Kurdish and Chechen Women in Separatism

Women’s activities and levels of involvement in non-traditional military organizations are diverse. Because of that, it is important to approach case studies for a better understanding of the connection between women’s personal experiences, their inner environments and their work in such organizations. In this article, Kurdish and Chechen women involved in separatism will be explored, along with the sociological, historical and ideological background of the groups they joined. 

Separatist Kurdish women

Starting with the formerly Kurdistan Workers’ Party/PKK (now Kurdistan People’s Congress/Kongra-Gel), considered by some states and organizations as a terrorist, it is important to notice that Kurdish women are an essential part of its advancement in Turkey. This is evident with a participation rate of 40-50% of the whole organization.

Embedded in a paternalistic and restricted society, many Kurdish women felt the grievances of not being allowed to pursue education and secure employment. Women would have to silence their memories in fear of retaliation. Additionally, many were forced to marry when teenagers and experienced abuses and honour killings, throughout the 70s. This is similarly present in the modern day. The politicisation of women started to grow, however, when the conflict intensified in the 90s, when Ankara was destroying Kurdish villages, and when Kurdish people were killed or disappeared.

Therefore, women’s condition and their desire to escape it, following liberation beliefs, maybe the strongest factor for them to join the PKK. This may be done voluntarily the majority of times (according to ex-PKK terrorists that decided to give interviews). But different factors might also be relevant to other women, such as trauma, and/or revenge, for instance. The group’s message evoked justice, gender equality and freedom, to deter the male-dominated sphere and power in their inner circles and in the Turkish state. As a result, women perceived themselves as leaders, receiving political and military training. Subsequently, they observed the prohibition of domestic and sexual violence, conducting their own military units, between other implementations.

Those advancements came with some debates from men. They did not recognize women with enough strength for combat or as a figure of authority from the start. Women were seen to have constantly argued with them, did not obey their orders, and challenged their roles. The consequences of this reaction went from women being put in auxiliary activities to constantly trying to prove their value in harsh duties. This included volunteering for suicide bombings – until the implementation of penalties by the PKK’s board destined to men that disrespected women’s positions or instructions.

After this episode, a new code of conduct was established, reaching the Kurdish society. This is where Kurdish men could be separated from their wives if there was any denunciation of husband abuse to the PKK. 

Another characteristic involving women is that sexual relationships are not allowed inside the organization. The death penalty was utilized as a means of punishment in the past (actually banned) amongst jail sentences, disconnection from the group, or denials of leadership positions all as forms of punishments. If there are pregnancies, the newborn children are considered to belong to the group. As a result, they are separated from their parents, with only limited visits per year.

Separatist Chechen women

Although a dormant movement now, it is interesting to examine Chechen women that joined terrorist groups, with their participation rate in more than two-thirds of suicide bombings from 2000 until 2014. The origin of such an involvement relies on the Second Chechen War, where tactics by Islamist extremists started to be implemented. Consequently, one of them consisted of female suicide bombers, labelled as “Black Widows” by the media.

With a limitation to state how many groups were formed, it is not possible to detain a whole image of Chechen women’s participation. However, it is notable that the crisis was between the Russian army and semi-independent commanders from the separatists. Talking about the condition of women, some suffered honour killings, domestic violence and abductions. The ones that had opportunities to enter university and full-time jobs saw their hopes of securing them vanished by the two conflicts.

On the side of women’s reason for participation, the majority of them witnessed the brutalities of the Russian military. This included death, beating or mistreatment of relatives, and the destruction of their neighbourhoods. Against this background, Chechen women usually had a strong desire to be martyrs as the conduction of their entrance into such groups. This was largely in response to their own visions and their country’s fight to be independent of Russia. Furthermore, this was aided to have justice for them and their families.

