August 2021

ISIL Twitter Account
 by Rise to Peace

Can ISIL succeed in their political objective in 2021?

ISIL on Gettr

ISIL on Gettr

 

On 1st June 2021 former Trump administration official Jason Miller launched “Gettr” a pro Trump, pro “free speech” alternative to Twitter, aimed at conservative Americans. However, in the space of a few weeks, the platform has become a hotbed of radical Islamic propaganda. Pro ISIL accounts have been flooding the platform with posts including video of beheading and other extremist content. This fits with recent intelligence which shows a renewed surge of ISIL activity on closed platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp, aimed at promoting their extremist agenda and targeting new recruits on social media. Chantelle Davis reports.

 

Despite losing, it’s billion-dollar operation, the loss of territorial grounds and a global pandemic, ISIL has become advanced in ‘undetectable’ social media recruitment techniques. However, their political objective remains the same – to achieve a transnational caliphate that has traits of old Islamic culture, but new ideologies based on their own political and governing laws; better known as ‘wilayat’. ISIL and its supporters are pursuing its political goals through propaganda campaigns targeting its hatred towards Western Governments and society. Unquestionably, ISIL is fixated on its strategy to establish a new political system within the territories it occupies, enforced by terror and threats those ISIL deem non-supporters or ‘kuffars’, but during the pandemic ISIL has strengthened its presence in online spaces  to a degree not witnessed before has. Researchers are concerned about the impact that this might bring to counter-terrorism, as these methods are far harder to detect (particularly on closed social networks), allowing recruitment and online radicalization to occur away from prying eyes. To examine the extent to which ISIL has the potential to sway the majority of jihadism, it is important to examine where the terrorist organization has stood and fallen over the years, with a close look at the online strategies they’ve utilized.

 

ISIL’ Territorial Fall

2015: Despite collapsing in 2014, ISIL became at its peak by 2015 with regards to territory and group following – offline and online. Reporters describe 2015 as the period for ISIL where they became a greater threat than Al-Qaeda.

 

2017: By 2017 ISIL had lost 95 per cent of their territory, but remained a threat in mainly Syria and Iraq. After two years of growth across online forums, ISIL became infamous by posting video content of beheadings and slaughtering. As ISIL’s geo political strength shrank, counter-terrorism experts became deeply concerned  as a wave of ISIL inspired stochastic terrorist attacks swept through Europe, carried out by young Muslims radicalized by ISIL’s effective online propaganda campaign.

2018: ISIL were described as knowledgeable of social media and made such a presence that invited numerous online affiliates who further represent the group and its cause.

 

2019: ISIL loses control of its final territory in Syria, which indicates that the terrorist group was defeated on the ground at least. ISIL became reliant on its online supporters and utilizes social media to its full extent in regard to recruitment and keeping its “brand” alive.

 

ISIL’ Modern Social Media Strategy

Research suggests that the terrorist organization ISIL most prominently use social media platforms Twitter, Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp. The primary focus on these apps has always been networking for ISIL, though, with unique features and tools each prepares a different strategy:

 

Twitter – Gain following and presence through short, meaningful content (tweets) that relates to its readers.

Facebook – Make use of the worldwide networking opportunities (messenger) and employ propaganda that appeals to every generation.

Telegram and WhatsApp – Exploit the encrypted messaging service of these apps and use them primarily for private discussions and its end goal: recruitment.

 

But what part does social media play in ISIL’s overall political objectives? Simons proposes that it is the group’s method of ‘political marketing’ to build upon their influence, credibility, and operational capabilities. It works to heighten ISIL’s relationships and appearance via propaganda, which sells the ‘dream’ and is appealing to vulnerable people. ISIL effectively utilizes multiple strategies on an array of platforms in a complex campaign to entice and manipulate individuals to join the path of jihad – recruitment – all to progress ISIL’s dream of a transnational caliphate.

