by Rise to Peace

Can We Profile the “Classic Terrorist” in Europe’s Most Deadly Attacks?

Over the last 20 years, the increased presence of terrorism in Europe has prompted many attempts to tackle the causes of radicalisation. In doing so, social scientists, journalists and psychologists have invested time, money, and effort into identifying the people behind some of the deadliest attacks. Despite all efforts, profiling terrorists is still a challenge.

Attempts to categorise martyrdom terrorists according to a single common variable is more of a challenge than we may realise. Data regarding martyrdom terrorists assessed by Lewis Herrington revealed many inconsistencies in existing theories. This is surrounding demographics, age, education, and even religious devotion.

Extremist ideology, psychological explanations and statistics do not always match

Albert Bandura’s Social Learning Theory examines how environmental factors pair with cognitive factors to influence human learning and behaviour. According to the Social Learning Theory, the behaviour of a person is influenced by observational learning of environmental factors. Thus, a person learns their behaviour by observing and imitating the attitudes and emotional reactions of those around them. Social Learning Theory has also been used in attempts to understand where martyrdom terrorists learn their ways. This is often accompanied by an analysis of their upbringing, economic status, religious adherence etc.

This Theory could be applied to the 2012 Toulouse shooting targeting the Jewish community, which killed a teacher and three children during the morning school run. As Herrington recognises, the self-proclaimed jihadist Mohammad Merah who carried out the attack, grew up in a dysfunctional family involved in violence, substance abuse, neglect, and anti-Semitism. The dysfunctional family picture, sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar noted, was evident in most extremists he had interviewed in 2014.

While this is evident in extremists, the statistics for martyrdom terrorists yet again pose an inconsistent figure. 75% of martyrdom terrorists analysed by Herrington experienced a stable upbringing with loving parents.

Additionally, arguments that poverty or lack of education drive young men to commit acts of terrorism, fall short of empirical evidence. This once again highlights the challenges in combatting terrorism through effective policy change in a concentrated area of concern.

Commonalities between martyrdom terrorists

When analysing martyrdom terrorists in Europe, some commonalities were evident. The men who were analysed displayed a clear decline in mental health. Consequently, even if they been assessed as mentally healthy they often struggled with substance abuse. An additional variable identified was the breakdown of their personal relationships.

One theory suggests that the link between substance abuse and martyrdom terrorism is rooted in the fact that substance abuse is connected to a strong sense of shame in the Muslim community. Lewis Herrington’s study found that 74% of martyrdom terrorists developed their substance abuse before turning to Islamic extremism. The theory goes that those with a history of substance abuse found mainstream religion unappealing or uninviting. The members of these communities who experienced a similar past tended to be more inviting. However, they also tended to be more prone to extremism.

Moreover, men pursuing martyrdom terrorism in Europe were documented to have been radicalised from the age of 20. Consequently, the average age of terrorists at the time of their attack was 27.49. Men who displayed extremist tendencies in their adolescent years were less likely to be involved in terrorism in their 20s.

Recommendations

In an attempt to tackle radicalisation, European ministries should consider partnering and financing faith-based drug rehabilitation centres. Organisations which engage with the religious communities may be more effective in providing practical treatment for mental health-related issues and substance abuse in young men.

This in turn could help tackle the isolation many troubled men face, which enables extremist networks to exploit that vulnerability factor in potential recruits.

Additionally, it is recommended that media outlets in Europe proceed with reports on terrorist attacks with caution.  This may be dictated by how the analysis is conducted by journalists. Insight is vital in understanding recruitment methods and how to prevent this. However, empirical evidence must be taken into account before claims can be made. Thus, the immediacy of reporting, unfortunately, opens doors for the possibility of misleading claims. This may be likely regarding the ‘typical terrorist recruit’.

Generating a profile of a classic martyrdom terrorist before consulting experts could lead to a false picture being created that poverty, education and demographics are not just vulnerability factors, but sole characteristics of recruits.

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 by Sydney Neuman

Women’s Roles in Right-Wing Extremism in the United States

All around the world, local law enforcement’s failure to understand the gender dynamics of terrorist organizations has led to many vulnerabilities in people’s safety and security. In the United States, there continues to be more and more evidence being discovered that women are playing key roles in right-wing extremist movements. Fortunately, in recent years, our understanding of female terrorists has improved as more people study this reality and officials stop assuming that women lack the ability to carry out these attacks.

In research conducted by sociologists, Mehr Latif and Kathleen Blee, a list was compiled of the typical roles designated for women in white supremacist groups. The main role for them is to do the “mothering” of the group, both literally and figuratively. If women do not have a “mother” role for the group, another common role women have is as a “sex symbol” for the men. The least common role of the women in these groups is as actual fighters for the cause. Latif and Blee described their role as both providing sexual gratification to male members and participating in violence themselves. However, these roles were designated by far-rightist men. As a result, women’s roles in these groups today are evolving into new ones.

