January 2019

 by Kyle Chapman

Returning Foreign Fighters: A Global Threat

As ISIS concedes its last remnants of territory, governments around the world must confront the return of foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. These fighters present many issues as they now have combat experience, support networks, and knowledge that can be used to create devastation. To explore the threat that returning fighters pose to nations around the globe, this article will first discuss the fighters’ backgrounds, explaining why some countries will have a higher influx of fighters than others. Next, it will discuss what expertise these fighters bring. Finally, it will discuss the global implications of the fighters’ return.

Image source: The Soufan Center/Statista/Mike Nudelman/Business Insider

Many people around the world believe that the makeup of the Islamic State is predominantly males of Middle-Eastern nationality. This is not an unreasonable assumption, given that the primary theatre of group operations is in Syria and Iraq. However, its’ members nationalities are diverse. Since the group’s inception in 2013, ISIS has attracted those from every corner of the globe, from the United States to Russia. According to a study by the Soufan Center and the Global Strategy Network, thousands of fighters have already returned to Europe and other countries in the Middle East from the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Of the estimated number of foreign fighters that have joined ISIS, around 30 percent have returned to their home countries (EPRS, 2018). Collectively, over 1,000 trained ISIS fighters have returned to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Belgium (Meko, 2018). 900 have returned to their native countries of Turkey, 400 to Russia, and 760 to Saudi Arabia (Meko, 2018). However, these numbers only include fighters that have been confirmed to have arrived- so the actual number of returned fighters is likely much higher.

Foreign women and children are also playing a noticeably larger role. According to a report from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College, approximately 41,490 foreign citizens became affiliated with ISIS from April of 2013 to June of 2018. Of this number, 13% were women, while 12% were minors. Women and minors accounted for approximately 23% of all British ISIS affiliates (Khomami, 2018). Like the men returning from conflict, each of these women and children may pose a major threat as well.

Fighters who have experience engaging in terrorist activities and operations in Syria, Iraq, and other countries in the Middle Eastern theater pose a serious threat for a number of reasons. First, through training and experience, they have mastered the use of weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), guns, vehicles, etc. They have learned an array of methods to inflict the maximum number of casualties possible. Second, these fighters will likely try to pass on their knowledge to others interested in committing acts of terrorism. Many areas throughout Europe have already become hotbeds of radicalization; for example, the Brussels suburb of Molenbeek has produced many Islamic extremists linked to terrorist incidents around the world, such as the 2015 Paris attacks. As hundreds (or possibly thousands) of foreign fighters return to Europe, they may target and train other radicalized individuals in places such as Molenbeek. There are many implications for European governments, who must take heed, prepare to apprehend these fighters, and prevent the spread of radicalization and training to at-risk populations.

Ultimately, the fall of ISIS in Syria will create an outpouring of foreign fighters. A proactive approach to apprehending these individuals is one of the best methods to prevent fighters from passing on their knowledge to others. Given the proximity of many countries in Europe to one another, it is easy for extremists to create international networks to facilitate attacks. By apprehending foreign fighters immediately upon their return, authorities can prevent them from galvanizing already-established networks in Europe- decreasing the likelihood of an effective, coordinated attack, and potentially saving hundreds or thousands of lives.

in EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA / Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by John Wilson

The Mysterious Case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis

Mohamad Jamal Khweis while in Kurdish custody. Image Credit: Associated Press.

Few in Alexandria, Virginia, would have suspected that the man driving a bus for the elderly would travel halfway across the globe to join the Islamic State (IS) and wage violent jihad. But this is the case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis, who went by the kunya Abu Omar al-Amriki while living in the self-declared caliphate. While the story of Khweis can be compared in some ways to others, not much is known about the actual path of radicalization he took in the lead-up to joining the IS. Khweis consistently lied and changed his story throughout his capture, interrogation, and trial, forcing officials to play a guessing game. What is known about Khweis’ case is analyzed here.

Khweis grew up in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., graduating from Edison High School in Fairfax County in 2007. As the child of two Muslim immigrants from the Middle East, Khweis grew up attending mosque. However, according to his parents, he was not particularly religious growing up. After high school, Khweis got a job as a bus driver for the elderly and disabled. He drank and smoked cigarettes, not activities associated with a devout extremist.