There is also evidence that the recruitment was based on their friendship and familial ties. However, womens experienced changed their lifestyle once they joined those organizations. Mostly, they were in charge of traditional roles, such as cleaning, nursing or cooking. Furthermore, they wore the traditional Arab dress and hijab. When they took suicide missions, there was the protocol of only travelling with an older woman or designated chaperone.

Another difference from Kurdish women is that, if training existed for Chechen women, it was very short. This was due to the two weeks it took from leaving their homes and beginning to act. Their roles were also distinct, with Chechen women having traditional and subsidiary activities. However, the male-run command did not have a problem using women as suicide bombers, as it could also signify propaganda to attract more recruits.

Conclusion

The context of separatist Kurdish and Chechen women is different in terms of historical times and players. Nonetheless, the issue of women’s restrictive conditions in their societies and post-war settings are a trend in both. Although their organizations grew in ideological basis away from each other, they may reveal a large image of women’s situation, their needs, the observation of any conflict escalation in the following years, and the initial de-radicalisation strategies that have to emerge.

 

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Historical Overview

The world watched as Israel and Hamas has exchanged rocket fire prior to the cease-fire issued on May 25th, 2021. The death toll stands at over 200 with 1,235 Palestinians injured. Ten Israelis were killed by rockets from Gaza. The recent tensions increased at the beginning of Ramadan as Israeli police put up barriers around Jerusalem’s Damascus Gate causing widespread protests. Israeli police say the barrier was erected to regulate people entering the plaza. Clashes increased as dozens of Palestinian families were evicted from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood inflaming longstanding property disputes between Israelis and Palestinians.  

Palestine theoretically includes the Gaza strip and the West Bank. Both Israel and Palestine consider Jerusalem as their political capital. Both regions consider the city religiously sacred. Hamas, a Sunni Islamist militant group, governs the Gaza strip. Several countries consider Hamas to be a terrorist group due, in part, to their violent attacks against Israel. 

Global protests have mobilized thousands in support of Palestine. Protests have engaged thousands in the middle east, New Zealand, Japan, Europe, Canada, and United States.

History of Conflict

The conflict has been occurring in this region for hundreds of years over land occupation and independence. The disputed territory almost found a solution in 1947 when the United Nations proposed Resolution 181, this resolution would create the two independent states of Israel and Palestine. Arab leaders rejected the resolution due to the territorial division while the Jewish leaders had satisfaction over territory lines. The resolution was adopted yet immediately Mandatory Palestine broke out the civil war between the Jewish and Arab communities leading the plan to not be implemented. 

In 1948, following World War II, Israel was established as a state when the British withdrew from Palestine. The Israel-Palestinian conflict began. As a result, this dispute is a continued fight over land occupation and independence. Since this time, there have been several wars, violent encounters, protests, and more failed resolutions from the United Nations. This is the conflict that continues today. 

Jordan had invaded this region in 1948, seizing homes from Jewish homeowners. Israeli law allows Jewish citizens to claim the land back in the West bank which their family owed prior to 1948. Palestinian residents in this region do not have the same opportunity under the law to reclaim their land. Thousands of Palestinians have lost homes due to this law. Many of these homes have been in the family for generations.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The United Nations along with countries around the world have called for a peace agreement in the region. If violence continues ally countries are considering putting conditions on weapons sent to Israel. Protecting human lives is the primary initiative needed in this region followed by peace discussions involving both Israel and Palestine leaders. The United Nations has been meeting with global leaders on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seeking resolution. The two independent state solution has been identified by global leaders as a solution to consider. 

 

The Growth and Impact of ISIL in Mozambique: The Difficulties to Defeating their Insurgency

Mozambique’s conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has experienced a notable increase in the level of violence within the last year. Although active in the region since 2017, it is only more recently that ISIL’s attacks have escalated in both frequency and severity. The bloodshed caused by ISIL throughout Mozambique has had an alarming impact, evident from the recurring raids on innocent villagers and the growing number of casualties, as seen by the increasing rate of people beheaded or raped.