Domestic terror organizations, like many organizations around the world, understand that the best way to appeal to women is by exploiting their inherent altruism and desire to protect children. One of the ways that women are recruited to these far-right groups is through social media “influencers” who distribute propaganda and recruit new members to extremist causes. They often create “mom groups” or lifestyle blogs to reach people who might not otherwise be exposed to political or extremist rhetoric.

The most recent example of women playing roles in domestic acts of terror is from the January 6th insurrection. There was a large array of groups participating in this attack, women were engaged in all aspects and many engaging directly in the violence. One woman directly participating was Rachel Powell aka the “Pink Hat Lady” or “Bullhorn Lady.” She was caught smashing a window of the Capitol with a pipe and yelled instructions to other insurrectionists through a bullhorn. The FBI later raided her home and car only to find numerous “go bags” loaded with ammunition for her registered AK-47, shooting targets with written slogans like “guns don’t kill people, I do,” throwing stars, knives, lighters, zip ties, duct tape, rope, and a tarp. 

Two other women were arrested and charged, Dawn Bancroft and Diana Santos-Smith, after the FBI investigated a selfie video taken of the two inside the Capitol on Jan. 6. They claimed they were there “looking” for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi “to shoot her in the friggin’ brain.”

Despite all of this, law enforcement officials seem to be paying little attention to the unique role of women in advancing right-wing extremist ideas and has led to a situation in which we refuse to treat female terrorists with the same seriousness and concern with which we treat men. So far, just over 10 percent of federal charges related to the Capitol siege have been brought against women. 

However, after many studies and observations have been done about why women chose to join terrorist organizations, it seems officials still show little desire to learn about how different a women’s path to domestic terrorism is different from most men.

While more research is needed in regards to the ideological and gendered differences of radicalization, evidence shows that the motivation and process of radicalization looks very different for a 40-year-old American-born mother of eight than an isolated 18-year-old boy who feels like he has nothing to live for in the United States. 

For example, some women who committed acts of violence in the last year in the name of Q-Anon, have explicitly said they were motivated by a desire to protect children from supposed pedophiles. Research on why women join international terrorist groups shows they believe that participating in terrorism could be a way to acquire rights and status, especially in societies and cultures where they are otherwise denied equal treatment.

Scholars Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein found that “radicalized American women tend to commit the same types of crimes and have about the same success rate as radicalized men, yet they are less likely to be arrested and convicted for terrorism-related crimes, highlighting a discrepancy in treatment and leaving a security threat unaddressed.”

The U.S. government continues to underestimate the important roles women can play as perpetrators, mitigators, or targets of violent extremism. This means there will need to be continued research on the roles of these women, better ways to prevent recruitment, and how to spot the signs of a female perpetrator.  

 

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 by Rise to Peace

The Sahel Region: Current Crisis and Challenges

Context

Over the past fifteen years, the Sahel and West Africa have become the hub of clandestine trafficking and the heart of the fundamentalist terrorist network. The proceeds of illicit trafficking (migrants, drugs, weapons, etc…) and the generous ransoms given by European governments to obtain the release of their citizens, victims of kidnappings, (mostly concentrated in the central-western Sahel), are fundamental sources of financing for terrorism.

The movements linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) and to Daesh are concentrating their tactical projection capacity in the Sahara and the Sahel, territories among the most difficult to manage on the planet in terms of size and climatic conditions, in order to establish an Islamist caliphate from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

AQIM forces are currently present in Niger, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania, but the terrorist network is also easily gaining ground in other states such as Algeria and Tunisia due to successful recruitment drives. Their expansion is based on a strategy articulated in two phases. First, they’ve tried to progressively root themselves in the central-western Sahel. Second, following the gradual extension of their power into neighboring countries, they aim to attract greater finances and greater international media attention, attention only set to increase as Western countries continue to pump resources into stabilizing the area.

A Sahel caught between today’s structural weaknesses and future challenges

The most dramatic effects of recent extremist campaigns are suffered by the local populations, of whom the majority are far from radical in their beliefs. Two coups in Mali, in August 2020 and May 2021, have only accentuated the lack of local administration, the different governments’ inability to unite the country and its ethnic groups, the structural corruption, and the failed attempt to secretly negotiate with extremist parties.

Several factors have also caused great concern not only in Chad but throughout the Sahel region, exponentially increasing the perception of further regional instability. One factor is the recent death of the President of Chad Idriss Déby at the hands of militant forces on April 20, 2021. The other is the unreliability of governments like those of Mali and the Central African Republic, both of which are now witnessing the recent, drastic French decision to suspend years-long military cooperation.

Over the years, major powers such as the United States and Russia, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, have created different task forces and coalitions to liberate and stabilize the Sahel region, but largely without success.

How is it possible that such a concentration of forces, funds, and efforts has failed to assist the region in building more transparent and effective administrative management? The above-mentioned weaknesses, combined with corruption and lack of state services in local communities, water the increasingly fertile ground for extremist growth and strategic success.

