The Threat of Drone-Based Terror

On August 4, 2018, President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela was attacked with explosive-laden drones during a political rally. Although the drones were not successful in assassinating the Venezuelan leader, they managed to injure seven national guardsmen who were at the rally.

A few weeks earlier in July, the Public Safety Secretary of Mexico’s Baja California was also targeted by an armed drone, although the attached IED did not detonate. Attacks such as these are indicative of the burgeoning threat that drone-related terror can play in today’s world.

No longer is drone technology limited to the militaries of countries like the United States, Nigeria, or Pakistan. Instead, groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels, and the Islamic State are getting in on the action. In fact, ISIS recently threatened Paris with a drone attack. As drones become easier to obtain and use, attacks using this technology will become more frequent, more sophisticated, and more deadly.

The barriers to carrying out a drone-based terror attack are lower than ever. Lightweight hobby drones are cheap, easy to purchase and allow terrorist groups to carry out attacks from a distance. While military drones are less accessible and harder to operate, they do provide a higher operational capacity and have a number of avenues by which terrorist groups can obtain them. In this way, drone-based terror is comparable to nuclear terror.

Hobby drones, like a dirty bomb, can easily be weaponized, but have a relatively small impact, while military drones, like a weapon of mass destruction, can be stolen, bought from a rogue state or corrupt official, and has a high potential impact. Additionally, improvements in battery and camera technology will only increase the negative impact of drone-based terror as groups learn to harness these ever-increasing capabilities. In recent testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that drones, “will be used to facilitate an attack in the United States against a vulnerable target, such as a mass gathering.”

The Security Challenges of Drone-Based Terror

Drone-based terror presents unique security threats and challenges. The particular tactical flexibility inherent to drones forces a rethinking of current security strategies. Traditional notions of perimeter defense and target hardening no longer apply when the threat is as maneuverable and flexible as a drone.

Small drones can be used in swarms to destroy commercial airliners, disrupt military operations through hyper-local targeting, or inflict asymmetric damage on civilian targets. Additionally, drones can and have been used in conjunction with more traditional methods of terror.

During the Islamic State’s defense of Mosul, drones were used to guide suicide bombers and improve the accuracy of rocket and mortar fire. The coalition’s anti-drone no-fly zone was quickly counteracted by a do-it-yourself solution implemented by fighters on the ground. Further, drones can conduct both intelligence and counterintelligence operations: terrorist groups could use drones to jam military communications, survey battlefields, and download sensitive data.

In addition to conventional attacks and military-based operations, drones could be engineered to disperse chemical weapons, biological agents such as viruses or Anthrax, or even radioactive material. A September 2018 National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin warned that, “some terrorist groups overseas are [pursuing] new technologies and tactics, such as unmanned aerial systems and chemical agents,” while Hezbollah may have the ability to carry out biological warfare using drones.

Finally, aerial drones are not the only technology terrorist groups can exploit. In January 2017, Houthi rebels killed two Saudi soldiers with a sea-based drone. As aquatic drone technology continues to proliferate, terrorist capabilities may widen to include attacks on coastal cities. Aquatic drones maintain the security challenges of aerial drones but can dramatically widen the target range of drone-based terror. Land-based drones may pose a threat as well, since “fighters in Syria and Iraq have been […] experimenting with remotely controlled vehicles and small robots for nearly a decade.”

Countering Drone-Based Terror

US doctrine focuses on active and passive defense, as well as a proactive intelligence-based approach, to countering air threats. Because of the small size, speed, and maneuverability of drones, they may not be detectable to forms of active defense reliant on radar. However, communication jamming may be a particularly effective form of defense against drones, reducing targeting accuracy and thus the potential threat.

Additionally, acoustic and radio detection methods can make up for radar’s shortcomings in countering drone incursion. On the passive side of defense, simple behavioral changes like hosting high-profile events indoors, varying arrival and departure agendas of potential target personnel, and changing transport routes can make all types of terror, not just drone-based attacks, more difficult. Finally, greater control and oversight of the supply chain, through the monitoring of suspicious purchases and cooperation with manufacturers, would decrease the likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring drones in the first place.

Drone-Based Terror Takeaways

Drone-based terror can be seen as an emerging threat to the global security environment which demands immediate and creative solutions. Terrorist groups are already making use of drones in the air, at sea, and on land in a variety of situations and capacities. The barriers to acquiring, arming, and using drones are lower than ever, and drone-based attacks come with their own unique security challenges. As drone technology improves, becomes cheaper, and proliferates, militaries will have to reckon with new security paradigms to combat this rapidly-evolving threat.