Furthermore, the details of these raids have become even more brutal and cruel in recent times, in that dozens of the decapitated victims have been young children. This not only serves to highlight the extent of terrorism within the state but its rapid escalation. This merits further discussion and analysis, as it arguably provides an indication as to the future of the insurgency, whether ISIL extremism will continue to grow and intensify, or if they will be ultimately defeated. 

All throughout the country, thousands of citizens have been reported as missing or misplaced as ISIL target their communities at a shocking rate from previous years of the conflict. The statistics reveal that the increase has multiplied several times over, with 172,000 misplaced in the spring of 2020 to over 732,000 this spring one year later. This demonstrates the impact that ISIL has had on a multitude, which has grown exponentially within a relatively short timeframe. This, therefore, illustrates the extent of their power as a terrorist organization. 

To further expand upon this is ISIL’s attack on the town of Palma last March. Although the local security forces were reported to have secured control of the town and defeated the terrorists, ISIL’s actions certainly left their mark there, with multiple buildings destroyed, several dozen military personnel killed and beheaded bodies covering the streets. The main image that can be taken from this fight in Palma is the barbarity and destructive power of ISIL. The counterinsurgencies victory and claim to have retaken the town pales in significance and impact when the atrocities of ISIL are brought to attention.

Upon examining the level of violence by the terrorists, the success of the security forces appears to be a mere detail in comparison to the widespread brutality of the insurgency. The extent of this is that ISIL activity nowadays seems to capture the spotlight whenever their presence is noted, their reputation and crimes far more prominent than the efforts of those who try to stop them.

This interpretation shows an alarming undertone as it can be argued that, regardless of whether ISIL wins or loses its battles with Mozambique’s forces, it leaves behind a clear atmosphere of death and destruction and from this an obviously daunting degree of fear. This fear is evident in that that so many citizens have been misplaced due to the terrorists; hundreds alone fled during the fighting at Palma.

So many in Mozambique clearly feel greatly threatened by the presence of ISIL. Thus, the danger that this organization presents cannot be understated. Indeed, this is apparent given that the primary goal of a terrorist is not always to overthrow a regime, but rather to spread chaos and terror amongst their victims. From this, it can be argued that ISIL is becoming more and more successful when discussing its actions, reputation, and infamy.

A worrying thought that comes from the Palma attack is that, on a certain level, the efforts of Mozambique police and military make little difference. If they are defeated in battles with ISIL, this increases the terrorists’ strength and reputation and damages the state’s morale, as well as likely resulting in a large number of deaths in both security personnel and civilians. However, even if the counterinsurgency technically defeats ISIL, as seen by the fight in Palma, the terrorists will still have been successful in their goal of causing casualties and spreading fear amongst a multitude. It can be determined from this that ISIL stands to gain whatever the outcome of their skirmishes and perceivably always one step ahead of the authorities.

In order to combat them, it has been more recently announced that multiple allies of Mozambique from other regions of Africa have promised to contribute their forces to the effort to eliminate ISIL, whilst Portugal and the United States have been providing training for Mozambique’s troops. Although the results of this are yet to be seen, it makes sense that a strong international backing is likely to increase Mozambique’s chances of defeating ISIL in the long-term. Whilst ISIL is fearsome and enjoys clear advantages in their conflict, it must be remembered that they had a similar experience in the Middle East, yet were successfully driven out. The same can occur in this current conflict. The combined efforts of multiple nations focused on overwhelming ISIL appear to be the best option to ending terrorism in Mozambique.

Overall, it is clear that the extent of ISIL activity and its impact on Mozambique is significantly growing. Furthermore, the threat they pose may also increase and become more serious. Unlike with other conflicts, ISIL terrorism is likely to continue to remain strong as the results of their fighting with local security forces appear to have less consequence for them. So long as they are able to spread chaos and fear, they remain a successful threat.