The “multidimensional” international stability operations led by the United Nations, in theory certainly positive, have had negative effects causing instability and scandal. Missteps grew to the point of generating popular protests, in Congo and Mali for example, by the same population to be protected. They have done little to address the problems of local administration, overall security, societal inclusion, and community development.

Conclusion

In the future, the crisis in the Sahel could become increasingly serious in light of the previously-listed structural weaknesses and the growing fatigue of international allies. How should interested parties move forward? There are several hypothetical action plans at both the national and regional levels that could guarantee greater stability for the countries of the Sahel plagued by extremist violence.

First, following coalition failures and the withdrawal of France from Malian soil, the security community should encourage an increase and a change in peacekeeping commitments by organizations such as the UN and the EU, as well as the G5-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad) and the African Union.

At the regional level, it is essential to underline the fact that up to now military responses have not been sufficient for defeating terrorism, a phenomenon that is primarily social rather than military. Indeed, one might first focus on problems such as unemployment, health care, education, infrastructure, water access, and agricultural support. This is the best way to weaken extremist influences in the Sahel before eradicating them militarily.

Further failure of the various sub-regional, regional, and international organizations involved would allow for greater destabilization and violence, with the potential to expand into even more countries in the region.

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Khalid noor Taliban
 by Ahmad Shah Mohibi

From Negotiations to the Front Line Fighting the Taliban: Hoping to End Their Fathers’ War

A Rise to Peace Exclusive interview with Khalid Noor, member of the Afghan negotiating team.

Afghan negotiator, Khalid Noor, has been fighting the Taliban alongside his father in northern Afghanistan, with the aim to reverse Taliban advances in Balkh Province. Noor’s diplomatic shift to the military is in response to the Taliban’s military attacks across Afghanistan gaining new territories while pushing back the Afghan security forces.

Driven by a sense of patriotism and a desire to see his country at peace, Khalid Noor believes resisting the Taliban is his duty, stating:

“(We have been trying to negotiate with them, but they would drag their feet). We have no other choice but to continue the fight, given that the Afghan government does not have the capabilities and human resources to fight everywhere.” Noor added: “We are still hopeful that negotiations and a political settlement are in the best interest of Afghanistan and that’s if the Taliban are willing to negotiate or fight. Our stand is clear, that negations are the path to peace and prefer talks over fighting.”

At just 25 years old, Khalid Noor was the youngest negotiator for the Afghan government in the Doha peace talks with the Taliban. The son of a legendary mujahideen commander, Ata Muhammad Noor, and a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and George Mason University, he is capable of bridging the gap between Afghanistan’s traditional politics and its rising younger generation.

Khalid Noor
Khalid Noor, in military uniform, advancing toward a Taliban position, June 26, 2021. Source: Rise to Peace
Khalid noor Taliban
Khalid Noor, in military uniform, advancing toward a Taliban position with his father Ata Mohammad Noor, June 26, 2021. Photo: Noor's Public Relation

As negotiations stalled, the Afghan government with its fragmented leadership has failed to turn back Taliban offensives. Instead, instigating heavy casualties for Afghan forces and territory loss. The situation turned brutal for Afghans when President Biden announced troops withdrawal by September of this year. This ultimately furnished a psychological moral to the Taliban militants, leveraging their cause – the “defeat” of the “world’s super-power.” Whilst Afghan security forces were pushed back by the Taliban, a national mobilization or uprising forces started across Afghanistan. This gave hope, that the Taliban cannot succeed militarily.

Within days and weeks, thousands of Afghans like Khalid Noor, used their ancestors’ guns to defend their communities and loved ones from the Taliban. Among them, women and teenagers as young as 15, have been seen with Ak-47 and machine guns. Instead of returning to Doha, Noor and his two younger brothers, Tariq Noor and Suhaib Noor, opted to defend their home province.

Along with his father, Noor mobilized a militia that intends to retake districts captured by the Taliban. On June 27, we interviewed Khalid Noor regarding his activities on the ground.

Video: by https://www.facebook.com/dw.dari/

Noor stated that thousands of his uprising forces, comprised of the grassroots, are fighting to retake Kaldar, a small district near Afghanistan’s border with Uzbekistan. On June 27, Uzbekistan’s state news agency reported that a Taliban attack on a government checkpoint in Kaldar, forced 17 Afghan soldiers to retreat. This left the district in Taliban control. Only days later, with Noor’s forces on the front lines, the district governor’s office and police station were retaken by government forces.

Noor reports that the Taliban has engaged in little face-to-face combat. Instead, they have primarily focused on guerrilla tactics. This has included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as artillery strikes targeting local infrastructure.

“The next target will be Balkh district, which is near the city of Mazar-e-Sharif,” said Noor. Balkh, the capital of Mazar-e-Sharif, has been seized by the Taliban recently. However, Noor’s operation days later was a huge success.

The Taliban do not have strong grassroots support in northern Afghanistan, unlike other parts of the country. However, in the last decade, their support has grown. This is primarily due to the government’s inability to secure the region. During their regime in the 1990s, the Taliban left a dark chapter with bitter memories. This was due to their destructions and killings of thousands of people when they overran Mazar-e-Sharif. The majority of Noor’s forces are volunteers who are willing to fight and prevent another catastrophe.

