November 2021

Nigeria
 by Joan McDappa

What Measures Should be Taken to Counter Nigeria’s Insecurities?

Nigeria has benefited from several projects and programs, all aimed at resolving the issue of insecurity including, addressing identified root causes and engendering factors. While these efforts seem promising, over time, one realizes its temporal traits. Being a significant player with yielding influence in Africa, Nigeria must understand all that is at stake for the continent if it fails to address its internal problems.

Insecurity in Nigeria 

Since its independence, Nigeria has experienced, at an ever-increasing pace, a series of conflicts and insurgencies.  These conflicts have turned the budding land in the Sahel to a leading figure on the list of unstable regions in the continent. From political violence to ethnoreligious conflicts, social agitations, resource conflicts, and now radical extremism, the nation continues to navigate these issues in hopes of survival.

Having survived a terrifying civil war, as well as spates of violence and conflicts, one would expect that Nigeria’s resilience will lead to stability. But in reality, this is not the case, as fears that the worst is yet to come remain strong. It was, therefore, no surprise to many when events of extremism began to gradually build up in the northern region of Nigeria, with Boko Haram taking the lead.

In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf, a famous preacher and proponent of the Izala sect of Islam and the founder of Boko Haram, began to radicalize his followers in Maiduguri, Nigeria. Establishing a religious center and an Islamic school, Yusuf reached many people from poor backgrounds across the country. In no time, Yusuf’s teachings attracted many followers and expanded into other states including Yobe, where it established a base nicknamed ‘Afghanistan.’ The ‘Afghanistan’ base (just like other operation bases) enjoys a geographical advantage, as it is within close proximity to Nigeria’s borders, thus aiding their expansion into neighboring West African countries.

Responses to Insecurity and Terrorism

Almost always, the first response to quell reports of security disruptions in Nigeria is the use of force. Following this response is an attempt to create a lasting solution through program developments, usually aimed at management and recovery.

Many of these initiatives, such as the NYSC scheme (introduced in the aftermath of the civil war), the Amnesty program (focused on ending militancy in the Niger Delta), and the de-radicalization program, all fail to address root causes; instead, they manage the situation for as long as possible.

Consequently, we see a resurgence of the same issues across Nigerian regions: in eastern Nigeria, there is a reawakening of secession agitations by Biafra, in the Niger Delta, an increasing rate of crime and kidnappings, and in the North East, terrorism is growing with reports of abductees willingly returning to their captors.

Recommendations

Nigeria’s rising insecurity may remain unresolved until the government understands the importance of engaging and collaborating with relevant stakeholders in the country. Thus, while external aid has its role, the outcome may not be as desired, until every group in the country bears its responsibility and the right environment to execute them is created.

Collaborate with CSOs

Civil society and humanitarian organizations have been present in Nigeria for decades, closely collaborating with the Nigerian government to maintain security and stability. Their role in Nigeria’s security largely revolves around responding to conflict situations by offering relief support, spearheading mediation and reconciliation, and rehabilitating victims and perpetrators.

While these are commendable efforts, the government and these organizations need to take progressive steps to ensure appropriate mechanisms are in place to identify and address early warning signs of extremism and incitement.

Community Engagement

The role of the community has largely been ignored in Nigeria’s decision-making system, regardless of it being a democratic nation.  A review is essential with relevant measures made effective immediately. The government should fully engage communities in various approaches to counter violent extremisms, as well as identify and prevent future cases.

Deliberate efforts to ensure a balanced representation of women and youth in counter-extremism approaches is necessary, as they introduce a unique perspective from a largely marginalized and vulnerable population.

Contingency Plans

As a nation whose primary responsibility entails protecting the lives and properties of its citizens, expecting a contingency plan is in place at all times is not out of the ordinary. Due to Nigeria’s porous borders, Boko Haram and other extremist groups are in an advantageous position. Unfortunately, even with the lessons learned from Boko Haram, Nigeria’s borders remain largely unprotected.

Address Root Causes

The impoverished state of the country and the northern regions, alongside poor tenets of its society, are some factors that aid extremists’ growth. Time and time again, we have seen extremist groups all over the world garner support from citizens by providing basic amenities that governments fail to supply. Some abductees who willingly returned to Boko Haram camps after being freed by Nigerian soldiers cited the harsh economic conditions as the reason they rejoined. The government must rise to its responsibility in driving development in Nigeria.