 

COVID-19 Impact

Fortunately, ISIL has been disrupted in their plans for violence as mass gatherings and travellers were restricted due to the global pandemic that hit 2019. This has prevented the group and its supporters from advocating their beliefs and deadly actions, but  also stemmed the tide of new recruits from travelling to the Middle East to join ISIL camps. Although this is an obvious advantage for counter-terrorism, these agencies have also been negatively impacted by COVID-19 via budget cuts as Governments pivoted resources to fighting the pandemic. The likely result is that ISIL is well placed to take full advantage and may launch a resurgence as pandemic restrictions come to an end. It seems to be already in progress, as researchers fear that ISIL is re-surging in Syria emboldened by the renewed Taliban campaign in Afghanistan.

 

 

Will ISIL Rise Again in 2021?

There will always be an Islamic State Terrorist Organization that threatens Western society, whether it flourishes in a group dynamic, lone-wolf actors or modern online affiliates. Likewise, while technology enhances ISIL, it means they must adapt and change its operations to maintain its image and not fall behind in today’s reality. A social media strategy for recruitment and expanding its popularity is cheaper, quicker and offers a wide-spread audience – so why wouldn’t they follow? Counter-terrorism initiatives should recognize this and design improved technological methods of removing terrorist propaganda more efficiently (i.e. faster machine learning), but also to limit their presence on both open platforms and closed social networking apps. As ISIL’s geopolitical strength and geographical base collapsed , social media has become the inevitable solution for its chance at success.

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 by Rise to Peace

The Evolving Russian-Taliban Relations

On July 7th, a Taliban delegation visited Moscow and met with the Kremlin envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabuluv. This visit took place against the backdrop of increasing Taliban gains in Afghanistan. One might ask how the Taliban, a movement designated as a terrorist organization in Russia, is being welcomed in Moscow by official Russian representatives. To understand how the Taliban achieved this diplomatic achievement, an examination of the historical relations between Russia and the Taliban, as well as Russia’s interests in Afghanistan, is needed.

Russian-Taliban Relations: Historical Background

On February 15th, 1989, the last Soviet soldier crossed the Friendship Bridge between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The humiliating Soviet withdrawal greatly impacted the USSR and Russia’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. When the Afghan Civil War erupted in the 1990s, Russia tried to avoid any involvement in the conflict. However, in 1999 Russia got off the fence and threw its support behind the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The catalyst for its policy shift was the Taliban’s recognition of Chechnya and its ties to international Islamist radical groups which operated in Chechnya and were loosely allied with the Taliban ally al-Qaeda.

Following the attacks of 9/11, President Putin was one of the first foreign leaders to reach out to Washington and pledge his support for the U.S response. Russia supplied the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda with intelligence, opened its airspace to planes carrying humanitarian aid, and accepted the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia. Following the initially successful U.S. invasion, Russia was reduced to the role of spectator for the rest of the decade, mainly criticizing and trying to eliminate the growing flow of drugs out of Afghanistan into Russia.

The Shift in Russian-Taliban Relations

The major policy shift towards the Taliban occurred in the mid-2010s, following the 2014 breakdown of Russian-Western relations over Ukraine. The shift was propelled by both national security and geopolitical concerns. First, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan raised alarms in Moscow. Russia was increasingly concerned by the threat ISKP posed to Russia and its Central Asian allies.

According to Moscow’s assessment, the threat from ISKP surpassed the threat the Taliban posed because the Taliban had no regional aspirations beyond Afghanistan, while ISKP posed a regional and global security threat. Russia believed that the Taliban could combat ISKP more effectively than the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. For Russia, supporting the Taliban was seen as a logical step, or as the Kremlin envoy Zamir Kabuluv explained it: “The Taliban are fighting in Afghanistan against the people we fought in Syria, that’s why our interests coincide”.

