017 that resulted in the death of four American and four Nigerien soldiers. This organization is a sub-group of the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), after being taken over by ISWAP in 2019. The goal of the ISGS is to establish a Salafist-Jihadi caliphate.

Islamic State West Africa Province

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) first pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. While ISWAP is often referred to as Boko Haram, the two organizations diverged from one another in 2016.

In late August 2021, ISWAP faced a significant setback when its former leader, Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, was killed. The details surrounding Al-Barnawi’s death remain greatly disputed; it is argued that Nigerian troops killed him, but others attest that he was killed by a rival organization. Despite this setback, ISWAP remains active throughout West Africa. Its most recent attack was on June 5, 2022, at an annual festival in Okene, Nigeria, that resulted in the death of two people.

Islamic State Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Islamic State Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) is active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda. This organization was first officially recognized by the Islamic State in 2018, but it may have begun operations as early as 2017.  In 2021, this group conducted attacks that resulted in the deaths of 1,200 people in just the DRC, not including its large-scale urban attacks in Uganda. It was formerly known as the Allied Democratic Forces but rebranded and aligned its ideology with the Islamic State.

Islamic State Mozambique

Officially recognized by the Islamic State in August 2019, the Islamic State Mozambique (ISIS-Mozambique) is most widely known for its siege of Palma in the province of Cabo Delgado in March 2021.  A French company, TotalEnergies’ liquified natural gas plant was attacked causing the project to be suspended until safety was guaranteed.  ISIS-Mozambique’s actions, overall, have resulted in the deaths of over 1,700 civilians and the displacement of 784,000 people from Northern Mozambique.

 Islamic State Central Africa Province

The Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) does not work as a cohesive unit but rather is an overarching entity comprised of distinct regional affiliates, such as ISIS-Mozambique and ISIS-DRC. These two organizations are distinctly different in their attacks, goals, and actions throughout the DRC and Mozambique and, therefore, should not be viewed as one single group.

Outlook and Mitigation Efforts of the Islamic State in Sub-Saharan Africa

The ideology of the Islamic State has taken hold of thousands throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, making the region a breeding ground for more radicalization and attacks.  Countless organizations, countries, and private militaries have become involved in hopes of slowing the growing threat of the Islamic State in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Reasons behind the involvement of the Islamic State in Sub-Saharan Africa range from economic instability to individuals identifying with the organization’s ideology, leaving a complex and extensive range of issues that the international community must address and mitigate. Without proper economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of individuals involved with the Islamic State will likely grow. It is uncertain the future of the Islamic State in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the Islamic State’s affiliate organizations continue to grow, and without a proper and warranted response, this security threat will continue to increase.

 

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Natural
 by Rise to Peace

Europe Turns to Mozambique for Natural Resources Despite Islamic State Attacks

Allegedly, energy companies are planning to return to the Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado despite unrest caused by ISIS-Mozambique. Due to the unrest with Ukraine and Russia, liquified natural gas production has slowed. Therefore, Europe is turning to Mozambique in hopes of mitigating the slow production.

Liquified Natural Gas Project in Mozambique

The Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Project, led by TotalEnergies, began with the discovery of a vast amount of natural gas in 2010 off the coast of Northern Mozambique. It was previously on track to begin providing liquified natural gas in 2024. Still, production has been put to a halt since April of 2021 due to the security situation in Cabo Delgado. LNG was forecasted to bring in over $100 billion to Mozambique in just 25 years of production.

Origins and the Current State of ISIS-Mozambique

ISIS-Mozambique has been in operation since October 2017, with Abu Yasir Hassan as the lead. Currently, 670,000 people within Northern Mozambique have been displaced, and the ISIS-Mozambique has claimed the lives of more than 1,300 civilians. According to reports, ISIS-Mozambique allegedly pledged allegiance to ISIS in April 2018, and was officially acknowledged by ISIS-Core in August 2019.

While it is unclear how many individuals are currently fighting for ISIS-Mozambique, the number is estimated to be in the thousands. The group quickly grew by leveraging economic grievances in a poverty-stricken and resource-rich area of the country. Additionally, ISIS-Mozambique provided loans to young men without any opportunity otherwise.

