Drones: Weapons of Terror?

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have taken responsibility of the drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil sites in Abqaiq and Khurais. These strikes have escalated tensions in the Middle East. Sources report that 5 million barrels a day of crude oil production were impacted; this impacted the half of Saudi’s output or 5% of the world’s output.

The Houthis claimed that the attacks were in retaliation of the years of airstrikes on its citizens and they will continue to expand their targets. They carried out the attacks via 10 drones. The claims of the Houthis have been challenged by the US, which continues to state that Iran orchestrated the attacks. Iran has vehemently denied involvement and warned the United States it would retaliate “immediately” if targeted over the attacks.

This is not the first instance of the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)/drone technology by extremist groups. ISIL has made the most of advances in the field of drone technology. While organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham have their own drone programs, it took these groups a considerable time to apply the drone technology in conflict situations. Compared to the slow adoption by other groups, the Islamic State adopted drone technology exponentially. This can be partly attributed to the development, availability, and commercialization of the technology. The application by ISIL involves a modification of the existing drone’s design or even constructing them from scratch once the basic blueprint from the commercialized drones is available.

ISIL’s first use of drones was for reconnaissance purposes. By September and October 2016, they had managed to weaponize the drones by attaching explosives and releasing them on the intended target. The first recorded incident was in October 2016 when two Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers were killed, and two French special forces soldiers were injured after a drone they were inspecting exploded.

A 2017 report provides detailed insight into the ISIL drone program, identified separate centers for training, weaponization, modification, and maintenance, as well as the existence of a center for storage and distribution. Owing to ISIL’s sophistication, each of these centers, based in Raqqa, also had their own separate command structure.

The Taliban has also used the drones in recent years. Much like other groups in the region, the use of drones has been mostly for surveillance, there not many reports of the Taliban using weaponized drones against its opposers. In October 2016, they released drone footage showing a suicide bomber driving a Humvee into a police base in Helmand province, the largest province in Afghanistan.

In the latest reports, Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan have been using unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor US troops, and their coalition partners in Afghanistan, Air Force Research Laboratory official Tom Lockhart revealed.

Outside the Middle East and Central Asia, drones have also been used in Central America. In August 2018 Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro said he escaped an “assassination” attempt that used an explosive-laden drone after a live broadcast showed him being escorted away by his security personnel when a bang went off during a Caracas military parade. His government said seven soldiers were wounded in the incident.

The easy access, affordability of drones, and the modifications they can undergo, make them a tricky technology to tackle. While it is the militarized drones grab headlines, the real value of UAVs lays in surveillance, according to Paul Scharre, a senior fellow and director of the technology and national security program at Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Small, cheap drones can stay in the air for a considerable amount of time. The military drones are used to get a better view of the battlefield and gain a tactical edge on opponents. That is true for extremist groups as we saw in the example of the Taliban.

Militarized drones, the kind probably available to groups such as the Houthis, are heavier and can carry several pounds of explosives at speeds up to 160km/h with a range of 650km. They have an immense tactical advantage as most can fly lower than current technology is capable of detecting, which was the case for the drone strike at the oil sites.

Countering drone attacks may lie in jamming the communication links that allow them to operate.  Drones generally rely on a GPS or radio link to a human controller, which can be blocked or hijacked. This seems like a good strategy for a conflict zone, but jamming communications in a typical civilian setting, like at an airport, can have more devastating consequences.

Whether the responsibility for the attacks lies with the Houthis or Iran, the attack on Saudi oil sites has demonstrated the difference in the adaptability of the drone technology and the lack of a fitting defensive technology.

Image Credit: Forbes

19th Edition of the World Summit on Counter Terrorism in Israel

The 19th edition of the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism was held from 9th to 12th September 2019 in Herzliya, a small maritime city just north of Tel Aviv, Israel.

I had the pleasure to live this unique opportunity, which gathers distinguished professionals working in the field of counter-terrorism under one roof, to facilitate the chance to exchange views and ideas on this very pertinent topic. The first two days of the Counter-Terrorism Summit are reserved for plenary sessions where members of the academia and policymakers set the scene for the Summit and illustrate how the issue is being dealt around the world.