In its support of the Taliban today, Russia chooses to turn a blind eye to the reemergence of al-Qaeda in more than 15 provinces in Afghanistan and reports of Taliban collaboration with ISKP. Russia relies on the security assurances the Taliban promises Russia. The Taliban assures Russia that it will help to secure the border with Central Asian states and prevent spillover of fighting and terror activities to Russia’s southern strategic frontier.

Second, Russia sees Afghanistan as an opportunity to harass and undermine the U.S. and the West as part of their great power geopolitical competition. By challenging the West in Afghanistan, Russia wishes to reassert itself as a dominant geopolitical player in the region after its status was weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union. It has been reported that Russia supported the Taliban efforts against the West and the Afghan government with weapons and funds. Furthermore, Russia was accused of offering bounties to Taliban-linked groups for killing coalition forces in Afghanistan during the U.S.-Taliban peace talks.

Conclusions

Russian-Taliban relations have changed over the years, changing from hostility to cooperation as part of their great power competition. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is seemingly a favorable outcome for Russia. This development, however, could eventually backfire and undermine Russia’s efforts to gain regional stability and dominance. A Taliban takeover could further destabilize neighboring Central Asian countries, requiring Russia to divert attention and military resources to Central Asia to protect its allies. Russia might soon find out that you should be careful what you wish for.

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 by Rise to Peace

Cyberterrorism in Europe Has a Clear Target, but the Motives are a Mystery

Tehrani’s description of terrorism is defined using Black Law’s dictionary and cites “the use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, especially as a means of affecting political conduct”. Tehrani argues that while an all-describing definition for terrorism has proven difficult to agree on, one common aspect of terrorism is apparent. This includes that acts of terrorism are conducted to cause fear and coerce the ‘enemy’ for the pursuit of a political, ideological, or religious goal.

Recent ransomware attacks in Europe

The application of this type of terrorism to the cyberspace has become a predominant topic of concern in the twenty-first century. The European tendency to digitize infrastructure with the benefit of it being more efficient and accessible has made it equally susceptible to ransomware attacks.

The WannaCry ransomware attack on the UK’s National Health Service in 2017 and the 2021 attack on Ireland’s Health Service Executive are examples of terrorism targeting vital institutions. Additionally, Finland witnessed a ransomware attack on a private company named Vastaamo. The company runs 25 therapy centers in Finland. The transcripts of these therapy sessions had been hacked. Consequently, clients were reportedly threatened to pay $200 dollars in bitcoin to deter their therapy sessions from being leaked. The director of Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation, Robin Lardot, estimates the number of victims to be in the tens of thousands.

Upon an internal inquiry, it was believed that the actual theft may have happened two years prior, in 2018. Despite the victims’ best efforts to adhere to advice set out by ministers and not engage with the threats, confidential notes of therapy sessions for 2000 patients had been discovered on the dark web.

Implications

The WannaCry, Vastaamo, and Health Service Executive attacks depict a grim reality of the most confidential aspects of people’s lives being leaked to the public. The implications are widespread and infringe upon multiple aspects of both personal lives and the functioning of society. The healthcare service attacks resulted in limited access to health services, often involving postponed treatment or even cancellation thereof. England’s NHS saw the cancellation of 19,000 appointments following the WannaCry hacks and cost the health service 92 million pounds. An added reason for concern is in the case hackers have access to the live documents of patients, information on the patients could be altered to result in large-scale misdiagnosis of patients.

In the case of the Irish ransomware attack, a statement made by the HSE declared that a small amount of data had landed on the dark web, much like Vastaamo hack. The curious turn of events happened when the hackers who committed the ransomware attack against HSE Ireland provided the software tool to reverse the hack. Despite this, it took a lot of work to rebuild the system. This clearly depicted how irreversible and deeply damaging a ransomware attack is, especially when data had already been leaked to the public via the internet. Here, nothing can be completely deleted. The truly harmful nature becomes especially noticeable when considering that the attack happened on May 14th, and July’s HSE statement included the warning that it was still being dealt with. This hits especially hard given the COVID-19 pandemic that not only involves more demand for the healthcare system but has also pushed back many vital treatments for those awaiting diagnosis/treatments for other illnesses even further than they already were.

