The Naxalite Insurgency

On October 30, 2018, a journalist and two policemen were killed in an ambush in Eastern Indian state of Chattisgarh. This attack is particularly notable given that it was carried out by the Naxalites, a group who has been responsible for a series of deadly attacks carried out against the Indian government, including one in 2010 which killed 76 police officers.

Unlike many other insurgent groups that are fighting in the 21st century, the Naxalites see themselves as fighting a Maoist struggle for liberation. To understand why a communist insurgent group still exists in India, it is important to understand the story of the Naxalites. The Naxalites emerged in the 1960s, when an aristocrat turned revolutionary named Charu Majumdar lead a branch of the Indian Communist Party. Unlike the rest of the Communist party, which generally supported the Marxist Leninism of the Soviet Union, Majumdar looked toward Mao with an emphasis on organizing the peasantry into a fighting force capable of withstanding oppression. This was best exemplified with one of their major slogans: “China’s Chairman is our Chairman.”

These efforts of rural organization culminated in the Naxalbari uprising of 1967, when groups of sharecroppers rebelled against landholders over harassment in the famed tea growing area of Darjeeling. Majumdar was soon arrested and later died in prison. With his death, the hope of a unified movement was lost as well. With the death of Mao in 1971, the rebels also lost a strong pillar of moral, (and possibly material) support as the People’s Republic of China began the gradual process of economic liberalization. These factors lead to a splintering of the movement, with over 140 groups claiming to be the rightful representatives of Maoist thought in India in the 1980s.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, violent Maoism began seeing a resurgence in Eastern India, especially in the provinces of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. This is largely due to the importance of growth of mining in these areas. This has been driven by a booming demand for coal and iron ore to fuel factories in both India and China. Many of the inhabitants of these areas have failed to see the profits of the industry, and work in dangerous conditions for little pay.

This sense of alienation is furthered by the fact that many of the inhabitants of these areas are Adivasi, a general term for members of indigenous groups in India. The assortment of tribes who inhabited these areas long lived as subsistence farmers and were left relatively disconnected from the rest of India. The mining boom deprived them of their previous livelihoods and thereby forces them to work in the mines for low pay. This makes them especially vulnerable to the pull of organizations such as the Naxalites.

The Psychological Battle Against Terror

A man prays by a memorial for the dead. Image credit: Christian Hartman, REUTERS.

There is a special aspect to be considered when analyzing the modus operandi and tactics of jihadist movements. As we all know, criminals usually act in secrecy, trying to leave no trace of their underground activities and avoiding capture. However, jihadi attacks and claims of responsibility have largely proven that violent extremisms aim to operate in the open.

In a word where communication is key, contemporary terrorism has become a constant and disruptive daily presence. Because their attacks are in the open, we feel a threat even when terrorists seem inactive.

The reason of this spectacularization can be found in their main purpose: what do terrorist groups want to gain from their attacks?

Behind all criminal activities, there is a certain desire for power. In the specific case of terrorism, it is all about power to influence people’s emotions.

It is plain to see that terrorists want to instill fear. As the German philosopher Hannah Arendt stated, “fear is an emotion indispensable for survival”- but violent extremism has led to a pathological and relentless “state of terror”. The Big Threat of our time has quickly wormed its way into our lives, and now we need to cope with its several consequences.

Terrorists want to develop a general and constant state of insecurity that follows people everywhere, in everything they do. The impact of terrorist attacks on the human psyche ranges from short-term psychological conditions to long-term pathologies: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, constant sense of doom, anxiety and anguish about future risks, feelings of terror and helplessness, anger and desire for revenge.

If even a few of these signs sound familiar to you, then their aim has been achieved.

It is not easy to deal with the effects of terrorism on mental health, and it is even harder to put into practice effective strategies to properly counter this insidious violence.

It is clear that we all should play an active role in facing this threat by taking action on a daily basis with a pure “contrasting strategy.” This strategy simply consists of disappointing the terrorists’ expectations: since extremists want to disrupt our sense of safety, we should be even more resilient, take back control of our lives, and resume our daily activities as soon as possible.

