April 2022

Philippines
 by Rise to Peace

The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Proactive Countermeasure Against Abu Sayyaf

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) come from a split of the Moro National Liberation Front, which was renowned as an active terrorist organization in the Philippines in the 1990s. Additionally, reports indicate that Al-Qaeda has funded and backed Abu Sayyaf. The organization is affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah and specializes in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, assassinations, and extortion, and are responsible for numerous violent incidents between 2011 and 2018.

The ASG is concentrated in the Sulu Archipelago’s Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan Provinces, with a strong and active presence in Mindanao. On occasion, members also travel to the capital of the Philippines, Manila. Unsurprisingly, the ASG has also been characterized as a criminal-like group because they are more profit-driven than philosophical. Most of its factions declared their allegiance to Daesh in 2014.

Abdurajak Janajalani, the group’s founder and senior leader, founded ASG in 1991. Janjalani studied in numerous Middle Eastern countries with the help of a so-called “fundamentalist organization.” He grew politicized and formed extreme ideas after studying and traveling in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other nations. Janajalani encountered Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, according to the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and may have been one of the fighters who defended Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. He considered Bin Laden’s philosophical narrative a gift because of his strong links with the past and was inspired to bring the ideology back to his homeland, the Philippines.

So, what exactly is Janjalani’s objective in Mindanao, Philippines? Janjalani’s goal is to create and execute an Islamic territory in southern Philippines, and an independent Salafist Sunni Islamic organization dedicated entirely to the Moros moiety.

For many years, it was assumed that this small group was fighting against the governments of the United States, Spain, and the Philippines. They claimed they had been repressed, resulting in the Bangsamoro fight, which molded their historical narrative. Furthermore, in 2016, the Islamic State released a video in which four “battalions” of militants from the Abu Sayyaf vowed loyalty to the group, indicating a visible allegiance to the Islamic State.

Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Comprehensive Efforts After the Marawi Siege

After the Marawi Siege in 2017, the Philippine government has increased its efforts to persuade ASG members to hand over their arsenal and surrender. A ground campaign had been implemented to retake the city of Marawi in southern Philippines, where militants connected with Daesh had assumed control, which resulted in a subsequent crackdown on the ASG leadership.

Since 2017, there has been a decrease in ASG-related incidents. According to statistics from the 11th Infantry Division, a Philippine defense force tasked with countering militancy in southern Sulu Island, ASG’s heartland; the number of militants operating in the area has reduced from around 300 in 2019 to about 100. Militant groups associated with Daesh reportedly lost foreign support in Sulu. “We are no longer monitoring fund transfers from the outside,” said Maj. Gen. Patrimonio, commander of the 11th Infantry Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Capitulation and Clash: Continuous Efforts of the AFP in Mindanao

In the province of Basilan, a follower of the ASG was killed in a quick shootout. On Friday, March 4, 2022, the clash occurred in Mangal village, Sumisip, as per Brigadier General Domingo Gobway, commander of Joint Task Force (JTF)-Basilan. According to Gobway, the forces were in the middle of a tactical operation when they were informed of the presence of Buloy Parang, an ASG supporter, in the Mangal village. Parang operated as a courier and anti-personnel explosive planter in the Sumisip area for the ASG alongside Pasil Bayali.

Army commanders reported that troops of the 41st Infantry Battalion tracked down and fought pro-Islamic State terrorists in a firefight in the village of Bungkaong in Patikul town on March 26, 2022, one of the Abu Sayyaf’s few surviving sanctuaries. There were no “issues of enemy fatalities,” but Patrimonio said soldiers found numerous items left behind by the insurgents, including one M16 automatic gun. According to him, no soldiers were seriously injured or killed in the incident.

On April 2, 2022, two suspected members of the ASG were killed, and nine others were injured in confrontations with government troops in the Basilan area. According to Brig. Gen. Domingo Gobway, head of Joint Task Force-Basilan, four of the nine casualties were soldiers from the 64th Infantry Regiment.