While demanding, these district-by-district advances are slow and dangerous, but the only way for the uprising militias to retake Taliban-held territory with their limited resources.

In response to Taliban aggression, forces like Noor’s are rising across Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani has called on them to form a “united front” to support the Afghan security forces, but their efforts currently appear uncoordinated and localized. Ata Muhammad Noor recently presided over a meeting of the political parties in northern Afghanistan and was subsequently selected as head of the military council for National Mobilization.

Noor’s forces have been on the front lines against the Taliban for weeks now and yet have over 22 casualties; six killed and 16 wounded. “The first three of our soldiers martyred by IED and the rest including four of my own personnel guards died in face-to-face combat,” said Noor. 

But Noor understands the potentially harmful implications of an uncoordinated militia-led resistance. His father, during the 1990s, was party to the intra-mujahideen civil war that left Afghanistan in ruins and without a government after the Soviet withdrawal.

“It is very dangerous if we [Afghans] go back to the ‘90s. That’s why my father has been pushing the government to work together to control the public uprising forces to avoid any future crisis. (My father believes in consensus. He sees a united front and voice the only way forward; a front that will decide unitedly at this difficult moment),” said Khalid Noor.

It will be up to young Afghan leaders like Noor to ensure that Afghanistan progresses into the future without forgetting the important lessons of its past.

Ahmad Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

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 by Rise to Peace

Trends of 2020: What increased internet has meant for terrorism in Europe

The European Union, United Kingdom and Switzerland have had an unconventional year for identifying trends in terrorist activity. The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns, travel restrictions, and digitization of everyday life have posed difficulties for some terrorist groups and opportunities for others.

A Europol report on terrorism in Europe declared that in 2020, six EU member states experienced a total of 57 completed, foiled, or failed terrorist attacks. Taking the UK into account, the number increases to 119. Upon analysis of their data, Europol revealed that all completed jihadist attacks were committed by individuals supposedly acting alone. Three of the foiled attacks involved multiple actors or small groups. All the attackers in the UK and EU were male and typically aged between 18 and 33, and in only one case in Switzerland was the perpetrator a woman. The same report identifies right-wing extremist trends over the last three years. Findings depict similarities between Islamist terrorists and right-wing terrorists in terms of age and gender. Right-wing terror suspects are increasingly young in age, many of which are still minors at the time of their arrest. Right-wing suspects appear intricately connected to violent transnational organizations on the internet.

COVID-19 lockdown restrictions have vastly increased European citizens’ reliance on the internet for everyday tasks, both professional and recreational. Statista recently released data showing that 91% of EU households had internet access in 2020, reaching an all-time high. But with the increased access and usage of the internet comes the risk of it being used for malicious purposes, specifically for terrorist organizing. The quantity of propaganda produced by official ISIL media outlets reportedly decreased in 2020. Despite this, ISIL continues to use the internet to stay connected to potential attackers who align themselves with the same ideology. These connections have allowed ISIL to call for lone actors to commit terrorist attacks. The data from Europol’s 2020 report confirms that it was lone-actor attacks that comprised most of the “successful” terror attacks in 2020, while attacks planned in a group were typically prevented.

Their right-wing extremist counterparts have developed sophisticated methods of recruitment in the internet age, particularly over the last year. Right-wing terror suspects have developed communication strategies via gaming apps and chat servers typically used by gamers. Presumably to attract a younger demographic, right-wing extremists with links to terror suspects have diversified their internet use to include gaming platforms, messenger services, and social media. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and vaccination programs, the Centre for Countering Digital Hate notes that Discord has been a vital tool for spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories involving racial hatred. In this case, strategies used in online games to reward progression have been translated to serve right-wing propaganda. Thus, points are awarded to the most active members of certain discord servers who can fabricate and promote conspiracy theories, often including antisemitic tropes involving Bill Gates. Virtual currency plays a key role in promoting the narrative of success and reward, and its ability to capture the interest of minors who are active in the virtual space.

Combating terrorist threats in Europe has always been a challenge on account of the sporadic nature of terrorists themselves. While the people behind the attacks may vary in socio-economic upbringing, religious affiliation and nationality, some similarities remain. Based on the commonalities, solutions to tackling internet-based strategies could be introduced. If the EU were to develop a common framework for disrupting and taking down radical groups online, it could find greater success in combating digital extremism. ISIL online networks on Telegram were taken down in November 2019, and they have since struggled to recreate networks to a similar degree.

Gender and age also give some insight for where to begin in diminishing future recruitment to ideology-based terrorism. While internet usage cannot be regulated, education can. Europe may benefit from the cooperation of educational institutions at all level in raising awareness of the dangers of online radicalization. Workshops, information posters, and seminars introducing the intricacies of radicalization would inform vulnerable students on the potential downfalls of internet consumption. This would create a clear understanding of modern conspiracy theories, where they come from and why they exist.