ISIS-Mozambique’s Palma Attack

On March 24, 2021, a siege lasting four days by an estimated 200 ISIS-Mozambique fighters left dozens dead at the Cabo Delgado town of Palma, with much of the city’s infrastructure destroyed. The town of Palma is home to over 70,000 people. There were numerous foreign workers for the LNG project trapped at the project site in the nearby area of the Afungi Peninsula. The prospect of ISIS-Mozambique gaining access to the LNG project proved worrisome and extremely dangerous; it would be alarming if high-yielding natural resources fell under their control.

Continued Attacks by ISIS-Mozambique

In the past six months, there have been numerous attacks in Northern Mozambique by ISIS-Mozambique. The violence has continued despite growing military interventions from different groups deployed to Mozambique in hopes of mitigating the continued violence. There are 24 countries and a multitude of other organizations working in Mozambique, including troops from Rwanda, the European Union, the South African Development Community military force, Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.

Europe Turning to Mozambique for Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)

As the crisis in Ukraine continues, the shipping of LNG in Russia has reduced significantly. Russia provides one-third of the LNG to Europe, behind the U.S. and Qatar. After Russia invaded Ukraine, most international investors involved in Russian LNG projects froze their financing shares.

Europe has now turned to Mozambique in hopes of filling their need for LNG. Italian Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio traveled to Mozambique in hopes of developing new deals regarding LNG supply partnerships as well as European government officials and parliament members have met to discuss how to best reduce its reliance on Russia’s liquified natural gas.

Outlook for Future Company Involvement

Mpho Molomo, the head of the Southern African Development Community mission in Mozambique, stated that it was too early to declare Mozambique safe enough to renew operations. The current state of Cabo Delgado has not reached a point of stability to guarantee the safety of energy company workers.

Environmental activists have viewed this as an opportunity to emphasize renewable energy sources instead of depending on fossil fuels, such as LNG. While attacks have slowed in Mozambique, it is still not safe enough to continue production despite the need of liquified natural gas in Europe. If the safety of the workers are not guaranteed, production should remain halted until ISIS-Mozambique is no longer a threat.

 

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Al Shabaab
 by Rise to Peace

The New Fight Against Al Shabaab

To counter the growth of Al Shabaab in Somalia, the Biden Administration has made the decision to deploy U.S. troops to Somalia. This decision came with a request from the Department of Defense to provide a persistent presence in Somalia.  In the previous administration, former President Trump withdrew all 700 U.S. troops from the country, a decision made during his last weeks in office. It is estimated that 450 special forces troops will be deployed to continue U.S. counterterrorism operations within Somalia.

Al Shabaab’s Rise to Power

Al Shabaab came to power in June of 2006 when they overtook Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. After an invasion in December of 2006 by Ethiopian forces into Somalia to counter Al Shabaab, the terrorist organization was forced to flee to the south of Somalia. Following this invasion, from 2006 to 2008, Al Shabaab’s membership skyrocketed from the hundreds to the thousands. By 2012, the group also announced its allegiance to Al Qaeda. As of 2020, there are an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 members of Al Shabaab in Somalia and its surrounding countries. The objective of Al Shabaab is similar to that of the Islamic State being that their ultimate goal is to create an Islamic State in Somalia and rule with their interpretation of Sharia Law.

Differentiation from the U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan

Comparing this issue to that of Afghanistan, President Biden’s statements about ending the “forever war” in Afghanistan by withdrawing all troops contradict his actions of redeploying U.S. troops to counter yet another Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization, Al Shabaab.  This troop deployment is justified due to the more direct threat of Al Shabaab and its affiliation with Al Qaeda, which pose a greater risk to U.S. security. Al Shabaab presents a more direct threat to the U.S.; its strategic relationships and location make this terrorist organization an increased threat in comparison to the Taliban.  Thus far, the Taliban does not have the capacity nor stated desire to presently become a danger to the U.S. and its allies.  However, Al Shabaab’s intentions for this have been made clear and entirely possible.