During the 19th edition of the Summit, among the variety of aspects discussed, the growing issue of cyber terrorism, one which has become of very high concern in current times for many Western governments such as the United States, especially in terms of online radicalization.

In today’s times, many terrorist recruiters have moved to social media platforms (exactly the ones we use daily e.g. Telegram or Twitter) to target vulnerable subjects and attract them to join extremist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). For this reason, platforms such as Facebook have recruited over three hundred people to ensure that terrorist content of all kind does not appear on their platforms.

On the second day, the most remarkable and touching event took place as part of the Memorial for the victims of the 9/11 attacks. American Congressmen, Military Personnel and Secretaries of States and all the attendees joined in a minute of silence for the victims followed by both the American and Israeli anthems.  This was an emotional moment where everybody put aside their personal identities to join a unique battle, winning over terrorism worldwide.

The third day marked the start of multiple workshops at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya. Here, numerous topics related to various aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism were discussed and recommendations were put forth by professionals, research fellows and members of the academia on ways to deal with this worldwide security threat.

Radicalization is among the most compelling issues, stressing the need for more policies able to detect subjects undertaking processes of radicalization. During the workshops, there was a repeated assertion regarding the need to control websites and social media platforms to identify extremist content and push it away from the access of youngsters and vulnerable subjects, a way of countering radicalization by denying terrorist the platform to access their audience.

The last day saw an interesting session on returning foreign terrorist fighters, an issue that demands more focus than it currently gets. However, it should not surprise how this phenomenon involves a variety of different aspects: from fueling the risks of radicalization to questions related to their integration in the society, but the most critical concern in this entire scheme of things is regarding children and women as foreign terrorist fighters often return with their families.

During the discussion, it was highlighted that besides the traumatic experience lived by the children, significant attention needs to be given to the role women have begun adopting over the past few years

During the discussion, it was highlighted that besides the traumatic experience lived by the children, significant attention needs to be given to the role women have begun adopting over the past few years. In this regard, Miss Devorah Margolin provided a thorough explanation on how the role of women has shifted from “staying at home” as wives of the fighters to “fighting on the field”, thus falling into the radar of many extremist organizations. Under these circumstances, it is crucial to remember that women have always been seen part of any conflict, though this role was previously limited to the domestic environment, with women being mothers and wives of the soldiers, but also nurses taking care of the casualties in a conflict.

The closing keynote address of the Summit highlighted on how the Islamic State might have been defeated geographically, but the challenge now is to remove its remaining signs around the world, as remnants of the group are still operating in the Middle East and some other parts of the world.

Finally, the Summit drew the attention to other emerging extremist organizations that are expanding their activities and gaining power in Africa and Lebanon, including Hezbollah and Boko Haram.

The stunning memento of this Summit is definitely the presence of a large number of people from different backgrounds, who gathered together with a sole goal of winning the global fight against terrorism.

Everybody can do something about terrorism, even a single word can help millions of people and we shall not forget this.

Not only is the Summit an opportunity to keep updated on counter-terrorism measures being applied around the world, but also the presence of students, professionals, policymakers or retired fellows suggests that counter-terrorism is not only a job but a mission to share among countries and regions of the world.

Everybody can do something about terrorism, even a single word can help millions of people and we shall not forget this.

reintegration

Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Afghanistan

Taliban reintegration into Afghan society is a precarious topic, thus it is prudent to devote weighty discussion towards barriers emboldened by corruption, terrorism, and political instability, as well as seek legitimate localized solutions.

Research conducted by Rise to Peace in regard to the Afghan situation strongly correlates with the educated opinions expressed by the panelists and the USIP. Reintegration is an important step for the creation of peace at the local level. Former fighters are presented with the opportunity to re-enter their communities and consequently build hope for a better life.

Afghanistan is plagued by the significant issues of corruption, terrorism, and political instability manifested in its upcoming election on September 28, 2019. Each of these matters must be highlighted and thoroughly discussed prior to the implementation of policies that seek to stabilize the Afghan situation. The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducts such imperative analysis that must be considered by all with a keen eye towards Afghan affairs.