How are ransomware attacks cyberterrorism?

Since ransomware attacks are committed anonymously, it’s impossible for spectators to know with certainty what the motive behind the attacks is, making it all the more difficult to label it as an act of terrorism. That being said, the commonalities in recent ransomware attacks seem quite clear. In Europe especially, health care services and companies are being hacked, and the patients are threatened.

The ransomware attacks definitely share the characteristic of terrorism which proscribes the use of violence to instill fear and coercion against ‘the enemy.’ This furthermore involves the targeting of innocent civilians. The withholding of a health service, especially during a pandemic, might be considered an act of indirect, albeit harmful, violence. What remains unclear, is the perpetrator’s motives, whether they were ideologically or financially motivated. The targeting of civilians, which included demanding ransom from minors, as well as the intentional destabilization of an infrastructure a country and civilians depend on, may be a message in itself which could constitute a new type of terrorism – requiring a new or separate definition. In this case, it may not be the motive, but the target that sets the tone for terrorism.

Conclusion

Moving forward, an increase in cyberterrorism is to be expected. This will become especially pronounced as more companies and institutions make plans to work remotely even post-pandemic lockdowns. For this reason, it is crucial for governments to clearly define cybercrime and cyberterrorism that can be utilized in prosecution.

Additionally, European governments should work towards protecting vulnerable adults and minors who are at risk of becoming victims of cyberterrorism. It must remain a high priority to get students vaccinated and back into educational facilities with safety measures implemented on site. If not possible, institutions are urged to use effective encryption for any data that is handled online.

The Vastaamo attack may have been preventable if the data had been encrypted properly. The continuation of online learning could open doors for cyber-terrorists to gain access to a wide range of new material for ransom threats.

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 by Connor Bulgrin

Iran’s Ambiguous Role in the Afghan Peace Process

On July 8, Iran hosted talks between delegations from the Afghan government and the Taliban. This effort provided a new venue for Afghan negotiators to engage one another as the Taliban advance continued and the U.S.-backed talks in Doha stalled. The Iranian position toward the Afghan war has been complex and often ambiguous. While the Iranian government is now advocating peace, its geopolitical interests in Afghanistan are much broader.

For the last 25 years, Iranian policy toward Afghanistan has been driven by a dual mandate. Iran has aimed to prevent the rise of Sunni fundamentalism while also contesting American power in the Middle East.

As a Shiite-majority nation, Iranian disdain for Sunni fundamentalism is palpable. Fundamentalist Sunni groups like the Taliban often assert that Shiites are not true Muslims and wage vicious attacks against them. In the last few decades, Iran has branded itself the “protector of Shiites” in the Middle East. At first, this made Iran an adversary of the Taliban. In 1998, Iran nearly declared war against the Taliban after the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, in which the Taliban killed many Shiites and 11 Iranian citizens. After the September 11th attacks, Iran, in alignment with American policy, supported the Northern Alliance campaign against the Taliban.

However, Iranian fear of American power has made it an inconsistent ally of America and the Afghan government. Since the initial defeat of the Taliban in December 2001, Iran has played a more nuanced role in Afghanistan, trying to cozy up with Afghan elites while also providing occasional support to the Taliban. Iranian officials fear that if America enjoys too much success in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran might become the next target of American regime change efforts. The numerous American military bases surrounding Iran and frequent calls for regime change in the American media exacerbate these anxieties. While Iran is glad to see the American presence in Afghanistan end, its policy toward Afghanistan must now chart a new course that consists of more than mere anti-Americanism.

Inside Iran, public opinion is divided regarding the ideal policy toward Afghanistan. The reformists have been hawkish regarding Afghanistan, disgusted by the Taliban’s religious fundamentalism and their recent outrageous targeted attacks against Shiite Hazaras. Etemad, a prominent reformist newspaper, recently warned of “unpleasant consequences if extremist and violent movements like the Taliban come to power.”

