October 2018

 by Unzila Qureshi

Counter Terrorism Strategy in Waziristan

WANA, PAKISTAN, Photo by John Moore/Getty Images

In recent months, Waziristan has been awash in terror attacks since the Pakistani military began new operations in the region. Ostensibly, the offensive is meant to root out TPP fighters, but physical action typically only treats the symptoms of the disease and not the cause. Without getting to the root of the problem, violent terrorism of this sort will generate here again and again.

Examine, for instance, an incident on April 27, 2018, in which a wedding in Waziristan was attacked and four people were killed, with dozens more injured. Reports are unclear who was responsible, the perpetrators identified simply as militants. Another source asserts that the TPP claimed responsibility for previous attacks, but not this one specifically. Disturbing a sacred, social rite like a wedding is significant on an anthropological level. There are many factors that allowed this to happen. They all signify that terrorist activity has become normalized, even occurring around such community activities.

Terrorist organizations tap into local sentiments to recruit on individual and community levels

Any viable solution to counter terrorism must treat it long-term, and it must learn to do so by studying how terrorism became so virulent in the first place. This is not an isolated phenomenon, working independently of other systems in place. It is part of the place and people in such a way that groups like TPP can use local systems of thought to get their way. This is evident in how terrorists recruit individuals as well as sway policies and politicians to their agenda. There is a deeper phenomenon at play, and the only way to counter it is to study it and determine what makes it work.

Obviously, religion ties in deeply with TPP and similar organizations’ activities. Experts have documented how organizations use Islam to recruit fighters and operatives and, more importantly, maintain their dedication. Terrorist organizations are canny this way because they tap into local sentiments to recruit on an individual and community level. There is a heady mix of patriotism, freedom-fighting, rebellion against Western influence and authority, anger, and religious cause. They use all of these things not to convince people that what they are doing is right, but rather to make them fear it would be wrong not to support them. This is a huge part of why these groups keep growing. Beyond the regular scare tactics (i.e. forcing people to do their bidding under threat of injury or worse), using culture and religion to legitimize themselves means that their idea will never die.

Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective: it takes little to do, but it has long-term effects on how they are treated and thought of

Terrorists take advantage of cultural and religious tensions to further their agenda and legitimize violence. Therefore, a way to counter them is to delegitimize their cultural and religious agency. In terms of policy, Pakistan’s government and media can do this easily. Change the discussion. Any engagement with or treatment of terrorists should identify them as violent criminals, not “Islamic extremists” or “insurgents.” These terms provide legitimacy in the most dangerous of ways. Destroy their legitimacy to combat them. Cut all their links with any local dynamic.

This solution is straight-forward and possibly effective. Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective. It takes little to do, and it has long-term effects on how terrorists are treated and thought of in public and private. Terrorism is a threat to millions of lives. Not the least in vulnerable rural communities. As such, Pakistan must use every weapon it has, including its words.

From there, such policies can extend to even more conspicuous efforts. Ones such as delegitimizing terrorist ideas in schools, in mosques, religious classes, in public and online forums. Leverage local systems of thought and action to do this, the same way that terrorists spread their ideas. Use these means not to normalize violence, but to normalize peace.

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 by Haoyu Huang

An Overview of SE Asian Extremism: Thailand

One of the regions people don’t usually think of related to extremism is Southeast Asia.  Yet, extremism is prevalent there, and like many other types of extremism, it is rooted in religious and ethnic challenges.  In this series of articles, I will provide an overview of extremism in Southeast Asia, starting with Thailand.

When people talk about Thailand, they often think about peaceful beaches, Buddhism, and even rice fields. Although these images are real,  Thailand is a religious and ethnically diverse country, which has led to some security challenges, particularly in Southern Thailand.

By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded and vying for power

According to the US State Department, 10% of the Thai population is Muslim, with most of the Thai Muslims living in Southern Thailand.  Starting in the 1990s, the 3 provinces in southern Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, experienced violent ethnic and religious insurgency, with tensions escalating in recent years.  These 3 provinces are predominately Malay Muslims residents, who share a different religious culture than the rest of Thailand. Beyond religion, the Pattani province was originally an independent Sultanate, conquered by Thailand in the 1700s, creating long-standing political tension.  

The historical, religious, and ethnic tensions between Malays and Thai were further heightened as Southern Thailand was left behind in economic development creating yet another division. Separatist groups from all three provinces share one goal —an Islamic Malay state centered in Patani.  