The Plans of the U.S. Government

All soldiers planning to redeploy will be U.S. Special Operations forces.  This operation aims not to engage in direct combat but to train local Somali forces to counter Al Shabaab and its affiliates effectively. This decision was a part of a larger request from the Department of Defense to have the U.S. military establish a base of operations in Somalia; they believe that a persistent presence from the United States military could help mitigate the growth and spread of Al Shabaab and their ideology. In support of this strategy, Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby stated, “our forces are not now, nor will they be directly engaged in combat operations. The purpose here is to enable a more effective fight against al-Shabab by local forces. The pattern of popping in to conduct limited operations was inefficient and increasingly unsustainable.”

Growth of Al Shabaab Without Any Intervention

It has been argued that from the perspective of Army General Stephen Townsend, head of U.S. Africa Command, that the initial withdrawal of troops from Somalia in January of 2021 hindered the ability of local and international forces to counter Al Shabaab. If no efforts to counter this group’s exponential growth are applied, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates the group’s violent attacks are set to rise by 71%.

Newly Elected Somali President’s Stance on Working with the West

This decision to redeploy troops is in conjunction with the election of a new president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, on May 15, 2022, following a five-year hiatus from the presidency. Mohamud is set to align with the West and has a desire to collaborate with the international community to counter the growth of Al Shabaab. During Mohamud’s hiatus, Al Shabaab spread throughout Somalia, fending off African Union Forces. The African Union will be one of the confirmed affiliate organizations that U.S. forces will work with in tandem.

Outlook for Future Mitigation

This growing threat of terrorism in East Africa, specifically from Al Shabaab, has fueled President Biden’s administration’s decision to redeploy U.S. Special Operations forces.  The chaos that ensued through the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan makes another invasion to counteract terrorism worrisome that the U.S. will be caught in another never-ending war.

As the U.S. deploys troops, a clear plan is essential with clearly articulated end goals to ensure that the U.S. military does not get involved in another decades-long war. This deployment of troops brings hope to the people of Somalia that they may finally be able to live in their country without fear of constant terrorism. Nonetheless it is unclear exactly when we will see tangible results from redeployment, training of Somali troops, and coordination with other international entities.

 

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Nigeria
 by Joan McDappa

Examining Militancy in Nigeria: Mistakes of the South and Lessons for the North

On June 25, 2009, then President of Nigeria, Umaru Musa Yaradua, made a proclamation granting amnesty and unconditional pardon to everyone who directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences, including those facing prosecution at the time, associated with militancy activities in the Niger Delta region. The requirement for this pardon to be effected was dependent on simply: the surrender of weapons and renunciation of militancy forms by concerned individuals at collection centres established for this purpose by the government. For about sixty days only, this proclamation stood valid, and in that time, over 20,192 individuals had accepted the terms of this amnesty offer.

In the same year, Boko Haram began an armed rebellion against the Nigerian government with multiple attacks across parts of northern Nigeria. Years later, Boko Haram became categorized as a terrorist group both in Nigeria and internationally, launching several attacks within Nigeria and neighbouring countries. For the last 12 years, Nigeria’s government steadily increased its responses to counter-terrorism, albeit widely perceived as counterproductive. More recently, the Nigerian government’s execution of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) program raises questions about its effectiveness.

The Identical Problem

The Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Insurgency are two main threats Nigeria has dealt with since its independence in 1960; both cases led to significant economic losses. Although the ideologies behind the two conflicts differ, the basis on which these ideologies come to be is very similar. In both scenarios, there is an ongoing deprivation of some sort, whether it be a functioning system where communities have access to basic amenities, or perceived injustice and marginalization, resulting in grievances that then form the ideological structure of these groups.

For the Boko Haram insurgency, endemic corruption is often cited as a menace in the Northern region that deprives the communities of even the basic needs that the government should provide. Widespread unemployment, lack of primary health care, massive poverty, and a general absence of the State all served as drivers for Boko Haram’s campaign in the North, especially in attracting recruits.