Additionally, understanding the meaning behind extremist imagery, symbols, numbers, phrases, and music (as well as how to report them on the internet) would increase awareness among otherwise distracted students consumed by online trends and activity.

Paired with the awareness commitment, the EU should set a budget meeting the needs of mental health services in schools to introduce spaces in which students may express their concerns. This in turn could curb their vulnerability to online extremist groups looking to recruit.

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 by Rise to Peace

How Traumatic Events in Conflict Can Serve as a Bridge for Afghan Reconciliation: Lessons from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Since October 2001, an estimated 241,000 Afghans and Pakistanis have died as a direct result of the war in Afghanistan. Many others have died from indirect consequences of the war such as disease, food and water insecurity, broken infrastructure, and a myriad of other issues. As in Afghanistan, families in both Israel and Palestine have encountered the same kind of grief caused by a prolonged conflict. But, instead of submitting to anger and calls for vengeance, some bereaved Israeli and Palestinian families realized that violence begets violence, and that their grief could become a bridge to support a peace and reconciliation process between the warring parties. With the rising death toll in Afghanistan, the peace model of these bereaved Israeli-Palestinian families could provide a possible pathway to decreasing the violence in Afghanistan.

Much research was conducted on how traumatic events propels individuals to take up arms and join insurgency groups to avenge their loved ones. A traumatic event such as the death of a family member or member of the community, a government massacre, or the killing or capture of a respected leader can make an individual vulnerable to insurgent recruitment and a potential perpetrator of violent acts.

Furthermore, the history of violent conflicts in Afghanistan, predating the U.S. invasion, increases the systemic vulnerability of its population. The war economy associated with previous conflicts in Afghanistan has a lingering and distorting effect. Those who benefited economically and psychologically from the previous conflicts would likely continue the conflict and the cycle of violence until they regain the spoils of war. These beneficiaries would portray themselves as the defenders and avengers of the fallen. Children that experienced loss and trauma would be targeted for recruitment, enticing the future generation into the cycle of violence.

In order to break that cycle of violence and propose an alternative mechanism to funnel the grief and anger caused by trauma, bereaved families in Israel and Palestine established the Parents Circle-Families Forum (PCFF). PCFF is a joint Israeli-Palestinian organization of over 600 families who have lost an immediate family member to the ongoing conflict. Created in 1995, this organization is identified with a call to prevent violence, to promote dialogue, tolerance, reconciliation, and peace.

As in Afghanistan, the non-combatant members of the warring parties in Israel and Palestine rarely interact with each other. The “interactions” that do take place are often mediated by various actors such as the media, religious leaders, politicians, and others. The Canadian theorist Marshall McLuhan once said that “the medium is the message.” The medium impacts the message it tries to convey. If the medium, such as 24/7 news channels, benefits economically and psychologically from conflict, its messages will lack de-escalating content and narrative sharing.

To bypass these intermediaries, the PCFF holds many in-person activities and events to promote reconciliation and peace. PCFF holds dialogue meetings between Israeli and Palestinian bereaved families with youth and adults where the families share their personal stories, narratives, and grief. Furthermore, the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day that PCFF and its partners host annually attracts many participants, both Israeli and Palestinian, when the security conditions allow. PCFF uses the internet to broadcast its events, bypassing the mainstream media. While its members are criticized by many Israelis and Palestinians as collaborators with the enemy, the organization successfully manages to provide an alternative narrative and a pathway for reconciliation and peace.

In conclusion, trauma and grief act as a recruitment tool for insurgents and vigilantes who wish to avenge their loss. This trauma, however, can also serve as a mobilizing force for bereaved families that wish to end the cycle of violence. The PCFF offers an alternative path for funneling trauma. Similarly, families of fallen Afghans could be inspired by their Middle Eastern brothers and sisters in grief and lead a change in Afghanistan. Echoing the words of Mohammad Gul, an Afghan boy who lost his brother in a terror attack in the western city of Herat: “Losing a family member is very painful, but I will have no complaint if peace, real peace, is restored. I will believe my brother was martyred in the name of peace.”

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 by Rise to Peace

The Security Threats to Afghanistan and its Problematic Shift to Peace

As the conflict status for Afghanistan resides on worsening, there has never been more reasonable grounds for troops to patrol and protect their people and prevent attacks from awaking.

With a robust Afghan National Security Force of approximately 350,000 troops, (1,000 UK and 3,500 US troops) deployed from the country Army Forces, its violence and security threats are supposed to have decreased under the freedom and protection intended under the NATO political and security agreement. After all, 30 countries are making executive decisions and a consensus on the actions best used to provisionally deter the threats and control of the Taliban and its ‘safe haven’ to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, such as Al-Qaeda.

There is still doubt among the citizens of Afghanistan, that deadly violence will most likely persist as a national surge. This is said to last until the Taliban and Afghan Government can form an alliance. Principally, this agreement is realistic in terms of how safety and control can be preserved. This is without further disruption from adversary parties or terrorist groups. To understand what could influence a peace alliance for Afghanistan, it is best to explore its current and emerging threats. 