Since January 2022, there have been more than four reports of ASG surrendering or clashing with the AFP every month. Along with these stories, local governments have sponsored programs to attract militants to return to the folds of the law and bring peace together. Various reports have been made about prominent ASG officials surrendering. “Our struggle was going nowhere,” remarked Faizal engagements with government troops, as per the military, the first of which occurred in 2014. Several of the ASG’s trainees come from the communities where the militants take refuge. Furthermore, other senior leaders at ASG have either been killed or surrendered to the AFP.

What is Next for Abu Sayyaf?

The apparent absence of Islamist militant operations in Mindanao, the Philippines’ southernmost island, is beguiling. Militancy in the region appears to be on the wane in 2020 and 2021. The AFP besieged terrorist strongholds and welcomed large numbers of insurgents’ surrenders, mainly from the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the ASG.

Following that, unsuccessful operations and the decapitation of global terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and ISIS, among many others, may have influenced the militant groups’ demise in the Philippines. Because these enormous organizations have also been crippled to their core, no support, allegiance, or finances have been shown to Philippine-based Islamic groups. Regardless of this gradual win, the presence of these groups is still evident. They may rise again, and may have spotted the right timing, for they still value their ideology. But then again, as long as the campaign against them is upheld, it might continuously dissolve in the coming years.

 

Kristian N. River, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Kabul
 by Rise to Peace

Deadly Attacks Target Schools in Western Kabul

On April 19, 2022, at least nine individuals died, and more than 50 were injured, per UNICEF’s report, after a series of coordinated attacks occurred in Western Kabul in the Dasht-e-Barchi neighborhood, home to a large Shia and Hazara population.  The first attack struck the Mumtaz Education Center early Tuesday morning, followed by three explosions, one caused by a grenade, at the Abdul Rahim Shaheed High School, where elementary school girls are still allowed to attend.

While no group has yet claimed responsibility for the attacks, violence is not a new phenomenon for the Shia community, which has previously been the target of attacks by the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).

Immediately following the attacks, various government and organizational figureheads spoke out, regarding the attacks as reprehensible and senseless.  Attacks against civilians, especially innocent children at schools, has struck an international nerve.  Ramiz Alakbarov, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, reiterated that violence against schools is never acceptable, as schools should be a source of physical and emotional safety.  Moreover, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric stated that “attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools, are strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law.”

Hazara Shia Community in Afghanistan

In 2019, the U.S. Department of State estimated that 10-15 percent of Afghanistan’s population are Shia, and of the Shia population, 90 percent are ethnic Hazaras.  The Hazara community predominantly resides in central and western Kabul.  Due to the minority status of Afghan Shias, they are frequently targeted by Sunni-based organizations, such as the Taliban and IS-K.  Ultimately, the Hazara community has “encountered persecution and systematic discrimination in their chronicle for more than a century.”

Initially, hopes rang high for the Hazara community when the Taliban collapsed 20 years ago.  The prospect of a democracy resounded throughout Afghanistan; however, attacks persisted against the Hazara Shia community, especially with the rise of IS-K and their mission to purge Afghanistan of any Shia Hazara Muslims.  Now, with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the Hazara Shia community is fearful that any progress they have made within society will be shattered and that attacks will steadily increase against their community.

Other Attacks Against the Hazara Community

While the attacks on April 19th in Kabul are horrific, sadly, they were not unprecedented.  Afghanistan’s Hazara community has been continuously and brutally targeted by both the Taliban and IS-K, from being the victims of targeted killings to discrimination to kidnappings.

Recent attacks include those in July 2021, when Hazara men in the village of Mundarakht were massacred by Taliban fighters “during a  two-day killing spree.”  Additionally, the attacks of April 19, 2021, are not the first-time schools have been targeted in a largely Hazara community.  In May 2021, at least 90 individuals were killed after a car bomb was detonated outside he Sayed Ul-Shuhada High School, targeting female students.  Also, the IS-K detonated a group of suicide bombers at a Shia mosque in October 2021, killing 47 and injuring at least 70.

Moving Forward

Ultimately, attacks against innocent children, especially at schools, should never occur.  The ruthlessness of these attacks must be met with a thorough investigation and changes within Afghanistan to protect the Shia and Hazara communities.  This is a moment in which the Taliban can demonstrate to the international community that they have truly changed by providing safety and security for all Afghans.  Finally, the international community must pay careful attention to the unrelenting attacks against the Hazara Shia community and take actionable steps to secure their well-being and prosecute any human rights violations.

 

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Mexico
 by Rise to Peace

A Growing and Changing Threat: The Evolution of Narco-Warfare in Mexico

The levels of violence associated with drug trafficking in Mexico are critical. The country has several security challenges due to the presence, activities, and strengthening of drug cartels. These illegal organizations continually seek to innovate their methods to ship drug shipments around the world, expand throughout the country and the region, and contest control of illicit markets against other criminal groups.

However, one factor relevant to drug cartel violence Mexican security forces must address is the modernization of cartel equipment, vehicles, and weapons. The evolution of narco-warfare in Mexico is extremely threatening as it exponentially increases the firepower of these illegal organizations, their warfare, and their defenses.

Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico

Mexico is currently experiencing one of its most violent periods. Drug cartels have intensified violence in the country, either through confrontation against other illegal organizations or against State forces.  In fact, it has been reported that in 2021 Mexico registered 33,315 homicides after the two most violent years in its history, under Andrés Manuel López Obrador, with 34,690 murder victims in 2019 and 34,554 in 2020.

Drug cartels are perhaps the biggest threat to the country’s security and stability.  Presently, 16 cartels are vying for control of the country; and the criminal organizations with the largest presence are the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), which has a presence in 24 states, and the Gulf Cartel, which has a presence in nine states. There are also other cartels with a large presence in the country, such as the Sinaloa Cartel or the Northeast Cartel, who have allied with the Zetas. Other criminal organizations with a presence in the country are Los Beltrán Leyva, La Familia Michoacana, Los Caballeros Templarios, Juarez Cartel, Arellano Felix Cartel, Tlahuac Cartel, Unión Tepito, Guerreros Unidos, Los Rojos, Los Viagras, and Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel.

Drug trafficking is the main source of financing for these groups and fuels the violence in the country.  According to the annual report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mexican criminal organizations continue to control much of the import of cocaine into the United States and wholesale cocaine trafficking within the country. They rely heavily on local criminal groups and street gangs for retail distribution.

According to U.S. authorities, Mexican criminal groups often procure multi-ton shipments of cocaine from drug traffickers in South America. The report also notes that according to U.S. authorities, the main cocaine trafficking routes, the eastern Pacific route and the western Caribbean route converge in Mexico, from where the drug enters the United States, mostly by land across the country’s south-western border.

However, Mexican drug cartels also engage in other types of illegal activities beyond drug trafficking to finance and fortify themselves. Some of these include human trafficking, migrant smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, piracy, fuel theft, vehicle theft on federal highways, illegal logging, extortion of mining companies, water trafficking, trafficking of medical equipment and medicines, including unregistered and counterfeit products, and loans.

Evolution of Narco-Warfare: An Emerging Threat

The millions in revenue from drug trafficking and other illegal activities have allowed Mexican cartels to modernize their equipment and weaponry, leading to increased firepower and warfare capabilities. This is a significant risk factor for Mexico’s stability and security, as the trend indicates that the cartels will seek to strengthen themselves.

In 2011, Mexican authorities in the state of Tamaulipas found two dump trucks, such as those commonly used for transporting goods, converted into tanks with armor up to 2.5 centimeters thick.  The “narco-tanks” have continued to be used ever since, and with their use among drug cartels appearing to be increasingly common. In 2021, in the state of Tamaulipas there was a confrontation between two narco-tanks of the Gulf Cartel and the Northeast Cartel, both of which were also equipped with high-caliber weapons. In March of the same year, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) exhibited two of its narco-tanks on the streets of Michoacán, which were two large trucks armored from the wheels to the roof with iron plates, transformed into homemade tanks.