In addition to developmental challenges, other root causes such as intolerance and marginalization remain unaddressed. Intolerance remains a bane in Nigeria and is the bedrock for the many ethnoreligious conflicts and radicalism that Nigeria has suffered over the years. The government, alongside relevant national stakeholders, must find ways to address these root causes and allot as much attention to these challenges as they do for terrorist acts.

Conclusion

Resolving insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria does not require additional funds or aid; all that is needed is a reformation of its systems, structures, and values. Merely formulating policies without a system that allows and ensures effective implementation would yield no result; this remains the case with Nigeria.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

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ISIS-K
 by Ahmad Mohibi

ISIS-K Grows as the Taliban Struggles to Maintain Power

According to a senior Afghan intelligence officer who spoke with Rise to Peace, ISIS of Khorasan (ISIS-K) is growing rapidly in the Char Bolak district of the Balkh province in Afghanistan, notably since the Taliban’s takeover. Recently, ISIS has claimed responsibility for two other attacks, one occurring outside of a women’s hospital in Liverpool, U.K., killing only the ISIS member himself.  The second attack occurred in Kampala, Uganda, killing three people and injuring 36. These attacks illustrate the rapid expansion of ISIS’s growth and activities.

Additionally, ISIS-K’s attacks have been characterized by violent expansion and retrenchment combined with periodic clashes with the Taliban, international forces, and Afghan security forces.

ISIS-K has been responsible for nearly 100 attacks against civilians in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as around 250 clashes with U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani security forces since 2017.

A senior Afghan intelligence officer informed Rise to Peace that ISIS-K is getting stronger due to a concentrated focus on increasing capabilities and power after the recent Taliban takeover.  There are no current counter-terrorism operations; however, the previous Afghan government used to have many counter-terrorism resources and operations, such as drone attacks. In addition, due to the Taliban takeover, there is no significant resistance against ISIS-K, leaving them with plenty of room to grow rapidly.

Furthermore, poverty is rampantly increasing in Afghanistan. So, not only does this make people more willing to join a terrorist organization, but also results in former Afghan security forces joining as a means to financially support their families. For example, an Afghan intelligence officer informed Rise to Peace that ISIS-K will pay 15,000 AFG to new recruits with no experience and 25,000 AFG for those with experience. Likewise, many top-level ISIS-K commanders who were captured during the previous five to six years were released after the Taliban takeover.

ISIS-K/Daesh Techniques

ISIS-K’s techniques are known to be chaotic and devastating.  ISIS-K strategically creates chaos and uncertainty through guerilla tactics in an attempt to discredit a government’s ability to provide security for its citizens.  Additionally, through these tactics, ISIS-K seeks to shift fighters from other groups into their own.  Through these efforts, ISIS-K aims to position itself as the leading jihadist organization in the region by recruiting new members, and poaching members affiliated with other groups.

Moreover, ISIS-K engages in various tactics to incentivize recruits, varying from marriage arrangements to threats.  One example includes sending out nightly letters to recruit people to join their cause.  They have even sent letters to Taliban soldiers, warning them to leave the Islamic Emirate or ISIS-K will assassinate them.

According to a senior Afghan intelligence officer who spoke with Rise to Peace, a new group within ISIS-K operates at night to kill members of the Taliban.  The unique aspect about this group is not only do they live seemingly normal lives, fighting at night while continuing to be farmers during the day, but they conduct their operations barefoot.  Thus, they have become known as the “barefoot fighters” among locals.  The “barefoot fighters'” tactics are comparable to those that the Mujahideen used during their existence, since the Mujahideen were referred to as “guerrillas” or “mountain men” and were similarly excellent in night combat.

Who are the targets?

Ever since ISIS-K’s founding, it has usually targeted Kabul with sophisticated and complex attacks.  In the majority of the attacks, ISIS-K has a high proclivity to target civilians whom they regard as infidels of Islam.

Capabilities

Most analysts and researchers, including the United Nations, gauge that ISIS-K’s capabilities have reached about 2,000 fighters, and increased when the Taliban released prisoners from the Afghanistan jail. This amount is somewhat comparable to the Taliban who have around 10,000 fighters at their disposal.