SIGAR recently released its report ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan’ and subsequently held a panel discussion in conjunction with United States Institute for Peace. Esteemed panelists offered in-depth knowledge and understanding in regard to the current political impasse and security situation in Afghanistan. They included Kate Bateman (Project Lead for Reintegration, Lessons Learned Program, SIGAR); Erica Gaston (Non-Resident Fellow, Global Public Policy Institute); Timor Sharan (Deputy Minister for Policy and Technical Affairs, Independent Directorate of Local Governance); and Johnny Walsh (Senior Expert, Afghanistan, US Institute of Peace). Their insights generated astute discourse.

The ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants’ report offered such inclusive knowledge. SIGAR’s Inspector General John Sopko summarized that, “the goal of today’s report is to help U.S., Afghan, and other coalition policymakers and agencies as they prepare for the daunting task of assisting with the reintegration of an estimated 60,000 full-time Taliban fighters, as well as numerous other non-Taliban combatants, in the event that the Afghan government and the Taliban enter negotiations to reach a political settlement.”

One key point became apparent: No reintegration in the absence of a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban with the ongoing insurgencies in Afghanistan.

Rise to Peace strongly supports SIGAR’s conclusions. Further, the findings of the Office of the Special Inspector General align with Rise to Peace’s research focused on peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Programs implemented in the past, as well as those currently in place, have irrefutably failed for many reasons, primarily the lack of an intra-Afghan peace agreement. Security threats faced by communities and those fighters who lay down their arms follow as a secondary impediment to a peaceful solution. Lastly, substantial economic barriers due to a weak Afghan economy also contribute to the failure of other reintegration initiatives.

It is fair to summarize that corruption, terrorism, and political instability — especially during an active election campaign — remain in a nexus that feeds one off the other in such an environment.

Nonetheless, failure does not mean an end, but rather, an opportunity to create a tailored solution from lessons learned. SIGAR’s report provides a series of recommendations to the US Congress and the Afghan government, that could ideally achieve a successful reintegration program if implemented.

What’s Next for the SIGAR Report?

Findings in the report provide a foundation for further action to be taken in the case that political will permits it. For example, Rise to Peace founder and president Ahmad Mohibi asked, “Where are you taking all the lessons learned? What’s next? Will be there possible action that will drive into policy? We have seen the great work SIGAR has done, so what should be done?” In response, Mr. Sopko replied:

 We try to get Congress to focus on this issue and we have been successful. SIGAR pushes for action since it continues to hold the attention of Congress, however, the Office understands that other agencies must adopt best practices for implementation in the future. Simply put, the United States government must amend its policies towards Afghanistan to demonstrate the collective lessons learned since its involvement in the country.

Some solutions remain complex and difficult. SIGAR suggests that a transitional program to reintegrate militants into a society free of fighting is a definite need in Afghanistan. Such an endeavor would foment the development of mutual connections within communities and decrease instances of regional violence. Continued support for the Afghan government is considered vital to this process as well. Nonetheless, SIGAR’s reporting advises that reintegration projects may be futile at the current time because of the lack of a peace plan and a ceasefire. It is especially difficult to pursue reintegration of fighters when the Taliban and Afghan forces remain engaged in an active conflict.

Therefore, the lack of an infra-Afghan peace agreement with the Taliban complicates any resolutions going forward. It is reasoned that the US Congress may not fund Department of Defense, State Department, and USAID programs because neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban cannot guarantee security, especially for those militant fighters seeking reintegration into civilian society. Policy decisions have real and actual repercussions on the ground.

Any attempt of reintegration in the current political environment may jeopardize any chances for peace talks as the Taliban considers such counterinsurgency initiatives to weaken their forces. Additionally, the lives of former fighters are at risk in areas controlled or contested by the Taliban. There are no guarantees that militants who choose to no longer fight will escape with their lives. For instance, most would meet an end like Zabet Khan; a Taliban commander who changed the direction of his life chose not to fight and made decisions to take care of his family. He migrated to Greece where he earned a living working on a farm until he returned to Afghanistan. The Taliban killed him and left his four children without a father.