From this, it is apparent that ISIL is likely to be successful from its current methods. Their position as terrorists makes their ambitions, whilst highly cruel, simpler and easier to accomplish than those of counterinsurgent forces, placing them at an advantage. Despite this, they are not unbeatable and there is hope that the foreign support Mozambique has received will be enough to ultimately defeat ISIL.

 

Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Afghan Peace Process

Following the ongoing U.S troop’s withdrawal from Afghanistan after the 20-year campaign in the country, the insurgency of the Taliban remains resilient. The Persian Gulf States played a key role during the Afghan conflict, in terms of mediation and reconstruction efforts. Consequently, their involvement is likely to increase once U.S troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan.

As a regional power with strong historic relations with Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia is expected to actively participate in the peace process. The “Declaration of Peace in Afghanistan”, signed in Makkah on the 11th June 2021, witnesses Saudi Arabia’s commitment to promoting peace and dialogue so as to prevent every form of violence and extremism, in line with the Islamic principles. However, it is relevant to take into consideration that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by the anti-Iranian agenda. Additionally, their goal is to expand Saudi religious, political, and cultural spheres of influence in Afghanistan.

Background

The Saudi monarchy has a long history of engagement in Afghanistan. In 1980, Saudi Arabia partnered with Pakistan and the United States to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan by financing the mujahideen in the 1980s for humanitarian aid and weapons. Osama Bin Laden was among the Saudi financiers of the mujahideen. In 1996, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan were the only three Gulf states to recognize the Taliban, after they took control of Kabul.

After 9/11, Saudi Arabia formally cut ties with the Taliban. This was due to international pressure, prompted by Bin Laden’s involvement in the attacks.

The shift in the Saudi policy in Afghanistan is evident in the Saudi support of the Afghan government, in terms of investment, reconstruction, and mediation efforts in the country. In 2010, the former Afghan President Karzai (2001-2014) sought Saudi mediation to reconcile with the Taliban. Saudi Arabia’s mediation with the Taliban failed, and Qatar emerged as the privileged actor in the Afghan peace negotiations.

Saudi Arabia Agenda in Afghanistan

Recently, Saudi Arabia hosted the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. Important decisions and agreements between the two countries were reached.

In regards to political relations, the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GCC signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The goals of which were to strengthen cultural, political, and economic cooperation. Furthermore, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia are committed to enhancing security cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This is subsequently a common threat.

Concerning the educational development, both sides agreed to accelerate the establishment of the International Islamic University in Nangarhar. This is a district where ISIL-K has not been entirely eradicated. The university will deliver religious classes in Arabic rather than Afghanistan’s national languages.

However, Saudi Arabia’s reconstruction and investment efforts in the country should be seen in the bigger picture of the Kingdom’s interests. Additionally, expanding its influence in Afghanistan should be seen as a way to balance the influence of Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran as the two leading Islamic powers, Sunni and Shi’a, are committed to the building of Islamic universities and higher education institutions in Afghanistan to exert their influence.

As stated by Simon Mabon, a lecturer in international relations and director of the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies at Lancaster University, “Funding schools and universities is an increasingly popular way of cultivating soft – cultural – power, with education seen as a way of empowering people and providing them with the means through which to improve their socio-economic positions within society”.

Conclusion

All in all, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the country may increase to fill the void after the U.S troops. In case of a full-scale civil war in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia may support armed groups based on its political and religious allies to exert influence within the peace process. Saudi Arabia and Iran should not lose their opportunity to engage in Afghanistan to mediate and stabilize the country. The result of its loss could result in a destabilization of the Middle East. Ultimately, this is not in any of the countries interests.

Saudi Arabia should rather focus on its commitment to supporting lasting peace in Afghanistan. This may be achieved by promoting peace and dialogue amongst the Afghani and Pakistani leaders, according to Islamic principles. A sustainable peace process in Afghanistan, as well as stability, can only be achieved by including Shi’a minorities.