The 1960s saw the founding of the Malay separatist movement in Thailand, with the National Revolution Front and the Patani United Liberation Organization.  These early organizations were peaceful groups that sought Patani independence. However, as the situation on the ground remained difficult for the people in Southern Thailand, the organizations became more extreme. By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded. In no time flat, they were competing for power. Although these organizations were new and relatively weak compared to the earlier organizations, they chose to launch terrorist attacks to quickly build their profile and relative power.  

In the beginning, the attacks were all targeted toward Thai government officials, police, teachers, and other establishment individuals.  However, starting in 2004, the violence escalated, with a January armory raid in which 364 weapons were stolen.  Many of the weapons were M16 rifles. Later that year, separatist groups attacked 11 military and police facilities in southern Thailand to steal additional weapons.  During this time, the extremist organizations also attacked the Buddhist population in the Southern provinces, killing two elder monks in Yala. Additionally, from June 27 to July 5, 2004, five bomb attacks destroyed Buddhist-owned rubber plantations in Yala.  These extremist groups were purposefully driving tensions and divisions between Malays and Thais in the region.

Starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties

The violence continues today. According to ACLED, there were already 72 incidents in 2018.  In September this year, attackers hit an army patrol in Pattani, killing two soldiers and wounding  four others.  While earlier in the year in Yala, separatists launched a bomb attack on a market, killing 3 and injuring 24. These endless attacks lead to high casualties and continued distrust across religious and ethnic lines.  According to the Bangkok Post, from 2004 to 2015, extremist insurgency groups killed more than 6,500 people, with Muslims the majority of those killed.

There are three trends that suggest rising conflict in the region. First, the number and intensity of violent attacks are increasing. The extremist groups have become more experienced with attack tactics, and thus more deadly. Under the attacks in the 1990s, the separatists were limited in scope.  However, as noted, starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties. The groups became more sophisticated and knew where the weak points of the government were and where they could most easily obtain weapons. The attacks on military facilities in 2004 is direct proof.  

The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom

Second, the groups were becoming more connected with other outside extremist organizations in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah. These groups provided training, tactical, and financial support. Officials believe Jemaah Islamiyah is behind some of the attacks. Additionally, the groups have become more extreme in ideology. The separatist groups initially did not target other religions, but have moved beyond that mandate and have since 2004 targeted Buddhist temples, and even monks.  

In response to the increasing violence, the Thai government has offered some solutions. In 2006, the National Reconciliation Commission, led by Anand Panyarachun, proposed a solution to the Southern insurgency.  The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom. However, the Thai government rejected it. Prem Tinsulanonda, council member and former minister, said, “We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai… We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language.”  

Currently, the 4th Army of Thailand is in the region and in charge of security, with more than 25,000 troops under their command. Outside of military presence, the Thai government has also tried to create a more inclusive policy to reduce violence. For example, the Thai government explained that the white in the national flag is not simply a representation of Buddhism, but a representation of all religions. Also, broadcast TV shows images of Malay people.  More officially, peace talks between separatists and the Thai government began in 2013. Supporting these talks and the peace process, the Thai government also promoted a community-based program to reduce violence, which focused on the power of neighborhoods to report violent actions. The program has allowed for faster response to such violence.

The separatist’s goal remains the formation of a sovereign Southern Thailand. The Thai government has welcomed talks under the structure of the current Thai constitution. Thus, an independent Southern Thailand is still far away.

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 by Liam Timmons

Nuclear Terrorism: Threat Profile and Potential Impact

The typical profile of a terrorist attack may include gunmen storming a government building or a suicide bomber detonating his explosive vest in a crowd of festival attendees. However, arms wonks, policy makers, and scientists have long been attuned to a more sinister threat: a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb. A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive outfitted with a radiological contaminant such as strontium or cesium, which kills not only through explosive force but radioactive contamination as well.

Terrorist groups can create dirty bombs without much scientific expertise–the difficulty is not in designing the weapon but acquiring the radioactive material. However, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, radiological sources are common in commercial or medical devices and are often poorly secured and vulnerable to theft. In fact, as early as 1998, nineteen tubes of radioactive cesium were stolen from a hospital in North Carolina and were never recovered. Poorly secured nuclear facilities in Russia and former Soviet states are also at threat for theft of nuclear materials, with facilities in a number of Russian provinces and Georgia reporting theft.

A Center for Nonproliferation Studies outlined four possible threats of nuclear terrorism. These include the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon, the theft or purchase of radioactive material and subsequent construction of an improvised nuclear device, attack against nuclear power plants, and the construction and detonation of a dirty bomb. Some sources have stated that nuclear terrorism may already be a reality: documents found in Herat, Afghanistan have indicated Al-Qaeda has been in possession of a dirty bomb since 2003, and radioactive contaminants before then.