However, something happened between 2007 and 2015. Khweis lied to family and friends in late 2015, a month after the IS attacks in Paris, when he began scheduling travel to Europe. In mid-December Khweis travelled to London before making several stops across Europe en route to Turkey. In Turkey, scheduled contact was made with an IS facilitator who directed him, along with several French would-be jihadists, across the Turkish border and into Syria.

Upon arrival in Raqqa, which was under IS control at the time, Khweis underwent religious training and began work doing miscellaneous household tasks for caliphate fighters. According to documents discovered by forces combating the IS, during this time, Khweis indicated that he was willing to become a martyr by utilizing himself as a suicide bomber for the caliphate.

After months of cooking, cleaning, and taking out the garbage, Khweis grew increasingly frustrated by his lack of military training. Throughout his time in the caliphate, Khweis was also routinely ill from consuming poor-quality drinking water. These factors, and possibly more, combined to make his frustrations unbearable. When Khweis was relocated to IS controlled territory in Tal Afar, Iraq, he made an “escape.”

Kurdish Peshmerga forces discovered Khweis walking alone, and after it was confirmed that he was not a suicide bomber, he was taken into custody. When Khweis was captured he carried several hundred dollars in Iraqi and Turkish currencies, three cell phones, and his Virginia driver’s license. At first, Khweis stated to his captors that he had been deceived by a female he met in Turkey into coming into Syria and essentially becoming a slave; however, this story quickly fell apart. Peshmerga forces were able to contact American authorities to inform them of Khweis’ presence, and he was quickly transferred to American custody. In American custody, Khweis changed his story over 15 times between intelligence interviews and criminal investigation interviews.

Even so, authorities obtained enough information to levy criminal charges. Lawyers representing Khweis argue that this was unfair, and that Khweis gave false information to investigators out of desperation to return to the United States. However, many indicators disprove this- including signs of remaining loyalties, such as Khweis’ refusal to identify or provide any information on Americans he knew who had also joined the IS. Throughout his criminal trial, Khweis again changed his story multiple times, at times even indicating that his time in the caliphate was a mistake made after a night partying in Turkey.

Extremist propaganda was discovered on Khweis’ cell phones after capture, but once again eluding to his own radicalization, Khweis stated that the propaganda was only on his devices because he was conducting research into life in Syria. It is unclear if he was radicalized by online propaganda like so many others. There has not been any mention of other radicalized individuals whom Khweis may have been in contact with in the United States. Ultimately, there is no strong evidence to suggest how Khweis fell towards extremist ideology.

Although a clear path towards radicalization cannot be observed due to Khweis’ lack of cooperation, some comparisons can be made to other cases of radicalization. First, Khweis was the child of Muslim immigrants, growing up in the United States in the wake of 9/11. This time challenged many young Muslims, leading many to seek answers about their identities. It was also a time which caused notable marginalization, or at the very least perceived marginalization, of Muslim communities in the United States.

Circumstantial evidence would suggest that Khweis was vulnerable to radicalization due to his perceived marginalized position in American society. As a child of Muslim immigrants in post-9/11 America, Khweis certainly grew up with various forces pressuring him and challenging his identity. While not much more can be properly guessed about what exactly occurred along Khweis’ journey, his uncooperative nature and refusal to provide information about other American jihadists belies the fact that he likely remains radicalized. Fortunately, his 20-year sentence for providing material support to the IS will provide critical time that may lead to more cooperation and insight into his beliefs and radicalization process.

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow for Rise to Peace.

in Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by John Wilson

Countering Extremism in the Digital Age

Source: Rand Corporation (2016) 

The Global War on Terror has challenged Western conceptions of warfare. The days of clearly defined winners and losers amongst nation states, as seen in the world wars, are largely in the past.

Tomorrow’s winners and losers will be defined in much more blurred terms as ongoing battles of information and communication seek to win over the hearts and minds of people around the world.

The State Department has acknowledged that for any legitimate success to occur in the fight against terrorism, countering the propaganda of extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS) is critical. While entering the fight in the war of information is a massive step in furthering counterterrorism efforts, the State Department has not yet taken the steps necessary to match the surging campaigns of extremist networks, particularly IS.

The State Department first officially began this type of counterterror operation with the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CSCC was active on social media, directly challenging IS profiles with counter-messaging while conducting various media campaigns such as ‘Think Again, Turn Away’.

Conceptually these were reasonable strategic maneuvers that attempted to challenge the cyber prominence of the IS’s media strategy as well as online recruitment efforts. However, what came to be considered tit-for-tat online trolling between low-level jihadists and the United States government likely emboldened and legitimized the IS.