The most challenging part of this strategy will be learning to deal with our personal emotions, which is why civil and governmental institutions should try diverse approaches to boost social cohesion and control. This will help people mitigate the sense of loneliness and helplessness that normally occur after shocking events and traumatic times.

Given the amount of power terrorists now wield over everyday life, it is critical that we do not give them any more influence. Ultimately, the power to reduce this influence begins in our own hearts and minds.

Lessons from Strasbourg

Cheriff Chekatt, the Strasbourg attacker. Image credit: BBC.

At approximately 8 pm on December 11th, 29-year-old Cheriff Chekatt opened fire in a crowded Christmas market in Strasbourg, France, killing and injuring numerous people in a premeditated act of terror. Not only did Chekatt manage to kill and wound numerous individuals, he was also able to evade authorities for two days before being shot and killed by police- despite the fact that, even before the attacks, Chekatt was already under surveillance (BBC News, 2018).

To understand why this attack was not prevented and why authorities were so slow to halt Chekatt’s rampage, this article will discuss the perpetrator’s background, examine the facts of the case, and outline what implications this attack has for the French government, the public, and others around the world.

Chekatt was born in Strasbourg in 1989 and has an extensive criminal history. He has 27 convictions for crimes, including robbery, in France, Germany, and Switzerland. Authorities believe he was radicalized in prison. They placed him on the “fiche S” in 2015, which is a watchlist monitored by the General Directorate of Internal Security, France’s primary domestic intelligence agency (BBC News, 2018).

The people placed on this watchlist represent potential threats to national security, so Chekatt’s placement on this list begs the question as to why he was able to carry out this attack while being monitored by the DGSI.

The route taken by Chekatt throughout the attack and its aftermath. Image credit: BBC.

The attack itself took place in several locations. Chekatt remained constantly on the move to confuse authorities, using the Christmas market crowds as cover. The initial attack took place in Kléber, one of Strasbourg’s central squares, which is located near the main Christmas market area. He then moved onto the rue des Grandes Arcades, rue de Samon, rue des Chandelles, and rue Sainte-Hélène, until ultimately arriving at rue du Pont Saint-Martin.

During the attack, Chekatt used a gun and knife to wound and kill people while shouting “Allahu Akbar” (“God is greatest” in Arabic) before arriving at Neudorf District via taxi (BBC News, 2018). Soldiers of the anti-terror Sentinelle operation had engaged Cheriff during his rampage, but only wounded him in the arm, enabling him to make it to a taxi and escape to the Neudorf district.

After learning he had disappeared in the Neudorf district, authorities launched a massive operation at approximately 7:30 pm on the 13th of December to apprehend Cheriff. At approximately 9 pm local time, police located Cheriff, who was trying to access a building but could not get in. After noticing authorities, Cheriff promptly fired upon them before being shot and killed. He had been carrying a gun, ammunition, and knife.

In his flat, authorities discovered a defensive grenade, loaded rifle, and four additional knives. The French government deemed this attack an act of terror, and so far there has been no news as to whether Chekatt was a member of a designated terrorist organization.

This case holds many implications for French security measures and public safety. First, while the suspect managed to kill at least three people and wound about twelve others, the attack could have been much worse had the French authorities not prepared emergency evacuation plans.

Because of this, the streets were cleared relatively quickly by authorities, and lives were undoubtedly saved because of it. However, this case also illustrates how difficult it is for authorities to track down a single assailant in a crowded area with thousands of people moving around.

Terrorist attacks at crowded events during the holidays are also not abnormal. For example, the truck attack in Berlin in December 2016 also occurred at a populated Christmas market. The primary implication to take from this is that the general public, not just in France but in every country around the world, must practice extreme vigilance when attending crowded gatherings in populated areas, especially during the holidays.

These gatherings are prime targets for lone-wolves and organized terrorist organizations who see these events as opportunities to inflict mass casualties.