SIGAR suggests that the United States should not support any sort of comprehensive reintegration program as long as the Taliban insurgency continues. In the current situation, it is much too difficult to vet, protect and track former fighters. It is subsequently difficult to conclude who remains an active Taliban fighter versus one who seeks a peaceful existence; therefore, it creates an identifiable security risk.

Kate Bateman of SIGAR expressed that it can be difficult to trust someone who claims to be wanting to leave the Taliban when asking for assistance. Based-off her experience and research, Bateman recommends that the Department of Defense and USAID designate a permanent office handling reintegration. As it currently stands, the US has not provided the required leadership and funding to establish such a position.

The Deputy Minister for Policy and Program at Independent Directorate Local Governance, Timor Sharan, expressed that a more localized approach is appropriate to facilitate the reintegration of former Taliban fighters into Afghan society. He elaborated upon the importance of honor in Afghan societal norms and that these ex-fighters must be treated with kindness during their reintegration back into their communities. Their decision to leave the Taliban must be respected by local populations too.

Disrespect between Afghans and the Taliban complicates the social dynamics within Afghanistan as well. It fomented a sense of distrust between the two groupings and this must be resolved before any semblance of peace can be achieved. Active interactions between the two, such as in the settings of town halls and local elections, are required to initiate dialogue as well as a sense of identity.

Afghanistan’s Senior Expert at the US Institute of Peace, Johnny Walsh reflected upon the setbacks that stalled peace talks over the last 18 years. “The United States would often revert back to the tactic of attempting to split or weaken the Taliban. History demonstrates that this approach has been applied many times and it simply does not work.” Walsh acknowledged the most recent setback related to President Donald Trump ending the peace talks and hoped that it would not result in the resumption of military activities to weaken the group, as it will undoubtedly fail. Further, Walsh — along with the rest of the panelists — agreed that post-conflict integration of Taliban fighters into their respective communities was a significant need.

In the case that the United States fails to support this agenda, the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K) would benefit. Former fighters would be left without any peaceful options if they are denied a place of employment and acceptance into regular Afghan society.

Nevertheless, reintegration remains an undertaking encumbered by its fair share of problems. The Afghan economy is a significant barrier to the fulfillment of dramatic life changes, especially those associated with the stigma of being a former militant. Economic opportunities remain bleak and the Afghan fiscal situation is often unpredictable. Unemployment remains a substantial impediment to community growth.

A lack of financial support and scrutiny from local communities mean that radicalization presents the easiest path to a purpose. This is an extremely problematic condition in Afghanistan.

The World Bank states that “a quarter of the labor force is unemployed, and 80 percent of employment is vulnerable and insecure, comprising self- or own account employment, day labor, or unpaid work.” Therefore, these factors present a situation in which former Taliban fighters will be unemployed and face difficulties in hiring due to their history. A lack of financial support and scrutiny from local communities mean that radicalization presents the easiest path to a purpose. This is an extremely problematic condition in Afghanistan.

As a result, corruption and terrorism are intrinsically linked. The lack of legitimate opportunities results in a situation where those at risk are often consumed by both. This is a challenge when reintegration projects are considered. Since it is difficult to determine the true intentions of a ‘reformed fighter’, such an individual could easily reap financial benefits or resources meant for those turning away from violence and redirect them towards terrorist activities. Therefore, Rise to Peace especially promotes evaluation of all resources aimed towards such programs, to ensure they are utilized legitimately.

The Rise to Peace Mentorship and Capacity Building Program

Rise to Peace focuses its research not only on integration measures for former Taliban but also for development and economic opportunities. The Rise to Peace Mentorship and Capacity Building Program is used to help support those who are fleeing violence and to establish themselves in a safe and secure environment. Another aspect of the program empowers women and youth through connections with local elders and important stakeholders.

Former fighters need not feel marginalized, but rather sense that they are an active member in society for the greater good of their village or city.

Safety and security is not just about physical violence, but also to feel safe and secure economically. A distinct lack of higher education, such as college graduates, hinders economic prospects in Afghanistan, therefore economic diversification must focus on an already entrenched system of capital accumulation.