Iran’s hardliners have the upper hand politically and support a more conciliatory approach to the Taliban. This June, Kayhan, a paper funded by the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, remarked that “The Taliban today is different from the Taliban that used to behead people.” Statements like these are not expressions of political solidarity. While Iran and the Taliban are united in their anti-Americanism, the Taliban has much closer ties to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rivals. Instead, Iranian hardliners make these statements to signal Iran’s belief in the possibility of a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Lately, Iranian officials have been stressing their hopes for peace. Rasoul Mousavi, leader of West Asia policy in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has stated that: “Opportunities pass like clouds. The opportunity of peace must be taken today, not tomorrow, as it might be late.” Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, the Iranian special representative to Afghanistan, recently met with the Afghan foreign minister to assure him of Iran’s commitment to peace. A cursory look at The Tehran Times, an Iranian newspaper with close ties to the foreign ministry, reveals an array of headlines promoting “talks” and “peace,” a tact that is strikingly similar to American rhetoric on Afghanistan.

But Iranian policy toward Afghanistan is more interested in stability than peace. Hostilities around Herat are ongoing, and Iran is concerned that the violence could spill into its territory. This July, the Taliban captured many districts in Herat province that are adjacent to Iran’s eastern border. They have also captured the Islam Qala border crossing that leads into Iran.

Fighting in Afghanistan also poses a threat to the Iranian economy, a chief concern for incoming President Ebrahim Raisi, who made economic renewal a centerpiece of his campaign. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan totals over $3 billion annually. Fighting also renders inoperable the newly-inaugurated Khaf-Herat railroad that links Iran and Afghanistan —and which is part of the much larger East-West Railway Corridor project—.

Continued fighting in Afghanistan is also guaranteed to bring more refugees to Iran, which will place a significant economic burden on the country and exacerbate Iran’s already troublesome surge of COVID-19 cases. Iran is already home to nearly a million registered refugees and hundreds of thousands more who are undocumented. Incoming Iranian President Raisi and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, in a recent telephone conversation, made cooperating to manage the influx of Afghan refugees into their countries one of their primary goals.

The Iranian desire for stability in Afghanistan has led it to hedge its bets on the Taliban. If the Taliban can secure a decisive victory, allowing commerce to proceed and the flow of refugees to slow, the Iranian government will be glad to align with them. If the Taliban cannot win decisively, Iran is likely to promote a power-sharing agreement in Afghanistan that allows it to forego the repercussions of a protracted Afghan civil war.

To maintain a flexible policy, the Iranian government has maintained ties with the Afghan government while also pursuing its own policy, including backing an anti-Taliban Shiite militia called Hashd al-Shi’i. Much like Afghanistan’s other neighbors, Iran has not decided whether Taliban rule or a political settlement is more in line with its national interests. The most crucial factors shaping Iran’s determination will be the success of the Taliban on the battlefield and the vulnerability Iran feels to the threats posed by Sunni fundamentalism and American regime change.

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The Crisis in Cabo Delgado: A Policy for a New Generation

This is the final piece in a series examining the ongoing extremist threat in Mozambique.

After understanding Cabo Delgado’s history of economic marginalization, socio-political agitation, and geographic remoteness, one might not be surprised by the government’s military-oriented approach to dealing with ASWJ. With politics dominated by FRELIMO since independence, Mozambique ranks 149th in the world on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Consequently, only 27% of Mozambicans see a difference between the ruling party and the state.

The central government has long lacked credibility in the region due to its ties to criminal networks, acquiescence to foreign companies, and a highly publicized scandal in which government officials hid and pocketed $2.2 billion in off-budget loans. Cabo Delgado is also home to the single largest private investment in Africa, Total SA’s $15 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project along the coast. But this project has provided little profit or opportunity to the locals, fueling further discontent and rent-seeking. 