Similarly, unemployment, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic and political marginalization are unfortunate realities that communities in the Delta region face, leading to overwhelming amounts of militant activities. Between 2007 and 2009, the agitations in the Delta region worsened so much that Nigeria recorded an estimated daily loss of $58 million. The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) was an attempt to salvage the economic crisis and deteriorating security situation in the region.

Lessons for the Nigerian Government

A decade after PAP, security in the Delta region seems to be taking a new turn with the high rise of illicit markets, such as oil bunkering, as a means of survival. The underlying issues that fueled agitation in the area remain; unemployment rates have worsened, the perceived marginalization is still very much present, and the environment continues to suffer. By and large, the goal of the Amnesty program was bound to fail the moment it didn’t prioritize addressing the grievances that led to the agitations in the first instance.

With the surrender of over 37,000 repentant Boko Haram members thus far, and the ongoing DDRRR program, one can only hope that there is a plan to address the underlying issues that have fueled the Boko Haram campaign to avoid a repeat of the situation in the Niger Delta. Presently, there is a worsening insecurity dilemma due to the noticeable rise in illicit markets in the northern region, including those not linked to Boko Haram. In effect, it may be the worst of its kind should the government fail to be deliberate in preventing a recurrence of the northern conflict.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Oil
 by Joan McDappa

The Effects of Oil Production on the Niger Delta

Peaceful, full of life, resource-rich, and green are all features that were once attributes of the Niger Delta. The region, located in Nigeria, comprises a few states in its southern area. The region’s economic buoyance dates back to its pre-colonial days when it boasted of trade explorations extending beyond its borders. With such magnificent antecedents, expecting the Delta to attain far-reaching heights in infrastructural development at the least is not exactly out of place. Unfortunately, the rightful expectation is far from reality. Regardless of its several positive attributes and resources such as oil, the region remains underdeveloped; and continues to fall victim to challenges which worsen its state.

Why is the Region Important?

After almost half a century of exploration, the year was 1956, and oil was discovered in Oloibiri, Niger Delta. The discovery led Nigeria to join the ranks of oil-producing countries in 1958, with a production output of 5,100 barrels per day. Over the years, Nigeria continued to reach a significant record in its production output, recording up to 2.5 million barrels per day in 2004. With the discovery of oil in 1956, Nigeria, which had a vibrant agricultural sector, slowly began to overly focus on oil and gas at the cost of developing other potential industries.

According to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the body charged with covering the spectrum of all petroleum industry operations, the petroleum and gas industry accounts for about 90% of Nigeria’s gross earnings, though this figure has significantly reduced. Simply put, the oil industry is a significant player in Nigeria’s economy, and the Delta is home to this crucial resource.

Twenty-Six Years Ago

On November 10, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel, and John Kpuine, commonly referred to as the Ogoni Nine, were hanged at a prison in Port-Harcourt under the military rule of Sani Abacha. These men were leaders of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). The crimes of these men were that they demanded better environmental practices and oil revenue sharing for the region. The response was imprisonment and eventual execution.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

In 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility for kidnapping four foreign workers in the region. MEND’s demands are very similar to those made by the Ogoni Nine, howbeit through a different means. The group expressed concern for environmental pollution, underdevelopment, and perceived unfair revenue sharing that belittles the oil-producing communities. The group’s continued attacks on oil facilities and oil workers impacted Nigeria’s economy significantly, reducing its oil outputs by one-third.

Overall, MEND has become a prominent militant organization posing significant challenges to oil production through its relentless efforts to undermine the oil industry in the Delta.

Truth or Imaginations

The continuing long-term struggle that has dominated the region for decades in various forms is not misplaced. Even though oil accounts for most of Nigeria’s earnings, making it the largest oil producer in Africa, the region bears significant environmental pollution.