In this distinct case, main sources of employment remain in agriculture and small-scale production. Entrepreneurship offers an additional pathway to financial independence. Development programs, such as USAID, need have a localized focus on the systems already in place, instead of suggestions of industries that have a little foothold in the country.

When these former Taliban fighters have a sense of purpose, such as opening a market stand in town, a sense of purpose to continue their lives peacefully because they are able to take care of themselves and their family

When these former Taliban fighters have a sense of purpose, such as opening a market stand in town, a sense of purpose to continue their lives peacefully because they are able to take care of themselves and their family. A fruitful economy is not the only conduit for reintegration, but an extension of peace, acceptance, and understanding within local communities is required also. Former fighters need not feel marginalized, but rather sense that they are an active member of the society for the greater good of their village or city.

Those actively involved in working towards peace in Afghanistan must listen to what Afghans need rather than decide what would be beneficial for them.

A focus on localized solutions is imperative too. Rise to Peace often mentions its adherence to community building and resiliency principles. Solutions must have local origins instead of those created by foreign governments or organizations. Those actively involved in working towards peace in Afghanistan must listen to what Afghans need rather than decide what would be beneficial for them. Western countries often mistakenly apply their views on state-building in societies that vastly differ from their socio-political situations.

Afghans that are connected to their villages and local societies can express what resources, educational sessions and infrastructure are required in their regional settings. For instance, those exposed to radicalization rhetoric can advise which educational tools, by way of training sessions and workshops, are most effective in countering recruitment. As well, strategies that stimulate government support can be tailored to regional groups, often distinctive in their ethnicity. Afghans hold the most in-depth knowledge that can only be accumulated through the first-hand experience.

It is prudent to establish a framework and facilities for deradicalization in regions that are not under Taliban control or their influence is negligible.

A localized approach is relevant to the discussions surrounding reintegration of former militants too. While it is a beneficial proposition to hold off on vast integration policies while the Taliban remain in conflict with the Afghan government, the situation is not the same across Afghanistan. It is prudent to establish a framework and facilities for deradicalization in regions that are not under Taliban control or their influence is negligible.

An opportunity to turn away from that lifestyle, especially in a region where the Taliban would be limited to target them for retribution, remains just as important compared to those in areas with high terrorist activity. However, if training and reintegration prospects are bleak, a former fighter might question his decision or deem it unreachable.

Lastly, if Afghans hope to achieve peace and build a cohesive society, they must take responsibility for their own country. It is prudent for them to embrace an active role in shaping the future of their homeland and voting remains an important factor. Citizens are more apt to vote when they consider their government to be legitimate and not installed by a foreign power, therefore free and fair elections are vital in Afghanistan. The ability to select their own president and representatives creates a sense of belief in their system of governance. It is for this reason that the elections on September 28 are important, especially under the current political context.

Rise to Peace reached these conclusions after significant research devoted to Afghanistan and with the respected observations of those with first-hand experience. Our non-profit organization is capable of engagement in all aspects of community building and resiliency projects that will certainly benefit Afghans at the local level through the achievement of peace in multi-faceted ways.


Ahmad Mohibi is the founder of Rise to Peace. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

Elections 2019: Is Afghanistan Ready?

On 17 September, a blast rocked Ashraf Ghani’s campaign rally in Parwan province, echoing the words of Mohammad Ismail Khan, a former Mujahideen leader turned politician, who previously stated that “the current situation in Afghanistan is not suitable for elections.” Ismail Khan’s pessimism, as well as that of other stakeholders, is no surprise given the political activity over the last few weeks. The collapse of peace talks between the US and the Taliban as well as the increase in the number of attacks by the Taliban paint a grim picture for the region’s upcoming general election.

In addition to the uncertainty over the US commitment to security in the region, as well as the escalation of violence from Taliban forces, history demonstrates that elections are tumultuous events in Afghanistan with reports of voter suppression, intimidation and ballot stuffing. A report by European Union election observers in 2014 suggested that more than two million votes — or about a quarter of total votes cast — came from polling stations with voting irregularities. This begs the question as to how the Afghan security forces will manage the September 28 elections and whether the country is, in fact, ready for the looming deadline.