Thailand Proposal

Thai bomb squad officials inspect the site of an explosion in Bangkok Feb. 14, 2012. Three minor blasts rattled the Thai capital Bangkok, leaving a foreigner seriously wounded when a grenade he was suspected of carrying exploded, police said. (NICOLAS ASFOURI / AFP)

The Thai government has employed multiple methods to combat the rising insurgency in Southern Thailand.

One includes a plan proposed by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in March 2005.  This article discusses the long-term solutions embedded in the work of the NRC which were designed to deal with the increase in violence.

Much of the unrest in Southern Thailand has been ascribed to the region’s high density of ethnic and religious minorities. 35% of the population identifies as Muslim and most of these Muslims as Malays. This high concentration of minority individuals creates greater religious and ethnic tension in the region. The tensions are fueled by the spread of extreme Islam in Southeast Asia. As extremist ideology has increased, so too has violence in the region. Since the insurgency’s start in January 2004 more than 6,500 people have lost their lives in southern provinces.

The National Reconciliation Commission, led by Anand Panrayachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand, provided a framework for managing the conflict and curbing the violence in the southern provinces.  

The commission was formed under the command of the King and Prime Minister, and was, “…charged with recommending policies, measures, mechanisms conducive to reconciliation and peace in Thai society. Particularly in the three southern border provinces.” The NRC was tasked with putting an end to daily violence. It is to serve as a catalyst for long-term changes around violence reduction. Finally, it is tasked with building institutions and programs for sustainable peace. The NRC suggested immediate and long-term proposals to combat the ongoing conflict.

In the short-term, the NRC mandated government-initiated peace talks with insurgents and advocates for non-military regional groups to maintain peace. The commission proposed three goals for conflict de-escalation. First, find common ground between the Muslim majority and Buddhist minority in southern Thailand, helping these groups live together peacefully as equals.  Second, create a common understanding of the majority population in Thailand. Third, create a larger, more harmonious and diverse Thai society.

To achieve these goals, the NRC noted the importance of conversation between the Thai government and militant groups.

The NRC noted it, “…believes it is necessary to engage in dialogue, freely exchanging views with people, both at home and abroad, who may subscribe to ideologies different from that of the state.”  In addition to the peace talks, it was suggested that an unarmed peace-keeping unit, known as Shanti Sena, be formed to defuse daily tensions through non-violent means. The mandate of this unit is to, “…prevent existing conflicts from escalating.”

As UN peace-keeping forces have demonstrated, these types of efforts can be effective, but they need sophisticated training and exemplary community relations. The NRC hoped the Shanti Sena would mediate to help re-establish trust between the people and their government. Thus, in the short-term, the NRC advocated for both a political solution and a common security policy.  

The long-term proposals accounted for greater post-conflict reconstruction, including five measures from the structure and seven from cultural and economic perspectives.   

Lastly, the proposal called for a better understanding of the situation in Southern Thailand. It wants to ensure that all parties understand the insurgency was not a simple rebellion against the government. The civil conflict was complex and rooted in historical injustices regarding religious identity, economic inequality, unequal power, and local governmental corruption. Southern Thailand was in a state of civil conflict for a long time.

There were obvious abuses of power in the region. In order to combat this, the NRC suggested, “…a transfer [of] state officials out of the area against whom abuse of authority complaints had been issued, an investigation guided by facts, and transparent legal action taken against such officials when appropriate.”  The NRC also proposed these transferred officers never again be deployed to southern provinces.

The NRC report makes clear that dealing with the crisis would require political will and input from all parties. However, it does not have realistic expectations or frameworks regarding how this might be accomplished.

This may stem from the composition and activity of the NRC. Unlike most conflict resolution boards, this group did not seek testimony beyond the 50 member commission. The commission was comprised of a cross-section of individuals including Muslim leaders and civil society agents both from within and outside the region. However, testimony from individual citizens was not sought. This is in contrast to similar commissions in South Africa and El Salvador. Finally, in other regions, such commissions were effective in post-conflict times, not during conflicts.

What Afghanistan Needs to Move Forward: National Unity

Brigadier General Abdul Raziq, Kandahar Chief of Police, speaks to the assembled locals of Kajran in Daykundi Province during a shura on October 22. DoD photo by Cpl. Mark Doran, Australian Defence Force/Released.

Afghanistan’s hero, General Abdul Raziq, was killed just days before the parliamentary elections, leaving a wide power vacuum in the Taliban’s birthplace, Kandahar.

General Raziq was shot and killed as he was leaving a U.S.-Afghan meeting in Kandahar, where Gen. Austin S. Miller, the Commander of American forces in Afghanistan, the Kandahar provincial governor, and other leaders were present.