Afghan Threats: Now and Tomorrow

Since 1978, there has been internal conflict, centred around revenge violence and political insurgence. This is between Afghan anti-communists and Afghan’s communist Government, known as the ‘Afghan War.’ Deadly threats soon turned into actions. This was largely in response to the September 11 terrorist strikes, which were mostly US-led invasions on the Afghan people. Subsequently, this guided the withdraw of the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan.

Ever since the devastating attacks, the US has been Afghanistan’s greatest threat – and in many ways – enemy. However, it is agreed that whilst both forces work together in the fight against terrorism, the elimination of “real threats” is underway. This is evident with the Taliban, ISIL, Al-Qaeda and their offline and online affiliates, in light of “#TalibanOurGuardians” circulating on Twitter as a top trending hashtag as they attempt to takeover across Central Asia. 

Today in the small and large cities of Afghanistan, there are ongoing security threats from Kabul towards Pakistan that highlight a potential resurgence of Al-Qaeda after the Taliban fails to cut ties, even after they pledged to do so. The Taliban are utilizing Al-Qaeda’s men that reside in Afghan, as their military position is stronger than ever before. If the Taliban choose to echo Al-Qaeda’s chain of commands, there will likely be an increase in violence.

Furthermore, there may be a disturbance to homes when used as ‘shields’ and predominantly women’s rights. This may jeopardise the progress made towards education and work for Afghan women and girls.

While terrorist groups become more advanced with technology and intelligence, the rationale for defence and preventing further threats is to form a relationship and offer cooperation between the Taliban and outside Governments. This may be an attempt to end the ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan. 

Many argue that the Afghan War will heighten with bloodshed and brutality. Consequently, this may result after its mutuality is lost between the NATO groups and the withdraw of US and British troops. This is evident with the Taliban capturing over 30 districts across Afghanistan, 48 hours following the US withdrawal announcement on June 19.

This is further reinforced with approximately 200 Humvees having been captured from All Nippon Airways in just 3 weeks. This will cause substantial disruption for US and British Air Forces in conflict zones. Essentially, this a faster reign of power than ISIL in Iraq in2014.

Could this jeopardise the US Government’s hold on the fight against terrorism? Many have argued that it has at least confirmed that their 20-year led mission to defeat has. Consequently, there is a difference in opinion. This is due to the conflicting opinion that peace action will bring great alliances for Afghanistan. This may eventually prevent the level of terrorism on their soil in years to come.

However, it is most likely the Taliban will continue to surge without cutting ties with Al-Qaeda. This is both a terrifying and dangerous period for the Afghan people; especially for those who disagree with the Taliban’s extreme beliefs.

Conclusion

There will always be crime and extremism among Afghan communities. This is likely due to its unrepairable history of terrorism conflict. Consequently, the momentum for change to peaceful neighbourhoods is heading in an undepictable direction.

Without ground protection from troops, threats will become harder to suppress and may be too late to prevent. Nevertheless, there is a somewhat logical basis for the Government’s decisions to build trust and alliance with Afghanistan’s violent extremist organisations. Most importantly the Taliban.

The progress towards peace will be determined in the forthcoming months. This will be measured by the Afghan Government’s attempts to tackle the Taliban insurgency. Beyond all, this will depend on how the control takeover is targeted whilst utilizing the advantages of Counter-Terrorism strategies, such as networking and negotiation, for inviting cooperation and harmony in Afghan. This is before there is no way of “containing” terrorist groups and their affiliates in such countries.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Recent Attacks in the Ethiopian Tigray Region and its Implications for Peace

Context

Ethiopia is a federation, made up of a federal government and nine member states. However, this social fragmentation is considered a source of conflict due to the political and economic inequality consolidated in the institutional and cultural fabric of the country.

The regional political parties, representing local ethnic groups, are often in opposition to the central government, as in the case of Tigray. The state-region of northern Ethiopia, under the control of the “Front for the Liberation of the Tigrinya People” (TPLF) Party, recently refused to participate in the merger of the various ethnic governments. This was on the basis that they did not lose their autonomy. Such dissensions have ignited armed clashes between the Ethiopian armed forces, and the armed militias of the TPLF. They are the best trained and equipped in the nation.

A few days ago, the Ethiopian air force struck the market of Togoga, a village located in Tigray. The attack caused the death of many civilians and as a result, placed a spotlight on the crisis, underlining its gravity.

Challenges to the peace process

The recent attacks as well as the non-stop heated conflict, affect the already precarious security and peace of the Horn of Africa region. How? By analyzing the conflict, it can be understood that the four main aspects of security are not guaranteed to the Tigray population. These are listed by academic, P.H. Liotta. 

First, human needs such as access to food resources are denied, as militias have looted and destroyed crops, stolen, and killed livestock, thus causing severe famines.

Secondly, is the little respect for human rights. Since the start of the clashes, there have been millions of internally displaced people and thousands of rapes against women. This includes the elderly and young females.