In the last six years, the Nigerian Ministry of Environment has recorded an alarming 5,000 cases of oil spillages, with a record event occurring a few months ago. In November of last year, members of a community in the region where the devastating effect of a leaking wellhead had become unbearable held a protest. The leak, which began about a month before the demonstration, had continued to spread into nearby communities and extended into neighbouring states. Unfortunately, such cases are not uncommon and have left a lasting impact on the environment.

The environmental impact is multi-layered affecting lands, rivers, air quality, and income sources for residents. So devastating are these effects that accessing clean and safe water is nearly impossible. Unsurprisingly, the overall consequence is unequivocally visible in the significant difference in the life expectancy rate in the region, which is ten years lower in the Delta region in comparison to other parts of Nigeria.

Beyond the Obvious

Jonah Gembre, an activist from Iwhrekan, stated, “we were thinking the oil companies were coming to elevate us from poverty, but they only give us poverty, and the economy is dying.”

The statement above reveals the expectation of many others living in the region. Sadly, the reality is farther away from the desires of the Delta people. Another overwhelming disappointment that further makes their desires for change seem unrealistic is the rise and fall of emancipators, whose sole goal, it would seem, is self-enrichment. 

A Blink of Hope

In January 2021, a Dutch court indicted a famous oil giant for spills in the region, ordering it to pay $111 million to affected communities. With the long history of exhaustion, frustration, and exploitation of the advocacy journey, January 2021 remains noteworthy to the people of the Niger Delta. Perhaps, there may be left, a remnant of truly devoted patrons that would bring to an end the critical dilemma of the region.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Insurgency
 by Joan McDappa

Ending Insurgency in Nigeria

October 1, 1960 was a significant moment in the history of Nigeria; finally, this nation would become an independent, self-governing entity. Accepted with a remarkable mix of hope and doubts, Nigeria set off on a journey that thus far has been characterized by many pleasant and unpleasant events.

Regrettably, the unpleasant events continue to reoccur on this journey, becoming a definitive part of Nigeria’s identity.  One such event was the over-a-decade-long insurgency in the northeast. From 2009 until today, the expenses of the Nigerian government on defence are well more than six trillion Naira. Despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, the country continues to face diverse threats from various groups, spiraling its development in a downward plunge.

Take Them Out?

“Those who are behind this insurgency will be taken out. They are being taken out one after the other, and it will get to a point that the last of them will be taken out, and then we’ll get to the end of it. It can be done within 17 months, that remains for this institution,” declared Femi Adesina, Media Adviser to the President of Nigeria.

The recent statement by Femi Adesina in response to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria is quite revealing. Interestingly, his view on taking the insurgents out to end the menace is not foreign to the government and has hitherto fueled its defence efforts.

Nothing short of an illusion is the premise that eliminating the insurgent group members is the solution to ending the bane of insurgency in the country. The current strength of the insurgency in Nigeria emanates from the same error of the government to eliminate members of the group in 2009. The lessons from the outcome of the government’s devastating error are still not learned, hence the repetition of the same failed strategy.

A Complex Situation

Considering the nature of the insurgency in Nigeria, it is not solely a matter of eliminating those behind it. Its sustainability thus far is mainly a function of the platform and the existing gaps in society it thrives on; so long as that platform exists, it is only a matter of time before another wave of insurgency awakens. Besides, the conflict in Nigeria is far too complex for the current proposed strategy.

The multifaceted nature of the insurgency poses a dire challenge to counterterrorism efforts. For instance, the famous terrorist group, Boko Haram, is highly defragmented with numerous cells, operating independently from various bases across Nigeria and other neighbouring countries in the West African region.

The continuity and the progression of Boko Haram’s operations and activities are clear indicators of the complexity of the problem. With the support and funding from other international terrorist groups, the activities of terrorist groups, like Boko Haram, in Nigeria continue to grow. Attempting to end insurgency in Nigeria without considering this essential aspect is more or less illogical.

The Way Out

The only way out of the problem Nigeria faces lies in a simple statement ascribed to the Chinese general Sun Tzu, “know thy enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.”