In 2017, Indonesian militants acquired low-grade radioactive Thorium-232, which they hoped to transform into more potent Uranium-233. This uranium would then be combined with a homemade explosive to produce a dirty bomb. When ISIS conquered Mosul in 2014, radioactive Cobalt-60 was housed on a university campus in the city, ripe for the taking.

While the terrorist group proclaimed they had seized radioactive material and took over laboratories at the same university, Iraqi government officials later discovered they had not touched the Cobalt-60. Terrorist groups have long been aware of the deadly capabilities of a nuclear attack and have sought to plunder, purchase, or create dirty bombs with which to carry out nuclear attacks. At the same time, governments and nuclear scientists are aware of the threat posed by terrorists to nuclear facilities and actively work to upgrade security systems to combat it.

Despite efforts by a number of terrorist groups to obtain radioactive material and build a nuclear bomb, some experts believe the threat of nuclear terrorism is overblown. A number of explanations for terrorist nuclear abstinence have been proposed. These include the difficulty of carrying out such an attack, the disruptive impact of counter-terrorism efforts, and the potential for a nuclear attack to undermine the terrorist cause rather than advance it. Since the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks to date have been simplistic strikes such as those utilizing knives, conventional explosives, or vehicles, a RAND Corporation analysis concluded, “Governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combating the spread and use of conventional weapons,” as opposed to countering nuclear terrorism.

Even assuming a terrorist group was able to carry out a dirty bomb attack, its impact may be limited. While the public may imagine dirty bombs as capable of killing hundreds or thousands of people, the death toll would more likely be limited to fewer than 100 people. If impacted civilians leave the area quickly, remove contaminated clothing, and shower to wash off radioactive debris, a dirty bomb does not pose much of a threat. However, the economic, psychological, and social costs of a dirty bomb would be much larger. As such, governments must be prepared for the long-term impact of a nuclear terrorist threat more than an initial attack. Costly, long-lasting decontamination efforts may be necessary depending on the level of radioactive contamination, and the public may be afraid of returning to the attack location, causing economic and social disruption.

Nuclear terrorism is a threat that has been underappreciated by the general public, but it has been recognized by counter-terrorism experts, governments, and scientists for some time. While the likelihood of a nuclear terror attack may be slim and the initial deadly effects small, the long-term threat of a dirty bomb attack means governments must upgrade nuclear security efforts at hospitals, power plants, and other facilities containing nuclear materials. Although prior thefts of radioactive material have not yet resulted in nuclear terrorism, it is only a matter of time before a dirty bomb or other nuclear threat becomes a reality.

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 by Roberto Malta

Profile: Brazilian Journalist Tim Lopes

O filho de Tim Lopes, Bruno Quintela, com a avó e mãe do jornalista, dona Maria do Carmo Leia mais<\/a>

The media alerts us to human rights violations and wars between the oppressed and their oppressors. An under-reported story, however, is how journalists, photographers, and radiographers put their lives on the line to tell us the stories that must be told.

Many of them die in the process of doing so: Robert Capa, a Hungarian war photographer, took some of the best-known photographs of World War II. Capa shot the D-Day landing at Normandy. He died when he stepped on a landmine in the Vietnam War. Paraguayan journalist Candido Figueredo has covered his country’s criminal organizations for years. Figueredo has received numerous, credible death threats and has lived under government protection for 13 years.

Tim Lopes was a Brazilian journalist who was killed while covering drug traffickers. Arcanjo Antonino Lopes do Nascimento, aka Tim Lopes, was born in November 1950 in Pelotas, in the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. When he was eight years old, his family moved to the Mangueira favela in Rio de Janeiro.

Lopes had a humble upbringing. However, that did not stop him from studying journalism at the Faculdade Helio Alonso (FACHA). He won the coveted Premio Abril de Journalismo award twice early in his career in 1985 and 1986.

Lopes was an investigative journalist who preferred to do fieldwork on the street over sitting in an air-conditioned office. In pieces like the newspaper O Dia’s Funk: Sound, Joy, and Terror, Lopes openly criticized the drug traffickers in Rio’s Favela. However, he also went after those he saw in the municipal government ceding control to the criminals.