Missteps and Militarization

For the past few years, the central government has outsourced its handling of the ASWJ crisis to foreign mercenaries. The notorious Russian Wagner Group was initially deployed but replaced by the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) after sustaining losses. In 2021, Amnesty International accused government forces, ASWJ, and DAG of war crimes targeting civilians, and DAG let its contract lapse in April.

The governments of South Africa, Zimbabwe, the United States, and the European Union have all expressed their commitment to resolving this crisis, and their assistance initially came as advising, training, and financing government forces. But these government forces are the same ones frequently accused of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and harassment of civilians. 

And now international military involvement is escalating. South Africa, a regional leader, initially ruled out putting boots on the ground but ended up sending soldiers to extract its foreign nationals from the siege of Palma. Last month, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the deployment of its standby force, but much of its makeup and mission remain unclear. In early July, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda preempted them, sending 1,000 troops in a bid likely meant to increase Rwanda’s sway in the region. The EU also announced its own military mission, staffed primarily by Portuguese, to provide further training to Mozambique’s armed forces.

The government and its partners seem to be making the same mistakes that the Portuguese made when battling guerrillas in the very same region. Over the course of their ten-year fight to keep their colony, the beleaguered Portuguese made various attempts at dislodging FRELIMO from Cabo Delgado. Yet, they never seemed to try the classic counterinsurgency strategy of developing communities and protecting the populace. This, local support was pulled away from the guerrillas. Instead, they swept the jungles of Cabo in the massive Operation Gordian Knot, which ultimately failed due to its onerous death toll and resource drain. This lack of community outreach, paired with blind military violence, only perpetuated the grievances fueling the insurgency. The same cycle of government rigidity and insurgent vitality appears to be the case in modern Cabo Delgado.

Attention and Investment

The chorus of international funds and troops meant to pacify Cabo Delgado has mainly reinforced this militarized approach. International partners must instead only finance those government initiatives which support rather than antagonize communities. They must also be more discerning in which squads they are funding and training, pulling support from those government forces with bad track records on human rights and battlefield conduct.

It seems that the West has yet to learn in its dealings with Islamist insurgencies that military force and weapons proliferation are not conducive to de-escalation. Throughout the war with FRELIMO, Portugal’s semi-fascist dictatorship also formed alliances with the West, yet for all the intelligence, finances, and training provided from abroad, Portugal could not pacify Cabo by the strength of arms alone. 

In the 1960s, Cabo consisted primarily of smallholder peasants growing cash crops. Today, though this region remains largely rural, there are increased opportunities in coastal trade and energy extraction. Yet, the youth see few of the benefits. The locals should be enabled to participate in their own economy, and this starts with conscious governmental policy. Instead of abusing already-marginalized communities, the government could push the conflict in a constructive direction if it took a whole-of-society approach to peace in Cabo. This involves responsive community policing, accountability for rights violations by security forces, development partnerships that include local businesses, investment in infrastructure and education, increased space for journalists and civil society, and consultative mechanisms to communicate with locals. These are the practices and institutions that international partners should be funding instead, even if they must be built entirely anew.

Conclusion: 

One can reasonably conclude that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is only going to intensify, and will remain a major security issue in southern Africa. Though international actors from the West to SADC have expressed their willingness to provide training and even troops, the history of Cabo gives little reason to be optimistic about external intervention. The people of this resource-rich coastal province have experienced purely extractive, disinterested economics for centuries, from Britain to Portugal to Total SA. And yet, when hundreds of youth take up arms under a salvationist banner of Salafism, the government and its international partners immediately opt for clumsy militarization and pacification.

Though their violence has been brutal, meeting the insurgents on the battlefield does little to solve the problems that energized them in the first place. Instead, anyone concerned with actually de-escalating the conflict must look to NGOs, local activists, and social institutions that should be invested in and listened to.

 

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