The third aspect concerns the social sector and development. To the security-development nexus, the more secure a country is, the more it has the possibility to improve. This is from an economic, political, and social viewpoint. This is likely due to the fact that the development will lead the state not to fight again. At the moment, Ethiopian authorities’ energies are concentrated mostly on power struggle, rather than the development of infrastructures or the education of the population.

The last point focuses on environmental issues. The upheaval of the ecosystem has threatened the environmental security of Tigray. This is caused both by the actions previously liste, and by the countless fires that have burnt many Tigrinya fields. 

How to act? The ceasefire requests, the access to humanitarian assistance, and the national dialogue. In reality, if they are not accompanied by concrete measures to safeguard the Ethiopian civilian population, they risk being ineffective. 

More active diplomacy is necessary. This includes the opening of negotiation channels between the federal government and the TPLF authorities. This is necessary to gradually and proportionally encourage the use of all means available to interrupt the cycle of violence and reach first a negative peace. Or, in the absence of any act of violence, to reach a positive peace with global well-being.

Conclusion 

Peace and security go hand in hand. However, the situation in Tigray is far from seeing positive implications. Hopefully, the political actions that can restore peace in the Horn of Africa region, will prevail as soon as possible. 

The UN and the EU are studying the heated conflict, with the well-being of the population at heart. With this, the pillars of international law come into play. This includes the right of non-interference and the responsibility to protect. However, this is another story.

 

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 by Connor Bulgrin

Biden Has Shown An Economic Commitment to Afghanistan. Now, He Must Show a Diplomatic One

The fate of Dr. Mohammad Najibullah haunts contemporary discussions over the future of Afghanistan. In the spring of 1992, Najibullah’s government collapsed under the pressure of mujahideen forces. While the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan weakened his government, the cessation of Soviet aid flowing into the country marked the final nail in his coffin.

Since President Biden announced America’s intention to fully withdraw from Afghanistan by September 11th, observers have worriedly speculated whether or not Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, might meet the same fate as Najibullah. The American intelligence community has predicted that the Afghan government could fall in as soon as six months. Despite this bleak projection, Biden is committed to bringing American troops home.

Over the last few weeks, American soldiers have transferred major American bases in Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces. Americans have already departed Kandahar Airfield; Baghram Airfield is expected to be vacated in the coming days. Additionally, Biden plans to evacuate the military’s Afghan contractors from the country if they wish to leave, a move Ghani warns will damage morale among Afghan soldiers. Still, Biden insists that this withdrawal does not amount to an abandonment of Afghanistan.

Accompanying his decision to withdraw, Biden is providing $300 million in additional aid to the Afghan government. This aid appears to be the crux of his strategy for defending the Afghan government. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has succinctly explained Biden’s policy: “As the United States begins withdrawing our troops, we will use our civilian and economic assistance to advance a just and durable peace for Afghanistan.”

Already, the folly of an aid-driven strategy is becoming apparent. Without American military support, Afghan security forces have been reluctant to put up a fight, abandoning dozens of military bases and police checkpoints across the country. According to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, 81 of Afghanistan’s 419 district centers are now under Taliban control. While the Taliban has thus far been unable to seize any provincial capitals, they have encircled the capital of Kunduz and appear to have momentum on their side. Beleaguered by corruption, ammunition shortages, and high casualty rates, the Afghan security forces have failed to put up adequate resistance.

Some representatives of the Afghan government have begun independently fighting the Taliban. In Mazar-i-Sharif, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Abbas Ibrahimzada, has taken to arming his supporters. Many similar militias have sprung up across northern Afghanistan. Districts under Taliban siege lack not only supplies but national leadership. It will take more than foreign aid to hold the Taliban back. Biden must make a diplomatic commitment to Afghanistan, in addition to his economic one, if the “senseless violence” he detests is to end.

In a recent statement, Biden’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, affirmed that the U.S. will continue “providing diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian assistance to support the Afghan people.” But the strength of America’s diplomatic commitment to Afghanistan remains unclear. Biden’s administration is likely to keep encouraging a resumption of the American-backed peace talks in Istanbul. While these talks can produce temporary ceasefires, they will never sustain a long-term peace without the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Most crucially Pakistan.

Biden’s administration has been reluctant to engage Pakistan. Biden has not even called Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, even though Ghani sees Pakistan as central to the Afghan conflict. Talking to American lawmakers last Friday, he reportedly remarked that “the Taliban is the hands, but Pakistan is the brains” of the insurgency.

Pakistan’s position toward the U.S. withdrawal has been ambivalent. Khan has been adamant that U.S. troops will “absolutely not” be permitted to conduct operations in Afghanistan from military bases in Pakistan. However, in a Washington Post op-ed, he stated that “Pakistan is ready to be a partner for peace in Afghanistan.” While Pakistan is unsupportive of the Afghan government and many American objectives in the region, Khan has repudiated the idea of a complete Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Despite its long history of interference in Afghan affairs and support for the Taliban, Pakistan has an interest in peace. It does not want to endure the potential spillover effects of a prolonged Afghan civil war, no longer constrained by the presence of American troops.