In 1995, Lopes joined Rede Globo, Brazil’s largest broadcaster, and began a career in broadcast journalism. Lopes kept his focus on fieldwork, specifically on the impact of those who grew up in the favelas as he did. He excelled at the network and within a year Lopes was a producer. Lopes and his team were awarded the Premio Esso, which is the Brazilian equivalent to a Pulitzer Prize. This was for a 2001 piece on drug traffickers. Lopes exposed traffickers openly selling cocaine in Rio de Janeiro’s streets. His work often included hidden cameras and disguises.

In June of 2002, Lopes left his middle-class apartment in Copacabana and stopped at the Rede Globo office. He continued to the Vila Cruzeiro favela to work on a piece about prostitution amongst minors. The local population had pleaded for Lopes to write such an expose. Lopes was filming when traffickers who had spotted his hidden camera approached and beat him. They kidnapped him, taking him to the Morro do Alemao, another favela where he had made enemies throughout his career.

There, he was tortured and condemned by a trafficker’s court. After being dismembered alive, Lopes was executed by being put inside car tires that were then set on fire, a method known as the microwave. The police listed the 51-year-old journalist as disappeared until an anonymous tip led police to a secret grave. There, a piece of Lopes’ rib was found, along with his wristwatch, crucifix, and camera.

Lopes left behind his wife Alessandra and their sons Diogo and Bruno. He also left behind many grieving coworkers and friends. Lopes received a proper send-off during Rede Globo’s Jornal Nacional, Brazil’s most popular news broadcast. Ending the show in silence was the habit when covering gristly developments. But anchor and chief-editor William Bonner led the newsroom in a standing ovation for Lopes and his work. To the last, they prevented the drug traffickers’ violence from having the last word. They proclaimed that journalists’ work would continue.

Tim Lopes’ life and legacy reflect his work. In life and in death he brought attention to the crimes and brutality of drug traffickers and government inaction. In the arduous work of improving the security of a city like Rio de Janeiro, his journalism led to action against drug traffickers. Lopes became nationally known after his death and a national conversation ensued. Lopes’ name is alive in the Newseum, in Washington D.C. There, he is commemorated among too many other journalists like him who were murdered in pursuit of career and moral commitment. In 2012 President Rousseff posthumously awarded Lopes the Premio Direitos Humanos, Brazil’s highest human rights prize. His death was an indictment of the favelas’ brutal realities – a testament to the terror that reigned there.

His life, however, proved no matter how humble one’s origins, no one has to join the criminals. In fact, one’s living could be made fighting them. Tim Lopes’ was a vital contribution to Brazilian society. His fight against drug traffickers led to better living conditions. Though our eyes may tear up, let’s not linger in the sadness following deaths like his. Let us, too, follow Bonner’s lead and give a standing ovation. We thank them for their vitally necessary work, their positive impact on society, and their inspiration for others to follow their path. That is how we make better and more peaceful societies and as a result, Lopes and his colleagues smile in Heaven for the survival of their work and legacy. 

The Complexo do Alemão. For many years these hilltops were used by leaders of drug trafficking gangs as sanctuary from law enforcement; they now feature the stations of a gondola transport system connecting the Complexo (operational since July 2011).

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 by Kate Kleinle

No-Deal Brexit: Implications for Transnational Security

Anti-Brexit demonstrators wave EU and Union flags opposite the Houses of Parliament, in London, Britain, June 19, 2018. REUTERS/Henry Nicholls

 As the threat of a no-deal Brexit looms closer, it is becoming increasingly clear that such a scenario would significantly hamper counterterrorism efforts in both the United Kingdom and Europe.

As an EU member, the UK is party to European institutions such as the European Arrest Warrant, a system of warrants valid throughout the European Union, and Europol, the EU-wide law-enforcement body that combats terror and organized crime. The UK also receives additional European data including fingerprints, DNA, and passenger flight information. Should it leave the EU without a deal establishing a continued partnership on such initiatives, it will lose access to European intelligence and risk becoming unaware of potential terrorist threats within their own borders.

This will adversely impact Europe as well. For every suspect arrested on a European Arrest Warrant, British authorities arrest eight EAW suspects from other states, so the benefit to European countries from British forces is huge. Given the extensive travel between Europe and the UK, it is critical that the two cooperate on intelligence so that no criminal may slip through borders unnoticed. Should this cooperation end, it is likely dangerous individuals will cross between Britain and Europe without notice.

If no deal codifies the partnership between British and European law enforcement, then both the EU and the UK are in an extremely risky position. To avoid the possibility of turning the UK into a de facto safe haven for European criminals, a no-deal Brexit must be avoided, and the UK must negotiate a continued partnership with the European Union.

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