Financial Routes

It is not exactly evident where ISIS-K receives its funding, but the public U.S. government assessments provide the clearest understanding.  ISIS-K primarily receives funds by extorting the local population and businesses, taxation, illicit criminal commerce, donations, as well as support from the ISIS-core.

ISIS-K moves its money around the world and throughout Afghanistan via the Hawala. The Hawala is an alternative or parallel transfer system which exists outside of traditional finance channels. Hence, it has been used widely in funding terrorist groups and activities both in Afghanistan and abroad. Further, ISIS-K has cultivated relationships with specific Hawala dealers who store thousands of dollars for them.

The response from the international community

The international community has taken several steps to combat ISIS-K.  For example, the UN Security Council established an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze in 2019 against ISIS-K by all UN member states. Additionally, the US government has implemented strategies such as economic sanctions and counter-terrorism efforts to inhibit ISIS-K’s operational and financial capabilities.  However, since the Taliban takeover, it has become increasingly difficult for the international community to combat ISIS-K and terrorism financing in general.

Looking forward

With both financial and membership increases, ISIS-K is growing extensively, especially after the recent Taliban takeover. Not only are their attacks violent and chaotic, but they also target civilians to convey their message of jihad.

In order to face the challenges posed by both ISIS-K and terrorism in Afghanistan, the international community needs to strengthen its coordination on impeding terrorism financing in Afghanistan.  In addition, concrete steps must be identified and articulated for the Taliban to take against ISIS-K’s financing practices. Ultimately, until the international community is able to create a tangible strategy, ISIS-K will continue to grow in size and power.

 

Krista Tammila, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

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Otoniel
 by Rise to Peace

The Capture of Colombia’s Most Wanted Man Ignites a Series of Terrorist Attacks and Violence

Dairo Antonio Usuga, better known as Otoniel and the leader of one of Colombia’s most feared narco-terrorist organizations, was captured on October 23.  Otoniel is the head of the Clan del Golfo or the Gulf Clan, an armed terrorist and drug trafficking group that poses a serious threat to the Colombian State.

Colombian authorities captured Otoniel, however, his capture generated retaliation from the Gulf Clan against the Colombian security forces. In recent days, armed forces members have suffered terrorist attacks in revenge for Otoniel’s capture.  Additionally, this event will likely start a wave of violence between the factions of the organization as they seek to seize power.

BACKGROUND

The Gulf Clan is a drug trafficking organization that stems from the demobilization of paramilitary forces. They currently operate in areas such as the Gulf of Urabá and the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. It is estimated that the group currently has about 6,000 troops and is present in more than 211 municipalities throughout the Colombian territory. Their primary income comes from illicit drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The financial power of this organization has allowed them to increase military capabilities, expand into new territories, strengthen alliances with other criminal groups and grow their income. Today, the Gulf Clan presents one of the most significant barriers to the stability and security in many of Colombia’s territories.

Consequently, the strengthening of the Gulf Clan in recent years represents a rising threat to the Colombian State and the civilian population.  As a result, the Gulf Clan will continue its narco-terrorist activities until action is taken against them.  While Otoniel’s capture is a major blow to the organization, there is still much work to be done to defeat it.

OTONIEL’S CAPTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

After several months of tracking and intelligence, Otoniel was captured in Antioquia, a rural area in the municipality of Turbo. His capture created a power vacuum in the Gulf Clan, so it is to be expected that there will be internal disputes for control of the organization, mainly among its mid-level leaders.

However, the most worrying implications of Otoniel’s capture are the current retaliations his organization is taking against the Colombian military.  On October 26, army soldiers were attacked by members of the Gulf Clan in the department of Antioquia with explosives and gunfire. In the terrorist attack, three soldiers were killed and three others were wounded.

A few hours later, another military platoon was ambushed by the Clan, leaving one soldier dead and another wounded.

For this reason, it is feasible to affirm that retaliations against the Colombian armed forces will continue in the coming days. It is also highly likely that an increase in homicides and displaced persons will result from disputes within the organization’s factions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the demanding public order and security situation in Antioquia, which will likely escalate, in the short term it is recommended that the Colombian State deploy more troops in the area. This is necessary as greater territorial control is required, and operational results are needed to reduce regional violence.