The State Department would go on to restructure the CSCC, creating the Global Engagement Center (GEC), which is also tasked with addressing social media activities of nation states such as Russia. The GEC however is experiencing similar issues in conjunction with reported limited staffing and funding.

The IS media strategy has often been simplified by Westerners in an effort to de-legitimize the IS as a whole. However, this has led to a fundamental separation between our understanding of the IS propaganda campaign and the means by which we counter it. In order to truly combat a propaganda campaign, its purpose, narrative and mission must be understood.

Once these elements are comprehensively understood, a counter-narrative strategy must be implemented rather than a counter-messaging strategy. A successful counter-narrative strategy must address issues to include factors that IS relies on to recruit vulnerable individuals to their ranks: desires for purpose and belonging. A counter-narrative campaign must also be inclusive of the Muslim faith, understand local cultural concerns, and be conducted in a way that does not appear to be dictated by the West.

The CSCC did re-post relevant material from news outlets in the Arabic world in an effort to appear more representative of local cultures, as opposed to speaking purely as an American source. Beyond the limited scope of the CSCC and GEC efforts, several governments now deny terror networks a platform to circulate their propaganda.

This strategy places pressure on social media platforms to promptly delete extremist content and profiles. This strategy does slow the spread of propaganda, but does not provide a counter-narrative to what these groups are using to recruit and draw sympathy.

The State Department’s GEC has implemented one significant upgrade from its predecessor: one of the GEC’s core competency areas, ‘partnerships’, has the GEC develop partnerships with organizations, religious leaders, and community leaders to help engage with those at risk of becoming radicalized or to help those who are already.

One recommendation for a counter-narrative strategy proposes that the narrative must portray the IS as manipulative and as a failure, as opposed to promoting the often-observed idea that the group is tremendously dangerous. Any successful counter-narrative campaigns must be directed towards specific sub-audiences of those vulnerable to radicalization or those radicalized who are vulnerable to being deradicalized.

The IS has been the latest international terror network to capitalize on the ease of using the internet to communicate propaganda. Terror networks have become adept at using the internet to accelerate the radicalization process, share ideals, and develop support networks across the globe, all while remaining largely uncontested by the governments of the world.

The State Department must conduct systematic changes in the near future if there is to be hope for success in this war of ideas.

First, the State Department must see an increase in staffing to properly manage the overwhelming load of work that comes with fighting international terror propaganda on the internet.

Second, incorporating community and religious leaders will be essential to foster an image that this is not a counter-narrative strategy dictated solely by the United States government.

Third, the GEC, in conjunction with these community and religious figures, must jointly develop the counter-narrative strategy.

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional as well as a Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

in Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by John Wilson

Lessons from the KKK

KKK recruitment propaganda. Source: Link

Upstate New York experienced a unique threat to the safety of their community this year: attempted Ku Klux Klan (KKK) recruitment of their school children. Specifically, the United Northern & Southern Knights of the KKK, two specific sects of the Klan, printed propaganda and placed it into bags accompanying candy. These bags were then placed onto driveways of school children in the early morning hours in an effort to ensure that the children got the packages while exiting their homes for school.

Oneida County Sheriff Robert Maciol was careful to note that the recruitment effort was a form of protected free speech; however, any attempt to solicit acts of violence would be prosecuted. Upstate New York is not alone in experiencing Klan activity, despite the fact that many perceive the KKK as essentially defunct. As of 2017, 42 known Klan groups were active across almost two dozen states. Current estimates place the number of Klan members, or those sympathetic or open to their ideology, at around 3,000 people. However, blanket recruitment efforts such as those used in upstate New York are distinctly unsophisticated and rely on chance, because the propaganda will only work if it lands in the hands of a child vulnerable to the beliefs presented.

Interestingly, many members of the modern Klan have a mixed ideology of traditional Klan beliefs and neo-Nazi beliefs. In some cases, these mixed ideologies can weaken extremist groups as it makes their members’ loyalties much more complicated.