General Raziq had survived dozens of life-threatening attacks but continued to fight against terrorism in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. He was proactive and took a strong stand against Pakistan, accusing it of providing sanctuary to the Taliban. The Taliban feared him terribly and he was regarded as a rampart against insurgents in the area.

His death is a significant loss for Afghanistan and the southern provinces are likely to be significantly impacted. Not only did General Raziq keep Kandahar and the southern provinces safe, but he also worked hard to facilitate Afghan consensus despite longstanding, intense conflicts between ethnicities and tribes. He had hoped for a bright and peaceful Afghanistan.

He was effective in fighting extremism, in encouraging Afghan unity, and in coordinating with leaders in the U.S. coalition.

Gen. Raziq was an influential American ally in the south where he was loved by Afghans for his patriotism and passion for bringing peace through eliminating insurgency. He was known for hunting and killing Taliban insurgents. Gen. Raziq said repeatedly that the goal was to, “kill them, not capture;” he was keenly aware of their destructive potential.

Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, commander of International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, greets Maj. Gen. Abdul Raziq, police chief of Kandahar province

Gen. Raziq joined the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan, led by Ata Mohammad Noor, Gen. Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqiq, and other reps from 34 political parties to vouchsafe a transparent election, and a legitimate government that fights extremism and serves the public.

An attack like the one that killed Gen. Raziq provokes doubt and despair. It spurs suspicions of governmental coordination behind such attacks and others like it: Gen. Daud Daud, Burhan-Uddin Rabbani, the former president of Afghanistan, the bombing of the Ministry of Defense, and others since 9/11. The Taliban leverages such paranoia for its purposes.

What’s next?

Over the past two weeks, America’s special envoy for Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, held talks with the Taliban’s political office in Qatar for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan conflict.

Next, Khalilzad met with senior officials in Saudi Arabi, Pakistan and Afghanistan to facilitate the Afghan peace process. All the while, the Taliban continues to execute deadly attacks, eliminating key figures, suggesting they do not want to negotiate, and undermining any hope for peace.

Going forward, Afghanistan stability relies on the following factors: 1) transparent parliamentary and presidential elections wherein a legitimate government is formed without foreign intervention, 2) a national peace process that includes all of the tribes in Afghanistan with meetings taking place only between Afghans, and 3) creation of a counter-insurgency policy that is three steps ahead of the enemy.

Help From Outside

The international community can foster change by supporting more education, helping with infrastructure redevelopment, and monitoring progress against corruption and social injustice. This would empower Afghans to build resilience against the terrorists who jeopardize national security.

Ultimately, the future of Afghanistan depends on its people. Good governance, transparent elections, economic development, education, and ethnic harmony all lie along the path to peace.

Afghans must realize that discrimination is ruining the nation, corruption is feeding terrorism, and division is eroding the values that ought to unify Afghans. When they recognize those challenges and commit to overcoming them, they can begin taking steps toward a lasting peace.

The Price of a Free Press: Jamal Khashoggi

People hold signs during a protest at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington about the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, Oct. 10, 2018.

The last time anyone saw Saudi Journalist Jamal Khashoggi alive was Oct. 2nd when security cameras caught him entering the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. Authorities presume he was murdered there. After openly criticizing the Saudi government, Khashoggi moved to Northern Virginia where he lived in self-imposed exile from Saudi Arabia.

Khashoggi, who wrote for the Washington Post, has been critical of the kingdom’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and King Salman for the past 10 years. He questioned the kingdom’s human rights positions, criticized the religious clerics, sided with Egypt during the Arab Spring, and more recently voiced opposition to the Saudi led intervention in Yemen.

Turkish authorities were quick to support Khashoggi’s fiancé in blaming the Saudi government.

The Saudis allegedly lured the journalist to the consulate in Istanbul where they presumably murdered him. His death has not been confirmed, but there is no security footage of him leaving the consulate. The official position of the Saudi government is they have no additional information.

The King of Saudi Arabia denied all knowledge of the situation to President Trump. However, a new theory and potential Saudi ploy is this was an interrogation gone wrong and an accidental death.

Turkish authorities were quick to support Khashoggi’s fiancé in blaming the Saudi government. Turkey suggested they had both video and voice evidence that the Saudis tortured and murdered Khashoggi in the consulate. There is speculation that Khashoggi might have recorded some of the incident via an Iwatch which sent data to a cloud storage, although this has not been released. The Turkish authorities have said the Saudi government is not cooperating with their investigation.

In an age when the press is already under attack by world leaders, for many, this is a red-line. Interestingly, although not uncharacteristically, U.S. President Trump has waffled in his response. He noted he would like to know what happened to the journalist. But he also noted he believes the Saudi King, and even suggested “rogue actors” could have done this without anyone’s authority. In other words, the American president is running interference for the Saudis. 