On the other hand, in the medium and long term, more effective intervention strategies are needed against this narco-terrorist group due to the risk level it represents. From an operational and tactical perspective, it is necessary to attack its sources of financing, such as illicit crops, strengthen intelligence capabilities to anticipate terrorist attacks, and prevent this organization from forcibly recruiting young people from vulnerable populations.

Finally, in terms of public policy, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the populations in areas such as the Urabá region of Antioquia.  This can be achieved through the generation of formal employment, the provision of public goods and services, and an improvement in the health and education systems. In other words, comprehensive state action is required to guarantee security, but also better living conditions, so risk factors, such as the emergence and strengthening of these groups, disappear or are considerably reduced.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

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Afghan refugees
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Afghans Stuck in Limbo at Emirates Humanitarian City Seek Answers to their U.S. Entry Status

Tens of thousands Afghan Evacuees at Emirates Humanitarian City Seek Answers to their U.S. Entry Status. Many are now in limbo in overflowing processing centers, fearful of what comes next.

Unlike other Afghan refugee camps in Ramstein Air Base in Germany and US army base in Qatar where evacuees have had relatively quick entry processes into the U.S., these individuals live in a state of fear and uncertainty as to their futures.

Afghan Evacuations

Thousands of Afghans were evacuated and fled Afghanistan after the Taliban regained control on August 16, 2021.  After the fall of Kabul, the United States began evacuating Americans and Afghans, sending refugees across the globe to camps in Germany, Qatar, Spain, Uzbekistan, and UAE.  While thousands of Afghans have already been vetted and brought to the United States, a much different situation has unfolded at the Emirates Humanitarian City refugee camp. 

Emirates Humanitarian City Refugee Camp

An estimated 9,000 Afghan evacuees are currently housed at the Emirates Humanitarian City refugee camp in Abu Dhabi. These refugees were among the initial wave of evacuations by U.S. forces after the fall of Kabul. Ultimately, these evacuees have been housed at the Emirates Humanitarian City for three months and have since observed new Afghan refugee arrivals come and go in a matter of days. 

While the Afghan refugees are grateful for the U.S.’s assistance in evacuating them from Afghanistan, the conditions at the refugee camp have become untenable, causing them to raise their voices and demand answers.

Living in Limbo

One of the loudest concerns from the evacuees at the Emirates Humanitarian City is the uncertainty of when they will be processed and brought to the United States, most notably for those who have valid documents or family sponsorship.  

Evacuees have criticized the insufficient amount of personnel at the site to process and transfer them out of the camp. 

Thus, the undefined timeline at Emirates Humanitarian City coupled with threats of deportation has resulted in a state of anxiety and distress among refugees. On top of this, reports from inside Emirates Humanitarian City state that several refugees have died from unknown causes. The news of their deaths has been intentionally suppressed by the media. 

Ultimately, the situation at Emirates Humanitarian City has risen to a level where the refugees feel compelled to voice their concerns, especially regarding the camp’s educational, financial, and health issues. 

Educational Concerns

One concern raised by the refugees is the now three-month, and seemingly indefinite, hiatus in education for the children at the Abu Dhabi camp.  Since arriving, the children have lacked the opportunity to continue their studies, causing concern that they will fall behind educationally.  While students have already had to navigate educational barriers caused by the coronavirus pandemic, this interruption in education at the refugee camp will exacerbate academic delays in students.

Financial Concerns

Another concern for individuals is that time spent in the refugee camp equates to money lost, due to the inability to work. This three-month gap in income negatively affects these individuals’ success once they immigrate to a new location and financially hinders family members from relying on their financial assistance.

One Abu Dhabi camp member voiced her concerns about employment impediments posed by the prolonged immigration delay. 

Mina 45, was the breadwinner of her family as a governmental employee in Afghanistan but was forced to evacuate on August 21st as a result of the resurgence of the Taliban. Consequently, without Mina’s income, her family remaining in Afghanistan is impoverished. 

Mina’s story is not unique, as countless individuals and families at Emirates Humanitarian City are unable to work and earn money to support their families.  The refugees are eager to work and therefore motivated to transfer out of the camp to find employment and provide for their families.

Health Concerns

While at the Abu Dhabi camp, refugees have voiced their concerns over inadequate health care. Not only have several individuals died at the camp, but a handful have been deported back to Afghanistan due to mental health concerns. It is no surprise that the stress and anxiety of living in the refugee camp, in combination with the strains of fleeing one’s home, has led to mental health concerns and a state of depression among many Afghans at the camp.  