The drug cartels’ new capabilities are not limited to the creation of narco-tanks but are also reflected in the acquisition of better weaponry. During the failed operation to capture Ovidio Guzmán López, son of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, it became evident through videos that the Sinaloa Cartel was in possession of weapons such as machine guns, assault rifles, grenades, pistols, and mortars. The gunmen were further known to be in possession of the fearsome Barrett M82 rifle, which is known as “the weapon of choice of the narcos terrorizing Mexico.”  As for the acquisition of these weapons, Mexican authorities found that seven out of every ten weapons seized from criminals are of U.S. manufacture, with many manufactured in Arizona and Texas gun shops.

There have also been innovations in the use of technology and explosives. In 2022, alleged members of the CJNG used drones to drop explosives in Michoacán. The cartel members dropped explosives and are likely to employ this technique again in the future as drones are capable of autonomous flight, are lightweight, and cheaper than traditional aircraft.

Mexican cartels have also improved their human talent and the quality of their troops. For example, a few years ago it became known that the Los Zetas cartel offered huge sums of money to former members of the Mexican Special Forces (GAFES), an elite military special mission corps created by the National Defense Secretariat and trained abroad to confront rival cartels and law enforcement agencies.

Other cartels across the country have replicated this practice. In 2020, the Mexican Army dismantled an alleged Sinaloa Cartel training camp in which five alleged former Mexican Army soldiers were training the cartel’s new recruits.  The training camps have also been used by other cartels and have been described as places where new cartel members are taught to “handle long and short weapons, to set ambushes, to respect the rules, not to be a gossip and also to kill.”

The cartels themselves have also shared the evolution of narco-warfare through online videos. In 2020, the CJNG shared a video showing more than 80 people carrying different caliber weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, military equipment, and several armored cars. The individuals in this video shouted slogans in support of the cartel’s leader, alias “Mencho,” and claimed to be members of the organization’s elite group.

Present and Future Implications

Improvements in the capabilities of Mexican cartels demonstrate that the risk posed by these organizations has increased exponentially, which is likely to further increase levels of violence throughout Mexico.

The cartels’ technological, warfare, and tactical advances indicate a high capacity for innovation. They have large sources of financial resources to fund such advances, have infiltrated Mexican security agencies, and will use their improvements to increase their profits, zones of influence, and power within the Mexican state.

The cartels’ equipment, weapons, vehicles, and fighters will make it more difficult for the Mexican security forces to operate since they will have to use more resources to combat illegal organizations, which are no longer simple criminal groups. Instead, they are organized groups with the ability to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks, mobilize large numbers of men and resources, and confront state forces with large-caliber weapons.

Therefore, despite the fact that today there is no clear solution to end the war on drug trafficking, it is necessary for the Mexican government to propose effective strategies to dismantle drug cartels, tracing high-caliber weapons, monitoring retired soldiers, and anti-drone and anti-armored vehicle capabilities. The risk that the cartels continue to improve their equipment and weapons is latent, so effective measures need to be taken as soon as possible to mitigate this risk and prevent the cartels from reaching the military capabilities of a conventional army.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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CIA
 by Rise to Peace

Looking Back: Al-Qaeda’s Unexpected Attack Against the Central Intelligence Agency

For a decade, an elite team of military and intelligence agents operated in secret around the world with one clear intention: to track down and kill Osama bin Laden. As the investigation into Bin Laden’s whereabouts progressed, it came to a critical and unexpected conclusion. The so-called “informant” assisting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials was an Al-Qaeda ally.

Due to this, Al-Qaeda achieved possibly its greatest success ever against the CIA and its Jordanian partner service on December 30, 2009. Seven CIA officers and one Jordanian officer were killed when a triple agent blew himself up at Forward Operating Base Chapman, a U.S. military base in Khost, Afghanistan.