Biden could work to promote the common objectives of America and Pakistan. His reluctance to do so suggests a sense of apathy about Afghanistan. Or, alternatively, a desire to take a new tact with Pakistan, given its increasingly close relationship with China. Regardless, Biden clearly has priorities that rank higher for him than Afghanistan.

Biden’s policy toward Afghanistan suggests that he has adopted the same war-weariness as the American public. For this, he can hardly be blamed. For the duration of the war, policymakers have struggled to define the preferred outcomes of the American military presence in Afghanistan. Still, Biden must avoid the aimlessness of his predecessors. He must articulate a clear alternative vision for America’s policy toward Afghanistan that puts diplomacy first.

Biden’s recent statements on the Afghan peace process are a combination of boilerplate and platitudes. One can expect this from an administration that wishes to politely exit America’s “forever war” while morally saving face. Biden has insisted that “Afghans are going to have to decide their future,” but he knows they will not be able to. Instead, the country that most forcefully devotes its resources to dominating Afghanistan will determine the country’s future. Biden seems reluctant to challenge this status quo, but he could.

A diplomatic solution to the war in Afghanistan is possible, but it would require multiple tracks of diplomacy. Biden cannot only rely on reviving the multilateral Istanbul talks. He must unilaterally engage with the key players in Afghanistan: Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Biden does not appear interested in unilateral engagement, but he should be. It could help promote a settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It could also help Biden build necessary diplomatic relationships for his upcoming focus on the rise of China.

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 by Rise to Peace

What We Can Learn About the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan in Anticipation of the U.S Troops Withdrawal

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, signaling the end of a nearly decade of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the beginning of a period of uncertainty.

As in 1989, the upcoming U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan on September 11, 2021, fosters much of the same uncertainty concerning the competence of the Afghan security forces and their ability to prevent the Ghani government from collapsing. According to U.S intelligence assessments, this may be as soon as six months after U.S withdrawal. Like their predecessors, the Afghan security forces and their foreign supporters will experience similar challenges.

In the aftermath of the Soviet force withdrawal, the Afghan security forces continued to be fully dependent on the USSR. The USSR continued supporting the security forces with advisors, ammunition, fuel, and funds. Furthermore, with the main raison d’être that unified all Mujahideen factions together, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan disappeared. Soviet agents managed to leverage those tensions and reach agreements with different factions to support the security forces.

Whilst security forces were successful in holding off Mujahedeen for three years, the dependence of the Najibullah government on Soviet support eventually led to its demise. Consequently, the government collapsed shortly after Soviet support ceased. This demonstrated the failure of the USSR to develop an Afghan security force that could sustain a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan. In part, failure is a product of the USSR and the Afghan government’s inability to develop a functioning Afghan state.

The security structures implemented by the Soviets in Afghanistan raised public distrust, which were frequently prone to corruption and bureaucracy. Consequently, many structures established by the Soviets collapsed shortly after their withdrawal. Others, such as the interior ministry structure, survived, however, they became components of militias, receiving orders from strongmen.

KhAD, the government’s intelligence agency, was the most successful and effective of the security forces. Consequently, the government was heavily dependent upon KhAD for regime survival. Nevertheless, even KhAD couldn’t prevent the government’s collapse.

One might question, whether the security structures implemented by the Soviets were appropriate for the mission they were designed to accomplish. As effectiveness is not merely a measure of the number of arms or quality of forces but rather of mission compatibility, some believe the answer is probably not.

Currently, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are supported by international funds and substantial U.S. support. However, the ANDSF is undermined by lack of capacity, corruption, factorization, high casualty levels, poor intelligence, lack of willingness to launch offensive actions, and more. Consequently, the government heavily relies upon the Afghan Special Security Forces, its most competent force. The central government’s control of the country continues to erode as the Taliban captures more territories and local warlords assemble militias to confront the Taliban.

The U.S. has poured more than $70 billion in weapons, equipment, and training into the Afghan security forces. Yet, the competence of these forces to survive a massive Taliban offensive post-U.S. and NATO withdrawal is unclear. All of the above, resemble the challenges the Afghan security forces experienced following the Soviet withdrawal. The U.S should honestly and openly ask itself if the current ANDSF structure is the right one for the mission. As in 1989, the answer is probably not. The recent Taliban successes and territorial gains strengthen that assertion.

In anticipation of September 11, the U.S and Ghani governments should work together to reform the ANDSF. A framework should be considered to confront the challenges that the Afghan security forces will face, post-U.S withdrawal. The collapse of the ANDSF will raise the probability of President Ghani sharing a similar fate to former President Najibullah, scenes that nobody wishes to witness again. Furthermore, it will plunge this war-turn country into further chaos. This may result in renewed terrorist threats to the U.S and its allies.

By learning from the Soviet withdrawal experience, the U.S could structure and prepare the ANDSF in such a way, that they could effectively and independently sustain peace and regime stability in Afghanistan.

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