Jamal Khashoggi knew he endangered his life by speaking out and questioning his country’s leadership, but he did it anyway.

Trump was again dismissive as he noted, “This took place in Turkey, and to the best of our knowledge Khashoggi is not a U.S. citizen,” in a chilling devaluation of the Virginian’s life and profession. The President also said if there is definitive proof, he will act swiftly. But Trump is not going to jeopardize a multi-billion dollar arms deal. 

The President places more value thereupon than he does the ethics of journalism and murder. We shall see whether the Republican-controlled Congress falls into step with the President, or maintain their earlier call for sanctions.

If we lack a free press that can question leadership, then we lose transparency and governmental accountability. Jamal Khashoggi knew he endangered his life by speaking out and questioning his country’s leadership, but he continued to do so. He fervently believed in the power and responsibility of a free press, and likely paid the ultimate price. 

As the journalist, Anna Politkovskaya wrote,  “How we react to the tragedy of one small person accurately reflects our attitude…” Politkovskaya, like Khashoggi, was murdered for her willingness to question, seek the truth, and advocate for a free press. The question remains for world leaders, how will we react?   

US Online Counterterrorism Strategy

Last week on October 4th the Trump administration released the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The White House strategy rightly prioritizes strong partnerships with allies and is refreshingly devoid of the president’s more controversial ideas. However, it curiously lacks any plan to combat the most serious evolution in terrorist threat since the last strategy was released in 2011. That is the towering success of social media as a tool for terrorists to radicalize, recruit and organize followers the world over.

ISIS’ cunning use of social media radicalized people the world over.

The US government must not only acknowledge this as the major threat that it is but develop new legislation that permits it to combat terrorist activity online. The internet continues to provide free space for terrorists to advance their causes and incite violence, all under the protection of the US constitution’s 1st Amendment. Our government must acknowledge this threat and develop a strategy to stop the dissemination of dangerous domestic terrorist propaganda on the internet. Importantly, it must do so without encroaching on US citizens’ rights to free speech.

Terrorism relies on publicity. ISIS’ capability to radicalize people the world over through its cunning use of social media was widely credited as one of the main reasons for its rapid growth, as well as its ability to create a global brand. Domestic terrorists have used the internet to accomplish the same thing. A 2016 study revealed that American white nationalist movement’s Twitter followers increased by 600% since 2012, surpassing ISIS in follower counts and tweets per day. Online forums and social media accounts provide safe spaces for violent rhetoric that extremists don’t feel comfortable using in public. For both radical Islamists and white supremacists, the internet has provided an effective means to broadcast their malicious,  hateful messages to the world.

Tech companies are not up to the threat; they are businesses with the prime motivator of profit generation, not national security.

The risks of terrorists exploiting the internet are uncontested. However, a broad interpretation of the 1st Amendment has wrapped the US government’s knuckles. Restraints on the government’s ability to censor content have left major national security decisions up to private companies, who lack the expertise to assess a threat to national security and public safety. And while tech giants like Facebook have recently stepped up their efforts to censor and report terror content, private companies should not own that burden alone.  

Tech companies have proven themselves to be inadequate to face this threat. They are businesses with the prime motivator of profit generation, not national security. In addition, they typically hold strict Libertarian views of the internet. Such companies see the internet as a common space for the free sharing of ideas. They tend to be extremely resistant to censorship of any kind. Too much government cooperation could sway public perception to their being in bed with Big Brother.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has clearly stated the significance of US leadership in passing new legislation: “It would be extremely helpful to other countries if the United States could find a solution to its limited ability to furnish judicial cooperation concerning foreign incitement offenses resulting from its jurisprudence concerning freedom of speech and expression.” 

The US cannot afford to continue without a strategy to combat digital terrorism. We must open the issue to new scrutiny. Such scrutiny starts with developing a clear and specific definition of what kinds of content can be censored. Laws that allow censorship already exist, such as the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) and recent Congressional prohibitions on sex traffickers. Why not censor content shown to be a precursor to terrorist attacks? Only content deemed to cause “imminent lawless action” would pass constitutional muster for restriction. What the US needs is a new federal bureau with combined expertise in national security, law, and technology.

In the event congressional action fails, what is a good interim solution?

With new legislation in place, tech companies will no longer decide what constitutes a threat to national security. They will also avoid the perception of denying free speech since they will simply be complying with the law. Some have suggested that a “Code of Ethics” be developed for social media companies which would create a more uniform approach to combatting terrorism. In the event congressional action fails to materialize this would be a good interim solution. If we can effectively fight terrorism in the virtual space, we can prevent the loss of lives in the real world.