So, who is the suicide bomber? He was a Palestinian whose parents had fled Beersheva during the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, eventually settling in Kuwait. They became refugees once more in 1991 when the Kuwaiti administration evacuated the Palestinian community following Kuwait’s liberation from the Iraqis by an American-led coalition. Humam Khalil al-Balawi grew up in Jordan before moving to Istanbul, Turkey, to pursue his medical degree and marry a Turkish woman. When he returned to Jordan, he found a job bringing medical aid to the needy in the enormous Marka refugee camp.

The CIA agents working on this case were made to assume that the Jordanian doctor had entered Al-Qaeda as a double agent when he provided a video claiming that he had met Al-Qaeda’s senior leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. But the truth is, he was a devoted follower of the Al-Qaeda ideology. It was all for show.

Jennifer Matthews, a mother of three and a desk-bound analyst, was the base leader in Khost. She was one of the agency’s top Al-Qaeda analysts, having spent years monitoring the most sought terrorist, Osama bin Laden, but Matthews was thought to lack field experience. In 1989, Matthews decided to join the CIA and was full of potential. A Capitol Hill employee who met Matthews overseas described her as “self-assured” and “able to blend into the atmosphere.”

The Error of the Operation

According to Matthews and other CIA officials, the doctor should be made to feel welcome and not searched. CIA officers formed a circle-like position to meet the “informant,” as seen in Zero Dark Thirty.

Furthermore, the Jordanian doctor was not stopped and searched before being taken to the facility. As al-Bawali stepped out of the car, he detonated his shrapnel-filled bomb in front of Matthews, Elizabeth Hanson, Scott Michael Roberson, Harold Brown Jr., Dane Clark Paresi, and Jeremy Wis, who were among those killed, in addition to Darren LaBonte.  It was also reported that several additional CIA officers were critically injured.

In a letter to CIA personnel in 2009, Barack Obama wrote that their deceased colleagues hailed from a “long line of patriots” who had already helped keep the country safe despite severe dangers. At that moment, President Obama recognized that the CIA had been put to the test “like never before,” since the 9/11 attacks.

Since the bombing of the CIA station in Beirut in 1983, the Camp Chapman attack has been regarded as the agency’s second-deadliest incident. In the Beirut incident, seventeen employees were killed. To summarize the issue, security standards failed because their treatment of al-Bawali was overly gentle.

The CIA officers used a desperate tactic in which they were deceived by false intelligence to obtain information. Again, the fact that they are stationed in a high-risk area serves as a reminder that, no matter how strong or poor their intelligence leads are, they must always put safety first.

Life of the CIA Agents

Jennifer Matthews worked as an analyst for the first seven years of her tenure at the CIA. Matthews was among those who digested intelligence delivered by someone else in the area and then examined what the CIA had acquired from it. She proceeded to the CIA’s counter-terrorist center in the mid-1990s, where she monitored al-Qaeda in a section of the agency that would see its prominence rise after the World Trade Center attack.

Scott Roberson was born on July 3, 1970, in Akron, Ohio, and relocated with his family to Tolland, Connecticut, where he promptly became an active member of the community. Roberson’s travels took him to a variety of countries and states, but regardless of where he was stationed, he was committed to serving his country and society. Working as a detective for the Atlanta Police Department, training police officers for the United Nations mission in Kosovo, safeguarding individuals working throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, and working as an officer for the CIA were among his professional responsibilities.

Darren Labonte served as a law enforcement officer in Libertyville, Illinois, and as a U.S. Marshal. According to his family, he achieved a leadership and shooting award at the FBI Institute in Quantico, Virginia, according to the FBI, and then went to the FBI’s New York district office. The CIA recruited him, and he withdrew from the Bureau in late 2006, moving to Washington, D.C. with his wife. His father was wary of the CIA, but his son always pursued his own path.