This election has been far from orderly since the beginning with many presidential candidates opting to avoid public addresses unless necessary, due to security concerns. The New York Times reported that Ghani himself “was reduced to addressing virtual rallies across the country via video-chat.”

Taliban activity increased across Afghanistan in the last few years, but their bombardment of Baghlan province in the north creates an even larger hurdle for the elections. Disruptions in the province also obstruct the AH76, one of the only highways linking the north to Kabul. The severing of communication and transport links will have a major effect on the region and heavily disrupt voters in the run-up to elections.

There is little doubt that violence will escalate in the coming weeks, especially since the Taliban have vowed to target the elections since the breakdown of talks with the US. “On any given day, there is fighting in nearly two dozen of the country’s 34 provinces” and as a result of this, over a quarter of the country’s polling stations will remain closed due to a lack of security.

The Taliban’s alleged control over 70% of Afghanistan is not the only terrorism-related hurdle that Afghanistan faces in the run-up to elections. A bombing at a wedding in Kabul that killed 63 people in August, and the assault on Mullah Habatullah Akhundzada (the younger brother of Afghanistan’s Taliban chief), presents a grave reminder of the increasing influence of ISIL in Afghanistan.

Trump’s suggestion that he may continue to withdraw troops despite the lack of a peace deal may provide Ghani with a challenge he has not had to face in many years: facing the Taliban without US support. One could expect a drastic decrease in the morale of Afghan troops who rely heavily on US airpower as well as training and heavy weaponry.

Even if the winning party survives the inevitable accusations of fraud and vote-rigging, Afghanistan’s governing structure has historically consisted of a weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic communities. This is a result of Afghanistan’s multiethnic and mostly tribal society which consists of fourteen tribal groups.

Although intra-Afghan talks are integral to the establishment of peace in the region, foreign intervention will also play a major role. Security forces, already spread thin, cannot afford the loss of US airpower, military training and heavy weaponry. Aside from security, the election process itself riddled with accusations of fraud and vote rigging in 2014, will heavily rely on an independent commission who will, ideally, give a sense of legitimacy to the election. This would at least allow the incoming government the ability to govern without the controversy that surrounded the beginning of the current government’s term.

Foreign involvement rarely creates the sense of authentic free and fair elections. However, as elections so strongly influence the extent to which a fragile state becomes stabilized, it is integral that stakeholders (including the US and NATO) are present and continue to provide the support, or at least the security, needed to hold the September 28 elections.

Image Credit: Staff Sgt. Christopher Allison of the US Department of Defense. An Afghan elder shows his purple inked finger to show he has voted and cannot do it twice.

Extremism Assessment Series: Homegrown Islamist Extremism in the US

Summary of Extremist Assessment

  • There is no set profile of a homegrown violent extremist; can be any ethnicity and can come from any socioeconomic background
  • The need to belong, political grievances, and sense of purpose are other common factors in an individual’s radicalization
  • Individuals are often radicalized through the internet/social media or through family and friends
  • Attacks are typically aimed at political figures and monuments and are not often organized
  • Although individuals may be sympathetic to terrorist ideologies, they may not have formal ties to the organization

Brief summary of their narrative 

Homegrown Islamist extremists follow the same narrative as established Islamist terrorist organizations, such as ISIL and al-Qaeda. They are mainly motivated by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, aiming to not only spread Islamist beliefs and establish the caliphate, but also to bring down oppressive powers such as the US as well as all “disbelievers”. Rather than travel abroad to fight with a foreign terrorist organization, they stay in their homeland and plan attacks. They use violence in order to achieve their political goals. Islamists believe Islam is the only basis for the legal and political system. They are opposed to liberal democracy and are oftentimes radicalized online and through social media.