Until Nigeria understands itself first and then its enemy, its efforts in achieving any progress in security and development will only meet setbacks. The weak structures and system failures are areas that the government must urgently monitor. The diversity of Nigeria, which underlies many of Nigeria’s conflicts, is a potential strength for its unity if rightly harnessed.

The insurgency in Nigeria feeds off the weaknesses and gaps present in the country. Identifying these gaps and sealing them off is key to ending the insurgency. The government must be wary in developing strategies to avoid conflict with other efforts. A take-them-out approach raises many questions on the purpose of governance and directly opposes the de-radicalization efforts that the government accords a high success rate.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Nigeria
 by Joan McDappa

History Replay: What’s Next for Nigeria?

One Nigeria, a phrase capable of setting off sparks depending on whom you address. Is Nigeria one? Or is this merely wishful thinking? Since its creation and independence, Nigeria has witnessed violence and conflicts; however, none of these threatened its existence as much as the 30-month long civil war from July 6, 1967 until January 15, 1970.

The civil war between the Nigerian-led government of General Yakubu Gowon and the Republic of Biafra, a secessionist state led by Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, is one that left the country more divided than ever before.

Often referred to as a genocide by the sympathizers of Biafra, the civil war saw the death of well over one million children due to starvation and diseases. It is a widely held belief that the casualties from hunger and starvation during the war were far more than those caused by combat.

Almost every ethnic group has its version of the war, blaming different individuals or citing failed strategies as the problem. However, the reality is evident in the unfortunate cruel segregation and oppression of the Igbos, which persists today.

New Agitations

Fifty years after the bloody civil war, new agitations for secession from Nigeria have rekindled, with the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leading the charge. IBOP claims that the desire to secede from Nigeria is due to their treatment as slaves and second-class citizens in Nigeria.

The Nigerian government’s response has been to use violence to attempt to quell the agitations. As expected, the government’s response has only succeeded in spiraling things out of control, committing worse crimes and atrocities in their bid to safeguard the country’s unity.

Like most groups that adopt violent approaches, the recent agitations started peacefully. With the constant maiming and killings of members of the group by the Nigerian security forces, the group’s switch to violent means came as no surprise.

Today, the combat activities in some of the southeast states bear much resemblance to an ongoing war. The Nigerian government’s dogged approach towards quelling the agitations of Biafra in comparison to the extremism of terrorist groups in the northeast and northwest raises questions.

Python Dance II & the Dance of Peace

Operation Python Dance II was a military operation launched in late 2017 in the southeast region of Nigeria. The Nigerian Army publicly stated that this operation aims to curtail the activities of kidnapping, which have plagued the region. Consequently, operation Python Dance II began to take on a different form, looking like an attempt to suppress the agitations of Biafra.

The activities of the Nigerian Army raised fears among the people of the southeast, with several claims of indiscriminate killings of unarmed civilians and pro-Biafrans by the Nigerian Army.

Two years after operation Python Dance II, the Nigerian Army has renamed the operation Dance of Peace. Renaming the operation appears to be the most significant change since the activities of the Army largely remain the same.

Alleged killings of unarmed civilians are still highly reported; arrests and detainments of Biafra agitators are also on a steady rise. With these events, the agitations continue to intensify, with the IPOB group, now designated as a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government, launching both offensive and defensive attacks.

Secession?

Following the unrest in the southeast region, civil groups have called on international actors to intervene in the situation. While the likelihood of secession via dialogue seems slim, the agitators are also unlikely to back down due to the current administration’s opposition.

In the words of Chief Cyprian Okoye, the leader of the IPOB in Australia, “we derive strength in the fact that we are already down, and a man that is down does not need to fear nor fall. You cannot beat a baby and ask him not to cry. If they have beaten us and deny that we are not members of the same country, it is our duty to cry, and I know those who have ears will not let the tears drop from our eyes to be in vain in the end.”