Elizabeth Hanson went through the CIA’s basic training at “The Farm” and was among a group of tech-savvy officers employed after 9/11. According to the book, Hanson was spirited as the CIA transitioned from a covert operation to one focused on tracking information on the web, over the broadcast media, or through advanced covert eavesdropping.

Harrold Brown Jr. was a former member of the United States military. He served in the Army as an intelligence officer and as a CIA case officer. When Harold was in town, he was the type of parent who always arrived at Mass when his kids were singing and smiling with delight at how much they could accomplish.

Dane Clark Paresi grew up in Portland and is a former Army Sergeant Major. Paresi matriculated from Marshall High School in Portland in 1982 and enlisted in the Army two days later, undergoing basic training at Fort Dix in New Jersey. As per family members, joining the Army and the CIA was a childhood dream come true.

Jeremy Wise was a former SEAL with eight years of experience who was assisting Operation Enduring Freedom with Xe Services. He completed Westside Christian School in El Dorado, Arkansas, and graduated from Hendrix University in Conway, Arkansas. He was a member of Virginia Beach’s Trinity Church.

The CIA Memorial Wall

“In commemoration of those members of the Central Intelligence Agency who gave their lives in the service of their country.” The Memorial Wall may be seen on the north wall of the lobby of the original headquarters building. The 137 stars on this wall serve as a silent, simple memorial to those CIA officers who have given their lives in the line of duty. The Memorial Wall was commissioned by the CIA Fine Arts Commission in May 1973 and sculpted by Harold Vogel in July 1974.

According to the CIA, “personnel who die while serving their country in the field of intelligence are honored on the Memorial Wall posthumously.” Death can happen anywhere, even in foreign fields and the United States. “Death may occur in the foreign field or in the United States. Death must be of an inspirational or heroic character while in the performance of duty; or as the result of an act of terrorism while in the performance of duty; or as an act of premeditated violence targeted against an employee, motivated solely by that employee’s Agency affiliation; or in the performance of duty while serving in areas of hostilities or other exceptionally hazardous conditions where the death is a direct result of such hostilities or hazards.”

CIA station agents work in both favorable and adversarial nations. When apprehended by an unfriendly nation, a CIA field operative acting clandestinely is typically regarded as a spy and is susceptible to imprisonment, prosecution, and even severe punishment. To not only nurture informants but also escape capture, a CIA spy must be skilled at integrating what the agency refers to as “people and street smarts.” CIA field agents have been imprisoned, tortured, and even executed in hostile territories or countries.

After all, it’s tough to work in a fast-paced workplace while maintaining the highest priority on the goal, which is to ensure people’s safety and security. The Camp Chapman incident served as a stark reminder to the general public that the CIA, and other intelligence officers from throughout the world, have a difficult job. People may think their jobs are “awesome,” but they are putting their lives on the line to give actionable intelligence in the best interests of their countries.

 

Kristian Rivera, Counterterrorism Research Fellow

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Failed
 by Rise to Peace

Mitigating Failed Counter-Insurgency Operations in India

Recent cases of repeated failed military operations in northeastern India provoked many to question New Delhi’s approach in countering insurgency in the Northeast. Failed operations at Oting and Chasa had once again incited many to question the age-old use of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the region.

The Act, which gives excessive powers to the Indian armed forces, had once again come under scrutiny. This time, it’s not just the public but also senior military officials and intellectuals from the armed forces. What lies ahead is New Delhi’s much needed change of approach in countering insurgency in the Northeast: a systematic change with legislative and institutional reforms.

From a mainland perspective, northeastern India is seen as a region infested with insurgency and secessionist movements. However, what is often overlooked is that it is also a region which has been periled by militarization. Under the premise of national security and countering insurgency, numerous civilians succumbed to its fallacious approaches. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 holds accountability for much of the fatality that the public had to been subjected to.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, known as AFSPA, bears a nauseant undertone along with its dreaded powers conferred upon the armed forces. AFSPA, previously known as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance was first enacted by the colonial British in 1942 to contain the Quit India Movement. Also, it was further adopted by Independent India in 1958 to suppress the armed struggle in the Northeast.