To recap events, individuals at the Abu Dhabi camp have previously lived in a war zone, were forced to flee from their country, and are now placed in a refugee camp with no set date for leaving. Research has found that refugees often experience high levels of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.  This is undoubtedly true for the refugees at Emirates Humanitarian City. 

Going Forward

Ultimately, while the evacuees are deeply grateful for the help from the United States, they seek transparency on whether they are being processed for entry into the United States. However, being left in a state of limbo for the past three months, while thousands of other refugees have had speedier transfer processes, has left the Abu Dhabi camp refugees confused and frustrated.  As a result, the refugees are calling for increased personnel at their camps to expedite their vetting and transfer process by U.S. officials.  

Presently, the Afghan evacuees at Emirates Humanitarian City have reached a point where silence and inaction are no longer an option.  And while their gratitude remains, their patience has dwindled, leading to plans of a hunger strike if continued inaction persists.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder Rise to Peace

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Boko Haram
 by Joan McDappa

What Went Wrong with Nigeria’s Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Mission?

Nigeria has continued to grapple with the issue of terrorism, and as expected, has had to launch many counter-terrorism missions. While domestic conflicts and extremism were not exactly new phenomena to a fragile state like Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram would understandably raise concerns, mainly because of its religious ideologies and fatal potentialities in constituting an existential threat.

Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda’wati Wal Jihad, fondly known as Boko Haram, has in its almost two decades of existence; carried out several attacks targeted at civilians, security officials, infrastructures, security facilities, international organizations etc. All these attacks, Boko Haram claims, are done to drive their mission of establishing a caliphate – a goal it briefly achieved during their brief occupation of large swathes of territories in the North East region.

Counter-Terrorism Operations

For the period that this group has existed, counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria seem to have substantially focused on the use of force, however extreme it may be: chiefly on the defensive and occasionally on the offensive.

With the military at the forefront of this campaign, alongside the collaborative efforts of other security agencies, the tactics employed to solve one problem often create a much bigger problem for the nation. Unfortunately, looking through history, this is becoming a pattern in Nigeria. The lack of restrictions in using excessive force by security agencies as a response tool (regardless of the situation, whether it is a peaceful protest or terrorist incident) significantly hampers their genuine efforts.

For instance, Boko Haram initially started as a religious sect with somewhat radical ideologies that were of no significant risk (at the time) to the nation’s security. Although there was a need to be wary of the group, at that point, perhaps a softer approach would be ideal, but this was not the case.

An unnecessary military operation that saw the maiming and killings of members of the ‘religious sect,’ and worst of all, the extrajudicial killing of the then leader of the group Mohammed Yusuf by the police; birthed a mountain of problems that have only complicated things for the Nigerian counter-terrorism campaign. Gradually, translating from a religious sect with Yusuf, the reluctant fighter as the leader- to an unstable group led by the highly erratic Abubakar Shekau, the outcome of counter-terrorism operations in the North East is visible.

The instability in Boko Haram resulted in many offshoots notable among them are Ansaru, which shares links with Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) with links to ISIS. Regardless of how the choice of strategy to counter terrorism seems to be multiplying the problems rather than reducing, it seems Nigeria has still not realized the glaring lessons before them.

Current counter-terrorism missions still have the military at the forefront, with its recent operations recording the elimination of leaders of terrorist groups. Again, we see the same mistake made with Boko Haram repeated, and in this case, the consequences are far graver as these groups now have international links and are not necessarily working on their own. These operations by the military may widen access for these international terrorist groups to further launch their campaigns, and in turn, gain more grounds in the already fragile region.

Recommendations

While these military operations may have their usefulness, we have seen over time that they are usually short-lived. There has been a rise in terrorist activities in the North East region, despite all the efforts and revenue invested in countering it. These groups still manage to onboard voluntary recruits amid the heated military operations.

A successful counter-terrorism approach should encompass strategies that focus on addressing development issues such as poor governance, low literacy, poverty, and unemployment; that these groups readily take advantage of to promote their campaigns. The failure to pay as much attention to extensively resolving developmental issues in the region while intentionally minimizing military tactics (which only infuriates terrorists and does nothing to deter or disengage them); continues to foil Nigeria’s counter-terrorism campaign.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

 

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