The fear of another civil war is slowly building among Nigerians, with many hoping that these fears never come to pass. Sadly, it seems that history is replaying itself again; grievances are uncapping, the government’s perception of unity is still the same, and the country is in a worse state than it was over 50 years ago. Rather than wait to initiate a disaster or crisis response, a better step is to prevent a disaster and crisis altogether.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Radicalization
 by Joan McDappa

Understanding the Drivers of Radicalization in Nigeria

Violent extremism in modern-day Nigeria dates back to pre-colonial days; from the far north to the deep south, historical records show the presence of violent extremism that lingered on to the colonial era and continues to date.

A unique point to bear in mind is the multifaceted nature of violent extremism, especially in Nigeria, where multiple criteria usually form the cause of extremism. Like many other closely linked concepts, defining extremism remains somewhat difficult, mainly owing to the varying perspectives of what may or may not be considered extreme.

Regardless of the existing disagreements in conceptualizing extremism, certain key factors appear to be comparable. Extremism is an ideological phenomenon that vehemently opposes a widely accepted, usually age-long, belief or perception, conceiving the views as wrong and seeking to replace them with a preferred alternative. Violent extremism is the attempt to fulfill extremism by an intended use of violence.

After the conception of an extremist ideology and subsequent goal, furthering that goal involves a process often referred to as radicalization or also known as a violent extremist social trend.

According to a UNHCHR Report, “the notion of ‘radicalization’ is generally used [by some states] to convey the idea of a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations.”

Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Nigeria

While violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, the recent phase of extremism, religious extremism, is not specific to Nigeria. It is, in fact, a global challenge that managed to find a footing in Nigeria and continues to gain ground, threatening security while also hampering development in the country and the entire region.

In Nigeria, the goal of extremist groups is to replace the present democratic system of government, which is viewed as Westernized, and thereby infringing on and directly challenging the tenets of their Islamic faith with a Sharia style of governance. Most proponents of this extremist view have, at one time or another, attempted to impose these views on other Nigerians, radicalizing as many as possible to join in the efforts to achieve their goal.

Boko Haram, which is more or less the face of terrorism in Nigeria, was inspired by such an extremist movement and continues to grow its base throughout the region. The majority of the members of extremist groups come from youth and children, both within and outside northern Nigeria. Researchers, stakeholders, and the government of Nigeria continue to seek to understand the factors that aid radicalization in Nigeria, and as expected, there is much confusion on the possible cause.

Ahmed and Many Others

Some schools believe that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures are drivers of radicalization in Nigeria. However, other schools object to this premise, as members of extremist groups also include wealthy, influential, and educated people. Besides, much of the population of Nigeria fall into these categories, yet they do not directly or indirectly support the extremist ideologies of Boko Haram.

Ahmed, an alias, is an illiterate Muslim youth from a poor background in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram had made attempts to recruit him, which he declined. During one of the many attacks and attempted forced recruitments by Boko Haram, Ahmed watched as his father was gruesomely murdered. Eventually, Ahmed found his way to the country’s capital, Abuja, where he began a new life as a bus driver, staying focused on living a peaceful and crime-free life. Like Ahmed, when many Nigerian youth face challenging conditions they continuously refuse to accept the extremist views forced upon them by extremist groups.

The Principle Driver of Radicalization in Nigeria

Regardless of the disagreements on the drivers of extremism in Nigeria, one key element that continues to resound in schools of thought is the government’s unintended role in fostering extremism. The failure of the government to execute its duties creates several conditions and grievances that enable extremist ideologies to thrive.

The government’s inappropriate response widens existing gaps, giving extremist groups a campaign tool and an added advantage to garner support from susceptible individuals. Beyond these factors is the state’s alleged role in aiding the longevity of extremist groups, like Boko Haram, by political actors, in hopes that they would garner public support.

Conclusion

Poverty, illiteracy, and a lack of religious teachings are not the cause of extremism in Nigeria, as some research claims. A survey by the Pew Research Centre showed that 94% of Nigerian Muslims hold a negative view of Boko Haram. Unfortunately, most assertions on the drivers of extremism are founded upon stereotypes fuelled by actors on and behind the scenes.

Ultimately, the principle driving force of extremism in Nigeria remains the state; and, many other push factors for individuals can be attributed to state failures.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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