The public should not become solely dependent on local law enforcement and other authorities, but should prepare ahead of time in the case a crisis does unfold to protect themselves, family, friends, and others.

This preparation can include conducting research on certain areas ahead of time, planning potential evacuation routes, and compiling an emergency kit made up of first aid, flashlights, water, and other provisions.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency provides an in-depth guide on how to prepare for potential crises ranging from natural disasters to terrorism.

Proper preparation can mitigate the number of fatalities and fallout from these attacks.

How Minnesota is Attempting to Combat Radicalization

Abdifatah Ahmed, who travelled to join the Islamic State, posted this image on Facebook with the caption “The return of the khilaafa [caliphate] insha allah [God willing].” Image credit: Facebook.

In 2014, 18-year old Abdullahi Yusuf was about to travel internationally when he was stopped at the Minneapolis airport by FBI special agents. Yusuf was confronted by the special agents about his plans to travel to Syria and join the ranks of the Islamic State.

This encounter soon led to nine members of a loosely connected cell being arrested and charged after it was discovered that all of the men had planned to travel and join the declared caliphate. Pre-dating these arrests, several others linked to the nine young men through various community connections had already travelled to join ISIS.

All of these men were connected through the tight-knit community of Somali immigrants in the Minneapolis area. All of the men had been targeted for recruitment in person (at pick-up basketball games at a local mosque) as well as through social media. Abdifatah Ahmed, one of the men who had managed to travel to Syria and was killed fighting for the Islamic State, confirmed in messages to family members that he had begun to socialize with like-minded individuals at these recreational basketball games and was further radicalized by online recruitment.

Judge Michael J. Davis, who was tasked with overseeing the cases, could see that addressing the issue went far beyond the normal criminal justice system utilized in the United States. After thorough research into deradicalization programs across the globe, Judge Davis contacted Daniel Koehler of Germany to help establish a Terrorism Disengagement and Deradicalization Program. Koehler had previous experience in multiple countries, focusing much of his efforts on combating neo-Nazism.

Koehler’s method of deradicalization is unique, as it does not focus on theological re-education or debate. Instead, Koehler suggests that radicalized individuals experience ‘tunnel vision’ which affects how they view life’s problems and potential solutions. Gradually, they begin to believe that all of life’s problems can be solved through violent action- making them increasingly likely to commit terrorist acts.

Koehler believes the key to deradicalization is to introduce alternative, nonviolent solutions to life’s problems. Once a radicalized individual begins considering these options, then other ideas can be introduced to reduce the damage done by radicalization. For example, Koehler suggests introducing hobbies and passions from the individual’s life prior to radicalization. Once these are reintroduced, the individual should arrange contacts with other Muslims who are interested in these activities- ideally ones who are successful and well known.

Not every radicalized individual is eligible for participation in the program. Koehler has developed a psychological profile of individuals for whom he believes the program will be effective. These individuals exhibit specific traits such as being able to disassociate with group-think, and are able to recognize old hobbies and interests as enjoyable.

However, the program does have its limits. First, Koehler believes that each case needs a minimum of four mentors as well as a case coordinator. This staffing plan, while likely justified, is a budgetary concern for those attempting to spread similar programs to new states or cities. Second, the program is relatively new in the United States, resulting in a shortage of data about its successes and failures.

While the program sounds plausible in terms of potential success, gaining widespread acceptance will require supporting data. Third, there is not yet a solution in place to address an individual who begins to relapse into radicalization once they have completed the program.

The program’s staffing issues could potentially be eased by working with universities in the areas it is being implemented in.

These programs could utilize graduate students in the social sciences to ease budgetary restraints. Unfortunately, the lack of data can only be solved with additions of new data; this involves similar programs being spread and studied critically, and there is not much immediate action that can address this issue.

The program in Minnesota may be tested in the near future, as the FBI stated as recently as 2017 that there are multiple open investigations on individuals who want to join the Islamic State. Hopefully it proves a success.