Brief History of the ideology or group in the United States

Prior to 9/11, Islamist extremism within the US was not a primary concern. After the 9/11 attacks, the US government re-directed its security focus to counter future attacks and also declared a War on Terrorism in the Middle East. This War on Terror created a divide not only between the US and the Middle East, but also within the US with Muslim communities becoming more and more marginalized. Politicians openly spoke about the possibility of other Muslim-Americans becoming radicalized and conducting attacks on US soil. The resulting bigotry and hate rhetoric aimed at Muslims in the US produced a volatile community. This led to even more discontent and frustration among Muslim-Americans, with some individuals turning towards extremist propaganda to air their political grievances, find a sense of belonging, or a sense of purpose. More recently, homegrown Islamist extremism has been overshadowed by the threat of right-wing terrorism, although the HVE threat still lingers.

Current State of Islamist Extremism in the United States

Homegrown violent extremists that are sympathetic to the Islamic State are constantly attempting attacks here in the US. Most of these attacks have been foiled by security officials, much like Rondell Henry’s suicide-plot to drive a U-Haul van into a crowd of people on a Maryland waterfront, attempting to kill as many “disbelievers” as possible. Law enforcement officials were able to stop Henry before he could pull of his attack. Henry explained that he had been admiring ISIL’s work for 2 full years and was inspired by the van attack in Nice, France.

Over the past 5 years, law enforcement has foiled nearly 58% of attempted attacks by homegrown violent extremists sympathetic to the Islamic State. These homegrown extremists have been encouraged by the Islamic State to conduct attacks on their own within their homeland. This has been a strategic way for ISIL to pull off attacks in the West without any risk financially or structurally. Homegrown extremists are able to conduct attacks with little to no training and are not as organized as attacks conducted by terrorist cells or networks. It is the lack of intense planning/organization of these attacks that make them more difficult to uncover and prevent.

In the US today, homegrown Islamist terrorism has seemingly fallen behind right-wing terrorism in terms of immediate security threats. Although right-wing terrorist attacks have increased in frequency, the threat of homegrown Islamic terrorism still lingers. The successes of local law enforcement and intelligence agencies have caused people to assume that the threat has diminished, even though individuals are found attempting to support ISIL every day.

Where are they prominently operating? 

Homegrown violent extremists operate without borders. Attacks have been carried out all over the world, some by individuals who have been described as “normal” prior to their radicalization. These individuals were radicalized either online or through personal connections and were inspired to act within their home countries. These attacks have taken place in the US and Europe, with several attacks leaving individuals severely injured or dead. The advantage of homegrown violent extremists is that they can attack anywhere at any time and are not restricted in where they operate.

A recent United Nations report stated that ISIL is planning to exacerbate existing political divisions in Western European nations. ISIL will most likely utilize homegrown extremists and foreign fighters for these attacks, carrying out reconnaissance and encouraging homegrown extremists to conduct their own operations in order to inflame discontent within the region.

What are their primary recruitment methods 

The primary recruitment methods of homegrown Islamist extremists include the use of social media to spread their radical ideology and the scoping out of sympathizers. Terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS release speeches online calling on all Muslims to join together and rid the world of disbelievers. Individuals that sympathize with these extremist ideologies are often initially exposed to this propaganda through social media. They interact with like-minded individuals through encrypted applications and are able to use training manuals from terrorist organizations to aid in their operations

ISIL also uses virtual planners who plan attacks online through encrypted apps, provide technical expertise, and assist with picking a target. These virtual planners utilize homegrown extremists to carry out their attacks abroad, minimizing the resources spent by the terrorist organization and also minimizing risk. Foreign fighters have also played a large role in the recruitment of homegrown violent extremists, often times through recruiting HVEs for specific attacks or through spreading extremist propaganda.

The recruitment of homegrown violent extremists by ISIL allows them to operate externally, even while they are losing territory in Syria and Iraq. Although a large number of external ISIL attacks against the West have been executed abroad, only 36% have been executed by individuals that had no formal ties to the terrorist organization.

Image Source: The open source image of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The Extremism Assessment Series is an initiative of Rise to Peace’s Domestic Counter Terrorism Program. It seeks to provide short educational pieces highlighting groups or social movements linked to extremist ideologies and/or tactics. Check back for new additions to the series.