The AFSPA granted excessive powers to the Armed Forces which continue to be contested to this date. The special powers conferred upon the armed forces include licenses to kill, destroy, arrest without warrant, shoot based on mere suspicion, and impunity of trials.

M.G. Devasahayam, a retired IAS officer who also served in the Indian Army during the peak of insurgency in the Northeast noted that ‘while exercising such draconian powers, there is bound to be misuse’ and accordingly, it had been misused, with over 1,500 alleged extrajudicial killings by security forces in Manipur alone, the region continues to be tormented.

The justification needed to invoke the Act and confer such powers to the armed forces was highly reliant on the subjective understanding of the concerned head of the state, such that any area deemed as ‘disturbed’ would fall victim to the Act. Hence, with insurgency prevailing in the northeast region for decades, plagued civilians by such an Act as ‘draconian’ as AFSPA.

Cases from Oting and Chasa

The incident at Oting on the 4th of December, 2021, where fourteen civilians were killed by the armed forces adds to the civilian death count under AFSPA. At around 4 pm, the 21st Para Special Forces carried out an offense based on the intelligence they had received, unfortunately, resulting in the deaths of civilian coal miners instead of insurgents.

Various contestations circle around the event as to whether the Special Forces were in an attempt of a ‘fake-encounter,’ which the region is quite familiar with, or if it truly was a botched operation. However, evidence suggests its own answers, this is backed by survivor claims of indiscriminate firing and circulated footage of the armed forces attempting to change the attire of the victims. The incident was however, widely popularized as a case of ‘mistaken identity.’ Subsequently, various protests occurred in the following weeks. The issue of AFSPA was the central concern amid the various protests, and the repeal of the Act was echoed by both the public and politicians.

Of late, New Delhi has decided to partially uplift the Act from certain parts of the region, seven districts from Nagaland, 23 from Assam, and six from Manipur. However, Oting still remains under the Act. Over the past three years the ruling government has been able to resolve a number of insurgent issues in the region by signing several agreements with the insurgents, and the partial withdrawal is seemingly another victory for the party.

However, it is rather too early to celebrate, as with AFSPA, the partial withdrawal makes little to no difference. Given, the central issue concerning AFSPA is with its provisions which continue to be manipulated time and again.

One day after the Act was announced to be withdrawn, two civilians from the Chasa village were shot and injured. It was on the 2nd of April, 2022 when the 12th Para Special Forces carried out a failed operation, another case of ‘mistaken identity.’ Similar instance of indiscriminate firing were reported despite the victims shouting and claiming they were civilians. These repeated instances have unearthed major flaws in India’s national security measures, which require legislative reforms and structural changes in India’s security force deployments.

The Way Forward

Retired Lieutenant Gen H S Panag recommended that the deployment of the Indian Armed Forces is not a necessity to counter-insurgency in the region but is rather a role that needs to be taken by the Central Reserved Police Force (CRPF). He further suggested that the Act be repealed fully and replaced by a more humane act which can serve the interests of both the people and the state.

Accordingly, to reiterate Lt. Gen Panag’s recommendations, the insurgency issues in the Northeast can surely be contained by internal security forces, like the CRPF. Internal security problems can be addressed by internal security forces, which is something they are trained and specialized to do.

In cases of counter insurgency operations, forces accompanied by a commanding officer who is familiar with the topography, culture, and conditions of the region should be deployed so that operations can be carried out, keeping in mind the repercussions of the Act.

Henceforth, AFSPA should be fully repealed and a committee should be formed comprised of retired justices from the Supreme Court along with retired military officials and senior civil society members from the region. This committee would seek to draft an act that can effectively confer power to the armed forces, all the while safeguarding the rights of the people. In this way, ‘security’ in its real sense can be achieved.

 

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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