Pakistan’s Support of the Taliban Might Come Back to Haunt Islamabad

The scenes from recent Taliban military successes in Afghanistan were positively received among members of Pakistan’s security establishment. While denying it publicly, these Pakistani hardliners have funneled support to the Taliban for decades. If the current trajectory of the conflict continues, they will get what they wished for: a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. A Taliban triumph, however, will provide a merely pyrrhic victory for Pakistan, a victory that it will come to regret.

Pakistan’s Support for the Taliban

Since the Taliban’s emergence almost three decades ago, Pakistan has continuously provided a safe haven and financial and military assistance to the Taliban. Following the U.S. invasion in 2001, Pakistan became a safe haven for Al-Qaeda’s leadership as well. There are a couple of reasons why Pakistan continues its support for the Taliban.

First, Pakistan’s security apparatus believes that the Taliban gives it strategic depth, securing the Afghan frontier and permitting the concentration of Pakistani forces on the Indian frontier. The Taliban is the only ally of Pakistan among Afghanistan’s political actors. Pakistan believes that maintaining positive relations with the organization will prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for anti-Pakistan militants and outside powers.

Second, Pakistan fears that targeting Afghan militant groups will invite retaliation against Pakistani targets. While Pakistan sponsors these groups, it lacks full control of them. Nevertheless, it continues to argue to the contrary, believing that this strengthens its position in international bargaining.

Third, Pakistan fears a strong and independent Afghanistan that is aligned and supported by India. Such an Afghan-Indian alliance, Pakistan believes, will encircle Pakistan. The 2011 Afghanistan-Indian strategic partnership agreement and the recent call by Ambassador Mamundzay, the top Afghan diplomat in Delhi, for India to play a bigger role in Afghanistan, increases Pakistan’s paranoia regarding Indian engagement in Afghanistan.

What Can Go Wrong for Islamabad?

Internationally, the Taliban takeover will affect Pakistan’s strategic depth and its diplomatic relations with its neighbors.

First, as mentioned earlier, Pakistan sees the Taliban in Afghanistan as its strategic depth in its confrontation with India. The Taliban, however, has its own interests. The Taliban would probably intensify its diplomatic campaign to gain international legitimacy. India has already established a new direct line to the Taliban and an Indian delegation has met Taliban officials last month in Doha. Normalization between the Taliban and India will undermine Pakistan’s conception of its strategic depth.

Second, Pakistan should expect increasing pressure from its Islamic neighbors Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. These countries have accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban in the past, and with the intensification of fighting between the Taliban and Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen warlords, this pressure is sure to increase.

Third, with diminishing influence over the Taliban and increasing international demand to rein in and influence the Taliban, Pakistan will find itself in a diplomatic nightmare. A victorious Taliban is less likely to defer to Islamabad in its moment of victory. At the same time, the international community will increasingly defer to Pakistan to act and impose its influence over the Taliban. The failure of Pakistan to influence the Taliban will inflict a blow on its international bargaining power.

Domestically, the Taliban takeover will create economic and security challenges for Pakistan. First, escalation of the war and a Taliban takeover will propel a massive flood of refugees into Pakistan. These refugees would join the 3 million people already seeking refuge in Pakistan. As Pakistan has its hands full, these new refugees will further exacerbate its economic situation.

Second, a Taliban win will embolden the jihadists’ anti-government factions in Pakistan. In the past, the Taliban has already inspired extremist movements in Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban have launched attacks against Pakistani targets, horrifically killing 132 kids in an army school in Peshawar in 2014 in one such attack. Taliban success in neighboring Afghanistan will lead to the import of sectarian violence from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Conclusions

While the Pakistani military establishment is cheerful about the recent Taliban successes, Pakistan might face an international and domestic blowback if the Taliban will take over Afghanistan. It might be in Pakistan’s best interest to confidentially ask the U.S. to intensify its air support to Afghan government forces operations to prevent the Taliban from taking over.