However, Ken Parker, a former leader in the Ku Klux Klan, is an example proving that full-fledged members of the Klan can change their ideological loyalties. Parker was recruited into the Klan after spending 11 years in the United States Navy, leaving the service during a terrible economic downturn. Parker was first driven to contact a local chapter of the Klan by programs on Netflix that looked at the history of the Klan and neo-Nazism. At first, according to Parker, he was uncomfortable with the anti-Semitic rhetoric of his newfound friends; even so, he fully radicalized within 6 months. Though he met his fiancée at a cross burning, Klansmen close to Parker disapproved of the relationship, leading Parker to renounce his position in the Klan and commit to being a neo-Nazi. After some time with the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement, Parker became friends with a Muslim filmmaker and renounced neo-Nazism altogether. Parker now spends his social time as an active member of a local church group.

What does Parker’s case tell us about those vulnerable to recruitment by the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups? Their belief system is not as strong, nor is it as deeply rooted as other extremist ideologies. The identity associated with being a Klansman has perhaps become diluted, making for weaker loyalties. If Parker’s case is representative of even a moderate percentage of Klan recruitment, then the Klan is relying on recruiting individuals who are susceptible to recruitment from a wide variety of groups. Many of these individuals are high-risk to be recruited by a wide variety of organizations, whether they be extremist groups, cults, or street gangs. These high-risk individuals often are looking to belong, to be meaningful members of a group, and to find an ideology which explains their real or perceived problems. While this may be seen as beneficial for the Klan, in reality it fails to produce long-term members for the group.

Lack of sophisticated recruitment capability likely is representative of a disorganized organization. While it is repulsive to experience Klan recruitment efforts at all, attempts like the candy drive in upstate New York are an indicator that the Klan is not in a position of returning to the strength it once held. Local law enforcement should monitor such cases to look for solicitation of specific acts of violence or changes in sophistication of targeted recruitment efforts. A change in recruitment operations for the Klan likely will signal a change in the organization, towards a more decentralized structure or to a more rigid structure depending upon the direction the Klan attempts to take going forward.

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and a Research Fellow with Rise to Peace.

in Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by Kyle Chapman

What Constitutes Terrorism?

An Israeli woman carrying a coffin with family members and friends to protest domestic violence. Source: The Guardian Photographer: Jim Hollander/EPA

Throughout the world, the word “terrorism” has many different connotations; however, each definition shares certain elemtns. The conventional definition of terrorism under U.S. law is that it is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” To dissect this definition a bit further, an act of terror must meet four criteria: premeditation, political motivation, targeting of noncombatants, and violence perpetrated by a non-state actor. This definition is similar to others agreed upon by scholars studying terrorism and political violence with minor differences, and is generally the most comprehensive definition in use.

However, the interpretation of what constitutes “terrorism” is constantly undergoing change. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that domestic violence is a form of terrorism. This declaration was made after thousands of women across Israel went on strike due to inaction by the government in curtailing the rise of domestic violence incidents within the country, arguing that domestic violence incidents have not been given priority by the Israeli government. One recent incident involved the murders of two teenage girls, both of whom were found dead on November 26, 2018. Their murders marked a total of 24 women in the state of Israel this year that have been killed by domestic violence. The objective of the strike was to increase government awareness and increase state funding to address the issue. In response to this, Netanyahu and other officials are working to pass legislation that enables the Israeli government to track domestic violence offenders via an electronic bracelet to ensure they do not violate restraining orders. By branding domestic violence as “terrorism,” Netanyahu may have aimed to mobilize political opposition to domestic violence and increase its priority level on the government’s agenda.

The case with Israel highlights one reason why the definition or interpretation of terrorism is constantly undergoing change. Often, the definition changes for political reasons. Due to an inappropriate response to the rise of domestic violence incidents, the Israeli government faced severe backlash from thousands of women, so an anti-domestic violence declaration of equal proportion was needed. To increase the scale of their response, the Israeli government declared domestic violence an act of terror, even though the common definition of domestic violence shares almost no relation to the definition of terrorism. For example, a common definition of domestic violence is violent or aggressive behavior within a home, which typically involves the abuse of a spouse or partner. This definition does not include premeditation, political motivation, the targeting of noncombatants, or a non-state actor. Ultimately, redefining domestic violence as terrorism is simply unfounded and takes away from what criminal offenses should be constituted as terrorism.

While the rise in domestic violence within Israel is of great importance and needs to be addressed properly, it has nothing to do with terrorism. Terrorism is a political instrument used by non-state actors and individuals to incite fear and reduce the legitimacy of state governments. It is separate from common criminal offenses that are committed in far greater numbers around the world. Once policy makers and government officials start using the word terrorism nonchalantly to define every heinous crime or offense, the word itself will lose its own significance and true meaning.

in EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments